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Preface
The aim of  this book is to fill a historiographical void by studying how 
local people on Timor fought, traded, negotiated and mixed with for-
eigners during two eventful centuries, from 1600 to 1800. The subject 
is not entirely new, for many good historians have taken up their pen 
and delved into the intricate history of  the island. What is still needed, 
however, and what this book tries to achieve, is a comprehensive discus-
sion that takes into account the entire island – what is today known as 
Indonesian Timor or Timor Leste. An account that traces both indige-
nous as well as colonial interests; a study which fully uses the rich archival 
sources that are available; a text that traces not only the exploitative and 
oppressive features accompanying the European presence and ensuing 
forms of  resistance, but also the forms of  co-operation, partnership and 
mutual dependence that subsequently evolved.
When using general textbooks to study the history of  Indonesia, it is 
apparent that a non-literate and low-technological culture like that of  the 
Timorese does not feature heavily. The same goes for works that survey 
Portuguese expansion overseas, where Timor is a footnote appended to 
discussions about Goa, Malacca and Macao. The extended arc of  islands 
known as Nusa Tenggara, which stretches out some 1,000 kilometres 
from west to east, is by no means devoid of  interest for the modern schol-
ar. The islands harbour a remarkable ethnic and linguistic diversity. They 
are characterized by small-scale polities, a strong belief  in the role of  
ancestors, ritual-spatial location, and marital exchange patterns between 
lineages. All this has engendered excellent scholarship, but scholarship 
that tends to sit within the field of  anthropology rather than history. This 
is matched by the public discourse of  modern Indonesia, where the cen-
tral, principally Javanese, narration of  Indonesia’s long history has been 
predominant. Powerful physical symbols, such as the Javanese kraton and 
temples and the Balinese religious sites, stand out in textbooks and tour-
ist guides alike. Unsurprisingly, much of  the official six-volume textbook 
Sejarah nasional Indonesia (Marwati Djoenad Poesponegoro and Nugroho 
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Notosusanto 1975) is devoted to the geographical centre, although there 
are also a few sections on Sumatra, Kalimantan and South Sulawesi, 
especially in reference to anti-colonial rebellions, perhaps illustrative of  
modern nationalist sentiment. Coverage of  Timor is restricted to a few 
scattered mentions in volumes I and III.
It must be emphasized that any gaps in the history of  Timor are not 
entirely due to a lack of  sources, as there have been a good number of  
documents during the last three or four centuries. Although the mate-
rial is largely Dutch or Portuguese, with all its inherent problems of  
Eurocentric bias, it can still be effectively used to trace historical pro-
cesses in the easterly regions of  Indonesia and Timor Leste. Language, 
however, has been an obstacle. For the most part, texts dealing with 
‘Portuguese’ Timor have not taken advantage of  Dutch sources, and vice 
versa. Notwithstanding this, since the cataclysmic separation of  Timor 
Leste from Indonesia in 1999, a number of  interesting contributions 
have surfaced. A detailed study of  the period 1613-1660 has been com-
pleted by Arend de Roever (2002), and I have no intention of  supersed-
ing his work. One may also mention the widely used online history of  
Timor by Geoffrey Gunn (n.y.), and the cartographic work undertaken 
by Frédéric Durand (2006a).
To write a comprehensive text covering two centuries of  history is a 
long and cumbersome yet rewarding journey, and it is hard to pinpoint a 
particular event that has been formative in the process. To do so would 
merely be a reconstruction after the fact, of  the type that is often found in 
literary autobiographies. After years of  labour, however, there are some 
occasions that spring to mind as being especially memorable. One such 
moment occurred on a January night in Ajaobaki, in the sonaf (residence) 
of  the Oematan family, once the rulers of  the West Timorese highland 
district Mollo. In the sparsely lit building from 1911 – as is often the 
case in these quarters, the electricity was off  – I found myself  talking to 
people whose ancestors had played important roles in the distant centu-
ries I was studying. The adat (tradition) expert tied to the Oematan fam-
ily, Mathias Sunbanu, an old moustached gentleman clad in a local kain, 
revealed the family history of  the Oematan since time immemorial – or 
rather a section of  it, since it is unbecoming that an adat expert tells more 
than he is allowed to according to traditional Timorese custom. Showing 
a good awareness of  historical criticism, he told me that one must circu-
late among the various experts to hear the variations. He added that sopi, 
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a type of  liquor, was mandatory to keep the experts in high spirits and 
help them relax and open up. With me in the room was Leopold Nisnoni, 
son of  the last Dutch-appointed raja of  Kupang and a descendant of  the 
Sonbai family. This family had held a position of  precedence among the 
princes in West Timor for many hundreds of  years, to such an extent that 
the Portuguese and Dutch colonizers heralded them as emperors. It was, 
indeed, one of  those moments when history comes alive.
Nor were moments of  fascination lacking when examining the ar-
chives. In spite of  the unreflecting style of  the Dutch officials, the very 
detailed daily records (Dagregisters) of  Timor included data about persons 
and events that entice the reader’s curiosity. During a sojourn at the 
Nationaal Archief  in The Hague in March 2007, my interest was piqued 
by a soldier from Stockholm with the Dutchified name Roeloff  Pietersz.1 
In the Dagregisters of  the late 1670s, he appears throughout the pages as 
a good and trusted servant of  the ‘Noble Company’ – the euphemis-
tic term for the profit-driven Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde 
Oost-Indische Compagnie). Pietersz was described as being taalkundig, 
meaning that he was knowledgeable in at least one local language. He 
was stationed by his Dutch masters as their representative on Rote, just 
off  the west coast of  Timor. In the baptismal book of  Kupang I found 
more information about this Swede, who had somehow ended up on 
the other side of  the globe. Pietersz was married to a local woman from 
Kupang called Cornelia, who had previously had a son with an unnamed 
Dutchman – in other words, outside of  wedlock. Roeloff  Pietersz and 
Cornelia had two daughters together before Roeloff  fell victim to a 
tropical disease, probably malaria. He was brought back to the Dutch 
centre in Kupang, and on 14 September 1680 he asked the bookkeeper 
to draw up his testament. Three days later, at two o’clock in the after-
noon, he passed away. These brief  notes only serve to fuel speculation. 
That he ended up in the East Indies was perfectly explicable, since many 
Scandinavians took service with the Dutch East India Company. But did 
he rejoice in, or, rather, regret exchanging the stench, filth and cold of  
the small Swedish capital for the strange life of  being the sole European 
on Rote? Did he find beauty and charm in the dark complexion of  his 
betel-chewing wife when comparing her to the fair, though lice-bitten 
ladies of  Stockholm? Did they get along in spite of  the cultural divide? 
1 Possibly a Dutch approximation of  Olof  Pettersson.
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Did he learn to appreciate the juice of  the lontar palm and suppress the 
turnips, coarse bread and mutton of  his childhood from his memory?
There are also less Eurocentric aspects to fire the imagination. On 
the same pages on which the story of  Roeloff  Pietersz is told, we find 
numerous snippets illustrating the life that was led by the peoples of  East 
Indonesia and Timor Leste. On 26 November 1679, a Rotenese trading 
party led by two regents visited Kupang and asked the Dutch authorities 
for food. The Dutch at first sent them mutton, but it turned out that peo-
ple on Rote did not appreciate such meat; in the end the Europeans de-
livered two live hogs to their choosy guests. On 6 December of  the same 
year, a slave boy called Lancke sat fishing on a rock by the sea. He must 
have fallen asleep and fallen into the water, as he was later found dead, 
floating in the waves by the rock. Lancke was unceremoniously buried 
that same day. On 7 September 1680, a cowherd serving under the 
Dutch met a lontar palm climber from Sonbai. The cowherd asked him 
for tuak, unfermented palm wine. When the Timorese refused, the cow-
herd lost his temper and delivered a blow to the man’s chest with a sharp 
weapon. Upon hearing this, the Dutch authorities immediately cast the 
violent cowherd into a dark prison and took the injured Timorese into 
hospital. The following day the lontar climber ran away, which is not 
surprising perhaps considering the standards of  European hospitals at 
the time. Eight days after the death of  Roeloff  Pietersz, at eleven o’clock 
in the evening, the Timorese chief  Ama Neno from Sonbai, who lived 
close to the Dutch settlement, went back home after visiting the nearby 
scrubland. Some of  his men were stationed there to keep watch over 
the paths lest an enemy approached, and in accordance with Timorese 
ritual-magical customs, he had spread a powerful substance, obat, on the 
paths. Back at his house he found a man of  the Helong tribe called Poto 
fornicating with his wife. Ama Neno reacted furiously. He beat the gongs 
so that the Dutch-allied regents of  the area came to see what was going 
on. The fornicators were detained, and the rulers stayed at Ama Neno’s 
place for some time, finally agreeing that the culprits must be beheaded. 
The next day the local Dutch authorities approved the sentence without 
hesitation. The two lovers were taken to Oeba, a 30-minute walk from 
the Dutch fort. Their heads were chopped off  and hung from a tree to 
serve as a deterrent to others, while their bodies were thrown into a pit. 
Had Roeloff  Pietersz lived to witness the tragic event, he might have 
recalled similar punishments for adultery in his distant homeland, intro-
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duced by stern Vasa kings to ensure sexual control.
Such images, saved from oblivion by the scrupulous officials and 
underpaid scribes of  the Dutch East India Company, have to be collated 
and contextualized in order to make real sense to us, however interest-
ing they might seem in isolation. Slowly, a picture emerges of  a world 
that is certainly different from the East Indonesian societies that face us 
today, but still has many links with current times. The political border 
and the different historical experiences of  Indonesian Timor and Timor 
Leste; the dissemination of  maize as the principal food crop; the spread 
of  weapon technology and metal utensils; the spread of  Christianity to 
the detriment of  Islam: these are all features that have their roots in the 
period we are studying. The organization and location of  the villages has 
been changed in the twentieth century, but much of  the traditional agri-
cultural and livestock economy persists. The traditional ‘animist’ beliefs 
have been replaced by Protestant and Catholic precepts over the last half  
a century, but the former rituals and perceptions of  the supernatural sur-
face from time to time. The old forms of  raja rule have been abrogated 
through bureaucratic centralization and republican sentiments, but re-
vivalism and the preservation of  hierarchical concepts have lived on. 
Hopefully a study of  the early forms of  interaction between indigenous 
polities and colonial groups, and of  the resulting forms of  hybridity, can 
help us understand the dynamics of  history in the Timor area – an area 
that was geographically isolated but also subjected to external influences 
from a rather early stage. 
A large number of  people have helped me in this endeavour by 
providing information or commenting upon my ideas on the subject. 
In Indonesia, I would like to thank Don Leopold Nicolaas Nisnoni and 
his family, Professor Hendrik Ataupah, the late Dr Tom Therik, Gideon 
Broery Amabi, Elcid and Anthony Li, Salmun Bislissin, the late Kanis 
Passar, the late Benyamin Messakh, Munandjar Widiyatmika, all in 
Kupang. Thanks are also due to F.H. Fobia and Doni Kusa Banunaek 
in Soe, Nesi Nope in Niki-Niki, Michael Bria in Atambua, the late 
Haji Achmad Kelake in Lohayong, the late Haji Muhammad Hasan in 
Lamakera, Ahmad Daud Boli Malakalu and Ibrahim Dasi in Lamahala, 
Leo Boli Lajar in Kalikasa, the late Edmundus Pareira in Sikka, and sev-
eral further informers. Not forgotten are the staff  of  the Arsip Nasional 
(ANRI) in Jakarta. In Timor Leste, I owe thanks to liurai António da 
Costa and several informers in the Oecusse-Ambeno enclave. In the 
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Netherlands, Professor Wim Stokhof  encouraged my work and received 
me as a fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS). 
Dr Paul van der Velde, also at IIAS, arranged for my manuscript to be 
submitted to KITLV. Other persons to whom I would like to express my 
gratitude include Professor Peter Boomgaard, Donald P. Tick, Dr Arend 
de Roever, Dr David Henley, Diederick Kortlang and the staff  of  KITLV, 
the UB in Leiden and the Nationaal Archief, all in the Netherlands; fur-
thermore Professor Robert Barnes and Dr Ruth Barnes in Oxford, Dr 
Douglas Kammen and Dr Geneviève Duggan in Singapore, Professor 
Leonard Y. Andaya and Professor Barbara W. Andaya in Hawaii, 
Professor Douglas Lewis in Melbourne and Professor James J. Fox in 
Canberra. In Sweden, the present research was made possible through 
funding by the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet). Professor 
Lars Olsson at Växjö University (subsequently Linnaeus University) was 
helpful in commenting upon my draft application to the Council. At 
Linnaeus University, the postcolonial seminar led by Professor Gunlög 
Fur has been a source of  inspiration, and arranged for funding for the 
final language check. The final polishing was done during a tenure 
in Leiden, funded by the NWO. In particular I wish to thank Emilie 
Wellfelt, who took the time to read and comment on an early draft of  
my manuscript.
Växjö, Sweden
14 May 2011 
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Timor and historical research
Timor is situated to the northwest of  [Zhong-] Jia Luo. Its mountains 
do not grow any other trees but sandalwood that is most abundant. It is 
traded for silver, iron, cups [of  porcelain], cloth from Western countries 
and coloured taffetas. There are altogether twelve localities which are 
called ports. There is a local chieftain. The soil is suitable for the raising 
of  grain. The climate is irregular, hot in the day, cool at night. The hab-
its of  the natives are obscene. Men and women cut their hair and wear 
short cotton skirts. They tie them around with cloth from Champa. Mar-
ket prices of  spirits and meats are reasonable. The women are shame-
less. The tribal chiefs are fond of  food, wine and sex, and when sleeping 
they do not cover themselves so that those who get infected [by diseases] 
die for the most part. If  one has been careless while among the natives, 
the disease will break out with attacks of  high fever once the ship has 
returned to China.1
This is how a Chinese geographer presented the distant Southeast Asian 
island circa 1350, and it is one of  the earliest known descriptions. About 
450 years later, in 1801, the French explorer Péron2 described the same 
land in somewhat more elaborate language:3
Barely two days had passed since we left the dry coasts of  New Hol-
land, and we could already behold the lofty mountains of  Timor. Three 
sets of  haughty rocks, running parallel to the length of  the island, con-
1 Dao yi Zhi lue (circa1350), quoted in Ptak 1983:37.
2 Not to be confused with Jean-Baptiste Pelon, a Frenchman in Dutch service who wrote a valuable 
study of  Timor in 1778, Description de Timor occidental et des îles sous domination hollandaise (1771-1778); see 
Pelon 2002.
3 Please note that all translations of  non-English sources are mine, unless otherwise indicated.
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stituted a threefold amphitheatre, whose furthest lying tiers, set back into 
the ground, also seemed to be the highest. The shape of  these mountains, 
although lofty, was somehow mellow; their regular and uniform exten-
sions and their steep summits were imperceptibly softened by the gentle 
waves, which died down by the seashore. The mountain slopes were com-
pletely covered with mighty vegetation; the outlines of  all the valleys were 
marked by the green foliage of  dense forests, above which the elegant tops 
of  coconut palms, areca trees and borassus palms rose on all sides – the 
happy product of  the equatorial climates.
 Soon we had passed the coasts of  Amarasi; we found ourselves at 
the mouth of  the strait that, together with Timor, makes up the island 
of  Rote, more famous for its beautiful women than for its copper mines. 
On the morning of  21 August we crossed this strait; after having passed 
the northern point of  the small island of  Landu, which, like many other 
islands, is often confused with Rote on the standard maps, we discovered 
the entrance of  a second strait, formed by the island of  Semau, which 
curves towards the western point of  Timor. At two o’clock we cast an-
chor in the middle of  this strait, opposite a pretty bay belonging to the 
island of  Semau. It would perhaps be hard to find anywhere else more 
charming and picturesque than the place which we currently enjoyed; 
surrounded by the land on all sides, it was as if  we were in the midst of  a 
beautiful lake; fishes of  all kinds, adorned with the richest colours, lived 
in these calm waters and multiplied in its depths; and wherever we turned 
our eyes, this image of  pure fertility seemed to repeat itself  with even 
more charm and interest. What a contrast to the nearby north-western 
coastlines of  New Holland, so monotonous and sterile!4
The same island was therefore commented upon by short-term visitors 
who travelled from afar. While it is likely that the geographical features 
of  Timor were comparable in 1350 and 1800, it is remarkable that the 
tone of  both descriptions differs considerably. For the Chinese, Timor 
was an island of  some importance because of  its resources of  white san-
dalwood (santalum album), the fragrant qualities of  which made it suitable 
for making incense and artwork. However, the doubtful standards of  
its inhabitants, the intolerable heat and the unhealthy living conditions 
4 Péron, 1807:141-2. Landu is in fact no island, but is part of  Rote. In most of  the quotations in this 
work I have rendered geographical and personal names in their modern form, in instances when there is 
no ambiguity about it.
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made it a place to avoid if  possible. For the explorer Péron on the other 
hand, who had no business to attend to there, Timor was a highly capti-
vating place. Though the Frenchman soon became aware of  the island’s 
darker side, its beauty and interesting ethnographic composition added 
a flavour of  good-natured curiosity to his account.
Ever since the days of  the medieval Chinese merchants, the image of  
Timor has oscillated between these two extremes. This Southeast Asian 
island, roughly equivalent to the Netherlands in size, has been visited 
over the centuries by Portuguese, Dutch and British travellers among 
others, and is often described in rather strong categorical terms. Indeed, 
the viewpoints differ to the degree that one cannot help but wonder if  
they are talking about the same island. If  the inhabitants are valiant and 
warlike in one text, they are weak and cowardly in the other; if  they are 
nimble and dexterous in one account, they are lazy and primitive in the 
other; if  the Timorese women are considered to be of  high standing in 
one narrative, they are badly oppressed to the point of  enslavement in 
the other. 
The problem in grasping the fundamentals of  Timorese society in 
a historical setting is obvious: the island is comparatively large, but lies 
far away from the western and central parts of  the Southeast Asian 
Archipelago, which constitute a meeting point of  cultures. From a his-
torical perspective, the cluster of  islands to the east of  Sumbawa tends 
to be settled by small polities and ritual communities with a compara-
tively low level of  (conventional) technological sophistication. In these 
societies clan, house, marriage patterns and ancestors become crucial 
nodes in what the anthropologist Jim Fox has called ‘the flow of  life’.5 
While islands such as Flores, Sumba, Timor and Solor have generated 
a substantial amount of  interest from anthropologists, the same cannot 
be said of  historians, something which is partly due to the nature of  
the sources. It is not entirely true that the art of  writing was unknown 
among the Timorese until recently, but there is only a limited amount of  
pre-1900 texts written or dictated by indigenous people. The great bulk 
of  the source material from the long era of  colonial presence – from the 
seventeenth to the twentieth century – was produced by officials and visi-
tors of  European extraction. One might say that the history of  Timor is 
doomed to be studied through Western eyes. 
5 For a popular introduction to this notion, see Fox 1991b; for an extended survey, see Munandjar 
Widiyatmika 2008.
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In spite of  this, the present work attempts to trace the indigenous 
political and social structures in Timor during an era that, for reasons 
soon to be explained, may be termed ‘early colonial’, thus encompass-
ing the age of  the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC, Dutch 
East India Company, hereafter also rendered as ‘the Company’) in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The main question addressed by 
this study relates to the methods of  interaction between colonial and 
indigenous organizations, and the changes in local society brought about 
as a consequence of  this interaction. In other words, the book will scruti-
nize how forms of  material culture, religion, ideology, political domina-
tion and trade were adapted for or imposed on the island by external 
individuals, and how the indigenous populations strove to adapt or resist 
these influences. In order to see the Timorese development within a geo-
graphical context, I also discuss the role of  surrounding islands, in partic-
ular Solor and easternmost Flores, both of  which were colonial stepping 
stones to Timor. Postcolonial studies in their broader sense tend to focus 
on forms of  culture influenced by the imperial process since the incep-
tion of  colonialism, and several issues raised by this line of  study can be 
applied to the early colonial context of  Timor. Thus, while not denying 
the asymmetric and often oppressive features of  the colonial relationship, 
one should avoid seeing it as a simplistic one-sided process. Rather, it is 
essential to identify the constituent roles of  colonizer and colonized, and 
to trace their hybrid forms, that is, an insoluble intermingling, via inter-
action, of  the (colonizing) centre and the (colonized) periphery.6
The case of  Timor is of  particular interest within the context of  
Southeast Asia. In spite of  having been visited by foreign traders for 
many hundreds of  years, the island is not very accessible, and regular vis-
its need to be well planned and to fit around the monsoon pattern. The 
oft-repeated but untrue rumour that Timor was covered by sandalwood 
forests drew European traders to its shores from an early stage: the first 
documented visit, by the remains of  the Magellan expedition, took place 
in 1522, and Portuguese traders visited the island from at least 1523 (Le 
Roux 1929; Newitt 2005:122). Regular Portuguese and Dutch establish-
ments on the Timorese coast date from the mid-seventeenth century, and 
6 Nünning 2005:68, 181-2. I will make no attempt here to define the ambiguous field of  postcolonial 
studies; for an overview of  this, see Gandhi 1998; Slater 1998.
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from circa 1670 most princedoms7 on the island were subjected to an 
amount of  European (or Eurasian) political precedence. In spite of  these 
early beginnings, thorough colonial rule as understood in conventional 
terms was hardly implemented before the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.8 Self-critical Dutch and Portuguese writers readily 
acknowledged the limited means that the colonial establishments had at 
their disposal to enforce their will on the innumerable local princedoms; 
‘colonial’ rule was indeed often little more than window dressing (Castro 
1862; Kniphorst 1885).
‘Indirect rule’ might be a better term, though it would be more judi-
cious to speak of  an indirect implementation of  a political and economic 
network. The small Dutch and Portuguese detachments stayed in coastal 
settlements from which they tried to manage the trade and deliveries of  
sandalwood, beeswax and slaves – their main raison d’être – with the 
little manpower available. 
Clearly, this situation is not unique to Timor. Rather, indirect rule 
was the most common way of  handling European trading capitalism in 
the coastlands of  Asia up until the nineteenth century. ‘Early colonial’ is 
therefore a term that is best used for this period of  Western impact on 
the area.9 Nevertheless, the difficulties faced by the colonial organiza-
tions in getting to grips with the indigenous people over the course of  two 
or three centuries raises questions about the ability of  a comparatively 
low-technological local society to resist highly-technological external 
intruders. Explanations of  the maintenance of  such resistance may be 
sought in cultural features, societal organization, ways of  warfare and, 
not least, in geographical factors. On the other hand, the very fact that 
there was a degree of  Timorese attachment to the Dutch East India 
Company and the Portuguese king suggests that arenas of  interaction 
and exchange developed, whereby political authority was not simply a 
matter of  enforcement. One may refer here to the ‘stranger king’ syn-
drome, which has been popular with scholars of  Southeast Asian history 
7 In this work, I use the terms ‘princedom’ or ‘domain’ rather than ‘kingdom’ for political units. The 
non-bureaucratized and indeed non-centralized nature of  these units means that the term ‘kingdom’ 
would misdirect the reader. At the same time, I retain the European term ‘king’ (koning, rei) for the heads 
of  local polities rather than the somewhat non-descriptive ‘ruler’, ‘chief ’ or ‘prince’. All this will be dis-
cussed further in Chapter III.
8 See in particular the detailed studies of  Davidson 1994; Farram 2003; Schlicher 1996.
9 That is, in the first place for Asia and Africa. The more intense colonization of  parts of  the Ameri-
cas after 1492, with massive resettlement and extermination of  peoples, differs greatly from the outlined 
pattern.
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in recent years.10 Societies with a stateless or non-bureaucratic structure 
have often tended to refer to a ruler or a dynasty as an outsider, who 
purportedly comes from another geographical location, often associ-
ated with the sea. The stranger king is ideally accepted by a particular 
polity as a commanding force, whose foreignness puts him in a position 
to mediate and keep the various competitive elements of  the polity in 
check. Various examples from the Southeast Asian Archipelago indicate 
that common ethnicity and matrimonial arrangements were far from 
sufficient to build a politically integrated society. Small-scale societies 
often maintained an economy of  gift exchange, which may have been 
more significant in the construction of  political networks. However, the 
competitive nature of  such exchanges also easily made for conflicts; 
a stranger who had few emotional bonds with the indigenous groups 
would be ideally placed to act as a facilitator of  conflict resolution. As 
will be seen, this syndrome is highly relevant to the Timorese case, where 
the Dutch East India Company was literally seen as a ‘prince’ (usi); the 
surrounding discussion can be elaborated on by drawing on the results 
of  modern anthropological research.11 The European outsider was, to 
such an extent, placed inside, localized within a system that made him 
indispensable and surrounded him with symbols and rites of  precedence. 
In fact, the Dutch post in Kupang, West Timor, was surrounded by allied 
princedoms who stayed loyal to the foreign lords from the 1650s until the 
twentieth century, in spite of  periods of  obvious misrule. As the allies put 
it to a white tuan (gentleman) in the face of  a British invasion attempt in 
1797: ‘We rajas have the land and tuan has the sea.’12 The lords of  the 
land paid their deference to the lord of  the sea whilst still having the 
means to wield power during negotiations.
Another interesting point is the presence, for some three centuries, 
of  two colonial organizations who were within the vicinity of  each other. 
Such an existence of  two centres of  colonial authority, which, for most of  
the time, had a mutually hostile attitude, is rather unique in a Southeast 
10 The discussion about the ‘stranger king’ syndrome in this book owes much to Henley (2002), who 
studied a case from northern Sulawesi, both similar yet quite dissimilar in parts. For more on the stranger 
king, see Sahlins 1981; Fox 2008; Barnes 2008.
11 Middelkoop 1952:227. Traube 1986:52-4 contains a discussion of  a related theme with regard to 
the East Timorese views of  the Portuguese.
12 LOr 2242, UB Leiden. The VOC was not normally addressed as ‘Lord of  the Sea’, but there might 
be an idea of  an opposition between the ‘female’ land and ‘male’ sea here, in accordance with Timorese 
traditional concepts. ‘Stranger kings’ in Southeast Asia tended to be associated with the sea.
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Asian context. Although a formal lasting peace between the Netherlands 
and Portugal was announced in Europe in 1663, the history of  their 
Timorese possessions is one of  suspicion, intrigue and wars by proxy. 
This is further complicated by the important role of  the Topasses, or 
Black Portuguese, a mestizo group with elements of  Portuguese culture, 
set in a localized Timorese context. Since the Topasses lived in a state 
of  downright hostility with the White Portuguese and the Dutch for long 
periods of  time, in effect there were three external, or semi-external, 
powers operating on the island. Conflicts between whites and mestizos 
are well known from other parts of  the Portuguese colonial realm, but 
in the Timorese case the hostilities appear to have been more extreme. 
This, in turn, raises questions about how the formal and informal aspects 
of  the Portuguese colonial complex worked in relation to each other. It 
also brings up issues of  the workings of  ethnicity and race in this period.
This brings us back to the resources available for the writing of  an 
autonomous history of  Timor. The archival material used for this study 
is mainly Dutch, and is found in the Nationaal Archief  (Dutch National 
Archives) in The Hague, the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- and 
Volkenkunde (KITLV, Royal Netherlands Institute of  Southeast Asian 
and Caribbean Studies) in Leiden, the Afdeling Oosterse Letteren 
(Department of  Eastern Letters) of  the University of  Leiden, and the 
Arsip Nasional (ANRI, National Archive) in Jakarta. There are irregular 
reports on the affairs of  the Dutch East India Company in the Timor 
region between 1613 and 1646, and regular ones after that date. In 1657, 
the headquarters of  the VOC in this part of  Indonesia were transferred 
from the small island of  Solor to Kupang. The Dutch authorities soon 
came into closer contact with certain indigenous polities which sought 
the protection of  the VOC and settled close to Kupang as subordinate 
allies. Due to this, certain routines of  interaction were worked out in the 
second half  of  the seventeenth century. The Company regularly received 
information from their allies, and took pains to instruct the children of  
the aristocracy in Malay, the general vehicle of  communication. Letters 
to the VOC authorities in Batavia were drawn up on a yearly basis by the 
allies of  Timor and the neighbouring islands of  Rote, Sawu and Solor. 
Reports written by the Dutch opperhoofd (commander, later also called resi-
dent) were likewise sent to Batavia at least once a year, with copies ending 
up in the Netherlands. These reports are often very verbose, encompass-
ing several dozens of  folio pages, sometimes more. The papers sent from 
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Kupang to Batavia also included letters and special reports on various 
subjects, and occasionally minutes of  council meetings and copies of  
Dagregisters (daily records). The latter two are particularly valuable, since 
they provide an idea of  how the VOC operated in Timor on a day-to-
day basis. Taken together, these sources provide valuable but piecemeal 
data on the history and structure of  the polities that came under the orbit 
of  Dutch influence, whilst also indicating activities throughout the rest 
of  the island. The impressive monograph of  Arend de Roever (2002) 
has made extensive use of  the VOC material up to 1660.13 For the later 
periods there are a few dated, but partly still useful articles in Indologist 
periodicals, mostly from the nineteenth century.14
The Dutch source material is verbose but episodic in character, and 
is certainly not above historical criticism. When addressing the central 
authorities in Batavia, the opperhoofden went out of  their way to justify 
their actions and decisions. Failures and unsatisfactory economic results 
were regularly blamed on the Portuguese or their indigenous allies, and 
occasionally, on the quality of  the other staff  of  the trading post. We also 
know that several persons who were sent to Timor as opperhoofden were 
considered to be among the least competent of  the VOC employees, and 
there is ample evidence of  corruption. On the other hand, the organiza-
tion of  the VOC as a trading institution meant that there were checks on 
the arbitrariness of  the reports that were written. The Company needed 
facts, not fiction, in order to take central decisions on policy and the al-
location of  resources.
What about the point of  view of  the indigenous Timorese? As a mat-
ter of  fact, there is a certain output of  textual documents from the VOC 
allies in Timor and the nearby islands of  Rote, Sawu and Solor, despite 
these aristocrats being almost always illiterate. Letters were drawn up on 
a yearly basis and sent with a Company ship to the Governor General 
in Batavia, together with the tributes. The letters were composed with 
the assistance of  those people linked to the VOC who could read and 
write, who were, in fact, sometimes ethnic Timorese. These letters dis-
play a rather formal tone and are not always very illuminating. They 
do, however, provide us with the Timorese version of  events spoken of  
13 For briefer statements of  his main arguments, see De Roever 1998, 2005.
14 In the first place Heijmering 1847; Van der Chijs 1872; Leupe 1877; Haga 1882a, 1882b; De Roo 
van Alderwerelt 1904; Fiedler 1931. More recent articles partly based on VOC materials include McWil-
liam 2007 and Hägerdal 2006, 2007a and 2007b.
9
1 Timor and historical research |
in the more verbose Dutch reports. At times they are written in a frank 
and critical style, thus providing an interesting corrective to colonial 
narratives. It is also important to remember that the Dutch were highly 
dependent on Timorese informers to find out what was happening on 
the island. Timorese voices are therefore constantly quoted in the VOC 
documents, albeit in a Dutch-language version.
When compared with the Dutch records, the Portuguese materials 
are rather different in style, more spread out and preserved in a less 
regular manner. For the period under scrutiny, they largely consist of  
reports and letters written by colonial officials in Lifau and Dili, and 
of  missionary – in the first instance, Dominican – texts. They are less 
systematic and, indeed, much less preserved than the VOC records, and 
usually display a profound lack of  interest or insight into indigenous 
Timorese affairs. Nevertheless, these documents are often written in a 
lively narrative style and contain many ethnographic details not found 
in the Dutch records. It is both rewarding and illuminating to compare 
the Portuguese and Dutch texts, since they often present different out-
looks and perspectives. In this sense, the documents of  each respective 
group can be evaluated in light of  each other. Some Portuguese letters 
are preserved in Dutch archives; besides these, the present study has not 
undertaken original research in Portuguese collections. Many Portuguese 
records from the seventeenth and eighteenth century, perhaps the major-
ity of  them, have been published or discussed in works issued before the 
Indonesian invasion of  East Timor in 1975.15
Apart from the output of  the two institutionalized colonial powers, 
there is also a collection of  travel writings and geographical descriptions 
by short-term visitors, written by travellers from France, England and fur-
ther afield. In terms of  the seventeenth and eighteenth century, though, 
these are relatively few and far between.16 Those writings that we do pos-
sess are, however, valuable, since they do not have the official character 
of  the Dutch and Portuguese reports, but instead provide their own – 
though certainly not unbiased – viewpoints on the island and its inhabit-
ants. Visitors include such celebrities as Captain Bligh of  the infamous 
Bounty mutiny, but the most valuable contribution is the long and very 
15 See in the first instance the works by Castro 1867; Faria de Morais 1934, 1944; Leitão 1948, 1952; 
Sá 1949, 1956-58; Oliveira 1953; Matos 1974a.
16 The published travel accounts are extensively discussed by Durand 2006a; this work also contains a 
very useful cartographic survey.
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involved account by the Frenchman Pelon, who stayed for several years 
in Company service in Kupang in the 1770s (Miller 1996; Pelon 2002).
A fourth category of  sources is the body of  oral Timorese narra-
tives. As pointed out by Gregor Neonbasu (2005), the ancestors of  the 
Timorese constitute the roots of  life. In order to perform the correct 
rituals and preserve community, oral tradition then becomes a key link 
to the past. Traditions are the trunk (uf, in the Dawan language of  West 
Timor) that supports the branches (tlaef) and sprouts (sufa) – metaphors 
for the components of  society (Neonbasu 2005:ix, 70-134, 369-73). Since 
the first half  of  the nineteenth century a number of  historical traditions 
and legends have been recorded by Dutch missionaries, visitors and of-
ficials. After 1949, certain efforts have been made by the Indonesians 
themselves to record the stories, though much of  the oral tradition has 
apparently been allowed to die out, leaving very little trace; so far, there 
are relatively few stories available from East Timor.17 Within a Timorese 
local polity there were always people who were assigned the task of  keep-
ing track of  origins, lists of  rulers, and important stories which would 
anchor the cohesion of  a realm. Among the Atoni18 population, who are 
still dominant in West Timor, there were the spokesmen for the rulers, 
the mafefa, who had the task of  keeping track of  the body of  local knowl-
edge. Among the Belu, further to the east, the corresponding figures were 
called makoan. The mafefa were assigned to the post due to their sharp wit, 
though they also tended to belong to certain lineages. Several elder per-
sons called mafefa are still found in West Timor. However, after the end 
of  the raja system in circa 1962, interest in their bank of  knowledge has 
declined, and several have passed away without telling or writing down 
what they knew for the future generations.
Let us now consider two ways in which oral tradition can be used: 
firstly, the extent to which it can inform us about past events; secondly, 
how it can help us to understand cultural and societal structures in the 
long term. Compared to most parts of  the world that have a strong tradi-
17 The most ambitious project to date is ‘The pre-colonial history of  the island of  Timor together with 
some notes on the Makassan influence in the island’ (1999), the unpublished compilation by the late Aus-
tralian scholar Peter Spillett. It contains a wealth of  important oral stories of  the traditional kingdoms 
in West and East Timor; these are in English, but the word-for-word translation from local languages is 
rather cumbersome.
18 In this work, for the sake of  convenience, I will use the word ‘Atoni’ rather than the more complete 
phrase ‘Atoin Meto’ or ‘Atoni Pah Meto’ (people of  the dry land). Literally, the term ‘Atoni’ (Atoin) would 
translate as ‘people’. The language of  the Atoni will be referred to as Dawan; it is otherwise known as 
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tion of  oral story telling, modern scholars are in a fairly good position to 
evaluate the oral stories, since we possess relatively extensive European 
documentary records. Methods of  using oral tradition have been devel-
oped in particular in the study of  pre-colonial Africa, the pioneer in the 
field being Jan Vansina (1965). Vansina was originally very optimistic 
about the possibilities, and hoped to achieve a historiographical recon-
struction on the basis of  oral sources, achieved by comparing sources 
and adapting the standard means of  historical criticism to the African 
situation. Later research has generally found these possibilities less clear-
cut; there are numerous traps to take into account when dealing with 
events beyond the scope of  living memory.19 Nevertheless, in African 
and in some of  the Asian postcolonial societies it is essential to challenge 
colonial narratives with indigenous ones. Here, oral tradition becomes a 
difficult but important corpus of  sources.
The results of  my own research are, unsurprisingly, ambiguous. 
When compared with European documents, some Timorese princely 
genealogies appear to be semi-reliable as far back as the second half  of  
the seventeenth century; others are garbled, but contain fully recogniz-
able figures from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.20 Yet more 
show details from no earlier than the nineteenth century, even though 
the families are known to have had a longer, more prominent history. 
There are also stories that can be linked to historical events dating from 
the mid-seventeenth century, but the content of  these greatly differs 
between versions. In his important work on the political and societal 
organization of  the Atoni people of  West Timor (1971), H.G. Schulte 
Nordholt provides several examples where notable Timorese altered or 
reinvented historical stories, not least origin stories. It would appear that 
the non-literate political centre wielded a certain amount of  control over 
the transmission of  stories and information, which can also be seen by 
comparison with African oral tradition.21 In Timor, the ritual language 
used in ceremonies was a way of  preserving information over numerous 
19 One may compare Vansina’s classic work Oral tradition (1965) with his more recent Oral tradition as 
history (1985), which maintains a much more careful and sceptical approach to oral materials and their 
methodological possibilities.
20 The pedigrees of  the West Timorese princely dynasties of  Sonbai and Taebenu in particular appear 
to be fairly reliable, despite minor variations in European sources. Other pedigrees, like those of  Ambeno 
and Amabi, mention people who are known to have been active in the seventeenth century, but supply 
confusing details up to the nineteenth century. For oral tradition on nearby Rote, see Fox 1971, 1979.
21 Finnegan 1996. Strong African kingdoms like the Ashanti maintained a biased but substantial body 
of  orally transmitted historical knowledge in comparison with societies with weak political centres.
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generations, information that could not be passed on openly but only 
communicated in ritual contexts. In addition, the entire story was not 
always told through one performance; it is therefore a trying and detailed 
task to piece together the course of  events from the various spokesmen 
(Neonbasu 2005:196-209). One cannot simply dismiss oral traditions 
when discussing Timorese history, though: they present a retrospective 
outlook on the historical landscape that contemporary reports are simply 
not able to provide. Without corroborating data they cannot be used for 
reconstructing events that took place more than a century before their 
recording, but they do provide information on how a Timorese polity 
preferred to remember particular events or circumstances.22 They also 
present Timorese views of  the colonial entities, helping us understand 
how foreigners could, under some circumstances, be accepted as ‘strang-
er kings’, and reminding us that there were other interpretations of  an 
event than that of  peevish, impatient colonial officials.
This book does not attempt to present a general history of  Timor 
before 1800. Although internal colonial administration and economic 
relations between European ports and the outside world are studied as 
a way of  mapping patterns of  policies and economic exchange in the 
region, they are not the focus of  this study. A host of  material is available 
in the Dutch records of  the VOC period to clarify these aspects, though 
time and patience are required to sift through them. This work, as was 
previously mentioned, uses European materials to study the Timorese 
version of  events, explaining their interaction with the Dutch and with 
the ‘White’ and ‘Black’ Portuguese. In particular, I will focus on the 
Sonbai (Sonnebay), the most prestigious dynastic group of  West Timor, 
which has important mythical connotations. The reason for this, apart 
from their importance to the Timorese, is the considerable amount of  
information available on the Sonbai in European records and oral ac-
counts. They tended to be involved in the dramatic crises and changes on 
the island from the mid-seventeenth century through to the Indonesian 
revolution of  the twentieth century. The ever-changing fate of  the 
Sonbai is therefore symbolic of  the turbulent changes that have afflicted 
indigenous Timorese society since the seventeenth century.
22 Yeager and Jacobson 2002 discuss the history of  the various West Timorese domains, going further 
than the oral tradition recorded by Parera 1994, Spillett 1999, and others. In spite of  the substantial 




The fi rst contacts
early reports
In general terms, it could be said that the history of  Timor began in the 
sixteenth century, the time of  European expansion. Prior to then we only 
have a few Chinese notes – the most important one being the description 
of  Timor quoted in Chapter I (Ptak 1983) – and a brief  mention of  the 
island in the Javanese poem Nagarakertagama (1365) (Robson 1995:34). 
In other words, the written history of  the island begins late, though 
not necessarily much later than most of  the rest of  the Southeast Asian 
Archipelago. Pre-1500, apart from Java, Bali and parts of  Sumatra, this 
part of  Asia is generally obscure.
To gain a general idea of  the situation before the European pe-
riod, it is therefore essential to assess its archaeological, linguistic and 
anthropological aspects. Human settlement on Timor is documented 
from circa 35,000 BC, earlier than anywhere else in the Lesser Sunda 
Islands. Agricultural activities began circa 2500 BC or later, and after 
1000 BC the island enjoyed closer contact with other parts of  Southeast 
Asia, something which may have coincided with the arrival of  new 
ethnic groups. In any case, Timor displays a remarkable linguistic di-
versity that includes both Papuan (especially in easternmost Timor) 
and Austronesian languages (Glover 1986:212-3; Durand 2006b:46-
7). According to a still rather speculative hypothesis (Granucci 2005), 
speakers of  Austronesian languages were present in the so-called ‘Old 
Indonesian heartland’ in North Maluku and North Sulawesi in around 
the second millennium BC. Later, a migratory wave of  seafarers began 
to penetrate Central Maluku and the chain of  islands that stretches from 
South Maluku to eastern Sumbawa. They belonged to the so-called 
Central Malayo-Polynesian linguistic group, which is quite different from 
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the West Malayo-Polynesian group that begins in West Sumbawa and 
continues all the way to Aceh in the far west.1 Among the groups that 
penetrated Timor, the Tetun, possibly from the east, displayed a political-
cultural preponderance on the island. There is little evidence of  external 
influences before the sixteenth century, with almost no record of  Indian 
or Javanese influences.2 
Timorese myths and rituals have been used by some scholars to 
outline the prehistoric economy of  Timorese society.3 According to this 
view, Timorese ritual language indicates that previously, crops such as 
Job’s tears, millet and sorghum were important for peasant subsistence; 
however, these crops almost disappeared at a later stage. The main 
crops found in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century sources are rice and 
maize, the latter of  which has American origins and must have been 
introduced around the period 1540-1650. Rituals connected to fertility 
usually focused on these two crops, which are often mentioned together 
(Fox 1991a:248-9, 254). Historically speaking, buffaloes have always 
been important as a source of  nutrition and a measure of  wealth, but 
flocks often roamed wild and were captured and tamed on occasion.4 
The buffaloes were also important in the preparation of  agricultural 
fields, trampling the ground into a sea of  mud (Pelon 2002:26). Other 
domestic animals included pigs, goats, dogs, hens and ducks. Sheep and 
horses were introduced relatively later judging by their respective names: 
bibi malae (in Tetun: foreign goat) and bikase (in Dawan, possibly: foreign 
1 Granucci 2005:39-43. It has also been suggested that the Austronesian languages of  Timor derive 
from the Muna-Buna-Tukang Besi zone of  southeastern Sulawesi (Hicks 2007:245). 
2 Thomaz 1981:58, 60. Jardner 1999:277-82, referring to local scholar C.C. Punuf, posits an increas-
ing differentiation of  the political system of  the Atoni of  Amanuban in West Timor, with three stages 
traceable within oral tradition: 1. A kin-oriented society where ‘big men’ form influential genealogical 
name-groups. During this period the characteristic quadripartition of  Timorese polities would have 
occurred, with four ‘fathers’ (amaf) of  the mighty name-groups being the primus inter pares. 2. A con-
centration of  power, where one name-group imposes its will on the four amaf. The leader of  this group is 
entitled nai (from nain, earth), and is more dependent on wealth and retinue than charisma. 3. A prince-
dom based on military expansion where the lord appropriates the prestigious title usi or usif, purportedly 
from the Javanese gusti, meaning ‘lord’. 
3 The foremost scholar in this field is James Fox; see Fox 1991a.
4 As described in VOC 1346 (1678-79), Dagregister, sub 3-12-1678. The capture of  buffaloes was 
connected with the performance of  magic necessary to tame the beasts. In this and following footnotes, 
archival refererences with the abbreviation VOC refer to documents found in the Archive of  the VOC, 
Nationaal Archief, The Hague. Likewise, references with the abbreviation ANRI Timor or ANRI VOC 
refer to documents found in those sub-archives in the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta. When 
referring to other archived documents, the reference is structured as follows: sub-archive or author, year, 
name document and/or entrance number and inventory number (where available), folio number, name 
of  archive.
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buffalo) (Pelon 2002:28; H.G. Schulte Nordholt 1971:49).
The importance of  Tetun political organization makes sense in view of  
the first, well-known, eyewitness accounts of  Timor. The Italian Antonio 
Pigafetta (circa 1491-1534), and the Spaniard Francisco Albo participated 
in the first circumnavigation of  the globe with Ferdinand Magellan in 
1519-1522. After Magellan was killed in Cebu in 1521, the rest of  the 
expedition under Juan Sebastián de Elcano proceeded to the Spice Islands 
(Maluku), setting sail for the south-west. In early 1522, De Elcano passed 
the islands of  Pantar and Alor and then sailed five leagues in a south-
southwesterly direction until the expedition reached Timor on 26 January. 
There they arrived at the settlement of  La Queru, the ‘Lanqueiro’ of  
later Portuguese records, which was situated to the east of  Cutubaba.5 
Pigafetta’s observations of  Timor deserve to be quoted in full:
I went ashore alone in order to speak with the chief  of  a place called 
Amaban, to ask him to provide foodstuff. He told me that he would give 
me buffaloes, pigs and goats, but we could not agree since he asked many 
things in exchange for a buffalo. Since we had few things, and the hunger 
forced us, we kept a chief  and his son from another village called Balibo 
as ransom. Out of  fear that we would kill him, he immediately gave us six 
buffaloes, five goats and two pigs; in order to fulfil the number of  ten pigs 
and ten goats (that we demanded), they gave us another buffalo. Thus we 
had established the conditions. Thereafter we sent him ashore very con-
tent with linen, Indian silk and cotton, axes, Indian knives, shears, mirrors 
and knives. The chief  with whom I went to speak only had women to 
serve him. [The women] all go naked, just like the other [women on the 
other islands]. In their ears they wear small golden earrings with hanging 
brushes at the side. On their arms they wear many bangles of  gold and 
yellow copper until the elbow. The men go about like the women, apart 
from that they hang certain golden objects, round like a plate, around 
their necks, and that they wear bamboo combs in their hair, adorned 
with golden rings. Some of  them wear dried pumpkin stems in their ears 
instead of  golden rings.
White sandalwood is found on the island, and nowhere else. [There 
are also] ginger, buffaloes, pigs, goats, chickens, figs, pisang [small ba-
5 A Dutch travel report from 1665 mentions Lakeru, between Tibar and Cutubaba, in present-day 
Timor Leste (VOC 2285 [1733], f. 200). In the Portuguese documents it is known as Lanqueiro[z] (re-
port written after 1769, quoted in Faria de Morais 1934:26). 
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nanas], sugarcanes, oranges, lemons, beeswax, almonds, brown beans 
and other things to be found, as well as parrots in various colours. At the 
other side of  the island are four brothers who are kings of  this island. 
Where we were, there were settlements and various chiefs. The names of  
the four residences of  the kings are as follow: Oibich, Lichsana, Suai and 
Cabanaza. Oibich is the greatest.
In Cabanaza some gold was found in a mountain, according to the 
information given to us, and their inhabitants carry out all their pur-
chases with small pieces of  gold. All the sandalwood and beeswax, which 
is traded to the natives of  Java and Malacca, is negotiated in this quarter. 
We found here a junk from Luzon which had come here to purchase 
sandalwood. These people are heathens. When they go out to fell sandal 
trees, the devil, as we were told, appears in various shapes and tells them, 
that if  there is something necessary, they must ask him. As a consequence 
of  this appearance, they become sick for some days. The sandalwood is 
felled at a certain phase of  the moon otherwise it will not be good. The 
merchandise which is valuable for trading sandalwood is red cloth, linen, 
axes, iron and spikes. This island is inhabited in all parts and stretches 
over a great distance from the east to the west, but it is not very broad in 
the north and the south.6
This is a most valuable text, which acquaints us for the first time with 
several features of  pre-modern Timorese society. Certain ethnographic 
details, such as the wearing of  bangles, combs and golden plates, corre-
spond to usage up until the twentieth century. The alleged nudity of  the 
women (and, apparently, the men) is more puzzling when regarding the 
long sarongs worn more recently, but it corroborates a Franciscan travel 
account from 1670.7 It is therefore possible that the well-known weaving 
traditions of  Timor were introduced or disseminated at a fairly late stage, 
serving as a reminder that one should not consider late pre-colonial soci-
ety as primeval or unchanging. The domestic animals mentioned are still 
found today, although we are left in the dark about the crops that were 
vital for the subsistence of  the people.
6 Le Roux 1929:26-7, 30-2; Italian text with Dutch translation. See also Pigafetta 1923:234-7.
7 Quoted in Teixeira 1957:1-3. The Franciscan visitor speaks about women who had no other ‘dress’ 
than tattoos, although the more prominent ones wore robes. Dutch illustrations of  the seventeenth cen-
tury show the men wearing a kind of  loincloth made of  straps, not known in modern ethnographic 
accounts. 
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Like their Portuguese contemporaries Tomé Pires and Duarte 
Barbosa – who only wrote from hearsay – Pigafetta and Albo emphasize 
the quantities of  sandalwood on Timor, which attracted merchants from 
Java, the Malay world, and even the Philippines. Unlike in many other 
travel accounts, we are spared the erroneous assertion that this precious 
wood covered the whole island; as Arend de Roever points out, it is likely 
that only the merest fraction of  the area was ever covered by sandalwood 
trees.8 Pigafetta also attests to the ritual perceptions regarding the fell-
ing of  sandalwood and its associated dangers; as late as the eighteenth 
century, sandalwood vapour was reputed to cause a burning fever and 
delirium among woodcutters (Salmon 1733:229-32).
Two other classic products of  Timor, beeswax and gold, are also 
briefly mentioned; the former would later turn out to be infinitely more 
profitable than the latter. The forested parts of  Timor are inhabited by 
a large amount of  bees (fani), whose nests are traditionally plundered for 
their honeycombs by the Timorese, who drive off  the bees by means 
of  smoke.9 The proverbial European thirst for gold led to exaggerated 
rumours about gold mines, rumours which induced the Dutch to force 
their Timorese dependents to pan for rare, not very pure, gold dust in the 
rivers of  the interior in the eighteenth century – both an uneconomical 
and very unpopular pursuit. The legends of  ‘copper mountains’ offer a 
similar case; these were only laid to rest in the late nineteenth century.10
Furthermore, Pigafetta’s account stresses the importation of  luxury 
goods such as textiles and metal utensils in exchange for the valuable 
sandalwood. As in wide areas of  the eastern archipelago, early Timorese 
societies were typically low-technology in character, meaning that indig-
enous mining and processing of  metals was limited.11 The information 
gathered in Malacca by the contemporary geographer Duarte Barbosa 
8 De Roever 2002:352. Tomé Pires (1944:202) wrote in circa1515 that ‘there is no other wood in the 
forests [than white sandalwood]’.
9 The method is mentioned in VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, sub 21-10-1680. It is described in 
closer detail in Timor 1824, Collection Schneither, Nationaal Archief, which states that Timorese bees-
wax was considered to be of  high quality.
10 Ormeling 1956:4, 115-6; Brouwer 1849-50, H 731, KITLV.
11 The craftsmen of  the small island of  Ndao, to the west of  Rote, traditionally worked as silversmiths 
in the Timor Archipelago. As such, the individual smiths travelled around the area, offering their ser-
vices in the various settlements, and were known for their skills as early as the eighteenth century (Pelon 
2002:60; Ormeling 1956:151-2). In Belu in Central Timor, silversmiths were frequently found by the 
twentieth century; metallurgic skills apparently developed earlier there than among the Atoni population 
of  West Timor, though the chronology remains to be established (Le Roux 1929:36).
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in 1516 confirms this; ships going to Timor picked up the mainstay 
products of  sandalwood, honey, beeswax and slaves, against the pay-
ment of  an array of  external goods: iron, axes, knives, swords, cloth 
from Pulicat in India, copper, mercury, vermillion, tin, lead and coral 
from Cambay in India (Le Roux 1929:42). Without doubt, the role of  
the white sandalwood is crucial in understanding the development of  
Timorese-European relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
for reasons that will soon be discussed (Ptak 1987). 
The other two main export commodities, beeswax and slaves, were 
certainly of  enduring interest to traders in the archipelago, but would 
probably not have been enough to motivate ambitious European schemes 
to exploit Timor; neither did the geographical aspects of  the island make 
colonial enterprises easy. To the trading ports of  Malaya, Sumatra and 
Java, the sea road was long and cumbersome, and travel had to fit around 
the patterns of  the monsoon winds. Overall, it was difficult to reach 
Timor from the west during the easterly monsoon season between May 
and October. The coastline itself  was far from inviting; there were few, 
if  any, good harbours and the south coast in particular held a sad record 
of  shipwrecks among Western seafarers. Given these circumstances, the 
Timorese themselves were by no means a seafaring people; on the con-
trary, they tended to keep away from the sea.12
In spite of  all this, Portuguese traders appeared on Timor at an early 
stage of  their East Indian adventure. Exactly how this happened unfortu-
nately remains unknown, but immediately after their seizure of  Malacca 
in 1511 they became aware of  the great potential value of  the white san-
dalwood trade. In the first half  of  the sixteenth century, as the European 
newcomers noted, the Malays and Javanese brought some quantities of  
sandalwood to Malacca (Ptak 1987:97). The fragrant qualities of  the 
wood made it sought after in India as well as in China; in South China, 
it was coveted for ritual purposes, since it was used to make incense sticks 
for the temples. It was also well known for its purported medical qualities 
and could be used for handicraft products. Despite this, it had the air 
of  a luxury item, and was hardly likely to ever become a major export 
product of  the East Indies (Ptak 1987:87, 96-7). However, the attraction 
of  Timor grew on account of  its uniqueness as a producer of  decent san-
12 De Roever 2002:80-2. This avoidance of  the sea is usually pointed out in categorical terms by an-
thropologists. As will become apparent, however, certain Timorese elite groups did have a certain interest 
in maritime affairs during the period in question.
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dalwood. From time to time there were rumours of  new and interesting 
sightings of  sandalwood groves at some other island, but they invariably 
turned out to be untrue or wildly exaggerated at best. Candidates such as 
Sulawesi and Sumba (which was inappropriately called Pulau Cendana, 
Sandalwood Island) were rejected as soon as they were seriously inves-
tigated, and the sandalwood resources that did exist on some islands of  
Oceania were, as yet, unexplored in the early colonial period.13
Given the circumstances, it should come as no surprise that we find 
individual Portuguese traders on Timor as early as 1523, to the dis-
pleasure of  the official Estado da Índia, the colonial apparatus in Asian 
waters.14 The Estado’s ambition to control trade in the region meant 
private enterprises by the subjects of  His Catholic Majesty were not 
encouraged; this soon proved impossible to enforce, however. When it 
came to geographically uninviting or distant places like Timor, the prob-
lems of  monitoring control increased accordingly. For such reasons, early 
Iberian enterprises in these waters are poorly recorded, and the fact that 
we know anything at all about them is largely due to the texts produced 
by the Dominican missionaries who came to dominate evangelization in 
the region.
the solor connection
The mountainous Solor Archipelago to the north was a stepping stone 
to the sandalwood riches of  Timor. The name Solor conventionally ap-
plies to a small scythe-shaped island tucked between Flores in the west, 
Adonara in the north, and Lembata (Lomblen) in the east, but until 
recently, the name was not known to the islanders themselves. It appears 
that the geographical concept originally included the area that spoke the 
Lamaholot language, from the easternmost part of  Flores to Lembata. 
It is presumably this larger area that is alluded to with the name Solot in 
13 As argued in the introductory chapter, for the sake of  convenience I use the term ‘early colonial’ 
to denote the European overseas exploits in the period c.1500-1800. In an Indonesian context, the dis-
solution of  the VOC in 1799 and the age of  Daendels and Raffles in 1808-16 are conventionally used 
to mark the transition to a new and deepened Western colonialism. In the case of  Timor, it took much 
longer.
14 Newitt 2005:122. Timor might have been visited by the Portuguese with a Luso-Malay vessel as 
early as 1514 or 1515; see Loureiro 2001:96.
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the Javanese text Nagarakertagama (1365).15 By the late sixteenth century, 
the Lamaholot population (or at least its elites) was divided into two 
groups: the Paji and the Demon. This division should not be overstressed 
in conventional political terms, but it entailed a ritual opposition that, 
at least in modern times, was founded in a legend about a set of  ances-
tral brothers or kinsmen who had had a falling-out in the distant past 
(Paramita Abdurachman 1983:91). There were, however, solid historical 
reasons for the division. The Paji tended to orient themselves towards 
the sea, fishing, trade and external contact, while a substantial number 
of  the Paji population may, judging from their legends, have emigrated 
from abroad at some unspecified time. By contrast, the Demon tended 
towards life in the highlands and living off  the earth. In the course of  the 
sixteenth century, all of  this took place against the backdrop of  two in-
terconnected factors: firstly, the dissemination of  Islam and Catholicism 
in the archipelago, and secondly, an increased interest in the region from 
seaborne foreign groups.
From the Portuguese point of  view, the north coast of  Solor, op-
posite Adonara, was a convenient place to stay on the way to Timor. 
It was not particularly fertile, but the mountainous nature of  Solor and 
the surrounding islands offered good protection against the winds and 
currents; in addition, there was no state to exert pressure on the foreign 
visitors. The archipelago was divided into small domains headed by 
chiefs, known to outsiders by the Javanese-derived title of  sengaji, while 
the indigenous term for addressing princes was magu, or elder. The Paji 
areas were loosely organized into a league consisting of  five domains 
(Lohayong, Lamakera, Lamahala, Terong and Adonara) with pockets 
of  dependencies strewn throughout the archipelago. This organization, 
named the Watan Lema or Five Shores, was headed by Lohayong on 
15 Canto 14, verse 5, mentions places in eastern Indonesia supposedly under the suzerainty of  the 
Javanese empire of  Majapahit: ‘Taking them island by island: Makasar, Butun and Banggawi, / Kunir, 
Galiyahu and Salaya, Sumba, Solot and Muwar, / As well as Wandan, Ambwan, Maloko and Wwanin, 
/ Seran and Timur as the main ones among the various islands that remembered their duty’ (Robson 
1995:34). The reality of  this alleged suzerainty is highly debatable, but may indicate that there were cer-
tain contacts between Majapahit and Solor, the Alor region (‘Galiyahu’) and Timor. In an unpublished 
research note, the Dutch indologist G. P. Rouffaer suggested that Lamaholot means ‘the land of  Solot’; 
see Rouffaer 1910b, Kleine Timor Eilanden I, H 673, KITLV. Indeed the s/h sound change sometimes 
occurs in the Lamaholot language. The word holot may mean either ‘united’ or ‘man’, and Lamaholot 
would then literally signify ‘the region of  men’. How Solot changed into Solor is less than clear (Robert 
Barnes, personal communication, October 2008).
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the north coast of  Solor, the very place where the Portuguese settled.16
At first, the sengaji of  Lohayong tended to co-operate with the 
Portuguese traders who arrived, probably in the first instance at Maluku 
where they had been regularly based since around 1520. With the estab-
lishment of  a Portuguese base in Macao circa 1552-1553, new oppor-
tunities arose to sell sandalwood directly to the Chinese. They had long 
since known of  Timor, but seldom made the difficult trip there. There 
are hints in the scarce sources that by the 1550s the Iberian traders stayed 
the winter (wet monsoon period) on Solor in order to conduct their busi-
ness on Timor. Twice a year, in late September and early January, ships 
would go to Solor to pick up the valuable Timorese wood, and then 
proceed towards Maluku or China (Kniphorst 1885:375-6). The north-
western coast of  Timor could be reached in a few days, but the short trip 
was not without peril: the waves of  the Sawu Sea were rough for part of  
the year, a problem exacerbated by the lack of  good anchorage along the 
Timorese coast. It is therefore symptomatic that the first geographical 
details about Timor in Portuguese sources in the 1560s consist of  indica-
tions of  the most important ports of  call. The well-known Indian scholar 
Garcia da Orta, incidentally a friend of  the poet Camões, published a 
medical and botanical treaty in Goa in 1563, which indicated that Timor 
was already of  some economic importance:
The white and yellow sandalwood originated from Timor, an island that 
has a lot of  both kinds. The sandalwood of  the port of  Mena is the best, 
although it has less wood than the others; and Matomea, which is an-
other port, produces a lot of  yellow sandalwood, but the heartwood is less 
though it has the best smell; and another port called Camanace also has 
sandalwood of  less quality since it has got little heartwood; it is the same 
thing with the sandalwood from Cerviaguo. 17
Of  the places mentioned, Mena is situated by the river of  the same name 
in the domain later named Biboki, on the northern coast; Matomea is 
Batumean in the domain of  Amanatun on the south coast; Camenaça, 
already mentioned by Pigafetta, is located in the south-western corner 
of  present Timor Leste. A more complicated geographical term is 
16 The borders of  the Watan Lema princedom and the Demon princedom Larantuka, as they were in 
the late colonial era, are shown in Dietrich 1989:59.
17 Loureiro 1995:93; see also Durand 2006a:62.
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Cerviaguo, the Servião or Sorbian of  later sources. It refers to an area 
that encompassed part of  north-western Timor, although the location 
of  the particular port with that name remains uncertain.18 Camenaça is 
situated in the Tetun-speaking area while the other three locations be-
long to the Atoni people of  western Timor. All the places mentioned are 
well known to later European sources in connection with the sandalwood 
trade. Sixteenth century maps include crude representations of  Timor, 
which is sometimes represented in triangular form. The renowned 
Flemish cartographer Gerardus Mercator adds a place name to a map 
of  Southeast Asia from 1569: Alifao (Durand 2006a:65). This place, 
the normalized spelling of  which is Lifau, was the centre of  Portuguese 
interests on the island until 1769. Its significance is still indicated by the 
existence of  the Oecusse-Ambeno enclave which, politically speaking, 
belongs to Timor Leste, despite being situated in the western part of  the 
island. Given that Mercator compiled his work in Europe, Lifau must 
have been a port of  call for years, and for obvious geographical reasons. 
Although not an excellent roadstead, it is situated opposite the Solor 
Archipelago and has a hinterland that is fertile by Timorese standards: 
it is crossed by several small rivers and is today a site of  sawah (wet rice) 
cultivation.19 As would be proven in the seventeenth century, Lifau was 
a convenient stepping stone to reach the inland areas of  north-western 
Timor, which were rich in sandalwood.
It would seem that relations between the early Europeans and the 
Lamaholot population were quite healthy. Although foreign visitors oc-
casionally denounced the Solorese as primitive and superstitious, the 
merchants did convert certain locals to Christianity. By 1559, a cer-
tain João Soares had 300 converts from an ‘island’ lying three leagues 
from Solor – in reality, the north-eastern peninsula of  Flores with 
Lewonama as its centre. The same report pointed out that the people of  
Lewonama stayed inland, as pirates rendered the coast unsafe. For them, 
the Portuguese presence and the acceptance of  Christianity apparently 
offered a means of  protection. At the same time, Muslim ideas were also 
being propagated by three or four qadi or faqir.20 From Java and Ternate 
in North Maluku came seafarers who, like the Portuguese, made little or 
no distinction between trade, politics and religion. Visitors from Sulawesi 
18 The Servião problem is discussed in Hägerdal 2006, and will be further elucidated below.
19 For a detailed discussion of  the environmental aspects of  this region, see Yoder 2005.
20 Rouffaer 1923/24:205; Kniphorst 1885:376. A qadi is a Muslim judge, a faqir a Sufi.
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also seem to have been present from the late sixteenth century onwards.21 
Clerical missionaries soon followed in the footsteps of  the traders. 
The Portuguese church overseas stood under the patronage of  the king, 
and therefore the entire expansion project in Asia was closely intertwined 
with religion (Paramita Abdurachman 1983:85). Missionaries are first 
documented in the Solor and Timor area in the 1550s, which is by no 
means a coincidence. Serious efforts to proselytize major parts of  the 
population in Asia began in 1542 with the Jesuit Francisco Xavier, and 
received a further impetus when Dominicans were sent to Asia six years 
later. The early missionary enterprise cannot simply be seen, however, 
as converging with the political and economic project of  the Estado da 
Índia. The Portuguese soldiers, administrators and traders were usually 
garrisoned in walled coastal towns with little direct influence on the sur-
rounding territories, meaning that missionary attempts necessarily had to 
take place outside of  colonial jurisdiction. It could very well have been 
to the advantage of  the missionaries to carry out their work without 
interference from the Estado, which had, at times, acquired a reputation 
for coercion and extortion. It was also in the interest of  the preachers to 
choose lands which were not heavily influenced by Islam or Theravada 
Buddhism, as this made conversion extremely difficult; the hinterlands 
of  the Portuguese strongholds of  Ormuz, Malacca and Ternate were far 
from promising in this respect.22 Small societies that practised traditional 
religion, with its emphasis on the spirits of  ancestors, were far more 
convenient for missionaries to work with, since these societies were not 
bound by a universalistic umat or sangha.23
To an extent, the Solor Archipelago was a promising prospect in 
terms of  religious conversion, as was Timor. Among the Lamaholot 
speakers, issues were complicated by Paji-Demon differences, where the 
coastal Paji tended to be susceptible to Muslim conversion. Initially, how-
ever, neither the Paji nor the Demon group was adverse to the Catholic 
21 De Roever 2002:72. Many ancestral legends in the eastern archipelago seem to indicate that non-
Muslim Javanese fled towards the east after the fall of  the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of  Majapahit in 
the early sixteenth century and established positions of  prominence among the low-technology people 
they encountered – Ende on Flores, the domains of  Alor and Pantar, Sawu, et cetera. By contrast, the 
seaborne Javanese visitors of  the late sixteenth century were clearly Muslim. A modern Makassarese tra-
dition, referred to by Spillett 1999:331-2, alleges that the ruler of  Tallo, ‘I Daeng Mannyonri’ (Karaeng 
Matoaya), unsuccessfully attacked Timor in 1596, a statement unconfirmed by other sources. 
22 Serrão and Oliveira Marques 2006:400. For the problems of  converting Theravada Buddhists and 
the loyalty that the sangha commanded from the population, see Chandler 2000:83.
23 Sangha being the Theravada Buddhist monastic community.
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creed. Furthermore, there was only a superficial presence of  Islam in the 
ports of  Timor in the second half  of  the sixteenth century at best, which 
made for obvious opportunities.24 The Dominicans, who had founded a 
convent in Malacca in 1554, were quick to seize the opportunity. One 
source mentions an António Taveiro who supposedly flourished in 1556 
and baptized as many as 5,000 people on Timor, as well as numerous 
converts on ‘Ende’, yet the source is less than reliable.25 Until the eigh-
teenth century, Europeans called the island of  Flores ‘Ende’, rather than 
the islet off  the south coast which actually is Ende.
That events were occurring on Timor at the time is confirmed by 
clerical letters from Goa, the centre of  the Estado da Índia and of  
religious administration. A letter by Luís Frois from November 1559 ex-
pands on the recent gains made by Catholicism in Asia. Apart from the 
king, Dom João Dharmapala of  Kotte, Ceylon, there was also ‘the king 
of  Timor, which is the land from where the sandalwood comes’ (Wicki 
1956:350). We are told that this king had sent a letter to the religious 
authorities in Malacca the preceding year, asking for a padre to be sent 
to Timor in order to receive more religious instruction. The king was by 
now a Christian, and so were many members of  the elite of  his kingdom. 
He sincerely hoped that the missionaries would be able to convert more 
people (Wicki 1956:350-1). The following year, in November 1560, the 
king of  Timor is mentioned in another letter, alongside the Christian 
rulers of  the Maldives, Trincomalee, Kotte, Bacan in Maluku and 
Inhambane in East Africa.
The inclusion of  this purported royal convert seemed important, 
especially since the letters pretended that he was the ruler of  the entire 
island – it is immediately apparent that there was a strong element 
of  rhetoric in the document. When geographer Manuel Godinho de 
Eredia described Timor in detail forty years later, the island was divided 
into a large number of  domains, a situation that would prevail until the 
twentieth century.26 A ‘king of  Timor’ in the literal sense of  the word 
24 According to the Malaccan geographer Godinho de Eredia (circa1600), the Timorese were tradi-
tionally ‘Moros’ or ‘Idolators’, Moros being a Portuguese term for Muslims. In the absence of  other data 
it is difficult to assess the value of  this remark.
25 Rouffaer 1923/24:204-6. At least, this is what João dos Santos alleges in his Ethiopia Oriental of  1609.
26 Eredia 1997:253-4: ‘The Empire of  this Island is divided into two parts, that is to say, North and 
South; the part along the Southern coast belongs to the Imperial Crown of  Camanaça.’ Later, Godinho 
de Eredia mentions the king of  Samoro, the emperor of  Mena and the king of  Luca, and nineteen 
further geographical locations.
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is inconceivable, although there was certainly a ritual system of  pre-
cedence, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Presumably, António 
Taveiro encountered a local lord on the north coast who perceived the 
Portuguese connection to be advantageous, yet this obviously does not 
exclude a genuine interest in the Christian religion.
However, no spiritual support was forthcoming. In 1561, the recently 
established see of  Malacca dispatched three Dominican brothers, but it is 
thought that their efforts were limited to the Solor Archipelago. However, 
they did achieve some success there when thousands of  locals were bap-
tized, including the principal sang adipati or sengaji of  Solor. Equally, the 
competition for Solorese souls increased with the arrival of  ‘Moors from 
Java’. A fleet of  Javanese vessels assaulted the missionaries’ enclosure of  
lontar trees in 1563, but was driven off  by a passing Portuguese ship. 
Realizing the dangers that beset the little colony, the missionary leader, 
António da Cruz, led the construction of  a strong fortress in Lohayong 
in 1566. This time, the walls were steeply erected and made from stone 
and lime, and there were five bulwarks supplied with artillery. Inside the 
fortress were a church and a monastery. The entire undertaking clearly 
indicates that by this time the Portuguese were acquiring a leading politi-
cal role in local society, a fact underscored by the appointment of  a lay 
Portuguese captain, who was locally elected by the clerical leaders. The 
dominating role of  the Portuguese foreigners can also be seen in the lay-
out of  the village of  Lohayong, which was divided into two settlements: 
to the west lived the sengaji and his subjects, amounting to a thousand 
people, while a further community of  two thousand people, consist-
ing of  lay Portuguese, soldiers and foreign Christians, lived to the east, 
(Rouffaer 1923/24:205-6; Visser 1925:283-5; Paramita Abdurachman 
1983:94-8). Permanent white settlers were termed moradores or casados and 
they regularly married Asian women. Not much is known about their 
social history, but in due course they would give rise to the mixed group 
of  people known as the Topasses or Black Portuguese, who would play a 
decisive and important role in the history of  Timor. 
The rapid militarization of  the Portuguese presence reflects the 
competition from external Indonesian groups who were not primarily 
motivated by religious or political divisions, but rather by the issue of  
control over the sandalwood trade. Javanese traders from the coastal 
area known as Pasisir were well aware of  the potential profits of  the 
sandalwood market, and apparently so were merchants from Sulawesi 
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and Maluku. A solid base in Solor could have guaranteed a regular flow 
of  the precious wood to the Pasisir ports, from where most of  it could 
be re-exported to South China and the Coromandel Coast in India 
(Rouffaer 1923/24:206). For the moment, the Dominican-led, part-
Portuguese congregation on Solor was able to thwart such attempts, 
but not to impede the influence of  Islamic preachers among part of  
the Lamaholot-speaking population. As Arend de Roever has shown in 
his PhD thesis, the regularity of  Asian sandalwood trade with Timor 
has tended to be exaggerated in some previous historiography. In the 
localized and politically small societies of  the Solor, Alor and Timor 
groups, only the mid-sixteenth-century establishment of  the Portuguese 
guaranteed a steady flow of  sandalwood to the main Asiatic purchasers, 
although even this flow was limited to perhaps the cargo of  one large 
ship per year (De Roever 2002:58-9, 289). Portuguese traders used the 
direct route between Macao and Solor instead of  going via Malacca, 
which in turn made Makassar on Sulawesi an important entrepôt for 
this trade. With the intensification of  Portuguese activity, the quality of  
the wood became ever more important. The potential profits to be made 
from sandalwood were considerable, standing at one hundred per cent 
in 1590 (Ptak 1987:103-4).
missionary activity on timor
Early accounts of  Timorese religion are not particularly illuminat-
ing. According to the Franciscan Juan de la Camara (1670), the ‘cult’ 
consisted of  putting buffalo heads onto poles and offering them food, 
‘bringing it to the Devil’ (Teixeira 1957:453). His contemporary, the 
Jesuit Antonius Franciscus (1670), was more positive, pointing out the 
Timorese belief  in a High God in Heaven (in Dawan, Uis Neno; in 
Tetun, Maromak), which might facilitate the teaching of  a monotheis-
tic creed (Jacobs 1988:248). The French engineer Pelon (1778) denied 
that the islanders had any religion at all, since the customs and rites he 
observed seemed too far removed from the world’s religions as he knew 
them. He did, however, mention Uis Neno as a sun god and principal 
‘motor’ of  the world, and another mighty power called Ous Sincuall 
(Pelon 2002:41). Hidden among these scattered remarks is a comprehen-
sive ritual system that accompanies the various stages of  the Timorese 
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life cycle. Looking at the Atoni, the previously mentioned Uis Neno is 
indeed the supreme god connected with the sun and heaven, but also 
with water, fertility and righteousness. He is not a monotheistic god, for 
there are also a lord of  the earth, Uis Pah, and a host of  earth spirits, 
pah nitu, who are less than benevolent and need to be appeased. After the 
death of  a person, his or her soul leaves the body, and the deceased con-
tinues to exist as a nitu spirit. Man is dependent on Uis Neno and other 
hidden forces, which makes it essential to perform the rituals correctly.27 
The Dutch seventeenth-century sources mention ritual experts (papen) 
who performed divination and rituals, but neither there nor in modern 
ethnographic texts is there mention of  a distinct priesthood.28
It took four centuries for Christianity to influence this complex sys-
tem, in spite of  the ostensibly promising start. Regarding the entangle-
ment of  religious and commercial interests, it may seem surprising that 
the missionary endeavour of  the late 1550s was allowed to lapse. Possible 
reasons may be that the reality of  the situation was far from promising 
– as previously noted, the letters from 1559 and 1560 are rhetorical in 
character – or that there were not enough Dominicans to send to Timor. 
Towards the end of  the century there were attempts to follow in the 
footsteps of  António Taveiro. From Solor, the chief  cleric António da 
Cruz sent a padre called Belchior da Luz to the north coast of  Timor in 
1578, to revive the work of  Taveiro. This time, the site of  the missionary 
enterprise is explicitly mentioned as the commercially valuable sandal-
wood port of  Mena.29 In other words, the king of  Mena was perceived 
in the missionary rhetoric of  the late 1550s to be the ‘king of  Timor’. 
That Mena was a place of  considerable importance in western Timor 
is also indicated by Manuel Godinho de Eredia who, in his geographi-
cal writings, gave the lord of  this place the exalted title of  ‘emperor’. 
Likewise, the first Dutch conqueror in 1613, Apolonius Schot, perceived 
Mena as the principal kingdom of  the island. Interestingly, there is only 
the shortest mention in the textual sources of  the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century of  the realm of  Wewiku-Wehali, which was known 
27 This is a very cursory presentation of  religion as found in traditional Atoni society, based on H.G. 
Schulte Nordholt 1971:141-53. For Tetun religion and rituals, see Vroklage 1953, II:3-189; Therik 
2004:177-215. The basic structure of  a heavenly supreme god (Maromak) and a host of  spirits is also 
found among the Tetun, who do not, however, directly associate Maromak with the sun.
28 VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, sub 30-4-1681.
29 Bierman 1924:37; Visser 1925:289. The arrival of  Da Luz in Timor is dated as 1587 in another 
source, presumably in error since the initiator António da Cruz passed away in 1579.
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both to Pigafetta and later sources as the foremost political centre on the 
island.30 Wewiku-Wehali is in fact situated in southern Central Timor, 
and was of  little or no religious or commercial interest to the early visi-
tors.
The new missionary attempt was hardly more successful than the 
first. At first, the king of  Mena seemed favourably inclined towards the 
Catholic creed. However, the polygamy that was prevalent among the 
Timorese elite presented a formidable obstacle to his actual conversion. 
Da Luz himself  soon discovered what so many later foreign settlers would 
experience, namely that the hot coastal climate was trying, conducive to 
fever, and unsuitable for temporary visitors. That the early European 
groups preferred to stay on Solor rather than Timor itself, is therefore 
no coincidence. Da Luz finally had to leave Mena after six months, ac-
companied by the son of  the ruler of  Mena, who subsequently followed 
his mentor on to Malacca. In the Portuguese overseas enterprise, it was 
a common tactic to place sons of  the elite in places where the Estado or 
the religious establishment wished to gain influence. Being brought to 
any of  the Portuguese power centres, these young were expected to adapt 
Portuguese customs and religious beliefs, in other words to become ‘lusi-
fied’ during an extended stay, and would subsequently be encouraged to 
work for the interests of  their hosts in their lands of  origin. In this case, 
success was slim although the sources insist that the prince was treated 
with all due respect. He returned to Mena in due course, under his 
baptismal name of  Dom João da Silva, but subsequently reverted to his 
ancestral beliefs, reasons unknown (Bierman 1924:37, 270). In a similar 
attempt and at roughly the same time, the king of  Luca – an important 
Tetun-speaking domain in south-eastern Timor – was baptized by the 
Dominican fathers. According to Godinho de Eredia, however, ‘owing 
to the neglect of  the latter, they [the kings of  Mena and Luca] became 
Moros and Idolators, as they always had been’ (Godinho de Eredia 
1997:254). The latter remark would indicate that Islam had gained a 
30 Wewiku-Wehali is not mentioned in the ‘Report on the Golden Chersonese or Peninsula’ of  Go-
dinho de Eredia, compiled in c.1600 or, in another opinion, in the 1620s. On Godinho de Eredia’s de-
tailed map of  1613, ‘Maibico’ and ‘Vayale’ occur, although with no indication of  their prominence; see 
Durand 2006a:80. A list of  baptisms and marriages by the priest Alonce Bourgois mentions under 1621 
a Cattharina from ‘Vaybico’ who married a Dutch soldier in Fort Henricus on Solor, following the VOC 
conquest; see ‘Memorije van de persoonen die alhier gedoopt en in den houwelijcken staat bevesticht…’, 
transcript of  a manuscript found in the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI). I am grateful to 
Diederick Kortlang, Leiden, who provided a copy of  this important text.
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degree of  influence in Timorese ports by the late sixteenth century. The 
formulation might be merely rhetorical, but half  a century later some 
of  the leading domains on the island would indeed prove open to this 
religion.
The Malaccan mestizo Manuel Godinho de Eredia is, in fact, the 
first major authority on Timor’s geography since Pigafetta. Of  both 
eastern and western origin, his mother was a princess from Sulawesi who 
eloped with a Portuguese seafarer under dramatic circumstances. As was 
still common at the time, his treatises and maps presented an intriguing 
mix of  fact and fiction, with talking bamboo stalks and luminous dogs 
alongside sober observations of  civet cats and nutmeg. The ‘Report on 
the Golden Chersonese or Peninsula’, usually dated to circa 1597-1600, 
surveys the lands of  Southeast Asia, complete with notes on their useful 
products and political situation. Godinho de Eredia holds Timor in high 
esteem, not least due to the presence of  gold, always an interesting item 
for Iberian explorers: ‘It is one of  the finest and most prosperous of  all 
the islands in the Eastern Sea; for besides containing a great quantity 
of  white sandalwood, tortoiseshell, wax, honey, shell-fish, rice, grains of  
every sort, and many plants and medicine, it also has as its greatest asset 
many mines of  gold, tambaga suaça’ (Godinho de Eredia 1997:253-4). De 
Eredia identifies five sandalwood ports on the northern coast and eight 
in the south; a few other ports could readily provide honey, beeswax and 
tortoises as cargos for ‘several frigates’. He perceived the political condi-
tions as fragmentary, but with a certain hierarchy or precedence. Apart 
from the ‘emperor’ of  Mena in the north, there was also the ‘imperial 
crown’ of  Camenaça in the south, which had already been noted as one 
of  the major realms by Pigafetta,31 and ‘many powerful kings’ on Timor. 
Godinho de Eredia believed that they had grown rich from the trade in 
sandalwood and the mineral deposits on the island. What does not ap-
pear in his account is any description of  petty warfare and headhunting 
as mentioned in later sources – he does not warn his fellow countrymen 
of  safety issues of  any kind. This aspect is also missing in other texts dat-
ing from the early seventeenth century, where violent incidents along the 
coast of  Timor appear to be instigated by rapacious European ship crews 
rather than indigenous chiefs. There is no reason to believe that Timor 
31 On his 1613 map of  Timor, Godinho de Eredia mentions five places in bold text, thus indicating a 
degree of  prominence: Servião, Siciale, Lifau and Mena on the north coast, and Luca in the south-east; 
see Durand 2006a:80-1.
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was a particularly peaceful place in 1600, as indicated by the settlement 
pattern documented by seventeenth-century visitors. The villages tended 
to be modest in size and situated on mountaintops, which served as natu-
ral defences.32 Nevertheless, it is quite possible that intra-island warfare 
was stimulated in the course of  the seventeenth century by the interven-
tion of  foreign groups and the scarcity of  resources due to a deterioration 
in the global economic climate.33
arrival of the dutch
Detailed first-hand information on Timor is only to be found with the 
advent of  the Dutch in 1613. This event has been described by other au-
thors, and so it will suffice here to sketch the general context and outline. 
The Portuguese and Spanish visitors to Southeast Asia who, since 1581, 
had a common monarch, if  little else, in commmon, enjoyed a virtually 
undisturbed existence in East Indian waters during the sixteenth century 
with regard to European competition. With the exception of  Aceh, no 
regional power stood a chance of  dislodging Portugal from the system 
of  forts, dependencies and alliances that it constructed in maritime 
Southeast Asia after 1511. Nevertheless, the Portuguese weaknesses 
were apparent. Firstly, it was not a colonial ‘empire’ as such, despite the 
early establishment of  the Estado da Índia as a paramount organization 
centred in Goa. Portuguese authority was shared between commanders 
in the string of  forts along the Asian coastline, local congregations such 
as the Leal Senado in Macao, and, not least, among Catholic padres 
such as those on Solor. In Portugal’s eyes, the sea route was long and 
cumbersome and the viceroy in Goa was not known for bold initiatives. 
The Spanish-Portuguese union had a limited effect on day-to-day affairs, 
in spite of  the Spanish being strategically positioned in the Philippines, 
and did not necessarily strengthen the Portuguese positions (Winius 
2002:105-6). In addition, there was a chronic shortage of  manpower; 
32 See for instance the missionary account of  1670 as quoted in Teixeira 1957:452.
33 Middelkoop 1963:12-3 refers to oral traditions that explain this: headhunting was unknown prior to 
the arrival of  outsiders who brought the secret of  iron with them. It is difficult to know what to make of  
material recorded in the twentieth century, but it will be seen below that headhunting and petty warfare 
were, in effect, encouraged by the colonial rivalry between the Dutch and Portuguese. Reid 1993:291-8 
argues that the 1640s-1670s were very dry in a Southeast Asian context, with socio-economic conse-
quences.
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Portugal in the sixteenth century was small and sparsely populated, and 
the odds of  surviving the carreira da Índia – the passage of  ships to India 
– were far from good. A further embarrassment was the poor reputation 
that the Portuguese had gained in many areas for brutality and their 
overbearing treatment of  local grandees and populations. 
In this context, the first Dutch expedition left Amsterdam in 1595 to 
explore trade possibilities with the East Indies. In the wake of  fluctuating 
supplies of  spices and the withdrawal of  Portuguese distributors from 
the markets of  northern Europe, the young Dutch republic ventured to 
explore Asia. The enterprise was initially defensive, namely to get there 
before their rivals did (Van Veen 2000:146). After some years of  indi-
vidual pioneer expeditions, trade was finally organized into a joint-stock 
company that would soon become an Asian power in its own right: the 
VOC. There are certain similarities to the old Estado da Índia, but even 
more obvious differences (Subrahmanyam 1993:213). The position of  a 
Governor General operating from an Asian stronghold parallels the posi-
tion of  the viceroy in Goa, though he had resources of  a rather different 
dimension. After gaining Ambon in Maluku as their first stronghold in 
1605, and especially after gaining Batavia in 1619, the Company upheld 
a cohesive policy. While ultimately run by a representative board in the 
Netherlands, the Heeren Zeventien (henceforth: Seventeen Gentlemen), 
the Governor General and his council had a lot of  leeway in taking 
strategic decisions, starting local wars, concluding treaties, and so on. 
The various VOC posts in maritime Asia were expected to present 
economic accounts and to report on local affairs each year; the informa-
tion was analysed by the headquarters of  the Company and formed the 
basis for strategic decisions and allocation of  resources. In this way, the 
Company had the advantage of  both financial resources and adminis-
trative cohesion and was therefore able to evict its English rivals from 
almost the whole of  Southeast Asia by 1623. From the same perspective, 
it might well have seemed feasible to handle their Iberian adversaries 
in the same violent manner. Born out of  a desperate struggle against 
the Catholic Spanish monarchy, the Protestant Dutch republic turned 
violently against the very same subjects of  His Catholic Majesty with 
whom it had recently co-operated. The Portuguese loss of  Ambon and 
Tidore in 1605 was the first major blow and was soon followed by other 
violent attacks around the Asian coastlines (Vlekke 1961:119). However, 
the Dutch ascendancy proved to be slower than expected: as a trading 
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company, the VOC had no initial interest in holding vast areas of  land, 
although it did secure its access to trade routes in Asia through an evolv-
ing system of  treaties and alliances. This, however, demanded that they 
broke the chain of  scattered Portuguese fortresses, which proved to be 
easier said than done, for the Portuguese fought back with a dogged re-
silience that clearly frustrated their Dutch adversaries. Ideological factors 
should not be underestimated; it has been remarked that all members 
of  the Estado, from viceroy to domestic servant, probably held a firm 
belief  that God and their ancestors had won the right for the Crown of  
Portugal to dominate Asia, as laid down in the age-old demarcation lines 
of  1494 and 1529.34 As will be seen, Eurasian and certain indigenous 
groups in Asia displayed a strong commitment to the Crown of  Portugal. 
After all, the autonomous components of  the fragmented Portuguese 
enterprise – individual traders, missionaries, adventurers – could develop 
forms of  interaction with local societies during the sixteenth century. 
Such intermingling was initially less obvious in the Company, given 
the supervision of  its employees and dependents (Coolhaas 1960:226). 
In spite of  recurring Portuguese brutality, the Portuguese were tied to 
local rulers and traders through mutual interests, especially since the 
traders enjoyed military protection from the ‘white strangers’. Thus, 
the Portuguese were accepted in a number of  places in maritime Asia 
because of  the need of  indigenous groups for protection and the elite’s 
interest in obtaining economic and other advantages through trade with 
the Portuguese (Van Veen 2000:230). 
Consequently, the marked superiority of  the Dutch at sea was not 
matched by similar success on land. The first quick victories were fol-
lowed by defeat before the walls of  Malacca in 1606. In the Philippines, 
in 1610, the Spaniards were able to drive back a Dutch squadron; two 
years later, they launched a successful expedition in Maluku (Van Veen 
2000:187-8). As a matter of  fact, the carreira da Índia only declined in 
the 1620s, because of  socio-economic events in Portugal itself. It was 
not until 1636 that the Dutch Governor General took the initiative and 
waged a comprehensive aggressive attack on Portuguese possessions. 
In the decades following Portugal’s separation from Spain in 1640, the 
Estado finally crumbled, losing vital posts like Malacca, Lanka and 
34 Winius 2002:108. The treaties of  Tordesillas and Saragossa, concluded in 1494 and 1529 respec-
tively, divided the non-European world between Spain and Portugal through a western and eastern 
meridian.
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Cochin until the declaration of  peace in 1663 (Van Veen 2000:207, 230, 
232; Subrahmanyam 1993:178-9). By that time, all that remained of  
Portuguese jurisdiction in Southeast Asian waters was the very region 
that forms the focus of  this book: Timor and its surrounding islands.
Against this backdrop, Solor and Timor became hotspots soon after 
the beginning of  the VOC expansion. A twelve-year truce between the 
Verenigde Provinciën (hereafter: United Provinces) and the Spanish-
Portuguese crown in 1609-1621 had a very limited effect in Asia, and 
unabated, the Company continued to capture returning Iberian vessels 
(Enthoven 2002:40). It also systematically explored all profit and trade 
possibilities east of  the Cape of  Good Hope, preferably at the expense 
of  their Iberian rivals. From this point of  view, the sandalwood of  Timor 
was an obvious lure. Spices had been a main motive for Portuguese as 
well as Spanish explorers, but as the Company further investigated the 
economic options, it was drawn into the intra-Asiatic trade in local prod-
ucts. Already in 1609, a set of  instructions for the Governor General 
stated that the sandalwood from Solor and Timor was sought after 
throughout the Indies; under strict instructions from the VOC board, 
this trade was to be appropriated (De Roever 2002:110). Though not 
explicitly mentioned here, the Chinese connection was also significant 
because of  the religious importance of  sandalwood: it was used for mak-
ing incense and could be traded for attractive commodities like white 
silk. Burma and India were other potential buyers of  the fragrant wood. 
Solor and Timor also enjoyed a strategic importance. The conquest of  
parts of  northern Maluku in 1605-1609 made it desirable to secure the 
sea lanes heading towards western Indonesia.
The Dutch conquest of  Solor in April 1613 has been studied in de-
tail by Arend de Roever, and so it is not necessary to repeat the details. 
Suffice it to say that the Portuguese – whose defeat was hastened by the 
absence of  part of  the Timor garrison – were set strangely lenient con-
ditions by the Dutch commander Apolonius Schot. With half  of  their 
goods, the Portuguese were allowed to travel to Larantuka in eastern 
Flores, where they could be transported to Malacca, which was still 
Portuguese. This group of  more than 1,500 people included some 110 
white lay Portuguese and seven Dominican monks, the rest being of  
mixed or indigenous origin (De Roever 2002:119-26; Tiele and Heeres 
1886-95, I:12-7; Barnes 1987:222-3). The composition of  the group 
illustrates the way in which the Portuguese community was becoming 
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localized, something which was in no way impeded by their defeat. 
Larantuka was in the land-oriented Demon territory, which had long 
since tended to support the Portuguese against rebellious sengaji from the 
coast-oriented Paji group. The bulk of  the Portuguese group came to 
settle permanently in Larantuka, which, according to an illustration from 
1656, lay several kilometres to the south of  the present town, opposite 
the islet of  Waibalun (De Roever 2002:93, 129, 307). The new settlement 
was able to survive with little support from the Estado da Índia and thus 
secured a future for the Portuguese in the region. An important reason 
for their survival was undoubtedly due to their interaction with loosely 
Catholic groups, which were carefully enumerated by Apolonius Schot. 
On the tiny island of  Solor itself, the villages of  Lewolein and Pamakayu 
were Christian, as were a number of  places in Adonara; on the island 
of  Flores, the Christian areas were Sikka, Numba and native Larantuka. 
These places, totalling roughly 2,150 households, were each governed 
by a chief  and a priest who held most of  the authority. Since the cleric 
was familiar with the surroundings, he could incite the locals in favour 
of  the Portuguese cause, thus depriving the Company of  much of  its ad-
vantage. The locals were armed with bows, shields and swords, but also 
possessed a few muskets (Tiele and Heeres 1886-95, I:18). 
Meanwhile the Dutch settled in the abandoned fort in Lohayong 
and befriended the Muslim inhabitants who were inclined towards the 
Company. The five Watan Lema princedoms, or at least Lohayong and 
Lamakera, paid lip service to Christianity in the late sixteenth century, 
but had obvious inclinations towards Islam, as shown in the violent 
rebellion in 1598-1599 (Leitão 1948:103-6; Visser 1925:293-7; Barnes 
1987:221-2).
The type of  Islam practised was heavily mixed with local religious 
traditions up until relatively modern times,35 and according to the 
Dutch commander Schot, the country’s population under the sengaji was 
completely heathen. The Watan Lema had no problems in forming an 
35 The Dutch resident W. Greve, writing in 1886, mentions that Islam was practised in coastal kam-
pungs on Adonara, two large kampungs on Solor, one coastal kampung in Lembata, and three small 
kampungs on the north coast of  Flores; ‘however, with so little observance of  customs and forms [of  
Islam] that one may put them in line with heathens’ (ANRI Timor:91,Algemeen rapport (1886), f. 5). VOC 
sources used in this book indicate that this verdict is not entirely justified, since circumcision ceremonies, 
Muslim-style marriages, rejection of  pork (but not alcohol), and the position of  religious scholars are 
mentioned from time to time. Traditional belief  in spirits nevertheless lived on side by side with Islamic 
precepts (Pelon 2002:69; Temminck 1839-44:297-300). 
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alliance with the Company, whose representatives had no missionary 
ambitions in these waters and who were themselves violently opposed 
to the Portuguese. Their main ally was Kaicili Pertawi of  Lohayong 
(d.1645), who was the highest-ranking of  the sengaji and who was in con-
tact with the far-flung Muslim rulers of  Buton, Makassar and Banten, 
and with Mena on Timor. The Galiyao league in Alor and Pantar, which 
was partly dependent on the Watan Lema, also leaned in favour of  the 
Dutch, as did Ende on the south coast of  Flores: ‘These had a truce 
with the Portuguese when we came here; they have now risen against 
them, declaring to be subjects of  the king of  Ternate.’ 36 The purported 
authority of  the Ternate ruler in these waters would later support the 
Company’s claims in Solor and Timor.
What about Timor itself ? Since so few Portuguese sources are avail-
able, it is not possible to determine the exact date when the coastal 
domains began to consider the Portuguese, or any external power, as 
their superiors (Serrão and Oliveira Marques 2006:404). What we 
do know is that there were annual expeditions from Solor in order to 
trade sandalwood, and that the Portuguese did their best to exclude the 
Chinese and others from the trade, all of  which seems to suggest a de-
gree of  interference with the prerogatives of  the minor kings. More than 
a thousand bahar37 (some 124 tons) were exported each year to China 
and the Coromandel Coast. These expeditions could demand a lot of  
manpower; when Apolonius Schot laid siege to the Lohayong fort in 
1613, a force of  80 whites and 450 mestizos were in Timor to collect the 
wood, which was in fact the majority of  Portuguese men. There is also 
evidence of  diplomatic forays into local domains, as the king of  Kupang 
in westernmost Timor received a letter – which he apparently could not 
read – from the Catholic vicar on Solor. By the time of  the conquest he 
had already promised the Portuguese that he and all his people would 
36 Tiele and Heeres 1886-95, I:19. The Watan Lema and Galiyao leagues each contained five compo-
nents. The former consisted of  Lohayong and Lamakera on Solor, and Lamahala, Terong and Adonara 
on Adonara. The Galiyao princedoms were Pandai, Barnusa and Belagar on Pantar, and Alor and Kui 
on Alor. On Alor were also the princedoms of  Mataru, Batulolong, Pureman and Kolana, which were 
not included in the league; see Van Galen, 1946, No.26, Nationaal Archief. Watan Lema and Galiyao 
were likened to two hands with outstretched fingers (Barnes 1995:499). A Dutch report from 1847 as-
serts that the ten princedoms constituted a superior league, the Sepulu Pantai or Ten Shores, which was 
finally broken up due to internal conflicts in 1820 (ANRI Timor:57, Register der handelingen en besluiten, sub 
14-11-1846).
37 On Timor one bahar was counted as 200 catty, a catty usually being one hundredth of  a picul, or 
0,62 kg.
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convert to Christianity. That Iberian visitors were not always popular 
with the local population, however, is indicated by an incident during the 
Lohayong siege. Schot sent three ships to the Timorese coast in order to 
harry the enemy. The ships captured a naveta (minor sailing craft) carry-
ing 250 bahar (about 31 tons) of  sandalwood, and later a galiot (a broad, 
low sailing ship with oars), which was destroyed after the wood had been 
salvaged. The escaping Portuguese scattered and were subsequently 
molested and robbed by the hostile islanders (Tiele and Heeres 1886-95, 
I:15), which may in part have been due to previous Portuguese attempts 
to regulate trade.
Whatever loyalties there may have been to the Portuguese up until 
1613 rapidly seemed to evaporate in the face of  the Dutch conquest, and 
several kings along the coast of  West Timor were even overtly positive 
about the new situation. Schot mentions Mena and Assem, east of  the 
present Oecusse-Ambeno enclave, whose kings both declared that they 
were prepared to sell all their sandalwood resources to the VOC: ‘These 
are the principal and most splendid kings of  Timor; they are all heathen, 
in whom one finds more fidelity and will keep their word more than the 
Moors.’38 
In contrast with many parts of  Southeast Asia, the opposition be-
tween trading coastal communities and inland groups that delived 
products, was not particularly marked. In the pre-colonial system, trade 
was probably of  limited consequence for increasing power, so that in 
places relatively untouched by the Europeans a simple barter system was 
in place. According to an account from the early nineteenth century, a 
merchant would arrive with his perahu (small ship) at the coast and place 
small quantities of  his merchandise on the shore. The locals would then 
immediately come down with their own products, and negotiations using 
38 Tiele and Heeres 1886-95, I:20. Mena was apparently centred at the mouth of  the Mena River, in 
the borderland between the later domains of  Insana and Biboki. Assem or Asson is harder to place since 
the name does not seem to be in use today. On the map in Freycinet 1825, Plate 15, Assem is a place 
halfway between Mena and Atapupu, on the coast of  Biboki. According to later tradition, Insana and 
Biboki were originally counted under the large Atoni realm of  Sonbai, but separated at one stage (Sejarah 
raja-raja 2007:29-30). People in Biboki claim that their ancestors originally arrived from Mutis-Bobnain 
in the heart of  Sonbai (Neonbasu 2005:61). That there were ancient relations is clear, as the first docu-
mented Sonbai lord in the mid-seventeenth century was in fact an in-law of  the then ruling queen of  
Mena (VOC 1233 [1660], f. 721). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Insana and Biboki usually 
had a tie to the liurai, or executive ruler, of  Wehali (Brouwer 1849-50, H 994:c, KITLV). Their status was 
wavering though, and in c.1832 they claimed to stand under Amakono, thus within the Sonbai complex 
(Francis 1832, H 548, KITLV).
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gestures and signs would follow. Finally, the locals would pick up the mer-
chandise they had bought and hastily run off  into the forest, with barely 
a word being exchanged throughout the process (Moor 1968:8). With the 
increasing demand for sandalwood, which in turn required concerted ef-
forts on the part of  the Timorese to cut and assemble the wood, certain 
local leaders received new opportunities to shore up wealth and power 
via external trade.
In order to profit from the sandalwood, the aristocracies of  the do-
mains had to therefore co-operate with external groups. Once this had 
been arranged, political dependency would tend to follow, especially 
considering the small size of  the local polities and their low-technology 
characters. Various seventeenth-century sources suggest that the aristo-
crats ordered their men to fell trees and bring the wood to the coast, hard 
and back-breaking work that drew resources from other livelihoods. At 
the coast the wood was exchanged via the local king for fine gold, corals, 
Chinese luxury goods, and so on.39 The deliveries obviously required 
immense effort and were often subject to delays. Horses were ubiqui-
tous on the island but wheeled wagons were not, and besides, would 
have been of  little use in the hilly and notoriously difficult terrain. The 
process was relatively manageable as long as there were forest resources 
close to the princely centres. Towards the end of  the seventeenth century, 
however, access grew more problematic, with political and economic 
consequences. 
The existing conditions thus enabled resourceful external powers to 
gain an important advantage over local elites, yet at the same time, it was 
necessarily a case of  reciprocity. The Portuguese, Dutch or others had no 
means to monitor the collection of  sandalwood whilst they only visited 
the coast of  Timor. The local rulers had developed routines by the time 
the Dutch arrived, something which the latter found far from convenient. 
To quote a report from 1614:
One finds a very strange way of  doing things there. The Portuguese 
themselves are the reason for it, for they have made it happen for many 
years, and one must now follow it since one cannot wholly deprive them 
of  this custom. The Timorese are a people with whom one must get on 
by showing patience. When one comes there to trade one has to give the 
39 Tiele and Heeres 1886-95, I:26. The corals were used to produce muti salak, strings of  coral beads 
that were much sought after as prestigious gifts. 
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king and the nobles some gifts according to their old custom, which they 
call sirih pinang.40 Furthermore one must agree with them as to what one 
should give to the king as ruba-ruba, that is, as tolls, and as lonbebata, that 
is, as an anchorage fee, and other such things that they use. One must 
give them to him first, before one can make any of  his subjects deliver 
wood. Then they obtain his consent to sell it at the shore. It is then sold 
for a small price so that they hardly get any pay for their work. All the 
other profits come to the king and the foremost nobles. (Tiele and Heeres 
1886-95, I:101.)
All of  this may give the impression that the upsurge in the sandalwood 
trade benefited the executive powers of  the local rulers of  coastal areas. 
Whether this was to the detriment of  the old paramount Tetun kingship 
of  Wewiku-Wehali, as has been argued, is harder to tell.41 It is not impos-
sible, however, since the most accessible sandalwood forests lay outside 
the old political-ritual centre in southern Central Timor, in places like 
Mena, Sorbian, Amanuban and Batumean.
the hunt for sandalwood
The conquest of  Solor in 1613 was seen as a glorious and important 
victory for the expanding Dutch seafarers and their expansionist ambi-
tions. It seemed to promise a bleak future for the Portuguese settlers in 
Larantuka, who could not compete with the resources allocated by the 
VOC. A cornerstone in the VOC strategy was the Helong group in west-
ernmost Timor, with its centre in Kupang, in the bay that is today known 
as Teluk Kupang, or Kupang Bay. Unlike the other coastal lords, the king 
of  Kupang had some knowledge about Christianity and he reigned over 
‘a sound and capable place with an abundance of  all provisions’ (Tiele 
and Heeres 1886-95, I:92). Before 1613, the Portuguese had entertained 
plans to erect a fortress in Kupang, but the Dutch were content at this 
stage to maintain a close alliance with the king. However, the harbour 
40 Sirih pinang (chiripinangh, serpinão) literally refers to sirih (betel) leaves and pinang (areca) nuts, which 
are chewed together with lime to produce a mildly narcotic effect. It is a traditional gift of  deference, 
and may actually consist of  other items other than betel and areca. In present-day Timor, it is usually 
replaced by an envelope containing money.
41 Gunn n.y.:3; Schlicher 1996:97-8. Compare the critical stance of  De Roever 2002:85-6.
42
| Lords of  the land, lords of  the sea
was far from excellent, and the ships that lay at anchor were easily af-
fected by adverse weather. The best shelter was in the narrow strait be-
tween the Timorese mainland and Pulau Semau (the island of  Semau), 
not far from Kupang. The strategic solution was to maintain Solor as 
a permanent post for as long as the Portuguese presence remained. By 
keeping check on Kupang Bay, it was possible to control access of  foreign 
ships to the southern (‘outer’) coast of  Timor, which, moreover, was inac-
cessible to ships from April until November due to the monsoon season 
(De Roever 2002:290, 352). An interesting combination of  geographical 
factors thus set the stage for a future relationship between the Dutch and 
Kupang, which was to last until 1949.
In particular, it was the commercial empire builder Jan Pieterszoon 
Coen who attempted to use the sandalwood resources for his larger eco-
nomic strategy. If  a sandalwood monopoly could be achieved, it would 
‘force the Chinese into the silk trade, since they are just as crazy about 
sandalwood as we are about silk’ (De Roever 2002:144). In modern 
terms: it was a win-win solution for everyone, except the Larantuqueiros. 
The consequences for them, however, were not as far-reaching as the 
start would suggest, and it would take another forty years before the 
Company finally established its presence on Timorese soil. Meanwhile, 
the Portuguese positions in the Solor-Timor area recovered to the extent 
that they were eventually made the main arbiters of  political power for 
much of  the seventeenth century.
There are several aspects to this lack of  total Dutch success. There 
was a lack of  consistency in the Company policy on Timor, and in spite 
of  Coen’s protestations, the Solor post had to yield to other priorities. 
Already by 1616, with a recent defeat by pro-Portuguese people from 
Adonara on their minds, the Dutch stopped their efforts in these quar-
ters and evacuated Fort Henricus, the rebuilt Portuguese fortification in 
Lohayong. The Seventeen Gentlemen in Amsterdam preferred to prop 
up Dutch positions in Maluku, which became the base for Timor trade 
for a couple of  years (Coolhaas 1960:48; De Roever 2002:163). All this, 
naturally, provided the remnants of  the Portuguese establishment with 
an opportunity to recover in their base in Larantuka. Although the 
Portuguese stood little chance when they encountered Dutch ships in 
these waters, they did wreak death and destruction on the Company’s 
newly found Paji friends on Solor (De Roever 2002:166-7). Also, by sail-
ing via the islands to the east of  Flores, they could reach the north coast 
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of  Timor unnoticed by the Dutch (De Roever 1998:53).
Under Coen’s influence the Dutch re-established the Solor post in 
1618, and this time they held it until 1629. The book of  baptisms and 
marriages preserved from the small Dutch settlement demonstrates a 
social process similar to that of  the Portuguese community, with frequent 
marriages between foreigners and the local populations. Of  the 56 wives 
mentioned, 29 came from the Solor Islands, nine from Flores and three 
from Sawu. The religious identities were still not as fixed as they would 
later be: ladies from Muslim Paji villages like Lamakera and Lamahala 
bore Christian names and were united in legal marriage with Dutchmen 
and Christianized Asians. About eight wives were of  Timorese ex-
traction, coming from a wide array of  places on that island: Assem, 
Ade, Suai, Tico (?), Camenaça, and even the central area of  Wewiku. 
Likewise, a large part of  the Dutch garrison consisted of  Mardijkers, an 
ambiguous category, which in this case meant that free, baptized Asians 
served under the Company.42 The Mardijkers of  Fort Henricus origi-
nated from all parts of  maritime Asia – in one case Mozambique – but 
five were Timorese from Maucatar, Mena and Suai.43 A small number of  
Chinese also settled in Solor; the Dutch considered them indispensable 
as artisans and petty traders (De Roever 2002:182).
This interesting multi-ethnic community was not destined to last as 
long as its Portuguese counterpart. In terms of  weaponry and resources 
the Portuguese were no match for the Company, but nevertheless, repeat-
ed Dutch attempts to invest in Larantuka failed miserably. The frugal 
conditions on Solor actually made the Catholic community an alterna-
tive for dismayed VOC officials and soldiers, which is demonstrated by a 
number of  defections from Fort Henricus. The successive commanders 
Jan Thomasz Dayman and Jan de Hornay, unable to explain their acts 
in front of  their superiors, defected to Larantuka in 1625 and 1629 re-
spectively, and enthusiastically participated in machinations against the 
42 The Mardijker category is discussed in Blussé 1986:165. The term originally denoted baptized free 
locals from Maluku who had adopted the Portuguese language and lifestyle. In Batavia they were Asians, 
mostly South Asians, who had adopted Christianity and the Portuguese language, and were serving un-
der the Company, carrying out a wide array of  tasks and occupations. The name derives from Sanskrit 
maharddika, meaning ‘great property’; in modern Indonesian merdeka, ‘free’ (Harrison 2007:465). 
43 Memorije van de persoonen die alhier gedoopt en in den houwelijcken staat bevesticht, transcript of  a manuscript 
found in ANRI, provided by Diederick Kortlang, Leiden.
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Company.44 Immediately after the defection of  De Hornay, the fort was 
razed and abandoned, since the benefits did not cover the considerable 
costs of  maintaining it. 
The Götterdämmerung of  the Chinese Ming dynasty drastically dimin-
ished the demand for sandalwood in China. It was thought that the 
Timor trade could be maintained without a fort, especially since a sepa-
rate treaty between the local Dutch and Portuguese in the Solor region 
had been worked out in 1627 (De Roever 2002:194-8, 207). Business was 
however far from booming: between 1613 and 1632 the VOC traded no 
more than 17,000 picul of  sandalwood, perhaps the equivalent of  2,000 
trees (De Roever 1998:47).
The lack of  a decisive Dutch policy was apparent during the events 
of  the next decades. The Portuguese were able to reoccupy Lohayong in 
1630 from their Larantuka base. Although a considerable Dutch squad-
ron drove them out six years later, the Company preferred to leave the 
Solor-Timor region to its fate for another decade, a decade that would 
turn out to be a heaven-sent respite for the Portuguese mestizo communi-
ty in Larantuka (Boxer 1947:4). Several dramatic events finally made the 
Company change its mind about the desirability of  maintaining a steady 
presence in the area, but by then it was too late to take a resolute hold 
on the situation. Portugal finally severed its bonds with Spain in 1640, 
closely followed by the conclusion, in July 1641, of  a peace treaty that 
had been in force for the previous ten years. This treaty also happened 
to coincide with an outburst of  Lusitanian activity on Timor, fanning 
Dutch fears that their rivals wished to establish a ‘second Malacca’ on 
Solor.45 In spite of  the faltering sandalwood trade the VOC finally acted 
and regained their Solorese foothold in 1646 (Tiele and Heeres 1886-95, 
III:314-24). This time they would remain in the region permanently.
Portuguese resilience is another major factor that explains the lack of  
total Dutch success. As convincingly argued by Arend de Roever, the vac-
illating priorities of  the Company facilitated the steady recovery and lo-
calization of  Portuguese influence in the Solor-Timor region (De Roever 
2002:289-90). The small, fragile community in Larantuka was able to 
44 A later Dutch report, from 1689, asserted that Jan de Hornay was originally not a Dutchman but 
a Dane (‘een deens inboorling’); see Tange 1689, H 49:v, KITLV, f. 7. The legendary account in Müller 
1857, II:189, on the other hand, says that he came from Amsterdam. The two statements do not neces-
sary exclude each other; at any rate, Hornay is not a Dutch name.
45 De Roever 2002:244. See also Boxer 1947:4.
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survive, if  not exactly thrive, thanks to the Dutch failure to allocate suffi-
cient resources to their Solorese acquisition, especially after the death of  
Jan Pieterszoon Coen. This can be compared to the larger picture. The 
official colonial organization of  the Portuguese, the Estado da Índia, was 
dealt some severe blows in the early seventeenth century, but the bulk 
of  its Asian possessions survived the following decades, even though the 
VOC soon surpassed the carreira da Índia in terms of  shipping volume. 
The continuing state of  warfare between the United Provinces and the 
Crowns of  Spain and Portugal took the form of  a Dutch trial-and-error 
approach, with a number of  blockades, unsuccessful sieges and captur-
ing of  ships, but no purposeful strategy (Van Veen 2000:205-7). This 
was only put in place after 1636, when Governor General Antonio van 
Diemen initiated a new chapter in the long history of  Dutch-Lusitanian 
hostilities. Political changes in various parts of  Asia created new op-
portunities for alliances, which were soon taken by Protestant powers in 
Asian waters. The middle of  the seventeenth century saw a long series 
of  serious defeats and losses for the Estado, beginning with Malacca in 
1641 and ending with Cochin in 1663 (Van Veen 2000:207, 232-3). The 
bulk of  the losses thus occurred after Portugal’s secession from Spain. 
There was one place, however, where the Portuguese were not only able 
to substantially expand their power in the face of  the Dutch threat, but 
also repeatedly defeat military expeditions launched by the VOC. This 
place was Timor.
The sources for the development of  the local Portuguese community 
who achieved this feat are not abundant, but some conclusions can be 
drawn. Steady intermarriage with Lamaholot and Timorese women 
soon made the population more Southeast Asian in character than 
European. Fragments of  evidence from the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries suggest that the beliefs and customs of  the region were ad-
opted, or rather, inherited, by the mixed population. Though bearing 
their fathers’ Portuguese name, they were still linked to their mothers’ 
families and were accustomed to local adat (Paramita Abdurachman 
1983:110). This included customs of  warfare, such as headhunting 
(which may have increased among the Timorese due to foreign influ-
ences); the observance of  rituals, such as the shearing of  the hair at 
funerals; the adoption of  social conventions, such as the intricate system 
of  wife-receiving and wife-giving. While they preferred to be called 
Portuguese or Larantuqueiros, they were known to local populations 
46
| Lords of  the land, lords of  the sea
and the Dutch as Topasses (Topas, Tupas, Toepassen) or Portugés Hitam 
(Black Portuguese, Swarte Portugeezen). The two terms are used alter-
nately in the sources, and appear to have had roughly the same semantic 
connotation. Tupassi or dubashi is an Indian term meaning ‘man of  two 
languages’, ‘interpreter’, which is very likely the origin of  the ethnic term 
Topass.46 In India, Malacca and Batavia a Topass was someone with a 
Portuguese cultural background, either a mestizo or a person who had 
adopted Portuguese cultural markers;47 this meant an overlapping of  
the category with the Mardijkers.48 In the Solor-Timor region, however, 
Topasses and Mardijkers were different concepts, with the latter being 
partly ‘Dutchified’ and baptized as free locals in service of  the VOC.
In spite of  the adoption of  local adat and steady intermarriage, the 
Topasses were seen as distinct from the majority of  the population of  
Timor and the Solor Archipelago. In oral Timorese accounts recorded 
in the twentieth century, there are numerous references to kase metan, or 
‘black foreigners’. The missionary and ethnographer Piet Middelkoop 
thought that the kase metan must be Africans, who were later used by the 
Portuguese as soldiers; however, a comparison between oral tradition 
and documentary materials leaves little doubt that the phrase kase metan 
in fact refers to the Topasses.49 The denomination black (metan) does not 
allude to them having darker skin than the Timorese themselves, but 
should rather be thought of  as an opposite category vis-à-vis the kase 
muti, ‘the white foreigners’ (in the first place meaning the Dutch). The 
stories, recorded in areas that later became Dutch territory, often display 
a hostile stance towards the kase metan, who are associated with overbear-
ing and brutish behaviour towards the native Timorese and with ritual 
complications. If  a marriage between a kase metan and a Timorese were 
to be arranged, ‘a boar-sacrifice must be offered, in order to subdue the 
violence and death [originating] from the divine sphere’ (Middelkoop 
1968:112).
46 See Yule and Burnell 1996:328 and VOC-Glossarium 2000:116 for suggestions on the etymology of  
the word. The term is also possibly influenced by the Persian word topi, ‘hat’, since the European-style 
hats were important identity markers of  those who defined themselves as Portuguese; see Boxer 1947:1.
47 Yule and Burnell 1996:933-4. A mestizo would, strictly speaking, be the child of  a European father 
and an Asian mother. In a more extended sense it denotes the further descendants of  such unions.
48 The interchangeable nature of  the concepts is shown in the well-known illustration of  ‘a Topas 
or Mardick with his wife’, made from a sketch by Johan Nieuhof  in the 1650s (Nieuhof  1988, between 
pages 278 and 279; see also Hägerdal 2007a, between pages 20 and 21).
49 This is seen, for example, when comparing documentary sources with the legendary account of  the 
Dutch arrival in Kupang (Middelkoop 1952:223-9); see also H.G. Schulte Nordholt 1971:456.
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The ‘otherness’ of  the Topasses is accentuated by material as well 
as spiritual concerns. In the low-technology Timorese society, firearms, 
Western methods of  warfare and maritime skills had a severe impact; 
small detachments of  musketeers would play a decisive role in armed 
conflicts on the island. Similarly, the Timorese were generally afraid of  
the sea, a fear that was reinforced or even caused by the intermittent 
slave-hunting and raiding operations that were conducted by foreign 
groups. The mobility of  the seaborne White and Black Portuguese al-
lowed them to keep large stretches of  the coastland under control. The 
very bases of  their might would set apart the kase metan, the Topasses, 
from indigenous groups.
Religion is a factor that must not be underestimated either. In the 
relatively isolated Portuguese community, the fathers of  the Dominican 
Order exercised a form of  leadership that was both spiritual and worldly. 
They led military expeditions, directed the building and defence of  for-
tresses, regulated the sandalwood trade, and mediated – even initiated – 
conflicts.50 In spite of  the small numbers of  padres, there is no evidence 
that members of  the Topass group ever renounced their Catholicism, 
however syncretistic in character it may have been. There was obvi-
ously a degree of  religiously motivated antagonism against the Reformed 
Christian Dutchmen, although at times there was also a sense of  sharing 
the same religion – they were two politically significant, but small and 
rather fragile Christian groups. In 1767, a Topass leader made a heart-
felt bid for Christian solidarity when addressing the Dutch authorities in 
Kupang about co-operation.51
In spite of  the Timorese unsavoury legend of  Iberian oppression, 
it is apparent that localized Portuguese groups were able to forge links 
with local populations, initially leaving the Dutch standing. In 1623, 
Governor General Pieter de Carpentier complained that ‘the Portuguese 
[…] have taken and occupied the ports of  the north coast of  Timor 
before our people, with four frigates’ (Coolhaas 1960:142). Three years 
later there was a busy trade route on the inner (northern) as well as the 
outer (southern) coast, with frigates from Macau, Manila and Malacca. 
50 See Biermann 1959:262-5 for the pivotal role of  Frei Luís de Andrade in gathering the Portuguese 
moradores and defeating a Dutch-Solorese attack on Larantuka in 1620.
51 ‘I entreat Your Excellency to stay away and not encourage any of  the Timorese to best us Chris-
tians; for their only aim is to eliminate the Noble Company and the Portuguese Christians and become 
their own masters’ (VOC 3215 [1767], f. 665b).
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The sailing crafts approached Timor via the Muslim port of  Makassar, 
which was noted for its commercial pluralism. But there was more to it: 
‘As it seems’, wrote the Governor General, ‘[they] are able to win more 
inhabitants with spiritual weapons than we do with our soldiers, to which 
many places in India, occupied by the Portuguese or the Spanish, bear 
witness’ (Coolhaas 1960:226). As an antidote, De Carpentier proposed 
the introduction of  Dutch Reformist clerics to save the populations of  
the archipelago who were now ‘the prey of  the Papacy and the Moorish 
creed’ (Coolhaas 1960:226). In spite of  this, Dutch missionary efforts in 
Asia remained limited during the VOC period.
The Portuguese, on the other hand, made the most of  their meagre 
spiritual resources. The missionary forays to Timor in the sixteenth 
century appear to have been false starts, but some years after the loss of  
Solor there was a new flurry of  activity. The sources are highly subjective, 
providing a crude hagiographical image of  the spread of  the Word. Even 
so, they suggest that the Dominican padres were able to forge important, 
semi-lasting bonds with the local aristocracies of  western Timor. In this 
way, their achievements appear to confirm the words of  De Carpentier.
Since circa 1618, Dominicans visited the island of  Rote whose in-
habitants evoked mixed feelings: ‘good, friendly and forbearing, easy to 
convert to the law of  God’ according to Luís Andrada, but an immoral 
lot according to Rafael de Veiga.52 Andrada speaks of  an island overlord, 
one of  those who invited the padres. However, when the Dutch ap-
proached the island several decades later, it had been divided into a large 
number of  small princedoms or nusak, some of  which tended to ally with 
the Company while others leaned towards the Portuguese side.53 The 
Portuguese influence, traces of  which lasted until the mid-eighteenth 
century, seems to have commenced with these Dominicans.
From Rote it was a small journey to Timor, which could be reached 
in less than a day. According to legend, the pioneer missionary Rafael de 
Veiga, fed up with the Rotenese, stepped into a boat and let the winds 
take him to the Timorese coast by chance. He ended up in the Kingdom 
of  Amabi, which by then encompassed an extensive area east of  Kupang 
52 Biermann 1959:183, 1924:38. Rote was known to the Portuguese as Sabo Pequeno (Sawu Minor), 
while the island today known as Sawu was called Sabo Grande. This may seem surprising, since Rote is 
much larger than Sawu.
53 The earliest detailed enumeration of  nusak is to be found in Johan Truytman’s report from 1660 
(VOC 1223, f. 725a). At that time there were 19 of  them; the number varied over the centuries.
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Bay, known as Amabi Bay. In the next years, he and his brethren were 
successful in Amabi, Kupang, Amarasi at the south coast of  West Timor, 
and Silawang on the north coast. The Dominican chronicle maintains 
that the kings of  these places were baptized alongside large numbers of  
their subjects around the 1630s. In 1640, the number of  churches on the 
island was 22, and they were served by ten clergymen.54
It is not clear what this meant, as the sources do not have much to say 
about the methods of  the Dominicans, or the intergration of  Catholicism 
into local society at this early stage. What they do suggest is that the 
padres used the common missionary strategy of  initially targeting the 
highest aristocracy: the king of  Silawang was befriended by means of  
rich presents, and was eventually baptized (Biermann 1924:39; Serrão 
and Oliveira Marques 2006:402; Visser 1934:149). One should not deny 
the possibility of  there being a serious interest in Christianity among the 
local population, and it has been argued that Timorese culture, in spite 
of  its seemingly parochial traits, has good potential for the successful in-
tegration of  foreign influences (Yoder 2005:111). It is also likely that the 
religion and culture of  the overseas visitors were means of  strengthening 
the position of  the local ruler vis-à-vis his subjects. The ruler could also 
improve outward security through the friendship and alliance with the 
Portuguese that was a natural consequence of  conversion. Once again, 
we must remember that the domains, although the Europeans called 
them ‘kingdoms’ (reinos, rijken), were small and fragile entities with little 
or no shipping or advanced technology. This facilitated their acceptance 
of  Catholicism as an awe-inspiring symbol of  authority, intertwined with 
the prestige of  the Crown of  Portugal. Nevertheless, there was a degree 
of  competition for spiritual influence since Muslim visitors were also ac-
tive on the island. In the first place they appear to have been Makassarese 
from Sulawesi, a factalso borne out by a large number of  oral traditions 
that seem to relate to the seventeenth century.55 The competition in-
evitably led to incidents: the Catholic clergyman Cristóvão Rangel was 
poisoned by certain Muslims in Silawang, although he survived and later 
died in 1633 (Visser 1934:149). 
54 Serrão and Oliveira Marques 2006:402. An account from c.1625 states that there were several 
Christians in Mena, Amarasi and Kupang (Biermann 1959:183).
55 A number of  such traditions, which will be discussed more fully below, have been compiled by the 
aforementioned Australian scholar Peter Spillett in his extensive manuscript (Spillett 1999). The work 
was unfortunately left unpublished at his death in 2005. 
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Towards 1640, therefore, Timor was an island with a still largely 
autonomous political structure. To all appearances, foreign goods and 
ideas had a limited impact on the life of  the Timorese people, and what 
impact there was occurred mainly in the coastland. The way in which 
Timor was included in the global flows that combined inter-Asian re-
gional trade with European expansion is also interesting. From the last 
decades of  the sixteenth century, Timor underwent the transformation 
from embryo to global commercial system, with European shipping link-
ing the West, Africa, the Asian coastlands and the Americas. Timor was 
a small component in all this, due to the importance of  the sandalwood 
trade; Timorese wood ended up in India and South China on a scale 
that would have been inconceivable prior to the mid-sixteenth century. 
Like the rest of  Asia, Timor was affected by the import of  new plants 
from the Americas, one of  which would have a fundamental impor-
tance for the economy of  the island. Maize was grown in westernmost 
Timor by 1658, but must have been known for a long time before, since 
by then it was already the main crop.56 As a dry-land crop it was suit-
able for the local climate, though it may at length have rendered the 
Timorese food economy less varied. In sum, the period before the start 
of  direct European intervention provides an ambivalent picture of  both 
geographical isolation and openness to the outer world. It also leaves us 
with the paradox of  a localized Portuguese community that, due to a 
combination of  factors, was able to expand its influence to the detriment 
of  the VOC, in contradiction to the pattern in the rest of  maritime Asia.
56 VOC 1229 (1659), f. 854a refers to a harvest of  ‘jagons’ (jagung, that is, maize) which was ripe by 
March 1659. According to Boomgaard 1997:419, it is possible that maize was introduced as early as the 
sixteenth century in a number of  islands in eastern Indonesia close to the Philippines, though the refer-
ences are ambiguous. According to Reid 1993:19, it was established in Maluku by 1540, from where it 
could easily have reached Timor by way of  Ternate seafarers.
3
Traditional forms of  power
tantalizing shreds of evidence
It has so far been shown how external forces influenced the course of  
events on Timor until circa 1640, and how Timor can be situated in a 
regional and even global context. Before proceeding with an analysis 
of  how Europeans established direct power in the 1640s and 1650s, 
it will be necessary to take a closer look at the type of  society that was 
found on the island. What were the ‘traditional’ political hierarchies 
like? How was power executed before the onset of  a direct European 
influence? In spite of  all the travel accounts and colonial and mission-
ary reports, the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century source material for 
this region is not rich in ethnographic detail. The aim of  the writers was 
to discuss matters related to the execution of  colonial policy and trade, 
not to provide information about local culture. Occasionally, there are 
fragments about how the indigenous society functioned, but in order 
to progress we have to compare these shreds of  evidence with later 
source material. Academically grounded ethnographies only developed 
in the nineteenth century, but we do possess a certain body of  writing 
from the last 200 years carried out by Western and, later, indigenous 
observers. Nevertheless, such a comparison must be applied with cau-
tion. Society during the last two centuries was not identical to that of  
the early colonial period, and may have been substantially different in 
a number of  respects. Although Timorese society was low-technology 
and apparently slow-changing until recently, the changing power rela-
tions, the dissemination of  firearms, the introduction of  new crops, 
and so on, all had an impact – whether direct or indirect – on the struc-
ture of  society. 
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chiefs or kings?
In the Dutch and Portuguese sources of  the seventeenth and early eigh-
teenth centuries, there was never any question over the status of  Timor’s 
local leaders. They were kings (reis, koningen) who reigned over kingdoms 
(reinos, rijken). Smaller hereditary rulers like those of  Rote and Sawu, who 
were basically lords of  a few villages, were often referred to as regents 
(regenten) but even they were sometimes endowed with regal titles. All of  
this must be seen in context: the early Western seafarers were quick to 
categorize local American, African and Asian leaders in royal terms. 
Japanese daimyo, Thai chao and Burmese myowun were ‘kings’ to the early 
chroniclers of  overseas expansion. In the case of  Southeast Asia, the for-
eign visitors may have followed the Malay use of  the term raja, which has 
a much wider usage than to simply denote autonomous monarchs. In the 
late eighteenth century and beyond, the status of  these local monarchs 
shrank in colonial eyes, at a time when evolutionist and Eurocentric ideas 
began to make an impression on the Western mind. At the same time, 
the increasing technological disparity seemed to render local polities in-
creasingly irrelevant. The indigenous leaders of  the Timor area became 
known under lesser titles such as ruling princes (vorsten), minor princes 
(regulos) or quite simply rajas, something that is paralleled by the structure 
of  the source material. The voluminous VOC records highlight a degree 
of  interest in the affairs of  local Timorese domains (or ‘princedoms’, as 
I will also call them) up until the late eighteenth century, at which point 
the material becomes sparser. After the fall of  the Company, which took 
place between the early 1800s and the 1830s, very little information on 
indigenous local history is included in the official Timor records, which 
presents an insurmountable problem for the historian.1
Who, then, were the persons known as ‘kings’ to the Dutch and 
Portuguese? It is obvious from a brief  glance at the records that their ca-
pabilities greatly differed from the abilities displayed by those who ruled 
the realms of  Java, South Sulawesi and parts of  Sumatra, which could 
be just as large as European kingdoms. The sheer number of  domains 
on Timor was stunning, not to say confusing. A Portuguese report drawn 
up after 1769 mentions two major provinces: Servião and Belu (Provincia 
dos Bellos), situated in the west and the central and east of  Timor, respec-
1 This conclusion is based on a survey of  nineteenth-century records on Timor (ANRI Timor, K.43, 
various years) in the Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta.
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tively. Servião encompassed eleven reinos while there were no less than 43 
in Belu.2 Moreover, the exact names and numbers of  the domains differ 
greatly from source to source,3 giving the impression of  a complex of  
small and steadily shifting centres of  power that become increasingly 
fragmentary the further east one goes. In 1867, the ex-governor Affonso 
de Castro calculated that the population of  the Portuguese half  of  the is-
land alone approximated 100,000 people, meaning there were a total of  
a few hundred thousand souls on the whole of  Timor (Castro 1867:310). 
On average, therefore, a domain would have a population of  perhaps 
3,000 to 4,000 people, although there were significant differences in size 
between those domains in the east and the west.4 Looking at it from 
that point of  view, ‘chiefs’ would seem a better designation than ‘kings’.
Nevertheless, the Timorese domains should not be judged solely 
on their size, as their functionality was not necessarily in proportion to 
their territory or population numbers. Their variation in structure and 
leadership has been sufficiently elucidated by anthropologists such as 
B.A.G. Vroklage (1953), H.G. Schulte Nordholt (1971), Elizabeth Traube 
(1986), A.D.M. Parera (1994), Andrew McWilliam (2002), Sofi Ospina 
and Tanja Hohe (2002), and Tom Therik (2004). All of  these studies, 
it must be emphasized, mainly draw upon twentieth-century materials. 
The most ambitious attempt to uncover historical layers from an analysis 
of  late colonial data was carried out by H.G. Schulte Nordholt. Using 
methods drawn from structural anthropology to support his argument, 
he has pinpointed the structural principles embedded within the tradi-
tional princedoms of  West Timor. 
One important finding of  his investigation was the extent to which 
the ruler was tied to a ritual system of  precedence and power relation-
ships that descended to a local level: ‘The horizons of  the world in 
which the Atoni live and within which formerly nearly all social relations 
were confined, excepting some trade relations via the coast or via itiner-
ant Chinese traders, were restricted to the princedom’ (H.G. Schulte 
2 Faria de Morais 1934, Appendix:26. Note that Belu can also denote the Tetun-speaking area of  
Central Timor, the Belu language being equivalent to Tetun. Today, Belu is a kabupaten (regency) in 
Indonesian Timor.
3 Compare the lists in Freycinet (1825) and the Sarzedas document of  1811, cited in Castro 1867:202-3.
4 The Dutch commissioner Emanuel Francis drew up a report in 1832 in which he estimated the 
number of  able-bodied men in the various Timorese domains; he multiplied this number by four to 
reach the total population size. Francis thus calculated that there were circa 439,000 people on the island, 
about twice De Castro’s estimate; see Francis 1832, H 548, KITLV. It is difficult to assess the reliability 
of  Francis’s estimates, but the two sources suggest an overall population of  well below half  a million.
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Nordholt 1971:186). The ruler was a necessary central component of  
the system, but his executive powers were not usually extensive. His 
main task was an inactive one: to eat, drink and sleep in his abode, in 
the centre of  the realm. The domains studied by H.G. Schulte Nordholt 
usually had a dual structure based on a common Timorese perception 
of  opposition between the ‘male’ (mone) and the ‘female’ (feto) element. 
The inactive, resting lord of  the realm would be female – notwithstand-
ing his or her actual sex – while an active, executive regent would be 
male. The male-female opposition, moreover, was highly situational: a 
component of  society could be male in one respect and female in an-
other. Furthermore, the territory or manpower of  the realm was often 
subjected to a pattern of  bipartition or quadripartition, with one aristo-
cratic lord or regent (usif in Dawan) leading each division. The use of  
spatial terminology is important in envisioning this socio-political model.
In H.G. Schulte Nordholt’s scheme (1971:403), power was shored up 
fourfold within the princedoms: it was a political system that rested on 
ritual relationships expressed in rites and myths; it was consolidated by 
a network of  kinship and marriage relations, which could help a ruling 
lineage expand its sphere of  power;5 it was maintained by tributes and 
gifts of  agricultural products; and it was either strengthened or weakened 
by the perpetual petty warfare that tended to plague the islands of  East 
Indonesia. In line with this, Andrew McWilliam has recently suggested 
that groups used the ubiquitous custom of  headhunting to build up a 
position of  political centrality (McWilliam 1996). At the same time, the 
data for the pre-1900 period suggest that power was seldom stable. The 
VOC documents abound with conflicts concerning the borders of  the 
princedoms and, sometimes, their sub-divisions. The documents also 
show that the smaller groups within the princedoms had a strong ten-
dency to vote with their feet if  the political leadership was not to their 
satisfaction. While migrations of  dissatisfied groups of  people are known 
to have taken place in central agricultural regions like Java, the lack of  
labour-intensive sawah cultivation presumably facilitated the numerous 
Timorese movements (Ricklefs 1981:500-1). Over the centuries, a large 
number of  Timorese groups offered to submit to or ally themselves with 
5 Fox 1999:10 notes that it was common among ruling Atoni clans to marry off  their male members 
into various settlements within the territory. In accordance with the Timorese system, the wife-giving 
clan would enjoy a position of  symbolic precedence, but equally, they would be politically attached to the 
ruling clan.
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the Dutch on Timor in order to fight off  an obnoxious overlord, which is 
illustrative of  the way in which allegiances could quickly change. There 
are also cases of  ‘men of  prowess’ who built up an individual power base 
and went against the established adat .6 The principles of  the society’s 
structure may suggest a self-perpetuating system, but in practice they 
were quite regularly violated.
H.G. Schulte Nordholt in particular based his study on Insana, a 
Dawan-speaking princedom in the north of  West Timor, thought to 
display archaic features until a late date – colonial rule was only imple-
mented in 1915. Before discussing the variation in Timorese political or-
ganization, it is worth summarizing his findings. In symbolical terms, the 
domain was organized according to spatial orientation, ritual opposites 
and kinship units. The basic territorial unit was the hamlet, known as kuan 
or lopo. A hamlet would be inhabited by the lineage of  a clan, called ume 
(a word also meaning house, compare to Malay rumah). This clan worked 
an area of  land, using it as directed by a tobe, or custodian. H.G. Schulte 
Nordholt found traces of  a quadripartition where theoretically four ham-
lets would form a village, although the reality did not usually conform to 
the theory. The head of  a lineage was known as amaf, and one of  these 
amaf would also serve as the tobe for the whole village.7 Such a person was 
known in European accounts as a temukung, a term that is actually derived 
from the Malay-Javanese noble title tumenggung. Some eight to twelve vil-
lages in turn constituted one quarter of  the princedom of  Insana. These 
quarters were originally led by the so-called four fathers, each of  which 
was titled amaf  naek, meaning ‘great father’. They were genealogical head-
men who were at the same time tobe naek, ‘great custodians’. This meant 
that they controlled land in their quarter and oversaw the rituals emanat-
ing from the princely centre. One of  their tasks was to collect poni pah, 
harvest gifts for the centre. In colonial times the Portuguese gave them the 
title of  kapitan, ‘captain’,8 but generally, VOC sources about Timor are 
vague regarding titles; they variously speak of  grand temukung, regents or 
even sub-kings, by which they probably mean amaf  naek, but which could 
also refer to usif, ‘noble assistants of  the palace’.
6 Some cases from the late eighteenth century will be discussed in Chapter X. Indigenous traditions 
about migrations of  Timorese groups are found in Middelkoop 1952 and Middelkoop 1968.
7 H.G. Schulte Nordholt 1971:186-8; Schulte Nordholt 1947. Insana is also studied in Cunningham 
1965.
8 H.G. Schulte Nordholt 1971:190. Kapitan derives from the Portuguese word capitão.
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These four components then formed the two halves of  the realm. 
Finally, in the centre of  the princedom, between these two halves, lay the 
sonaf, the ruler’s residence. It was quite in accordance with his ascribed 
role that he was known as atupas, ‘he who sleeps’. At his side he had an 
executive palace chief, known as kolnel, ‘colonel’, yet another Portuguese 
concept. Moreover, four lords or usif, one per quarter, also assisted the 
princely centre of  the ruler. The usif originally lived at the centre, as can 
be seen by the placement of  their sacrificial poles (tola ana). These items, 
essential to the rituals, were placed around the large sacrificial pole of  
the ruler. Clark Cunningham has pointed out that the lordship of  Insana 
‘united clans in a territory but should not supersede their interests, and 
compensation between local lineages, not fines to the lord, resolved dis-
putes’ (Cunningham 1965:375). 
After the implementation of  colonial rule in the early twentieth 
century, much was changed in the princedom. The usif became district 
heads or fettor at the expense of  the amaf  naek. Meanwhile, the old kolnel 
lineage was ousted from power while a new powerful lineage, Taolin, 
became officially appointed rajas; the old atupas line faded into relative 
obscurity. It is evident that the Dutch of  the late colonial period preferred 
a bureaucratic structure, and a raja with executive powers (H.G. Schulte 
Nordholt 1971:189, 212, 227-9).
This brief  summary leaves out many niceties of  the system, but may 
give a rough idea of  how a ‘traditional’ princedom might have been or-
ganized. It is nevertheless important to remember that different domains 
could exhibit considerable variations. In Amanuban, another Atoni 
princedom that has been studied by Andrew McWilliam, there was no 
diarchic structure at the centre – a ‘female’ ritual ruler and a ‘male’ ex-
ecutive regent – at least not by the nineteenth century. Rather, the ruler 
controlled the ritual functions that were understood to guarantee pros-
perity in the realm as well as active governance. The usif were controlled 
by the ruler, and the four amaf  naek could not secure a strong place within 
the domain. This variance may be due to political reshuffling; traditional 
stories suggest that a new dynasty of  Rotenese origin seized power in the 
past, possibly in the seventeenth century.9 
The system of  governance was also dependent on the local inheri-
tance system. Throughout Timor, the position of  the mother is an im-
9 McWilliam 2002:65-6. My own findings indicate that a ruling line might have expired c.1736 when 
the Amanuban elite approached the king of  Amabi to be their suzerain lord (VOC 2383 [1736], f. 108).
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portant factor in determining the inheritance of  a lordship, as is clearly 
demonstrated by records from the VOC period. The Helong and Atoni 
peoples of  West Timor have a system that is basically patrilineal, but 
where the relationship between the bride-giving and bride-taking fam-
ily (with a Malay-Tetun term, barlaque) is of  prime importance.10 This is 
visible in the princely pedigrees that have been preserved; certain noble 
families had the privilege of  providing a prince with a bride, generation 
after generation. As was the case in much of  the archipelago, a marriage 
bestows a symbolic precedence on the family giving away the bride vis-
à-vis the new family. The bride-price, belis, is a part of  all this: failure by 
the bride-groom and his family to pay a substantial belis over a period of  
time means that the children of  the marriage can be claimed back by the 
bride’s family – in other words, a matrilineal feature within a patrilineal 
system. Documentary sources reveal that not even princely families were 
spared from such claims.11 It was also a common practice that one child 
in a set of  siblings was returned to his, or her, maternal clan as a part 
of  the marital exchange (Fox 1999:9). Among the Tetun of  South Belu, 
where Wewiku-Wehali is situated, the system is clearly matrilinear, but 
sometimes, as with the Bunaq of  Central Timor, the system contains 
elements of  both.
Can these domains, therefore, be termed ‘kingdoms’ or ‘early states’, 
and their lords ‘kings’? A comprehensive debate has surfaced about the 
early state in recent years, and one may do well to refer to Henri Claessen 
and Jarich Oosten’s discussion of  the formation of  early states. As they 
point out, the manner in which early states were governed depends on 
a system of  delegation of  tasks and power. In such a system, the central 
leaders and the local leaders vie for power, the former favouring central-
ization whereas the latter favour decentralization. This will result in the 
search for a balanced system, but also in competition for offices. Claessen 
and Oosten point out four basic conditions that enable a state organiza-
tion to develop (Claessen and Oosten 1996:4-5). Firstly, there should be 
a sufficient number of  people to form a complex and stratified society. 
This criterion is partly fulfilled in the pre-1900 Timorese domains, in 
10 Barlaque derives from Malay berlaki, ‘to be married to a man’. Note that barlaque was important in 
other parts of  Timor as well. For convenience sake, the term is used in this book on a Timor-wide level.
11 ANRI Timor:59, Register der handelingen en besluiten, sub 29-4-1850, cites a case where three princes 
of  Amanuban became princes of  Sonbai, since the belis had never been paid for their mother, Maria 
Elizabeth Nisnoni of  Lesser Sonbai.
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respect of  which there is detailed information available. Although the 
population merely consisted of  a few thousand people, or, at the most, 
tens of  thousands, an elaborate hierarchy of  offices and lineages can be 
discerned. Whether the Timorese system included a ‘nobility’ has been 
debated, since not all members of  a clan that produced usif or amaf  
naek retained a privileged status. At any rate, it is clear that genealogical 
factors were decisive in determining the status of  an individual, so that 
social stratification and political hierarchy paralleled each other.12
A second condition is control over a particular territory. This does not 
mean that the territory is self-sufficient; control over an insufficient area 
of  land may motivate expansion and conquest. Here, too, the Timorese 
domains partly match the prerequisite condition. As in several areas of  
the archipelago, the polity was based on a number of  personal relation-
ships and a greatly fragmented control over manpower, held together by 
a ritualized system (Henk Schulte Nordholt 1996:4-11, 149). The exact 
area of  settlement was constantly changing in response to political and 
economic opportunities, but the documents also point to an awareness 
of  the borders of  the realm. The Timorese informers would, at times, 
describe border claims in great detail to their Dutch allies. This is also 
demonstrated by the existence of  gate (pintu, eno) settlements that mark 
the boundary markers of  the princedom or the smaller district.13 As 
remarked by Jim Fox, domains mentioned in the sixteenth century were 
still viable entities in the twentieth century, showing the ability of  the 
polities to survive and maintain strong links with the land (Fox 2000:18).
Thirdly, there should be a system that harvests part of  the produc-
tion surplus and distributes it to those carrying out specialized roles and 
the privileged groups. Such a system indeed occurred in the Timorese 
princedoms, where ritualized harvest gifts are mentioned as far back as 
the mid-seventeenth century, as are the contributions, called tuthais. A 
12 H.G. Schulte Nordholt 1971:382. For Belu, Vroklage (1953, I:547) has noted the distinction of  the 
noble ‘estates’ (Standen) known as dasi (the full-fledged princely persons) and usi (the lords of  lower rank) 
vis-à-vis the broader strata of  society. The bona fide dasi must have had princely blood on the paternal 
and maternal side. Likewise, in 1760, the executive regent of  Greater Sonbai emphasized to the Dutch 
the importance of  the ruler being of  good blood on both sides: ‘According to our laws nobody can be-
come an emperor who is not sprung from royal blood on the side of  the father and the mother’ (VOC 
2991 [1760], n.p.).
13 Compare McWilliam 2002:111. The border between the VOC-Helong complex and Amarasi was 
carefully delineated in a report from 1692. From north to south, it purportedly ran via Oypahak, Icanfot-
ty, Fattoemetan, Wanilawa, Wonnameke, Oynenopotty, Omackphenou, Tuaha, Massipalak, Fattoeheo, 
Waemina, Nimanette, Taymettan, Pilinaussy, Tamwenno, Poukay and Asiasi (VOC 1516 [1692]).
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comprehensive system that involved the various levels of  society had 
therefore evolved before the onset of  colonial influence. The sandalwood 
trade generated income for the elites, which in turn encouraged a system 
that made the local settlements collect wood, or, failing that, beeswax, 
honey, gold, turtle-shell and slaves. 
Last but not least, the development of  a state demands an ideology 
that offers a rationale for the unequal distribution of  wealth and the 
existence of  hierarchies and elite groups. On the one hand, ideologies 
may be seen as superstructures of  a material, socio-economic base; on 
the other hand, they can be considered a central element in the evolu-
tion of  a socio-political system, highly embedded in society. In that 
sense, they are on a par with the economic, demographic and economic 
aspects of  a community (Claessen and Oosten 1996:15-6). In terms of  
Timor, ideologies are elaborated in ways which have been explored in 
substantial detail by H.G. Schulte Nordholt (1971), Parera (1994) and 
Neonbasu (2005). As exemplified by Biboki on the north coast, the king is 
the centre of  a symbolic complex, which sees him as the ‘trunk’, a central 
figure that brings good life and blessings. In this capacity, he embraces 
the cosmos throughout his lands and does not err in his actions. He is 
thus a sacred and superior figure, yet at the same time, is expected to act 
humbly and benefit the people (Neonbasu 2005:198-203). This suggests 
an imagery of  lordship that goes further than the level of  chiefdom. 
The lack of  literacy motivated a comprehensive bank of  oral ‘knowl-
edge’ about the past, what may be termed myths and legends. This body 
of  knowledge set out the origins of  the current order of  society. In the 
parochial outlook of  the subjects of  the Timorese domains, such nar-
ratives explained the founding of  a princedom, the origins of  a ruler, 
the establishment of  the usif families, the relation between the elites and 
the local communities, and so on. Such narratives were not fixed, but 
tended to alter its contents according to the circumstances; in this way, 
the performance of  oral tradition was a highly political act. It was also 
institutionalized, so that particular spokesmen and tradition experts – 
mafefa among the Atoni, makoan among the Tetun – were entrusted the 
task of  preserving the ‘correct’ version. The idea that the current order 
of  a polity was founded in mythical conditions is very common in the 
eastern part of  the Southeast Asian Archipelago (Therik 2004:77).
In sum, Timorese polities, for all their internal competition, con-
tained elements which in certain respects placed them in the early-state 
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category.14 Considering their small and non-centralized character, the 
terms ‘princedom’ and ‘domain’ will be used throughout this work. In 
accordance with contemporary European usage, the heads of  these 
princedoms will be termed ‘kings’ in order to clearly distinguish them 
from the executive regents. The most detailed material for the pre-1900 
situation pertains to the western princedoms, which tended to be larger 
than the eastern ones. Whatever early Portuguese material there is at 
hand, however, suggests that the basic organizational framework was 
comparable throughout the entire island.15 At the same time, it must be 
emphasized that the administrative details and capabilities of  the elite 
were altered during successive centuries. In a way, the rulers became 
‘kings’ or ‘rajas’, or even ‘emperors’, because the foreigners chose to 
honour them as such. As mentioned earlier, the increase in the trade 
of  sandalwood must have altered conditions in the coastal princedoms, 
since it provided new sources of  income for the elite. The same goes for 
the import of  Portuguese-Catholic symbols of  authority, which were 
soon deeply embedded in collective values and underpinned the posi-
tion of  the elites in various ways. The Dutch influence after the mid-
seventeenth century was important in defining the power capabilities 
of  its local allies. The dissemination of  firearms could either strengthen 
or, equally, eradicate the princedoms. Finally, with the dawn of  the 
twentieth century, the colonial authorities deconstructed the princedoms 
in East Timor, and transformed them into zelfbesturende landschappen (self-
ruling territories) in West Timor, motivated in both cases by concerns 
of  colonial exploitation and governance. This, however, is a process that 
cannot be described in detail in the present work.16
wehali – the centre
Hitherto, we have spoken of  Timorese polities as being comparatively 
small, a feature they share with most regions of  the eastern archipelago. 
However, there were also politico-ideological structures that surpassed 
14 In the same way, Andrew McWilliam, working with late colonial sources, argues that ‘the concept 
of  state, or some allied form of  federated political order, has a tradition in Timor that predates colonial 
meddling’ (McWilliam 1996:162).
15 See in first instance Ospina and Hohe 2002:17-37; Traube 1986.
16 In an Indonesia-wide context, the process is chronicled by Bongenaar 2005.
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the limited area of  the princedom. Like the Minangkabau kingship of  
Pagaruyung in Sumatra, and the Dewa Agung of  Klungkung on Bali, 
they were ‘kingdoms of  words’, which to the colonials seemed to be 
irrelevant and lacking in real authority, but which did enjoy a lasting 
importance in regional political culture (Wiener 1995; Drakard 1999). In 
terms of  symbolic classification, the most important polity on the island 
was Wehali or, to use its double-barrelled name, Wewiku-Wehali. In the 
first place it represented the Tetun people who settled in Central Timor 
and parts of  East Timor, and who enjoyed a politically and culturally 
prominent island-wide role. By extension, Wehali was considered the ‘na-
vel’ of  Timor, and its ritual origin-house is conceptually the origin-house 
of  the peoples of  the world (Therik 2004:91-3, 175).
Considering the turbulent history of  the island, Wehali may seem 
an unlikely location for a central place. It is situated in the alluvial 
plain in southern Central Timor, in the modern regency of  Belu, an 
area suitable for the cultivation of  a variety of  crops; it therefore has 
good economic preconditions in comparison with other parts of  Timor 
(Therik 2004:33). These advantages have no doubt contributed to the 
prominence of  Wehali in historical terms. However, the flat land is dif-
ficult to defend and lacked fortifications. It is regarded as ‘female’ land 
(rai feto), which is in opposition to the surrounding ‘male’ mountain ter-
ritories, and the likewise ‘male’ ocean in the south. In spite of  violent 
interventions by the Portuguese (in 1642, 1665, 1677 and 1759) and 
the Dutch (in 1899 and 1906), its female character has not abrogated 
its great symbolic importance. On the contrary, its function as a revered 
ritual centre has apparently helped to preserve it, though it has certainly 
not emerged unscathed.
Pre-1900 data on Wehali are rare and often vague. From twentieth-
century materials, however, a detailed picture can be reconstructed of  
the ‘traditional’ institutions of  the realm. Unlike the common Timorese 
pattern, the Tetun of  South Belu were matrilineal, and the inheritance 
of  political positions was an intricate matter which has had implications 
right through to the present day.17 In the very centre, in the village of  
17 In particular, one may refer to the conflict that arose after the death of  the last liurai of  Wehali in 
2003. An early claimant to the (nowadays symbolic) position was met by counter-claims, causing him to 
leave the village of  Laran, the centre of  the realm. Personal communication with local informants, Belu, 
February 2008.
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Laran close to Betun, was the great lord of  the realm, maromak oan.18 
The title means ‘the son of  God’ and points to his role as a ritual head, 
watching over a set of  sacred objects. He was the archetypical inactive 
ruler, expected to keep the system in place by resting at its centre – ‘the 
one who eats reclining, who drinks reclining’. He was the ‘dark lord’, 
a term that does not carry negative connotations, but means that he 
represented the earth – a ‘female’ entity in contrast with the ‘male’ heav-
en.19 While retaining the supreme authority in the centre, he delegated 
power to realms in other parts of  Timor (Fox 1982:26). In early colonial 
documents the references to a ‘king of  Wehali’ are ambiguous, and most 
probably refer to the executive ruler of  the realm, the liurai. The office 
of  maromak oan is only described in reports from the late nineteenth 
century onwards, which demonstrates the poor European knowledge of  
Timorese ideologies in general, and Belu in particular.
The liurai was the active, ‘male’ lord of  Wehali. In contrast with 
the maromak oan he was the ‘visible lord’ through whom contact was 
maintained with the outside. The term means ‘surpassing the earth’. In 
modern times it has been used in Portuguese East Timor to denote rul-
ers in general; however, its use originally seems to have been much more 
restricted. Before the late eighteenth century, it appears to have only oc-
curred once, and then in the form ‘lieuw lay’ (liulai, a side-form of  liurai). 
In July 1732, the ruling queen of  Belu was referred to by this title when 
she sent an envoy to the VOC in Kupang.20 In the legends of  the Atoni 
of  West Timor, the term liurai refers to the ruler of  Wehali in particular. 
Liurai-Sonbai is moreover a conceptual pair among the Atoni, where 
the two dynastic terms denote rice and maize, the basis of  the Timorese 
farming economy. At least by the early nineteenth century the rulers of  
the Atoni Sonbai dynasty were themselves known as liurai – but this did 
not apply to any other Atoni princes. A widely disseminated version of  
history talks of  an early maromak oan, the father of  three sons who be-
came the liurai of  Wehali in Central Timor, Sonbai in West Timor, and 
18 A pedigree of  the maromak oan is found in Munandjar Widiyatmika 2007:51, drawn from a docu-
ment from 1928. It only encompasses eight generations and does not quite agree with the disparate 
Dutch materials. When I visited Laran in January 2005, Dominikus Tei Seran, the claimant to the 
liurai title, gave me a list of  maromak oan which was at complete odds with Munandjar Widiyatmika’s. It 
is somewhat surprising that the essential ritual role of  the title has not ensured more precise and stabile 
traditions about its history; the contrast with Sonbai in West Timor is apparent.
19 Therik 2004:xvi-xvii. Regarding the impossibility of  elevating the maromak oan to an effective execu-
tive function in the late colonial period, see Francillon 1980:252-4.









































   
   












































































































| Lords of  the land, lords of  the sea
Likusaen in East Timor.21 The three liurai were therefore the ‘assistants’ 
of  the maromak oan, who took charge of  the three parts of  the island. In 
that way, Wehali constituted the theoretical origin-point of  Timorese 
kingship.
The origins of  the prestige enjoyed by Wehali are shrouded in con-
tradictory myths and legends. One origin myth claims that the world 
was covered with water in primeval times, and that Marlilu, in Wehali, 
was the first land to appear when the water receded. This circumstance 
gave Wehali a status of  being the central point of  the lands.22 As noted 
above, in insular Southeast Asia, and especially in the eastern part of  
the archipelago, the notion of  a ‘stranger-king’ is important. The exact 
origin of  the immigrants to Belu is a moot point. An early document 
from 1836 argues that the Belu were descended from Jailolo (Halmahera) 
in Maluku (Kruseman 1836:15). This is interesting considering the 
hypotheses about early Central Malayo-Polynesian migrations from 
northern Maluku. These hypothetical migrations would have occurred 
over a very long period of  time, and may have left an awareness of  their 
distant origins in the collective memory of  the old Indonesian heartland 
(Granucci 2005:41). On the other hand, stories recorded in the twentieth 
century single them out as Sina Mutin Malaka, ‘the White Chinese of  
Malacca’. This group of  people supposedly set off  from Malacca on one 
occasion in order to find new means of  earning their livelihood. Bringing 
sacred items from their homeland, their boats eventually arrived at the 
fertile plains of  South Belu, via Makassar and Larantuka. At that time, 
the land was inhabited by the Ema Melus, aborigines armed with bows 
and arrows. These were easily worsted and expelled, and the newcom-
21 Spillett 1999:344; Fobia 1984:10-8; H.G. Schulte Nordholt 1971:391. An early version, which 
speaks of  kings (reis) rather than liurai, is found in a document from 1734 (Castro 1867:242-3). As dis-
cussed below, the tripartition Wehali-Sonbai-Likusaen is sometimes replaced by Wehali-Sonbai-Cam-
enaça or Wehali-Sonbai-Luca (Francis 1838:393). In West Timor there are other enumerations, which 
include a variety of  local Atoni ancestors among the brothers. However, the components ‘Wehali’ and 
‘Sonbai’ always appear.
22 Interview, Dominikus Tei Seran, Laran, 30-1-2005; Vroklage 1953, II:140; compare Munandjar 
Widiyatmika 2007:37-64, 109. One of  Munandjar Widiyatmika’s sources says that a woman, Laka Lo-
rok Meak, first appeared on Gunung Lakaan, which is actually in North Belu, some distance from 
Wehali. Her two sons and two daughters married each other, and one pair founded Naitimu. The other 
pair begot ten grandchildren who were established in Flores, Biboki, Insana, Lidak, Lakekun, Maucatar 
and Fialaran. Wehali itself  was thus left out of  this North Belu origin myth. In modern times spokesmen 
from this area have tried to downplay the precedence of  the maromak oan institution. Nevertheless, Dutch 
documents from the nineteenth century clearly suggest that Fialaran, Lidak, and so on, were subjected 
to the symbolic authority of  Wehali (ANRI Timor:54, Register der handelingen en besluiten, sub 9-5-1844).
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ers expanded their influence over the island (Grijzen 1904:18-9; Therik 
2004:53). The exact meaning of  Sina Mutin Malaka is far from clear, 
and at the moment there is no way to tell when the migration took place, 
as the pedigrees of  the liurai and maromak oan vary too much in terms of  
their content to allow conclusions to be drawn. If  the very name is as-
sumed to reflect historical reality, it would suggest the period between the 
founding of  the Malacca kingdom in circa 1400 and the first mention 
of  Wewiku(-Wehali) in 1522. The Dutch writer Grijzen in 1904 believed 
that there was indeed substance to the claim of  a Malacca connection 
since there were similarities in the respective adat of  South Belu and 
Malacca. Nevertheless, one should note that the Tetun language is not 
closely related to Malay, in spite of  numerous loan-words, but rather is 
closer to Polynesian languages.23 If  migrations did take place, it would 
likely have been only a small group, albeit one of  potential cultural 
significance.
What is certain is that the Tetun-speaking population on Timor 
enjoyed a historical precedence. The elite of  most of  Timor are con-
nected to Wehali in one way or another, and even where there was little 
actual contact, the oral tradition of  the princedoms of  the east and the 
west referred to Wehali as the ultimate point of  reference. It has been 
concluded that a military Tetun aristocracy subjugated Central and 
East Timor, subsequently introducing their political-ritual system over 
the island. This conclusion is supposedly strengthened by traces of  a 
superimposition of  the Tetun-speaking aristocracy, the datos belos, on an 
earlier theocratic local nobility (Thomaz 1981:58). Among the Atoni of  
West Timor, too, the aristocracies claim to have descended from Belu, in 
particular Wehali. 
In spite of  the exclusive position of  Wehali, its immediate sphere of  
power was not large. In the centre of  the South Belu plain lay a nucleus 
of  four princedoms, in line with the usual structuring principle of  quad-
ripartition. The Sina Mutin Malaka encompassed four sub-tribes, who 
settled in Wehali, Wewiku, Haitimuk and Fatuaruin. Of  these, Wewiku 
was the strongest component, the foremost ‘post’ of  Wehali, although 
it was not always on good terms with it. Fatuaruin was the seat of  the 
executive lord, the liurai, who is usually referred to as the liurai of  Wehali. 
23 Thomaz 1981:59. Vroklage (1953, II:153-4) assumes that the concept of  Sina Mutin Malaka arose 
from old trading relations, where the Chinese would be associated with the colour white because of  their 
comparatively fair skin.
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Outside this ‘female’ land lay three further Tetun domains to the east 
and north, called Lakekun, Dirma and Fialaran. The lords of  these 
princedoms bore the title of  loro, or ‘sun’. All of  the historical docu-
mentation that remains, implies that while Wehali had a strong claim 
to authority over these lands, it also had continuous conflicts with them. 
Further away, on the north coast, lay three other loro-ships that were 
also subjected to Wehali influence, although they were not Tetun, but 
Atoni or Tocodede. They were Insana, Biboki and Maubara. Even more 
remote, the liurai of  Sonbai and Likusaen, alternatively Suai-Camenaça, 
accorded Wehali a position of  precedence, although the consequences of  
this were both subtle and indirect. 
Nevertheless, Wehali will not, unfortunately, hold a major place in a 
study of  seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Timor. This is not due to 
any lack of  importance, but rather to the nature of  the source material. 
The Dutch as well as the Portuguese had limited interest in the tradi-
tional power structures, except when it concerned their own implemen-
tation of  power. The relative lack of  references in the documents shows 
that neither group made much effort to establish their interests in South 
Belu. The Portuguese did, however, instigate a rough geographical divi-
sion of  the island into two major ‘provinces’, namely Servião and Belu. 
These two terms are found in texts from the seventeenth century. In later 
documents, there are long lists of  reinos, which were attributed to either 
province.24 
Roughly, Servião encompassed the Dawan-speaking Atoni lands in 
the west plus the Helong domain of  Kupang. Although the ethnic terms 
Tetun and Belu are approximately interchangeable, the province of  Belu 
did not just include the Tetun domains; it also encompassed all the do-
mains in the east, where some fifteen different languages are spoken.25 
An early report from 1702 asserted that Belu constituted ‘the major part 
of  this island’ (a mayor parte desta ilha) (Matos 1974a:229). This inclusive 
geographical concept can be partly explained through the position of  
Tetun as a lingua franca of  the central and eastern parts of  the island – a 
vehicular language, to quote Thomaz (1981:54). With the exception of  
24 The intricate question of  the origins of  the terms ‘Servião’ and ‘Belu’ has been discussed in Häg-
erdal 2006.
25 Hull 1998:1-4 has identified nineteen languages on Timor and off-shore islands. Omitting Ndao, 
Rotenese, Helong and Atoni, which are not spoken in the eastern half, that would make fifteen. The 
linguistic map in Durand 2006b:47 shows seventeen languages in the east.
67
3 Traditional forms of  power |
the Fataluco-speaking eastern tip of  the island, Tetun was normally used 
as a second language in these areas. That must have been the case by the 
time the Europeans arrived, as seen from the mistaken belief  that the 
eastern lands spoke one language. This is found in a missionary report 
from the second half  of  the seventeenth century: ‘In this island of  Timor, 
there are only two languages, distinct from each other, which are called 
Vaiquenos [Dawan] and Belos [Tetun].’26
The Portuguese use of  the term Belu ultimately derived from the 
political and cultural prominence of  the Tetun, and as such it was a 
colonial device. The enumerations of  reinos in the Portuguese documents 
did not include the all-important Wehali. Rather, this polity was included 
in the other major ‘province’, Servião. Why this occurred, is hard to say. 
Perhaps the prestigious Wehali seemed more akin with the larger Atoni 
domains of  the west than with the small reinos of  the east. A Portuguese 
document from 1727 discussed possible ways of  strengthening colonial 
dominance through the establishment of  strongholds, further comment-
ing about Wehali: 
Besides, more can be done in the lands of  Vayale [Wehali] (part of  the 
Provincia do Servião), namely a frontier trench of  that province, well 
settled to cool down the enemy, the Larantuqueiros; and it will be much 
better than any inlet that can be made, and it is not very distant from 
Batugade and has the best security. That government delivers more re-
spect than other ones that conspire against it. (Faria de Morais 1934:67.)
The quotation implies that the Portuguese clearly understood the cen-
trality of  Wehali, and used this knowledge to prop up the precarious 
Portuguese authority. Astonishingly, Wehali was believed to have ‘the 
best security’, notwithstanding its vulnerable situation on the South Belu 
plain, something which may be explained, in part, by the great authority 
that Wehali still enjoyed, despite its political weaknesses. A few decades 
later, the Dutch opperhoofd in Kupang would point out Wehali as the ‘key’ 
to appropriating the Belu lands.27 
26 Loureiro 1995:147; see also Hägerdal 2006:52n.
27 VOC 8346 (1753), f. 43.
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sonbai
When speaking of  the western province of  Servião, there is an oft-
quoted passage from the ‘Instrucções do Conde de Sarzedas’, a lengthy 
memorandum written for the incoming Portuguese governor of  Timor 
in 1811: 
The island of  Timor is populated by native inhabitants, with a distinction 
between the Bellos [Belu] and the Vaiquenos [Dawan-speaking Atoni], 
in opposition to each other. They constitute, so to say, two provinces and 
two nations. In the eastern part the Belu inhabit the province called Belu 
[a provincia denominada dos Bellos], and in the western part the Vaiquenos 
inhabit the province called Servião. These two provinces are divided in 
kingdoms; Belu comprehends 46 more or less powerful ones, but all are 
free and independent among them, and have, according to lists drawn up 
in 1722-1725, 40,000 armed men, 3,000 [of  whom carried] shotguns and 
the rest swords, cutlasses, assegais and bows and arrows. The province 
of  Servião has got 16 kingdoms, which all recognize as their superior 
Senobay [Sonbai] with the title of  emperor [imperador], who is king of  
the Kingdom of  Servião, from which the province has taken its name. 
This province has got 25,000 fighting men, 2,000 of  whom were armed 
with shotguns and the rest with assegais, bows and arrows, swords and 
cutlasses. In that way the whole island of  Timor is divided into 62 king-
doms, besides the Kingdom of  Kupang which is at the southern point 
of  the island, where the Dutch have their fortress that bears the name 
Kupang. […] Over the whole of  the island is produced sandalwood, bees-
wax, cotton, tobacco, wooden containers, sea animals, kauri, rice, large 
corn, beans, corn, tamarinds, large cinnamon, coconuts, ginger, saffron, 
long pepper and salt. (Castro 1867:185.)
In this document, West Timor is an ‘empire’ where the so-called 
Vaiquenos, the Dawan-speaking Atoni population, all pay their respects 
to the overlord of  Sonbai. In this way it parallels the nomenclature of  
other colonial texts from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The 
Dutch as well as the Portuguese insisted on employing the title of  em-
peror (keizer, imperador) for the ruler, which obviously set him apart from 
the other lords on the island. Up until the late eighteenth century, when 
the title of  ‘keizer’ diminished in importance, there was no other ‘keizer’ 
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than the lord of  Sonbai noted in the Dutch documents. Likewise, the 
Portuguese reserved the denomination ‘imperador’ for the ruler of  Sonbai 
and, occasionally, the ruler of  Wehali.28 
There are a great number of  oral narratives concerning Sonbai 
in West Timor. Together with the liurai of  Wehali, the Sonbai lord is 
a major point of  reference and holds a place in the ritual language. 
Liurai-Sonbai are substitute words for maize and rice, the basic crops of  
the peasants, and according to a widely propogated myth, Liurai-Sonbai 
gave the people their main agricultural crops through a human sacrifice 
involving a sister, or a female relative, of  the two figures. The body of  the 
woman changed into maize, rice and other useful products (H.G. Schulte 
Nordholt 1971:55, 271). The reputation of  the Sonbai lords in folk tra-
dition is somewhat ambiguous. They are culture heroes who are deeply 
embedded in the Atoni view of  a mythical past. There are at least three 
sacred places on West Timor where sacrifices are performed and prayers 
said to the Sonbai lord, one of  which is situated at the rock of  Kauniki, 
one of  the old historical strongholds of  Sonbai, which is also seen as the 
‘navel’ of  Timor. As late as 1927, several decades after the end of  Sonbai 
rule in the inland of  Timor, a grand sacrificial ceremony was held in 
order to ask Sonbai for help against an invasion of  mice that destroyed 
the harvest (Middelkoop 1938:403-4). At the same time, however, there 
are stories that depict the Sonbai lords as a negative force, emphasizing 
their cruel and despotic features. 
It is clear that Sonbai enjoyed a political precedence, but this, again, 
must be seen in terms of  status rather than conventional political power. 
The Sonbai lands encompassed extensive territories in the inland of  
West Timor, more or less corresponding to the later landschappen of  
Fatuleu, Mollo and Miomaffo. However, the realm was cohesively weak, 
despite a few individual rulers who stood out in the sources as being 
personally active. Nevertheless, the Sonbai ruler generally followed 
Timorese political conventions, and was seen as an inactive figurehead. 
He was known by the titles of  neno anan (son of  heaven) or atupas, or by 
28 When speaking about the ruler of  Wehali, the early colonial records are not clear. In general, it is 
not obvious whether the maromak oan or the liurai is referred to – although one can assume that it is the 
latter – as the active component in the diarchy is alluded to in most cases. When the missionary H.A. 
Jansen met the maromak oan in 1892, the latter was also known as kèser, ‘emperor’ (Jansen 1893). The word 
is derived from the Dutch word keizer and must have been introduced later, after Dutch political influence 
began to disseminate in the latter half  of  the eighteenth century.
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the Belu term liurai.29 In his capacity as liurai or assistant to the maromak 
oan of  Wehali he was ‘male’, but as the head of  the Sonbai congrega-
tion he was ‘female’. The executive powers of  the realm lay with the 
‘male’ regents that belonged to the Kono and Oematan families. The 
powerful position of  the first regent is denoted by the term Amakono 
(Father Kono), which was often used as a synonym for the Sonbai realm. 
The other Atoni princedoms did not usually pay homage to the lord of  
Sonbai, let alone obey him, although most of  them saw themselves as 
related to the ruler in genealogical terms. 
According to the extant legends, the origins of  Sonbai are twofold. 
One version states that the first lord descended from the lord of  heaven 
(Uis Neno). Appearing on earth, he improved the means of  livelihood of  
the people, cementing his role as a culture hero. However, there is also 
a longer account of  the early stages of  the dynasty, which can be sum-
marized as follows below. This version is the one told within the princely 
family in the twentieth century; it was committed to paper by the local 
scholar F.H. Fobia (1984).30 
The story begins with the migration of  a Tetun elite group from 
Wehali, which was led by Nai Laban, also known as Nai Dawan. He 
was an eponymous ancestral figure representing the Dawan-speakers, 
or Atoni. He was the second of  three brothers, sons of  maromak oan. His 
elder brother, Nai Suri, was the forefather of  the liurai of  Wehali, while 
the youngest brother, Nai Taek, was the ancestor of  the East Timorese 
liurai-ship Likusaen (Liquiça). There are other versions of  the story, the 
oldest ones being those written down by Salomon Müller (1829) and 
Geerloff  Heijmering (1847), but all emphasize that the Sonbai ancestor 
was the brother of  the Wehali liurai.
Nai Laban, valiant by nature, was dispatched by the maromak oan in 
Laran to secure the source area of  the rivers that flowed down to Belu. 
He entered the hilly area in the company of  six chiefs and their followers. 
These chiefs then established themselves in various parts of  West Timor, 
and their congregations were thus the nuclei of  the later Atoni domains. 
29 These titles are only known from relatively modern writings. VOC documents only refer to the 
Sonbai lord as ‘keizer’. The Belu title ‘liurai’ for the Sonbai lord is documented from the 1820s onwards 
(Müller 1857, II:145-7).
30 F.H. Fobia is the son of  Nikodemus Fobia, who was the mafefa for Tua Sonbai, raja of  Mollo (died 
1959). Fobia received information from his father and the raja, and furthermore interviewed some 30 
experts on tradition in the inland of  West Timor. His account is therefore a digest, and presumably rep-
resentative of  the extant stories. For a published, abbreviated version of  this, see Wadu et al. 2003:17-65.
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Having surveyed the vast western areas, Nai Laban had a meeting with 
his elder brother in Wehali at the river Noel Bi Lomi, where his elder 
brother agreed to his right to govern over the mountainous lands. After 
some time, the immigrant lord passed away at Noel Bi Lomi. His son, 
Nai Natti, took over his prerogatives and maintained the bonds with Belu 
by marrying a lady from Besikama, situated on the southern plain. After 
residing in Humusu for some time, Nai Natti fell ill, but prior to his death 
he commanded his adolescent son, Nai Faluk, to continue expanding in 
the highlands, right up to the source of  the Benain River. When the liurai 
of  Wehali heard that the new lord of  the hills was still young, he sent two 
assistants to help him maintain his authority. They were Fai Bele and Ifo 
Bele, who arrived in Humusu with numerous retainers and cattle (Fobia 
1984:14-6).
Nai Faluk grew up to become a restless warrior, at one stage leaving 
Humusu in order to explore the mountainous lands. He departed on his 
horse, Bilu Oba, whose hoof-mark can still be seen on one particular 
stone – Timorese legends have a propensity to name animals, and to 
try and prove the veracity of  a story by referring to natural occurrences. 
On his journey, Nai Faluk carried a lance, a sword and a collar that he 
had inherited from his forefathers. He explored the area around the 
mighty Gunung Mutis, which at 2,427 metres is the highest mountain 
in West Timor. As a sign that he was to govern the land, he lit a huge 
fire, the flames of  which reached the sky. However, he had still not met 
any people. Blackening his body and equipment with soot in order to 
resemble the dark-skinned inhabitants of  the area, he headed towards 
the Noebesi River, where at a spring he saw two girls drawing water. At 
first the two girls shrugged at the sight of  the dark foreigner; however, as 
he washed away the soot, they became enamoured with the handsome 
young man. Realizing their feelings for him, Nai Faluk subjected the 
girls to a test. He asked the spirits of  his ancestors for help, and thrusting 
his sword in a tree, asked the girls to pull it out. Only one of  the girls, 
Bi Lile Kune, managed to do so, whereupon he thrust his lance into the 
ground. Again, she was able to pull it out whereas her sister failed. Nai 
Faluk then announced that Bi Lile Kune was the woman he wished to 
marry (Fobia 1984:16-20).
The father of  the sisters was a local chief  called Nai Ke Kune. Not 
only did he accept the marriage of  his daughter to the newcomer, but he 
developed such a strong relationship with Nai Faluk that he subsequently 
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named him his heir. The Kune family resided in Sabatu, but they also 
owned a residence on the slopes of  Gunung Mutis, which was known as 
the House of  Eight Pillars. Since it was situated at an altitude of  1,750 
metres, it was too cool there to stay comfortably, and so the residence 
was given to the chiefs Nai Jabi (Amabi) and Nai Besi (Amabesi). On 
one occasion, Nai Faluk went together with Nai Ke Kune and his two 
assistants, Fai Bele and Ifo Bele, to see the House of  Eight Pillars. When 
they stopped to rest, Nai Faluk asked Fai Bele to look for a spring to fetch 
water. Fai Bele failed to do so, but Ifo Bele was successful in locating the 
water. For that reason, Fai Bele was renamed Kono (to pass by), while 
Ifo Bele received the name Oematan (spring). When the party reached 
the House of  Eight Pillars, however, Kono defeated Oematan in a spear-
throwing contest, causing Kono (or Amakono, Father Kono) to become 
the first executive regent of  the princedom, while Oematan became 
the second one. The two regents married sisters of  Bi Lile Kune, which 
meant that the Sonbai, Kono and Oematan descendants were all united 
by blood ties (Fobia 1984:20-4).
After having received the lands of  Kune, Nai Faluk sent a bamboo 
piece floating down the Noebesi and Benain rivers, all the way to Wehali. 
The bamboo contained a message in the form of  a rebus, and reached 
the liurai of  Wehali with the help of  the ancestral spirits; the rebus mes-
sage said that Nai Faluk had now created a princedom in the uplands. 
Perceiving this, the liurai was quick to send new migrants towards 
Gunung Mutis. They were the Timau and Belumau groups, who origi-
nated from next to the Bunaq lands in East Timor. The Timau headman 
was subsequently renamed Foan (Amfoan), while the Belumau headman 
was renamed Benu (Ambeno), and the two groups initially settled down 
on the heights of  Paeneno-Oenam, where the House of  Eight Pillars was 
situated (Fobia 1984:20-2, 24-6). 
Nai Faluk’s son and successor was Nai Lele. It was he who adopted 
the name Sonbai (Sona’ba’i, Sonba’i) for the dynasty. Folk etymol-
ogy shows that the name derives from the name of  one of  the ruler’s 
residences, which resembled a boat turned upside down (sonaf, princely 
residence; bai, boat).31 Meanwhile, Nai Lele Sonbai called his realm 
Oenam, after the eight-pillared residence of  ritual importance that was 
31 Müller (1857, II:151) shows Sonabai to derive from sona (stab) and bai (much). The various sugges-
tions for the origins of  the name Sonbai have been summarized in Munandjar Widiyatmika 2007:72-4. 
The only conclusion that we can draw from this is that the exact roots remain unknown. 
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considered to be the centre of  the realm. Nai Lele Sonbai in particular 
is portrayed as a culture hero; his name means ‘plantation’. He ordered 
the population under his rule to settle down in fixed places, rather than 
roaming the mountains and forests. He also developed agriculture by 
teaching people to construct proper plantations, stopped erosion by using 
various devices, and developed ditches for rainwater. People were taught 
to cultivate maize, rice paddies, bananas and sugar-canes. Earth, rain, 
heat, and so on, were gifts from the Sonbai lord; for he was ulan tuan, 
manas tuan (lord of  rain, lord of  heat). Each year when the harvest was 
about to be collected, Nai Lele Sonbai, together with the people, would 
perform worship at Paeneno-Oenam with the following prayer: ‘The 
buffalo reaches Paeneno-Oenam, the horse reaches Paeneno-Oenam, 
the ripe banana goes to Paeneno-Oenam, the ripe sugar-cane goes to 
Paeneno-Oenam’ (Fobia 1984:32-6). 
If  Nai Lele Sonbai was the culture hero, then his son Nai Tuklua 
Sonbai was the warrior who expanded the authority of  the Oenam 
kingdom by various means. He had magic properties, and could change 
into a stone, a tree or a python – an animal particularly associated with 
Sonbai. He also arranged a grand meeting at the river Noel Bi Lomi, 
to settle the spheres of  influence of  the liurai of  Sonbai, Wehali and 
Likusaen. At the meeting, the various am uf or ‘minor kings’ of  the Atoni 
people were present. The status between each of  them and Sonbai was 
laid down according to a scheme which sets out the two Timorese means 
of  defining precedence: via siblingship or barlaque relations.
Sonbai and Amanatun are like older and younger brother (tataf-olif).
Sonbai and Amarasi are like brothers-in-law (mone-feto).
Sonbai and Amabi are like younger and older brother (olif-tataf).
Sonbai and Amabesi are like younger and older brother (olif-tataf).
Sonbai and Amfoan with Ambeno are like older and younger brothers 
(tataf-olif).32 
The Amabi and Amabesi groups guarded the Paeneno-Oenam Hill, 
but indicated that they wished to run their own affairs, causing Sonbai 
32 Fobia 1984:36-40. Local genealogies and origin stories claim that the Amanatun, Amabi, Amfoan 
and Ambeno ancestors were brothers or close relatives of  Liurai (meaning the kingship of  Wehali) and 
Sonbai (Banunaek 2007:7; Middelkoop 1952:203; Heijmering 1847:27; personal communication, Diniz 
da Cruz, Oecusse, 13-1-2004).
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to order his Oematan regent to expel the two congregations from the 
hill, which he did successfully. The defeated lords led their followers to 
Gunung Mollo, a 2,070 metre-high mountain to the south of  Gunung 
Mutis. The Amabi stayed on the mountain slopes, while the Amabesi 
group decided to move on to the west, and finally ended up in Kupang. 
Sonbai replaced the rebellious groups with two other communities, the 
Amfoan and the Ambeno, who settled at the prestigious summit. After 
a while, however, they too became conceited, and the Oematan regent 
was once again ordered to march against the rebellious groups. After 
some hostilities, both of  them were obliged to leave the area and move 
towards the north coast, an area rich in sandalwood, honey and other 
commodities. The Amfoan settled down in the north-west, in the terri-
tory that henceforth bore their name; the Ambeno occupied previously 
uninhabited land, which now constitutes the Oecusse-Ambeno enclave 
of  Timor Leste (Fobia 1984:43-5, 53-8).  
The problems of  Nai Tuklua Sonbai with the Amabi did not, how-
ever, end with these changes: at Gunung Mollo, the Amabi were joined 
by a related group from the land of  Banam (Amanuban), and together, 
they became a formidable and expansive power. When they threatened a 
small domain called Lassa, the latter called for Sonbai assistance, which 
was readily given. After a military setback when a prominent champion 
was killed, the Amabi lord chose to jump to his death from the steep 
slopes of  Gunung Mollo (Fobia 1984:46-8). With this very event, one 
may argue that we have moved from Sonbai protohistory to the begin-
nings of  historical writing.
 The death of  the king of  Amabi at Gunung Mollo is known to have 
taken place at the beginning of  October 1657, though the circumstances 
described in Western documents are rather different from what is related 
above.33 It is worthwile pausing for a moment to consider this.
Naturally, the narrative above must not be seen as history in a con-
ventional sense. Although historical particulars can survive in a recogniz-
able shape for hundreds of  years, for example when laid down in ritual 
language, the fabric of  the story is likely to have been much altered by 
the process of  transmission. To the Timorese mind, there was no term 
for ‘myths’, since ‘myths’ were considered to be the truth, the equivalent 
of  history. In human society, myths incorporate memories of  the past, 
33 VOC 1226 (1658), f. 509b. The incident will be more fully discussed below.
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the experience of  the present and the expectations for the future, all at 
the same time. In a traditional society, the future will then usually mean 
a return to a conceived past (Locher 1978:83). What is important to 
consider, therefore, is the function of  the Sonbai dynastic myth as a char-
ter of  legitimacy. The elements of  the narrative explain the origins of  
various Atoni groups, their early migrations and their relations with each 
other. They also explain the reasons why the Sonbai dynasty continued 
to be held in awe and deference, and why their political authority lasted 
in various forms until the 1950s. The Sonbai dynasty is also seen as the 
originator of  West Timorese forms of  agriculture, and is considered the 
source of  the later division of  power and authority among the Atoni. 
Finally, it is the possessor of  supernatural powers that have far-reaching 
consequences.
There are interesting variations in the episodes preserved in various 
accounts of  the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While the Sonbai 
genealogy recounted above talks of  five generations before the coming 
of  the Westerners, several sources assign their exploits to just one or two 
generations.34 This is indicative of  the atemporal sense of  the past often 
found in non-literate cultures. The Sonbai lord could be one or many in 
the stories; there are also important variations in tone. All versions do 
agree that a Sonbai ancestor married the daughter of  the Kune lord and 
took over his chiefdom in the central parts of  West Timor; however, the 
two oldest accounts, by Müller (1829) and Heijmering (1847), disagree 
over whether it was a peaceful process. Müller claims that Kune was 
subjugated by brute force, while Heijmering roughly agrees with Fobia’s 
version recounted above (Müller 1857, II:150; Heijmering 1847:17-27). 
Interestingly, the story here serves as the rationale for the peculiar posi-
tion of  the Kune family until the twentieth century. As the original lord 
of  the land (pah tuaf), the chief  of  the Kune clan received a small part 
of  the harvest from the lord of  Sonbai or his regents until comparatively 
34 I understand from Father Gregor Neonbasu of  Kupang that there is a longer Sonbai pedigree 
collected by Father Eric Breunig, which is different from Fobia’s account (compare Parera 1994:196). 
Parera, who originally wrote his text in 1971, collected folk stories from Mollo, which provided a list of  
Sonbai rulers that corresponds to that of  Fobia (Parera 1994:268). Spillett 1999:115 also gathered the 
same list from an old ex-raja of  Miomaffo. Johannes Cornelis Banu, the mafefa of  Amfoan (interview, 
13-6-2006), gave me another list, which contained largely the same names as Fobia’s manuscript, though 
in a partly different order. In sum, it is hazardous to draw any conclusions about historical developments 
before 1650 based on the orally transmitted genealogies.
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recent times.35 His ritual role is illustrated by the important leu, ‘sacred 
heirlooms’, which were preserved in Miomaffo, the north-eastern part of  
the old Sonbai realm. The heirlooms were known as Nai Massu (Lord 
Smoke) and represented the original lineage of  the lord of  the land, 
Kune (Van Geuns 1927:466-7). 
Maintaining the line of  original owners of  the land at the side of  
the current ruling dynasty is a well-known phenomenon in communities 
of  the eastern archipelago. It is a part of  the ‘stranger king’ syndrome 
which is so common in Austronesian societies, and which posits a ritual 
opposition between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ in a given polity. The Sonbai 
lord is a stranger king, and his position as an outsider is an important 
part of  his position in the system. The pattern of  the ‘stranger king’ 
myths is often similar: an ancestral dynastic figure arrives, subdues the 
original lord in a contest or by other means (in this case, a marriage), is 
elevated to princely status, and arranges a division of  the realm whereby 
the original inhabitants or chiefs retain particular rights with regard to 
the land. Moreover, Kune adopts the role of  providing wives for the 
lords of  Sonbai, Kono and Oematan, which puts him in a ceremonial 
position of  precedence, in spite of  his loss of  executive powers (Fox 
2006:2, 6, 8-10). There are obvious parallels here with the coming of  
the Dutch and the Portuguese to Timor. In both cases they were volun-
tarily received by local rulers (Kupang, Ambeno), who were the original 
lords of  the land and who were henceforth maintained and, in part, 
honoured by the foreigners.
A peculiar problem in this context is the geographical term ‘Servião’, 
which is associated by the Portuguese sources with Sonbai. The first 
explicit mention of  this connection, to my knowledge, is a letter from 
the first regular Portuguese governor in 1703 that characterizes the 
Kono lord as ‘the one who governs the Empire of  Seruião for the afore-
mentioned Sonouay [Sonbai]’ (Matos 1974a:336). As we have seen, the 
geographical term Servião as such is mentioned in Godinho de Eredia’s 
description from circa 1600, and also occurs on two maps that he drew 
in 1613. It is later mentioned by Dominican sources in the context of  
35 The theme of  an original lord of  the land is common in Timor and on surrounding islands. An-
other example is the Nubatonis clan in Amanuban, which was superseded by the Nuban or Nope family 
(McWilliams 2002:62-3; Müller 1857, II:214-5).
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the events of  1641-1642.36 The Portuguese officer Francisco Carneiro 
de Siqueira in 1647 mentioned Servião as the ‘centre of  the island of  
Timor’, a place where copper could supposedly be found.37 Certain 
modern traditions actually describe Sorbian as an ancient realm, associ-
ated with the Kune family, which encompassed Timor and the surround-
ing islands.38 The name occurs in numerous Dutch sources as Serviaen, 
Zerviaen and, later on, Sorbian. The problem is that this term in the 
nineteenth century alluded to a mountainous area of  limited political im-
portance in the north of  West Timor, which more or less overlapped with 
the princedom of  Amfoan. This ambiguity is partly explained by looking 
at certain late-seventeenth-century VOC documents, which make it clear 
that the groups that originated from the lands of  Sorbian, namely the 
Amfoan and Taebenu, were also considered to be included in the larger 
Sonbai group.39 All this, of  course, adds colour to the traditional narra-
tive referred to above, which posits an original affinity between Sonbai 
and Amfoan. The earliest traceable history of  Sonbai will be returned 
to in the next chapter.
the elusive eastern liurai
While the identity of  the central and western liurai, of  Wehali and 
Sonbai respectively, is reasonably clear, there is considerable doubt 
about the liurai of  the eastern component. The tripartition appears to 
have been more symbolic than real, and the details of  the components 
changes with the circumstances. Several oral versions point out the lord 
of  Likusaen as the liurai established in the territory of  present Timor 
Leste, whose ancestral figure was the youngest brother of  the Wehali 
and Sonbai ancestors. The name corresponds to Liquiçá, a reino to the 
west of  Dili, which is mentioned from time to time in both Portuguese 
and Dutch documents. It enjoyed a certain local importance, but with 
36 Durand 2006a:76, 78, 80; Santa Catharina 1866:300. A letter by the ‘apostle’ of  Timor, António 
de São Jacinto, in Vasconcelos 1929:78-9, mentions ‘the kings of  Sertão’ (probably a slight misspelling 
of  Servião) who rejected the name ‘Portugal’ because of  the fall of  Malacca. To the missionaries of  the 
1640s, Servião therefore appears to have been a comprehensive geographical concept including several 
kings.
37 Fiedler n.y.:15, H 475b, KITLV.
38 Interview, Johannes Cornelis Banu, Kupang, 5-2-2005 and 7-2-2005.
39 VOC 1577 (1696), Dagregister, sub 2 and 3-1-1696.
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the exception of  Pigafetta’s account from 1522, there is nothing to 
suggest that it held authority over a wide area, let alone a major part 
of  East Timor. Moreover, there are other candidates, for example, the 
double kingdom of  Suai-Camenaça in the south-west of  present Timor 
Leste, which is intermittently mentioned as the principal eastern realm 
in nineteenth- and twentieth-century accounts.40 A third candidate is 
Luca, a Tetun domain on the south-eastern coast, which is mentioned 
as a paramount power in the east, by Müller (1829) among others.41 
Some accounts emphasize that Luca was not a legitimate power, but had 
usurped power in the east at an unspecified time. All in all, we are left 
with a highly confusing picture.
This ambiguity is already apparent in the oldest documents that treat 
the issue. There is a letter from a Portuguese governor, written in 1734, 
which alludes to a revivalist and anti-European movement in the period 
1725-1728, long after the introduction of  Portuguese authority. This re-
vival included ‘the idea of  expelling [the whites] and the enthronement 
of  their three kings Sonobay [Sonbai], Liquiçá [Likusaen] and Veale 
[Wehali]’ (Castro 1867:243). The insurgents were never able to carry out 
their aim, but nevertheless, it demonstrates that the tripartition found in 
certain twentieth-century oral stories is not a new concept, if  not as a 
political reality, then at least as a commonly held idea. However, there is 
another version of  the movement, found in the 1811 Instrucções do Conde 
de Sarzedas, and evidently based on other eighteenth-century documents. 
This text cites Camenaça rather than Likusaen as the third component 
(Castro 1867:205).
Oral narratives picked up in the late twentieth century further eluci-
dated the issue. A Tocodede-speaking adat elder interviewed in 1994 in 
Ulumera, close to Dili, emphasized the role of  Wewiku-Wehali as the 
demographic source of  the Liquiçá area. At the same time, the modern 
place called Liquiçá was not completely identical with the historical 
region of  Likusaen: 
40 There is a slight ethnic difference between the Tetun-speaking Suai-Camenaça and the Tocodede-
speaking Liquiçá (compare Bastian 1885:14), although Tetun and Tocodede are related Austronesian 
languages.
41 Francis 1838:393; Müller 1857, II:91. The map at the back of  Müller 1857, II, appears to show 
Luca as a princedom covering East Timor up to the borders of  Wewiku-Wehali. This is clearly a gross 
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Likusaen was not a kingdom but the name of  a region. Mota Ain [Mo-
tael] was the centre of  the kingdom, which consisted of  Mota Ain, Tasito-
lu, Ulumera and Pissu. Likusaen means ‘the limit or end of  the journey’. 
[…] Mota Ain is made up of  three kingdoms – Mota Ain (Amu); Loro 
Monu, which covers the area of  Suai-Camenaça, and Loro Sae, which 
covers the area of  Maunfahe [Manufai]-Same. All beneath the govern-
ment of  Mota Ain. Under the Portuguese, the liurai was called kornel.42
Another adat elder, in the kampung of  Kaiteho, provided a similar story: 
‘The people here in Kaiteho came from there, Wehali, to Mota Ain, Dili, 
to Ulumera and then to Kaiteho. Mota Ain was the centre of  Likusaen. 
Upeti [tribute] was given to Mota Ain by way of  Ulumera and then to 
Kaiteho. The language spoken here is Tocodede.’43
All this seems to imply that Likusaen was a comprehensive area in 
the west of  present Timor Leste, the centre of  which was Motael, situ-
ated next to present-day Dili. Indeed, Motael was a reino of  considerable 
importance, which invited the Portuguese authorities to establish their 
new centre in Dili in 1769 (Matos 1974a:98-9). An encyclopedic entry 
from the late nineteenth century characterized it as ‘the most important 
kingdom of  the island in the Portuguese part’.44 Motael claimed to 
hold precedence over Suai-Camenaça and Manufai at the south coast, 
although the reality behind these claims is not apparent from the extant 
documents. However, if  the entire area was included in one hierarchical 
system, it would explain the varying identity of  the eastern liurai-ship – 
Likusaen or Camenaça, depending on the relative strength or authority 
of  either. 
The occurrence of  Luca as the paramount realm of  East Timor in 
some nineteenth-century accounts is related to its position as a Tetun 
polity. While the demographic centre of  the Tetun lies in Belu, in 
Central Timor, there is also an eastern Tetun-speaking area. This in turn 
is separated from Belu by an area inhabited by the Mambai-speaking 
people. The foremost reino of  this eastern portion was Luca, which is 
42 Spillett 1999:251, 253. I have changed the spelling of  some names slightly, in order to keep the text 
standardized.
43 Spillett 1999:259. Slight changes have been made in the spelling of  names. Peter Spillett inter-
viewed persons connected with Suai-Camenaça in 1992, 1995 and 1998, but the narratives do not 
explicitly refer to Motael or Likusaen as central places (Spillett 1999:323-5).
44 The encyclopedic notes of  Raphael das Dores, compiled in 1871-1892, are reprinted in Marcos 
1995:33-66. For the reference to Motael (Montael), see pages 55-6.
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already known of  in the sixteenth century. In 1647, the Portuguese of-
ficer Francisco Carneiro de Siqueira characterized it as the ‘head’ of  
the island at the eastern coast, and a place where the Portuguese unsuc-
cessfully tried to prevent the Makassarese and Malays from trading.45 
In 1661 it was characterized by a Jesuit writer as the best and healthiest 
place on Timor, inhabited by a good-natured population.46 According 
to interviews with the old titular liurai of  Luca in 1994-1995, there was a 
historical connection between Wewiku and Luca, the kingdom of  which 
was actually older than the maromak oan institution. Luca was supposed 
to have been a very large kingdom in early times, before the colonial 
dominance by the Portuguese monarchy.47 There were also smaller 
kingdoms in the region, which were branches of  the larger kingdom, 
such as Takanar and Viqueque. The latter domain had a special connec-
tion with Wehali. The realm of  Wehali in turn was defined by the liurai 
of  Luca as including ‘loro Sonbai, loro Wehali and loro Likusaen’ – once 
again the old tripartite constellation known from stories found in other 
parts of  Timor.48 
Luca was the place of  Uma Bot, ‘the great house’, which was the 
centre of  the realm. Outside of  Luca itself, however, were four minor 
kingdoms, namely those of  loro Ossu-Ossuroa, loro Vessoro, loro Vemasse, 
and loro Waibobo (Spillett 1999:300). Interestingly, this particular infor-
mation is confirmed by early documents. As we will see, the position of  
Vemasse on the north coast was controversial in the seventeenth century, 
causing conflicting Makassarese, Portuguese and Dutch claims. The 
VOC argued in a document from 1668 that Portugal had no historical 
rights to the coastal princedoms of  Manatuto and Ade (Vemasse). In pre-
vious times they had been tributaries of  the Kingdom of  Luca, although 
they had abrogated this relationship some years previously.49 The Dutch 
claimed that the tributaries encompassed a rather wide territory in 
eastern Timor Leste, including areas where Austronesian languages like 
Galoli, and Papuan ones like Macassai, are spoken. Although this hier-
45 Fiedler n.y.:13, H 475b, KITLV.
46 Jacobs 1988:169. The praise is partly due to it being open to Catholicism.
47 Marques Soares 2003:45 claims that Luca encompassed a vast area in the east of  the island. The 
border ran via Ue-Hedan, Rantau by way of  Mount Lihu-Wani, Laclubar, Cai-Mauc, Aituto, Mount 
Ramelau and Suai.
48 Spillett 1999:301. According to another interview, with a grandee from Wehali, Likusaen had au-
thority throughout eastern Timor; Viqueque in particular was pointed out as being under the authority 
of  Likusaen (Spillett 1999:158).
49 VOC 2285 (1733), f. 179-80; Hägerdal 2007b:557.
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archy may have been more symbolic or ritual than executive, it explains 
why Luca was accorded such high consideration in certain European 
texts. Once again, however, it must be emphasized that the eastern do-
mains were considerably smaller than those in the west. In spite of  the 
theoretical partition into three Timorese liurai under the maromak oan, the 
eastern component(s) did not have prerogatives comparable to those of  
Wehali and Sonbai.
On the preceding pages we have traced the pre-modern Timorese 
perspectives of  political power. Obviously, the late date of  the indigenous 
Timorese accounts complicates such an investigation, but nevertheless, 
it will constitute a necessary backdrop to the analysis of  contemporary 
data from Dutch and Portuguese sources. We may therefore return to the 
chronology approximately where we left it, circa 1640, in order to trace 
the earliest colonial establishment on the island.
4
Establishments and clashes, 1641-1658
makassarese inroads, portuguese responses
The dual kingdom of  Gowa and Tallo’, commonly known as Makassar, 
developed as a major power in South Sulawesi during the sixteenth 
century. Through contacts with Malay merchants, an archipelago-wide 
network was forged that had both commercially and politically impor-
tant implications. At the same time, a hierarchy of  titles and positions 
developed, which created the basis for an expansive early state. Some 
authors have gone so far as to say that early Makassar turned into a 
bureaucratic state with centralized institutions, yet this is hotly debated 
(Cummings 2007:5, 9). At any rate, its political and commercial influ-
ence greatly increased in the seventeenth century, especially after the 
adoption of  Islam in 1605. Islam provided an ideological rationale for 
taking military action against pagan territories, by way of  reference to 
the classic juridical juxtaposition of  the House of  Islam and the House 
of  War.1 There was supposedly a latent state of  conflict between those 
lands under Muslim rule, and those lands that were not, hence providing 
a degree of  legitimacy for military conquest.
In 1602, Makassarese squadrons operated from the islands of  Flores 
and Solor, making an unsuccessful request for tributes to be paid by 
the Solorese in 1613. The fact that kingdoms on Sulawesi had an early 
interest in the Solor-Timor area is also illustrated by the role of  Buton, 
whose sultan formed an alliance with the VOC in order to take control 
of  the Portuguese fort on Solor in 1613. Makassarese, Javanese and other 
Asian ships are known to have visited Timor and Maluku over the next 
decades, sometimes being hunted down and captured by the maritime 
1 Noorduyn 1987:314. The juxtaposition is, of  course, considered obsolete by many modern Mus-
lims, though it persists in Islamist circles. ‘House’ is understood here as community.
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forces of  the Dutch East India Company (Paramita Abdurachman 
1983:100-1; De Roever 2002:121, 126, 181, 192, 213). All in all, one 
receives the impression that a lot of  trade-related action was going on 
unbeknownst to the Dutch or the Portuguese. 
This impression is strengthened when looking at the historical tra-
ditions of  Timor, as well as those of  Makassar itself. Numerous oral 
accounts collected in the late twentieth century by Peter Spillett show 
the important place of  the early Makassarese travellers in the collective 
memory of  the Timorese. Mentions of  them can be found from the 
Atoni in the west, to the Fataluco in the east. These stories highlight both 
the warlike and more peaceful pursuits of  the people of  Sulawesi, who 
even crowned kings and queens of  their choice. Since there has been in-
teraction with the overseas seafarers up until modern times, the accounts 
need not specifically refer to the seventeenth century, but at least some 
of  them do. One version states that the people of  Wewiku-Wehali claim 
ancestry from Makassar and in particular from Tallo’, whose raja arrived 
to the island riding on a crocodile. The Makassarese supposedly brought 
iron technology to Wehali, and taught the locals how to make weapons; 
intermarrying with local women, they generally remained on peaceful 
terms with their hosts (Spillett 1999:155-205).
Even today, the raja family of  Tallo’ tell stories of  how Karaeng 
Matoaya, alias Sultan Abdullah (reign 1573-1636), had numerous con-
tacts with Timor. Karaeng Matoaya, who introduced Islam in the dual 
kingdom in 1605, supposedly undertook several military campaigns 
on the island from 1596 onwards. In 1630 he is said to have married 
a princess from Wehali, and aspired to become ‘the king of  Timor’. 
His son and successor was Sultan Muzaffar who ‘travelled around and 
governed in Timor, where he acquired land’ (Spillett 1999:331-2, 335). 
Muzaffar married a woman called Sitti E Heriya who died on Timor: a 
gravestone, dated 1637, stands at Hera, east of  Dili, and is said to belong 
to her (Spillett, Makkule and Susilo 1995:5). While Sultan Abdullah and 
Sultan Muzaffar are well documented as rulers of  Tallo’, the Timorese 
details about the marriage and campaigns are unfortunately not found 
in the authoritative Tallo’ chronicle of  circa 1641, and the source of  the 
information that we do have, is not clear. For example, the name Sitti E 
Heriya does not occur among the wives of  Muzaffar in the chronicle, so 
the name written on the gravestone at Hera, known to the raja family, 
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might have been added to the story by inference.2 
What is quite clear from several sources is that Muzaffar did under-
take an expedition to Timor, and that a close relationship developed 
between Tallo’ and Wehali. At this time, Makassarese activity in the 
Solor-Timor waters had grown to such an extent that the Dutch became 
worried. In 1636, they complained that the skilful Sulawesi seafarers 
were able to steer their boats to Timor during the east monsoon as well 
as the west monsoon. Meanwhile, the Portuguese were steadily drawing 
ahead of  their Dutch rivals, due to their long experience of  trading with 
Macao. Once again the Dutch had to admit that their Lusitanian adver-
saries worked better with the native Timorese than they themselves did, 
thus meaning the Portuguese were in a position to occupy the best ports 
on the island. The islanders themselves were not allowed to trade with 
the Company.3 In addition, the relationship between the Makassarese 
and the Portuguese in the archipelago was usually good, since Gowa 
and Tallo’ maintained a liberal trading policy that allowed Portuguese 
merchants to use Makassar as a base for their businesses. 
Relations were, however, temporarily soured by a major seaborne 
expedition under the leadership of  Sultan Muzaffar himself, with no less 
an aim than to subdue Timor and defeat the Portuguese of  Larantuka. 
As discussed in detail by Arend de Roever, the expedition was the logical 
outcome of  Makassar combining its long-time role as an intermediate 
station for sandalwood with new commercial ambitions. The Portuguese 
of  maritime Asia – still unaware that their homeland had been recently 
liberated from Spain in Europe – were badly beset by Dutch blockades 
and hostilities, resulting in the loss of  enormous quantities of  cargo to 
the enemy. The leading Makassarese politician and prince Karaeng 
Patingalloang cleverly took advantage of  this; he drew up an agreement 
with the Company that would make Makassar the supplier of  sandal-
wood for the Dutch, who had, besides, failed to maintain a monopoly of  
the fragrant wood. In January 1641, an impressive fleet of  5,000-7,000 
men set out from Makassar in order to eliminate, or at least subdue, 
the only serious obstacle to the agreement: Larantuka.4 The very day 
2 The account of  the two reigns may be found in Cummings 2007:87-92. Among the names of  Sul-
tan Abdullah’s conquests, which are carefully listed, there is nothing that can be associated with Timor.
3 De Roever 2002:216. A similar remark is found in the Generale missiven for 1640; see Coolhaas 
1964:118.
4 De Roever 2002:234-5. The accession of  João IV of  Portugal took place on 1 December 1640, 
meaning that news of  the restoration only reached Southeast Asia in late 1641.
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before, the Portuguese, after a siege of  five months, had been forced to 
lower their colours in Malacca, the nucleus of  their power in Southeast 
Asia.
The expedition was controversial among the Makassarese elite, and 
was certainly no unqualified success. A Dominican account written 
after 1679 tells in heroic terms of  how the king of  Tallo’ arrived with 
an enormous power, ‘intent on destroying Christianity and to plant the 
cursed sect of  Mafamede [Muhammad], of  which he was a practitioner 
and grand zealot’ (Sá 1958:421). Here, the clerical author completely 
omits the economic aspect of  the enterprise. As the Larantuqueiros de-
clined to parley with the invaders, the latter went ashore and destroyed 
the settlement, including the church and the holy images, while the 
locals fled to the hinterland. As on several similar difficult occasions, 
the weak Portuguese community displayed an astonishing degree of  
doggedness. Characteristically animated by a Catholic padre, a band of  
Larantuqueiros charged with their shotguns. Firearms were nothing new 
to the Makassarese, but after suffering considerable losses they decided to 
voyage to the Muslim village of  Lamakera on Solor. From there Sultan 
Muzaffar set sail for Timor, presumably accompanied by Solorese pilots: 
Closing in on Mena, he threatened the queen and other kings who had 
been baptized. He gave Moorish bonnets to the [lords] of  Servião, and 
to Vajalle [Wehali] who, on this island, was treated like an emperor. He 
converted them to the faith of  Mafamede and promised them great as-
sistance. This did not happen, for when he arrived back in Makassar, to 
where he returned, his own wife killed him by poison. She feared her 
husband, since she had had an affair with a servant during his absence.5
Before his untimely death, an event not confirmed by the Tallo’ chroni-
cle, Sultan Muzaffar had ravaged the coastlands of  Timor for two long 
months, taking some 4,000 prisoners to be sold at the slave market; if  
accurate, this is a substantial number. In fact, Sultan Muzaffar’s actions 
marked the first large-scale invasion in the history of  the island, some-
thing which made its mark on the Timorese collective memory. As found 
in later oral traditions, the near-contemporary material speaks of  friend-
ly relations between Tallo’ and Wehali, which seem to have used each 
5 Sá 1958:422. A near-contemporary account is to be found in Vasconcelos 1929:79-80.
87
4 Establishments and clashes, 1641-1658 |
other’s authority to strengthen their island-wide position. The Historia de 
S. Domingo speaks of  the exalted status of  the Wehali ruler ‘to whom all 
the kings on the island paid tribute, befitting his status as their sovereign’ 
(Santa Catharina 1866:300). The Portuguese texts do not make quite 
clear whether the maromak oan or the liurai is alluded to – either of  them 
could have been perceived to be ‘like an emperor’ by the chronicler. At 
any rate, the ruler in question accepted Islam and the protection of  the 
foreign sea-lord, and in return made available his status as the central 
ruler to the ambitious Sultan Muzaffar.6 If  there is any truth in the 
story of  the Tallo’ ruler’s marriage to a Wehali princess, it would put him 
in a peculiar position, since as the wife-receiver, he would owe his in-laws 
symbolic deference. 
With Wehali’s powerful ally gone, however, the project soon col-
lapsed, along with the Islamicization of  Timor. The relatively unscathed 
Larantuqueiro community immediately launched an armed expedition 
to the north coast of  Timor, in order to strengthen their commercial 
clients7 on the north coast. The recent Dutch-Makassarese under-
standing constituted a vital threat to their position, both with regard to 
the sandalwood trade and to the spread of  Christianity. Typically, two 
Dominican padres followed the 150 musketeers who set sail towards 
the important port of  Mena. With assistance from Mena, Lifau and 
Amanuban, the small troop turned its attention to Servião in a miniature 
version of  Hernan Cortes’ Aztek adventure:
They climbed up the vast lands of  the king of  Servião, who was the first 
object of  punishment. The king retired to his mountains at the time, not 
entrusting the many people who followed him, with the resolution to 
await a battle. With that our men entered the land and went on to dev-
astate it and plunder it without resistance. This was seen and bemoaned 
6 The missionary account by Jansen in 1892 states it was the maromak oan who was the kèser (emperor), 
although this title was clearly a late Dutch-influenced import (Jansen 1893:27). Raja Serang (Tei Seran), 
otherwise known as the liurai of  Wehali, was perceived by Jansen to be his assistant. Of  course the details 
of  Timorese political theory might have escaped the Dominican friars who wrote about the event.
7 In accordance with Dutch usage, I call the princedoms tied to the VOC ‘allies’. Those tied to the 
Portuguese are usually referred to in Dutch and Portuguese sources as subservient (‘underlings’, ‘sub-
jects’, and so on). I choose to call them ‘clients’, although in a way they can also be considered allies who 
had undergone the ubiquitous oath of  alliance through the mixing and drinking of  blood. Since blood 
oaths were a ubiquitous Timorese way of  concluding alliances, there was a thin line between ‘subject’ 
and ‘ally’, which can clearly be seen from the conflicting claims made in cases of  dispute (Hägerdal 
2007a:13).
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by the inhabitants (who blamed the king, whose erroneous stance had 
reduced them to such misery).8
The king of  Servião finally had to stop and surrender the ‘bonnet’, 
meaning in this instance the Muslim headgear, which he had received 
from the Makassarese as a token of  his commitment to the new reli-
gion.9 In an astonishing turn of  events, the king was baptized at the 
hands of  Friar Bento Serrão, and committed himself  to spread the creed 
throughout his kingdom – a good illustration of  how political bonds 
were crafted through religious symbolism. However, there remained 
the issue of  Wehali, which was still not aware of  the abrupt death of  its 
powerful Makassar ally. According to the Historia de S. Domingos, the ruler 
‘proceeded in the arrogance of  dominating the island’ (Santa Catharina 
1866:302), and threatened the Atoni kingdoms whose subjects had been 
baptized. The Wehali ruler also sent a message to Tallo’ containing 
a request for a new squadron to be sent to Timor; Makassarese rein-
forcements would allow Larantuka no opportunity to assist its clients 
on Timor. Nevertheless, a new Larantuqueiro expedition with 90 mus-
keteers and three priests arrived in Mena in May 1641 (or 1642). The 
Portuguese secured the Batumean kingdom as an ally; this is the area 
later known as Amanatun, which borders Wehali. The alliance itself  
was sealed by the baptism of  the ruler, which embodied the political as 
well as the religious act.10 Both Batumean and Servião had been se-
verely threatened by Wehali, and now offered to join an alliance against 
the central kingdom. The campaign is enthusiastically recorded by the 
Historia de S. Domingos:
8 Santa Catharina 1866:300. For a discussion of  the expedition, see Fox (1982:22-3), who notes the 
parallels with the conquistadors’ exploits in the Americas.
9 According to information gathered by Peter Spillett in Wehali in the 1990s, the Makassarese be-
stowed a hat on the ruler of  Wehali as a keepsake or memorial of  their visit. This hat was still kept in the 
ritual building, the Uma Lulik, although in a very worn state (Spillett 1999:159).
10 Batumean, a village on the south coast of  Timor, was the centre of  a kingdom in the seventeenth 
century (compare Ormeling n.y., H 1352, KITLV). A Dutch report from 1614 says: ‘At Batomian, situ-
ated on the southern side, where wood was purchased on this trip, there are two kings; firstly, Amenato 
[Amanatun], who is the most powerful, and secondly, Amenisse [Amanesi]; both of  them have promised 
to enter into trade with only the Dutch. Some years it is possible to purchase 250 bahar of  wood, but 
always at least 200 bahar. It is an unhealthy place for foreigners; thus the Portuguese assert that entire 
crews have often died there, and the ships and the goods have drifted ashore and got lost, such as our 
people have also found out, God help us’ (Tiele and Heeres 1886-95, I:92). In the eighteenth century 
the name Batumean disappeared and was replaced by Amanatun, its most important component. For 
traditions pertaining to Amanatun, see Banunaek 2007.
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The whole fleet of  ours (and also the clerics) was cheerful and in a festive 
mood, as the beginning was as fortunate as if  Heaven had opened its 
gates for the future campaign. The captain gave orders to his people, and 
to the multitude of  natives (who concurred, and joined in from Mena, 
Servião, Amanence [Amanesi] and Batimão [Batumean]), and they 
marched in good order, and with great effort, since the roads were rocky 
and the heat excessive. They arrived at the frontiers of  the [ruler of] Va-
jalle [Wehali], who, impudent and haughty, dared to battle with a major 
force. The captain led the [battle-cry] ‘Santiago’ and invested such valour 
and flame in our men that many enemies fell at the first musket salvo. The 
Vajalle turned back and passed a river with many people, and made their 
way through the scrubland. In that way [the Portuguese] went on without 
meeting any resistance, letting the villages suffer the hostilities of  iron and 
fire, until coming to the court where the army rested at night, and there 
was no lack of  abundance at the table, which increased the joy of  victory. 
The following day, as the recklessness of  pursuing the enemy in the scru-
bland had been proven, it was found that the best advice was to return. 
Having set fire to the palaces of  the Vajalle, they came to Batimião and 
were received with demonstrations of  joy by the king, and by that of  
Amanence, for the bid for victory and the ensuing grand consequences. 
(Santa Catharina 1866:302.)
The Historia de S. Domingos is a problematic document due to its strongly 
rhetorical, hagiographical purpose,11 something which is clearly illus-
trated when comparing events of  the 1650s with Dutch sources. The 
image of  an emperor-like figure that is venerated on a Timor-wide level 
might well be exaggerated, since the defeat of  a powerful enemy in such 
a way justified the Portuguese-Catholic claim to dominate the island. 
Still, the words of  the Dominican friars strikingly echo later claims of  
the lord of  Wehali being the central ruler of  the island. Undoubtedly, the 
emphatic use of  musketry could have had a decisive effect on Timorese 
forces only armed with assegais and bows. Reading the account closer, 
however, it seems to imply that the Portuguese victory was far from 
conclusive. The chronicle carefully avoids any mention of  the fate of  
the Wehali ruler. In addition, the 1641-1642 campaign did not seem to 
lead to the subjugation of  Wehali or the domains to the east, something 
11 A similar text from circa1679, Summaria relaçam do que obrarão os religiozos da ordem dos pregadores na 
conversaão das almas, closely parallels the Historia de S. Domingos, but is less verbose.
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which may also be deduced from a Dutch text of  1662, where the VOC 
representatives asked their clients on the island of  Rote about their feel-
ings towards Portugal:
Thereupon they said that they had no inclination towards the Portuguese, 
but that they try to maintain the old friendship with their friends who are 
the sworn enemies of  them, like with the negeri of  Fealy [Wehali] that was 
once ravaged by the Portuguese, who were however once again beaten 
by the inhabitants; idem Calisou, Thiris, Soufaey [Suai], Cammanassy 
[Camenaça], Bourouw, Bibeloutow [Bibiluto], Iesorouw [Vessoro] and 
Maccaky [Viqueque?], all situated on the south-east side of  Timor where 
the Portuguese until this day have nothing to say and are kept out.12
Among the numerous oral stories that circulate about the Makassar con-
nection, some explicitly mention a similar confrontation. Three makoan 
or adat elders in the 1990s told Peter Spillett how Wehali and Makassar 
had once joined forces against the encroaching Portuguese. A battle took 
place at Suai, where one of  the Wehali military commanders was killed 
and the other fled back to Wehali. However, when the Portuguese tried 
to pursue them, they all drowned in one of  the bays, meaning the king-
dom was saved in the end (Spillett 1999:155). Another story, recorded in 
the Atoni lands, says that Amanatun (the ‘Batumean’ of  the old docu-
ments) had, on one occasion, to fight off  an extraordinary attack by the 
Nesnay family, whose historical position vacillated between Amanatun 
and Wehali. The Nesnay were supported by the so-called Tiy Toe tenu 
Lub Lubu Makasal, meaning the Makassarese.13 The Amanatun elite 
called for a champion from the island of  Sawu who duly appeared on 
the scene and was able to stop the intruders. The final battle took place 
at the border between Amanatun and Belu, where the two foremost war-
riors of  the Nesnay were killed.14 In essence, these stories show defeat 
for Wehali and the Makassarese, although the first story also emphasizes 
Wehali’s ability to survive.
In spite of  the obvious exaggerations of  the clerical writers, the 
events of  1641-1642 apparently led to an increase in Portuguese influ-
12 VOC 1240 (1662), f. 887.
13 The term Lubu Lubu Makasar occurs in several oral stories. It possibly combines Makassar with 
Luwu, another well-known kingdom in South Sulawesi.
14 Sejarah raja-raja 2007:39-40.
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ence in some of  the Atoni domains,15 including the elusive realm known 
as Servião. From the Portuguese accounts, it appears that it was a vast, 
mountainous land, close enough to Wehali to be effectively intimidated 
by the latter. At the same time, the early Portuguese writers did not 
equate Servião with Sonbai, as some eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
accounts do. In the Historia de S. Domingos and the account of  circa 1679, 
Sonbai (Reino do Senovay) is mentioned as a separate entity (Santa 
Catharina 1866:309; Sá 1958:426). This is a problem to which we will 
return later. The influence of  the Makassarese on Timor was not wholly 
abrogated through Portuguese intervention. The generally good rela-
tionship between Makassar and the Portuguese merchants was restored 
soon after the expedition of  1641, whose initiator Sultan Muzaffar was 
now dead. The seafarers from Sulawesi kept the eastern domains of  
Manatuto, Ade (Vemasse) and Con in a state of  loose dependency, and 
had a continuing relationship with Wehali.16 Only in the 1660s would 
Sulawesi influence in these quarters be thwarted by renewed Portuguese 
expansion. The Makassarese were, however, unable to secure a continu-
ous supply of  sandalwood for the Company, and it was obvious that the 
Dutch had overrated the logistic capabilities of  their partners (De Roever 
2002:238). 
dutch beginnings
The liberation of  Portugal from Spain led to negotiations with the 
United Provinces, which finally resulted in the so-called ten years truce, 
yet delays in implementing the truce meant it lasted a mere eight years, 
from 1644 to 1652. There was no question of  the Dutch returning the 
15 Jim Fox (1988:269-70, 2000:19-20) has argued that an Atoni expansion took place in West Timor 
during the course of  colonial history, since Atoni groups appropriated muskets, iron tools and maize 
from the Europeans or Eurasians, and were able to assimilate other groups. The process would explain 
the contrast between the mono-ethnic west and the multi-ethnic east. This is supposedly indicated by the 
relatively uniform Dawan language, which contrasts with the dialectic diversity on Rote, suggesting that 
Atoni dominance occurred at a comparatively late date. The hypothesis is supported by seventeenth-
century VOC records, which mention numerous migrations of  smaller and larger groups, and occasion-
ally suggest different languages of  the various congregations of  West Timor (Sonbai, and so on). On 
the other hand, the missionary text Notícias de Timor e sua cristandade, written after 1641, argues that there 
were only two languages on the island: Vaiquenos (Dawan) and Belos (Tetun) (Loureiro 1995:147). While 
this is incorrect for East Timor, it indicates that Dawan and Tetun at least were leading, or ‘vehicular’, 
languages in the west and east respectively, on the eve of  Western colonialism.
16 VOC 2285 (1733), ff. 193-4; VOC 1257 (1666), f. 710.
92
| Lords of  the land, lords of  the sea
overseas possessions they had conquered from Portugal during the reign 
of  the Spanish Habsburgs, or during the first few years after the restora-
tion (Winius 2002:122-5). Subsequently, Portuguese control in Southeast 
Asia was reduced to Larantuka and the clients in the Solor-Timor area 
– places that were largely outside the supervision of  the Estado da Índia. 
The only true commodity of  general interest was sandalwood, but the 
possibility of  earning a profit from this item was not likely. The chaos 
that marked the end of  the Ming dynasty in China equally deprived the 
merchants of  their best market. This, however, was balanced by another 
noteworthy event. In 1639, the important Japanese market was irrevers-
ibly closed to the merchants of  Macau, delivering the lively South China 
Sea city a blow from which it never really recovered (Matos 1974a:176; 
Subrahmanyam 1993:172). Interest in turning a profit from the sandal-
wood trade rose accordingly, although the full implications were only 
seen a few years after the establishment of  the new Qing dynasty, when 
sandalwood prices again increased. A load of  40 bahar (circa 7,258 kg) 
which cost 40 mas in 1647, cost 50 mas in 1648.17
The trading policy of  the Portuguese differed markedly from their 
territorial policy, where they strove to form ties with the princedoms 
of  the Timor region rather than to govern them. While the general 
Southeast Asian conception was one of  free and open sea roads, since 
the sixteenth century the Portuguese had seen the waters dominated by 
them closed to other seafarers (as did the VOC). Any ship that wished to 
trade in these waters was required to get a cartaz, a special permit. On 
the initiative of  Goa in 1650, the Christian Timorese were prevented 
from trading with non-Lusitanian outsiders, and various domains were 
attacked during the following decades if  they were believed to have had 
commercial or political dealings with the Dutch or Makassarese.18
The VOC, for their part, feared that their Portuguese rivals were in-
tent on establishing a ‘second Malacca’ in the Solorese waters, now that 
the real Malacca was lost. In order to forestall a similar development, 
the Governor General of  Batavia gave orders to once again establish a 
presence in the old Fort Henricus on Solor, which had been deserted for 
several years (De Roever 2002:243-5). The Watan Lema league on Solor 
and Adonara was still as anti-Portuguese as ever, and consequently keen 
17 De Roever 2002:248. One mas was equivalent to 2.70 guilders. The example is complicated by the 
different units of  bahar that were used in the East Indies (VOC-Glossarium 2000:15).
18 Villiers 2001:156; Fiedler n.y., H 475a, KITLV; VOC 2285 (1733), ff. 181, 200, 214-5, 218-9.
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to support the return of  the Dutch. At this time the league was headed 
by a woman, Nyai Cili, who resided in or close to Lohayong, and was 
styled the ruler or queen of  Solor. She was one of  several strong women 
in power in maritime Southeast Asia in the seventeenth century – ac-
cording to a later story she originated from Kedah and made such an 
impression on the original lord of  the land that he bequeathed the land 
of  Solor to her and her kin.19 
A set of  new agreements were made with the five Solorese rulers 
in January and February 1646, which contained the usual agenda for 
Company clients: there were to be no dealings with any visitors other 
than those approved by the Company, who also had the right to buy 
products collected on the islands around the fort. The treaties were cer-
tainly asymmetric: the Dutch had the right to keep those Solorese who 
wanted to embrace Christianity, while deserters from the fort who wished 
to enter Islam had to be returned to the Company. A Dutch garrison of  
some 60 men was installed in the fort, complete with one vessel.20 The 
event was significant: from this moment on, there would be a Dutch 
presence in the area that would last until the end of  colonialism in the 
1940s. Nevertheless, no one in Batavia or Amsterdam expected much 
profit to be generated from the project, which was rather motivated by 
political strategy. 
Conditions in Fort Henricus (and, for that matter, in nearby Larantuka) 
were described in somber terms by the Dutch opperhoofd, with scarcity of  
provisions and lack of  commercial opportunities. The Solorese had their 
own ideas about the treaties they had just signed. Like in many other 
parts of  Southeast Asia, the locals probably saw the papers as an insignia 
of  friendship and assistance, and cared less about the actual wording of  
the text, all the more so since the Solorese were largely illiterate. The al-
lies then proceeded to do everything in their own interests, trading with 
the Portuguese, delivering insufficient foodstuff  to the Company, and de-
clining to assist with the restoration of  the fort. The tiny and vulnerable 
Dutch post, moreover, had express orders from Batavia to win over the 
hearts and minds of  the population using encouragement and incentives 
rather than brute force. Anything else would benefit the Portuguese. This 
19 VOC 1728 (1706), ff. 138-40. Contemporary documents rather suggest that she was the widow and 
successor of  the former ruler of  Solor, Kaicili Pertawi (reign before 1613-1645). She could still, of  course, 
have come from Kedah.
20 Fiedler n.y.:1, H 475a, KITLV; Barnes 1987:231.
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policy, which was in stark contrast to the oppressive Company policy in 
Maluku and elsewhere, would be used on Timor at a later stage.21 
The next step was to extend the political network in the region. 
Flores was not a promising area, being partly under Portuguese or 
Makassarese influence, and with few ‘commodities’ other than slaves 
to offer visiting merchants. On the south coast, the settlement of  Barai 
in the Ende area was loosely connected with the resolute lady Nyai Cili 
of  Solor. Consequently, it claimed to be under the Company’s control, 
which did not stop its inhabitants from trading with the Portuguese 
when they saw fit; relations with the Dutch post were sporadic at best. 
Further to the east lay Pantar and Alor (alias Ombai or Malua), and 
the league of  five coastal princedoms known as Galiyao. Galiyao, too, 
supposedly paid a loose deference to Nyai Cili, which meant little in 
practice. From a commercial point of  view, Galiyao had little to offer. 
Nor was there much on Sumba, despite its enticing alternative name 
Pulau Cendana (Sandalwood Island). At the time, the island was con-
sidered to be under Makassarese control, and the slaves were excessively 
expensive.22 
Only Timor offered substantial supplies of  sandalwood, known 
with obvious hyperbole as ‘sandelboschen’, or sandal forests. Contrary 
to some enthusiastic early reports, no more than a very small fraction 
of  the surface of  the island was covered with sandalwood trees – at 
the most, 0.02 percent according to research by Arend de Roever (De 
Roever 2002:287). What sandalwood there was, however, was an inter-
esting proposition when the price of  the wood started to rise in 1647. 
The Dutch of  Fort Henricus saw a potential ally in the king of  Kupang, 
the strategic location of  the island perhaps serving as a stepping stone 
for further expansion. Moreover, the relation between Kupang and 
the Portuguese was far from hearty. Its ruler Ama Pono I was appar-
ently murdered at the instigation of  the Portuguese in 1619, when he 
concluded a treaty with the Company. In 1645, the then king, baptized 
under the name Dom Duarte, dictated a letter of  submission to the 
Crown of  Portugal. He approved the erection of  a fortress near to 
the Koinino River as well as a church, and referred to padre António 
de Saõ Jacinto, who supported him. As it turned out, the Portuguese 
21 Fiedler n.y.:1-2, H 475a, KITLV.
22 VOC 1180 (1650), ff. 582b-583b.
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resources were only sufficient for the erection of  a minor building.23 
The Portuguese may have thought the same about treaties as the Dutch 
on Solor: a contract was perceived to be more of  a token than a set of
 instructions.
Kupang was inhabited by the Helong people, whose adat differed 
from that of  the Atoni in several respects. According to later legends, 
the ancestors of  the local elite migrated from Seram in Maluku. During 
the sojourn along the northern coast of  Timor, a brother of  one of  the 
immigrants turned into a crocodile, and subsequently led the group to 
the estuary of  the Koinino River, where they founded a princedom. 
Crocodiles were henceforth the totem animals of  the kingdom, serving a 
protective function.24 Like most Timorese princedoms, it was a diarchy. 
The ruler, Ama Pono II, was the son or grandson of  the man who was 
murdered in 1619, which presumably made him less willing to continue 
supporting the Portuguese if  other opportunities arose; this soon hap-
pened.25 At his side was a momboir (executive regent) called Ama Fo, 
and under them ranked a number of  temukung, corresponding to the 
Atoni amaf  naek. In the nineteenth century they were four in number, 
but the population had probably shrunk by that point.26 Even in the 
seventeenth century it was by no means a large princedom: the number 
of  able-bodied men appears to have been no more than several hundred. 
Circa 1650, the centre of  the realm lay in Attrai, some 45 minutes’ 
journey, presumably by horse, from the present town centre.27 It en-
compassed the areas to the south of  Kupang Bay (Babau Bay) and Pulau 
Semau, but the central area of  settlement was not particularly fertile. At 
one stage, possibly in the early seventeenth century, Kupang expanded 
its territory to the Sulamu area north and east of  the bay. The Taebenu 
group in Sorbian fought a war against another princedom, Amabi, and 
received assistance from the Helong. In return, the Taebenu ceded part 
23 Fiedler n.y.:5, H 475b, KITLV; Fiedler n.y.:5, H 475a, KITLV; Leitão 1948:210.
24 Interview, Salmun Bislissin, Kupang, 7-2-2005. According to Mr Bislissin, the first sonaf was erected 
at Kelang on Pulau Semau close to Kupang. Kelang was named after an island off  Seram with a similar 
name. This is not confirmed by VOC documents, which seem to indicate that the Helong only inhab-
ited Pulau Semau in any kind of  numbers from 1653, and then only with Dutch assistance (VOC 1299 
[1653], f. 114b).
25 Fiedler n.y., endnotes, H 475a, KITLV. According to Fiedler the second Ama Pono was the grand-
son of  the first, but a letter by opperhoofd Von Plüskow from 1760 seems to imply that he was the son (VOC 
2991 [1760], f. 137).
26 ANRI Timor:99, Kort verslag, sub 7-1857.
27 VOC 1299 (1653), f. 112a.
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of  their land to the Kupang kingdom.28 This transaction would have 
had consequences if  the Company had stepped in, but the acquired area 
was in effect a forested no-man’s land. Later sources spoke about the ses-
palen gebied, a stretch of  land some ten kilometres (six palen) along the bay, 
where the power of  the Helong king and later the VOC was imposed.
In 1648, Dutch sights, particularly in the person of  Hendrick ter 
Horst, the new opperhoofd of  Fort Henricus, were firmly set on Timor,. 
Ter Horst was an energetic and pious person who led the little Solor 
community through the crucial years of  1648-1654, and then again from 
1655 to 1659. Having served twelve years in the Indies, he was married 
to an Indonesian woman, which impeded his return to the Netherlands. 
However, his liberality towards the local Solorese was limited, as was his 
patience with mediocre Company servants. Ter Horst believed that the 
locals had to be kept on a tighter rein, given their poor observation of  
the treaties of  1646.29 From Timor, interesting news reached the ears 
of  Ter Horst: the queen of  Mena had been baptized by padre António 
de São Jacinto in 1641, placing her high up in terms of  Dominican 
historiography. Seven years later, however, she ordered twenty-seven 
White and Black Portuguese to be put to death for unspecified reasons. 
The old and ailing padre, seeing part of  his missionary project ruined, 
sailed from Larantuka to Timor with a number of  supporters to deal 
with the situation, but was not to be heard of  again. Next, a Company 
servant who had been plying the waters of  the inner coast reported that 
the capitão mor, Francisco Carneiro de Siqueira, was intent on establish-
ing a fort in Kupang.30 Carneiro de Siqueira told the Kupangese king, 
Ama Pono II, that he would move 20-30 Portuguese families there, thus 
turning the small Portuguese building in Kupang into a real stronghold. 
All this led to a heated diplomatic exchange between the local Dutch 
and the Portuguese. The former threatened to open hostilities against 
the Larantuqueiros if  they fulfilled their ambitions in Kupang, since the 
area had held a contract with the VOC since 1619. The Portuguese, on 
28 This is the story told in an interview that the Dutch opperhoofd Willem Moerman had with the Tae-
benu leaders in 1693, in VOC 1535 (1693), n.p. The war took place in the time of  the great-grandfather 
of  the current king of  Taebenu. In a letter from the kings who were allied to the Company (VOC 1568 
(1696), f. 76), the acquisition of  Sulamu was described as having taken place ‘200’ years earlier, that is, 
in c.1500. It is possible that ‘great-grandfather’ should be understood merely as ancestor, but it is equally 
possible that the Timorese used the phrase ‘200 years’ as a simple equivalent for ‘a long time ago’.
29 Fiedler n.y.:9, H 475a, KITLV.
30 Boxer 1947:5. It never became more than a small building for three or four people, before the 
Dutch arrived in Kupang.
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the other hand, argued that in that case, the Dutch should return Solor 
to them; the island had, after all, not been in Dutch hands at the time 
at which the ten-year peace was concluded. In the end, the Company 
servants decided to await further orders from Batavia.31 
In the meantime, in 1648-1649, the Company was busy drawing up 
contacts with the islands to the west of  Timor: Sawu and Rote (Tiele 
and Heeres 1886-95, III:424-6, 474, 476). Both were politically divided 
into a number of  small domains, which, combined with the limited eco-
nomic resources, predictably led to continuous political unrest. The five 
domains of  Sawu plus the small offshore island of  Raijua were counted 
by the Dutch as being under the vague precedence of  the central domain 
of  Timu (although this precedence status is denied by modern tradition). 
The raja, or duae, of  Timu used the Company to bolster his own author-
ity, but never in too certain terms. There was hardly any other merchan-
dise than slaves to be found there, and their fear of  being sold off  to the 
Dutch made them defect to the ‘rebels’ who were fighting against raja 
rule. Furthermore, the island was too far away from the main routes 
for auxiliaries to be sent in at this stage. In this respect, Rote was differ-
ent, divided as it was from westernmost Timor by a narrow strait. For 
anyone wishing to dominate the trading routes towards the outer coast 
of  Timor, Kupang and Rote were essential strategic components. There 
was no indigenous power on Rote to claim ritual or political precedence, 
and there were deep internal divisions on the island. Certain nusak in 
the west tended to support the Company, while others retained an old 
attachment to Portugal. This division would have far-reaching regional 
consequences until the mid-eighteenth century. The local economy was 
based on lontar palm juice, as well as cattle breeding and the cultivation 
of  crops,32 and although this was sustainable under normal circum-
stances, natural calamities sometimes set the economy off  balance. This 
sharpened intra-island conflicts, which in turn increased the supply of  
captives to be sold as slaves.
At the end of  the 1640s, the uneasy truce between the two colonial 
powers still persisted, though it was soon to be broken. The Portuguese 
forbade their clients in eastern Flores, West Solor and West Timor from 
trading with the Dutch on threat of  excommunication, while the Dutch 
issued similar prohibitions to their Solorese allies. Outside these two 
31 Fiedler n.y.:10-1, H 475a, KITLV.
32 VOC 1210 (1663), f. 876; Fox 1977.
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powers, a number of  Javanese, Minangkabau and Makassarese trad-
ers operated along the coast of  Timor, with the Makassarese enjoying 
a lasting influence on the north coast of  east Timor (Tiele and Heeres 
1886-95, III:475). 
Meanwhile, the sharply increasing price of  sandalwood created an 
obvious incentive for both powers to secure the ports of  Timor. So far, 
however, most of  the trade was controlled by the Larantuqueiros, and 
much of  the sandalwood went to Makassar under Portuguese supervi-
sion, where the Dutch could purchase it (Coolhaas 1964:374). Against 
this backdrop, a new protagonist entered the scene: Sonbai.
the rise of sonbai
We have already seen that Servião was an extensive inland realm in 
western Timor, whose ruler was forced to abandon his Muslim leanings 
for Catholicism in 1641. Its territory met the waves of  the Sawu Sea in 
the north-west, where an important port for sandalwood was situated, 
possibly modern-day Naikliu. At this time, it was not expressly said that 
Servião was the most prestigious kingdom among the Atoni; on the 
contrary, a Dominican text from this period speaks of  ‘the king of  [A]
manuba[n], whose kingdom is in the interior of  the island, and is reput-
edly the foremost among all’.33 Mena, which was previously pointed out 
as the principal power of  the island, is henceforth only accorded second-
ary importance in the sources. In both cases, the European view of  them 
might have been conditioned more by their role as a commercial outlet 
than their actual political status. We do not hear much more about the 
interior of  the island until 1649, when the Atoni lands were suddenly 
shaken by great upheavals.
The first time Sonbai is mentioned in documentary sources is in two 
letters from September and December 1649. Envoys from the rulers of  
Servian (Servião), Amarang (somewhere in the north-west of  Timor) and 
Mena requested assistance against their ‘brother’, Amma Sonnabaij, the 
ruler of  Sonbai. He had waged war against the others with the help of  
the Portuguese, who supported his claim for a ‘roadstead’ (wherever it 
33 Afschriften [Dominican report], c.1650, H 697a, KITLV. I am grateful to Per Stille, Växjö University, 
for translating this Latin text for me.
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would be situated).34 Ter Horst’s enthusiasm to provide assistance was 
fueled by the envoys’ stories of  gold in the land of  Sonbai. A river or 
goldmine in ‘Almeno Sonnebaij’ was mentioned, possibly alluding to the 
Noilmina River, in the vicinity of  which some gold can actually be found. 
The authorities in Batavia instructed Ter Horst to encourage prospec-
tors, while investigating the actual occurrence of  gold in the said river. If  
the story turned out to be true, one could ‘pick up great and wondrous 
advantages from it’ (Tiele and Heeres 1886-95, III:476).
Ter Horst was also ordered to appear at Kupang, where the 
Portuguese seemed to be acting in an increasingly aggressive manner 
against the Dutch-minded King Ama Pono, wanting to expel the Helong 
and replace them with the Amabesi people. His orders were to lodge a 
resolute protest against the rivals, but not to undertake anything that 
could jeopardize the sandalwood trade. He was told to purchase the 
sandalwood offered by the Portuguese by any means necessary, even if  
the price was higher than usual, ‘since the said wood presently gives tasty 
profits in Taiwan, and the best sort was recently sold for 50 reals per picul 
[60.48 kg]’ (Tiele and Heeres 1886-95, III:477).
Here, however, Sonbai caused complications. The kingdom main-
tained an aggressive outlook, and it joined forces with Portuguese troops 
under the command of  Francisco Carneiro de Siqueira, a group that 
included indigenous Catholics from Konga on East Flores whom the 
Dutch contemptuously called ‘rice Christians’. Terrifying rumours rap-
idly spread among the Timorese that the aim of  the campaign was to 
cleanse the entire land and bring it under their control. As the people of  
Sonbai and the hangbroeken (the hanging trousers, that is, the Portuguese) 
marched through the land of  Servião in 1650, they mockingly asked the 
hapless inhabitants, ‘Where are the Dutchmen now, the cowards that 
you trusted so steadfast, who would come and assist you this year?’ The 
people of  Helong greatly feared an attack on their territory, and vented 
their frustration on the Dutch trading officials who stayed in Kupang at 
the time. The Company people could barely go outside without being 
derided as liars or cowards.35 The situation never escalated to the point 
34 Tiele and Heeres 1886-95, III:476; VOC 1173 (1649). The latter text also mentions the rajas of  
Amakono, Taebenu, Anenapy (?) and Amatoco (?), but their position is not evident from the fragmentary 
text. I am grateful to Arend de Roever, Heemsteede-Aerdenhout, for providing me with a transcript of  
this letter.
35 VOC 1180 (1650), ff. 586b-587a.
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of  a full-scale invasion of  Kupang, but the land of  Servião did suffer hor-
ribly at the hands of  the enemy. By May 1651, Servião and the surround-
ing territories were completely in the hands of  Sonbai, which plundered 
the area for gold and slaves. The Dutch likened their devastations to the 
exploits of  the Duke of  Alba during the war of  liberation – they spared 
neither young nor old, nor even unborn. Francisco Carneiro de Siqueira 
tried to stop the worst excesses by ordering that those who submitted 
and accepted baptism, should be spared. The enterprise also took on 
an interesting commercial aspect. The merchant-adventurer Francisco 
Vieira de Figueiredo, who was mostly based in Makassar and had a great 
influence over Portuguese affairs in Southeast Asia, sent a vessel to Siam. 
There, it picked up a sizeable load of  rice and then proceeded to Timor, 
where the boat dropped anchor at Lifau in the Ambeno kingdom, a place 
now seen specifically as a Portuguese port of  call. A party of  sandalwood 
was collected by the Sonbai ruler and taken aboard the boat for further 
transport on to Larantuka and interested European buyers.36
Unfortunately, there is no Portuguese document to explain the back-
ground of  this alliance. Where did the Sonbai come from, and how could 
they suddenly be established as major players in western Timor? Their 
powerful appearance indicates that they had had a long history prior to 
1649, as also confirmed by their own genealogical tradition. A docu-
ment from 1660 makes clear that the ruler of  Sonbai was an in-law of  
the queen of  Mena, and, as we have seen, was the symbolic ‘brother’ of  
the rulers of  Servião, Amarang and Mena.37 An outburst of  activity at 
this time is indicated by the stories surrounding the ruler Tuklua Sonbai, 
which tell of  hostilities with groups in western and north-western Timor. 
The oldest preserved story telling of  Sonbai’s origins dates from 1829; 
it claims that Sonbai overcame the Kune family, the original pah tuaf, by 
brute force (Müller 1857, II:150). We have to conclude that after 1641, 
Portuguese power over areas such as Servião and Mena was far less sta-
ble than indicated by the Dominican texts. The VOC records specify that 
the Amarang settlement in the north-western corner of  Timor was de-
stroyed because the inhabitants had sold crops to the Company, and that 
the Portuguese had sworn to ruin anyone entertaining even the slightest 
contact with the Company (Coolhaas 1964:499). As part of  their effort 
to secure the supply of  sandalwood and negate the Dutch influence, the 
36 VOC 1187 (1651), ff. 626b-627a.
37 VOC 1233 (1660), f. 721.
Genealogy of  the Sonbai dynasty, mainly after Dutch sources
  ------- 
________________________|__ _ _ _ _ ____________________________________ 
Ama Tuan I (Ama Utang)  Ama Tomananu Ama Tabelak 
of Sonbai ?-1657/58  executive regent executive regent 
of Greater Sonbai 1658-c. 1680 
m. sister of Queen of Mena (?) 
________|_____________________________________________________________
junior  Ama Tuan II  a ruler  son
king  of Lesser Sonbai of Greater Sonbai 
d. 1659  1659-1672  
_________________________|______________   
Bi Sonbai (Usi Tetu Bi Sula daughter following: 
Utang) of Lesser _______________________|____________________ 
Sonbai 1672- Dom Pedro Sonbai Ama Baki        Nisnoni 
1.5.1717  (Tomenu) of         fled to 
Greater Sonbai         Kupang 
fl. 1704-1726        d. after 1748 
m. Usi Bi Lalan 
_________________________|_____________________________________________
Bernardus  Corneo Leu             Daniel Taffy Alfonso Salema 
(Bawa Leu)  of Lesser             of Lesser (Nai Bau Sonbai) 
of Lesser Sonbai Sonbai             Sonbai of Greater Sonbai 
1717-28.9.1726 1728-1748             1748-1760 before 1749-19.3.1752 
_____|_ _ _ _ ____________________  | m. sister of Nai Lake 
Jacobus   Bernardus          Pieter                  Kornel of Bikomi 
Albertus   Nisnoni          Nisnoni      _______________________|_____________ 
Taffy   (Baki Bena)         (Nube       Nai Don Ber- Albertus Johannes 
of Lesser   of Lesser          Bena)       Sane nardo Taffy (Nai Tafin 
Sonbai   Sonbai          of Lesser of Greater Sonbai) of Greater 
1760-1776   1776 (1782)-        Sonbai  Sonbai Sonbai 1760-1768 
  1795          1798-1821 1752- m. daughter of 
               |  1.4.1760 Nai Lake of Bikomi 
later rulers            | 
of Lesser Sonbai  Alphonsus Adrianus 
(until 1917) and  (Nai Kau Sonbai) 
Kupang (until 1955)  of Greater Sonbai 
     1768-1802 
 _________________________________________________|________ 
Nai Sobe Sonbai  Nai Tua Sonbai 
of Greater Sonbai ___________________________|_________ 
1808-1867  Nai Nasu Mollo Nai Liofi Sonbai 
______________|____________ co-ruler of Greater            | 
Nai Bau              Nai Sobe Sonbai 1870-1885 Nai Kau Sonbai 
Sonbai of             Sonbai             | 
Greater Sonbai          pretender-ruler  Nai Tua Sonbai 
1867-c. 1885             1885-1906  zelfbestuurder of 
            d. 1922  Mollo 1930-1959 
d. 1686, perhaps 
father of the
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Portuguese therefore formed an alliance with Sonbai, a member of  a 
cluster of  Atoni domains with consanguineous ties. The alliance resulted 
in the elimination of  the major recalcitrant, Servião, which was possibly 
headed by the Kune family, and similarly underpinned the emergence of  
the lord of  Sonbai as the imperador de Servião. To the Dutch it seemed that 
if  nothing were done, then within a short time the Portuguese would be 
the masters of  all Timor under the guise of  the Sonbai lord (onder dexel 
der Sonnebayer).38
In 1693, one of  the very few VOC reports documenting indigenous 
Timorese traditions was completed. It is in the form of  an interview 
between then opperhoofd Willem Moerman and the aristocrats of  the 
Taebenu princedom who had fled to Dutch Kupang from Sorbian five 
years previously. Sorbian, Sarbaong or Serviaen was by then a name 
for the land in the north of  West Timor, later known as Amfoan. When 
asked about the historical position of  the Taebenu in ‘Sarbaong’, the 
aristocrats replied: ‘Through the old heritage, since it was conquered 
by the Sonbai about 50 years ago. Since that time they [the Taebenu] 
stayed in Amarasi, and after the Sonbai abandoned the land 32 or 33 
years ago, it was once again repossessed by them. However, they must 
usually stay in Amarasi.’39 Another text from 1696, however, speaks of  
‘the Taebenu who are also Sonbai and also descended from the ancestral 
house of  Amfoan’.40 According to these documents, Sonbai dominated 
the north-west from the 1640s to circa 1660, a rather short period of  
time. Still, there was a perceived generic affinity between Sonbai and 
the aristocracies of  the area, again suggesting that Sonbai had histori-
cal roots that reached far back into time. Further details of  the political 
structure prior to 1649 will presumably remain unknown.
the company builds a fort
Some refugees fled towards the west and settled in the area considered to 
belong to Kupang, under the somewhat weak protection of  King Ama 
Pono. By this time, Kupang was decidedly pro-Dutch. They accepted 
gifts from the Company, which kept a small trading office at the estu-
38 VOC 1187 (1651), f. 637.
39 VOC 1535 (1693), n.p.
40 VOC 1577 (1696), Dagregister, sub 2-1-1696.
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ary of  the Koinino River.41 Adding to this, the ten-year peace between 
the United Provinces and Portugal was soon to expire, and it was only 
a matter of  time before hostilities would resume between the colonial 
rivals. All this made for an explosive situation on the local scene, with the 
unfortunate little princedom of  Helong right in the middle of  it. When 
the Company ships paid a visit in the autumn of  1651, they found Ama 
Pono sitting in the Company office by the seashore with his entire fam-
ily and belongings. He and his retainers dared not stay in his settlement 
at Attrai anymore, nor roam the surrounding wilderness, for fear of  the 
aggressive Sonbai and Portuguese. They intended to move over to the 
island of  Rote as there were ties between the Helong and Rotenese aris-
tocracies, and the Helong, unlike most Timorese, were acquainted with 
small-scale shipping. With some effort, the Dutch were able to persuade 
Ama Pono to return to Attrai. At the king’s request, the Dutch agreed to 
place six soldiers on guard at the Company office, presumably to deter 
any Portuguese action in that direction.42 
This does not mean, however, that the main actors of  the Solor-
Timor region necessarily grouped themselves neatly in line with the 
Dutch-Portuguese dichotomy. To their irritation, the Dutch found that 
their old Solorese allies acted in their own interests, and had little un-
derstanding of  the monopoly principles of  the Company. Lamahala 
on Adonara was one of  the five Watan Lema princedoms, but it often 
proved recalcitrant and stubborn in its dealings with the white foreign-
ers. In early 1652, a Lamahala ship plied the waters of  Timor’s inner 
coast without bothering to request a Company permit. For the sake 
of  convenience, they brought a princevlag – the Dutch tricolour – when 
they traded in the coastal settlement. At Amaniap43 in Servião, they 
clashed with the local population, killing twelve or fifteen men who tried 
to resist them.44 The Dutch feared that such things could turn people 
in the region against the VOC. On a later occasion the Company ves-
sel Alkmaar tried to stop a Lamahala captain, or nakhoda, called Ronga 
41 VOC 1187 (1651), f. 625b.
42 VOC 1193 (1652), ff. 740a-741b.
43 This should be Nai Niap (Nai Niab) of  the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources. It was then 
formally a part of  the Sonbai realm, and situated on the Noimeno River close to Amfoan. According to 
later tradition, Nai Niap was ruled for a long period by a branch of  the Kono family called Takaip, who 
governed as fettor or usif under the lord of  Sonbai (Müller 1857, II:153). All this seems to reinforce the 
conclusion that Servião was originally a much larger area than that later known as Amfoan or Sorbian.
44 VOC 1193 (1652), f. 742a.
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from taking goods to Makassar. The captain swung his cutlass over his 
head while shouting ‘Mari, mari, anjing Hollanda’ (Come on, come 
on, Dutch dogs). Beating his breast he went on, ‘Sunggu, sunggu, Beta 
orang Lamahala’ (Truly, truly, I am a man of  Lamahala), and then had 
his men shoot at the Alkmaar with cannon and arrows.45 Lamahala also 
formed a short-lived neutrality pact with the Portuguese of  Larantuka, 
which eventually failed due to the inability of  the Portuguese to make the 
promised payment of  coveted ivory tusks to their counterpart (Coolhaas 
1964:683-5). The weak position of  the Dutch on Solor meant that such 
incidents went unpunished.
As hostilities with Portugal resumed, it was found that the Company 
had underestimated their enemy. A small Dutch wood-cutting expedition 
to the Portuguese stronghold Konga on western Flores was resolutely 
eliminated by Francisco Carneiro de Siqueira. An ensuing attack on 
Konga by a larger naval force illustrated to the Dutch the problems of  
waging conventional warfare in these waters. True, the place was burnt 
down by the Company soldiers, but the inhabitants all took to the for-
est, carrying all their goods and leaving very little plunder for the ‘vic-
tors’. This matched a pattern common in parts of  Southeast Asia: the 
temporary flight of  populations from small centres often made better 
sense than stubbornly defending against a strong enemy. The inhabit-
ants simply took to the forests and waited for the invaders to depart. The 
Dutch also noted the great influence wielded by the Catholic padres in 
the region, which impeded their own attempts to expand their political 
network.46 In another quarter, however, the efforts of  the Company 
were rewarded with a small degree of  success: Kupang.
The Dutch squadron that attacked Konga was part of  a larger stra-
tegic enterprise directed by Batavia. Before reaching Flores, the ships 
stopped over at Kupang between 2 and 13 February 1653. With the 
consent and assistance of  Ama Pono, the Dutchmen erected a simple 
but defensible fort on the rocky heights west of  the river estuary. The 
fortification was given the somewhat optimistic name of  Fort Concordia. 
Nothing remains today of  the old structure, on the site of  which the 
45 VOC 1200 (1653), ff. 93b-94a.
46 VOC 1200 (1653), ff. 84b-85a; Coolhaas 1964:683-5. While Anthony Reid (1988:122) sees this as a 
general Southeast Asian pattern, Charney 2004:74 has argued that it was not; the history of  Southeast 
Asia is in fact full of  long, stubbornly contested sieges. For parts of  the archipelago, abandonment of  
settlements was nevertheless often preferred to sieges: the relatively small-scale architecture of  the east-
ern archipelago meant that settlements could be quickly rebuilt in cases of  devastation.
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Indonesian army keeps a garrison, but it is still possible to discern its stra-
tegic advantages. Towards the sea the rocks are difficult to scale, whilst to 
the west stands a ravine; to the east is the river, which provides the area 
with fresh water. The weakest point was the rear of  the fort, which lay 
towards a low hillside (a problem the British invaders would experience 
when they occupied the fort in 1811). According to the captain respon-
sible for the building, the fort was ‘the key to all Timor’.47 Traders going 
to the outer coast and back would have to take in fresh water here, always 
a scarce commodity on Timor. For safety reasons, the ships would have to 
pass the strait between westernmost Timor and Pulau Semau, meaning 
that the Company could control the shipping with a few minor vessels 
that lay in the strait;48 at least, this is what the captain believed. At the 
time, everyone preferred to ignore the obvious disadvantages of  Kupang: 
the infertile limestone ground, its poor harbour and the problems of  ac-
cessing the sandalwood – the main reason for being on the island. 
Fort Henricus on Solor remained the principal Dutch post for the 
time being. Twenty-five soldiers and four sailors was the modest number 
that the expedition could afford to station in the new Fort Concordia, be-
fore the fleet proceeded to Solor, Flores and finally Maluku, where they 
would fight the Portuguese on other fronts. Like the Portuguese expedi-
tion in 1641, the number seems ridiculously small, but the proficiency in 
modern weaponry – muskets, grenades, artillery – and the authority of  
the princevlag were deemed sufficient to deter the enemies of  the Helong 
people. The first months in the fort were comparatively tranquil, but 
incidents did occur. For reasons unknown, two soldiers tried to catch a 
‘black’; he however defended himself  and mortally wounded his pursuers 
with his assegai. A third soldier disappeared by the river, leaving his hat 
and jacket at the shore. It was assumed that he had either drowned or 
been eaten by a ‘caiman’, the name used for the crocodiles which infested 
Kupang Bay.49 Soon enough, however, startling news reached Dutch 
ears about unrest inland.
A dozen years after their first forays into Timor, the Portuguese ex-
47 VOC 1200 (1653), f. 83b.
48 De Roever 2002:253.
49 VOC 1200 (1653), f. 87a. The term ‘caiman’ is probably derived from a Central African word that 
was spread through the Portuguese maritime expansion in the sixteenth century. It is nowadays reserved 
for several species of  Alligatoridae in the Americas. The latter are related to but different from the family 
Crocodylidae. The ‘caimans’ were a great scourge for the locals, and sometimes attacked Company slaves 
who left the Dutch fort chained two-by-two.
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perienced difficulties in mobilizing their Atoni clients. A captain from 
Larantuka, Diogo Fernandes, stayed on Sonbai with his 150 musketeers, 
termed canaille by the Dutch. The captain wished to lay siege to Fort 
Concordia, but the Sonbai bluntly refused to go along with this, hav-
ing no interest in such a venture. The troop marched on to Amabi, 
an extensive princedom lying further south, which likewise declined to 
support the Portuguese. There were many marital and friendship ties 
between the Helong and the Amabi, and the latter were maybe unwill-
ing to come into conflict with the Company. Impatient, Diogo Fernandes 
trapped the king of  Amabi and his retinue, which included the wife of  
the Helong heir to the kingship. The prisoners, some 200–300 people, 
were brought to Amanuban, a reliable ally of  the Portuguese, in order to 
guarantee the good conduct of  Amabi. The event showed the difficulties 
that even sizeable Timorese domains faced in staging effective resistance 
against determined Portuguese (more specifically, Topass) detachments; 
this was possibly due to the awe in which firearms were held rather than 
Portuguese martial efficiency. It aroused great consternation in Kupang, 
where rumours spread of  a Portuguese attack, supported by troops from 
Amanuban, Amarasi, Amasolo and Amabesi.50
Amabesi was a little entity of  its own, which oscillated between alli-
ance and enmity with the Kupang princedom whilst maintaining matri-
monial ties with the latter. The main settlement was situated on a peak, 
less than a day’s journey from Kupang, and it was so strategically placed 
that ten defenders were believed capable of  resisting 1,000 troops. In re-
sponse to the renewed threat, the Helong and Dutch agreed to approach 
the little domain, weapons in hand. After sealing the decision by eating 
the raw meat of  a buffalo, the Helong marched to Amabesi alongside 
the Dutch in May 1653. Negotiations followed with the locals, with 
considerable success. It was agreed that Kupang and Amabesi should 
support each other against the Portuguese. The treaty was confirmed 
by a macabre act: eighteen Topasses, including a young woman, who 
were unfortunate enough to be staying at the place, were slaughtered 
and beheaded. When the Helong returned to Kupang they brought the 
heads to King Ama Pono. A feast for the heads was planned, complete 
with singing and dancing and great rejoicing until midnight.51 The 
Dutch also persuaded the chief  of  Amabesi to hand over the influential 
50 VOC 1200 (1653), ff. 87a-87b. The identity of  ‘Amasolo’ is not clear.
51 VOC 1200 (1653), ff. 88b-89a.
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padre Frei Jordão de São Domingos, but the priest was warned by a local 
Christian and managed to escape to Sonbai.52 
This is one of  the earliest references to a dark aspect of  Timorese 
warfare: headhunting. Native tradition suggests that the custom was 
not indigenous to the island, but rose under the influence of  the 
Makassarese or other foreign influences. This remains uncertain, con-
sidering that the custom was widespread in Southeast Asia, in particular 
in the low-technology areas.53 As it occurs in modern ethnographic 
literature, the act of  headhunting and the ensuing preparation of  the 
severed heads is highly ritualized and based on the belief  that the heads 
join the protective spirits of  a settlement.54 Raids were led by promi-
nent warriors called meo, who were adorned in a peculiar fashion; in 
the VOC records they are known as voorvechters or orang berani. On the 
basis of  nineteenth-century materials it has been argued that the rituals 
served as a creative basis upon which political groups could strengthen 
positions of  power (McWilliam 1996:129-30). The VOC records from 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries do not contradict this, indi-
cating petty warfare as a contest in taking sizeable numbers of  heads. 
The colonial powers did little or nothing to stop the practice, and it is 
conceivable that their rivalries actually underpinned it. To reduce the 
custom to a question of  primitive blood-thirst (as the Dutch writers of  
the VOC period did) is too simplistic. It disappeared quite rapidly after 
the full implementation of  colonial rule around 1900, when the old syle 
of  warfare was suppressed.
The Portuguese reply to the Dutch foray was swift and ruthless, and 
proved their ability to improvise. No officer was available on Timor at 
the time, but a number of  soldiers stayed among their Sonbai clients. 
They gathered at the news of  the Dutch foray and demanded that the 
elderly padre Frei Jordão be their captain. The priest protested, saying 
that he was a poor old man and not used to bearing arms, but he was 
appointed nonetheless (Santa Catharina 1866:309-10). One and a half  
52 Santa Catharina 1866:309; VOC 1200 (1653), f. 89b. The Dominican chronicle speaks of  ‘Ama-
nence’, which would normally allude to Amanesi in Amanatun on the south coast. There is apparently a 
case of  confusion in this rather unreliable and careless text. Dutch reports leave no doubt that Amabesi 
is the place in question.
53 A comparative study of  the phenomenon in various parts of  Southeast Asia, with a gendered per-
spective, is found in Andaya 2004. See also Hoskins 1996.
54 H.G. Schulte Nordholt 1971:345-53 is a useful survey of  the headhunting custom, as is McWilliam 
1996. A number of  important, but partly cryptic, traditional accounts involving headhunting are given 
in Middelkoop 1963.
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months later, a mixed troop approached the dry coastlands of  the west. 
It consisted of  700 men, 100 of  whom were classified as Portuguese. The 
latter included whites, Topasses and a category that the Dutch contemp-
tuously called ‘rice Christians’, thereby suggesting that their conversion 
was due to material benefits.55 The others were Taebenu from Servião, 
and Amarasi from the south coast. The invaders did not care or dare to 
attack Fort Concordia, but they ravaged Attrai and Oletta, the villages 
of  the king and the executive regent of  Kupang. In the process they 
slaughtered 206 people, mostly women and children who could not run 
away quickly enough due to the heavy copper bangles around their legs. 
Nothing was heard but bitter crying and tears, which, according to the 
Dutch, could have made a stone heart feel pity.56
A small Dutch fleet arrived just as Frei Jordão proceeded to attack 
the Company’s new-found ally, Amabesi; allegedly, he swore that he 
would not even spare a newborn at its mother’s breasts. In order to 
thwart them, a Dutch-Helong expedition of  250 men was sent inland. At 
midnight the troops arrived in the vicinity of  the abandoned Amabesi, 
where the enemy camped. The soldiers moved slowly forward through 
the stony terrain without being discovered. Suddenly, a careless soldier 
accidentally set off  his shotgun. In an instant, the Portuguese camp was 
on its feet. For lack of  an efficient officer – which Frei Jordão apparently 
was not – a valiant Larantuqueiro landowner called Matheus da Costa 
led the charge.57 From the heights of  Amabesi, he and his comrades 
raised the battle cry and rushed down on the Dutch. The latter hastily 
retreated to a fence of  tuak palms that they had prepared. After a hotly 
contested fight, where the adversaries stood less than a pike’s length from 
each other, the Dutch found that they could gain no advantage over their 
enemy. In the dark of  the night they withdrew through the scrubland, 
losing several more men to the Portuguese in the process. The next day, 
55 The expression ‘rice Christians’ is still sometimes heard in present-day Indonesia in Muslim circles.
56 VOC 1200 (1653), ff. 112a-112b.
57 Santa Catharina 1866:310. The Dominican chronicle contains gross rhetoric exaggerations, alleg-
ing that all the Dutch were slaughtered. The Dutch, similarly, tried to gloss over their defeat by claiming 
considerable losses on the Portuguese side. Matheus da Costa, according to a VOC report, was actually 
a Papanger, meaning he came from or was descended from a native of  Luzon in the Philippines (VOC 
1246 [1664], f. 1577). Such Papangers were used as soldiers by the Spaniards in North Maluku, and 
Christianized members of  the community may easily have moved over to the Portuguese possessions. 
The words of  the chronicle, capitão de huma estancia, appear to imply that Da Costa had acquired a size-
able farmland on Timor. His descendants are the Da Costa family that has held the position of  liurai of  
Oecusse until modern times.
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the latter set fire to the Amabesi settlement and withdrew. The popula-
tion, which stayed in the neighbourhood, was escorted by the Company 
force to Kupang. Ama Pono had no objections to receiving this addition 
to his manpower, but asked that part of  the population be shipped over 
to the nearby island of  Pulau Semau, as not everyone could make a living 
in the lands around Fort Concordia, which were far from fertile. This was 
done, and subsequently the permanent Timorese settlement of  Pulau 
Semau may have started.58
The beginning of  Dutch colonial rule in Kupang, such as it was, was 
far from auspicious, especially for the locals who had hoped for protec-
tion. During 1654, the Portuguese clients Amarasi and Takaip exerted 
great pressure on the population. By this point, the Helong appear 
to have abandoned their main settlements, Attrai and Oletta, which 
disappear from the records, and to have moved to a negeri (settlement) 
closer to Fort Concordia. Nevertheless, the situation was abominable 
by any standard. A sizeable enemy troop robbed nine Helong leaders 
right outside the fort, apparently without the Dutch lifting a finger. No 
local or Dutchman dared to stroll far from the fort. The dry ground in 
the immediate vicinity could not sustain the population, and the result 
was a severe famine, against which the Company was unable or unwill-
ing to take measures (Coolhaas 1964:749-50). Meanwhile, the Dutch-
Portuguese war proceeded on a small scale in the eastern archipelago. 
In Rote, the Dutch supported the small allied nusak against those nusak 
who supported the Crown of  Portugal, with some success. In the main 
Dutch fort on Solor, on the other hand, not much could be achieved 
apart from the seizure of  an enemy ship here and there. The garrison 
and the sailors were sickly and could not pose a serious threat to nearby 
Larantuka, which was, nonetheless, dependent on supply lines to feed its 
population, and could not have withstood a blockade. Larantuka housed 
around 1,000 able-bodied men, but it was not fortified – in case of  at-
tack the population would be content to withdraw to the steep volcano Ili 
Mandiri situated behind them.59 Batavia and the Estado da Índia were 
fully occupied with affairs in other parts of  Asia and let the little worlds 
of  Solor and Timor manage their sliver of  the global conflict as well as 
they could. The Dutch project returned no economic profits, and per-
haps none were expected. As little sandalwood could be bought directly 
58 VOC 1200 (1653), ff. 113a-114b.
59 Fiedler n.y.:22, 26, H 475a, KITLV.
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from the locals, the European rivals, despite their differences, needed 
each other to maintain their important economic networks.
new alliances, new defeats
The lack of  enthusiasm in some Timorese circles for the Portuguese 
enterprise on the island was already visible in 1653. Both Sonbai and 
Amabi were averse to participating in military enterprises beyond their 
immediate interest, especially if  their enemies possessed the much-
feared firearms. Finally, in 1655, there was a major falling-out between 
the Portuguese and some of  their clients. The exact background is not 
clear from either Portuguese or Dutch sources, but it appears to have 
been the culmination of  accumulated grievances, including objections 
to the levying of  taxes and other contributions. Larantuka could only 
survive by importing provisions, and the soldiers staying on Timor ap-
parently made demands for their maintenance. In April 1655, a number 
of  rulers island-wide started to kill any Portuguese they could lay their 
hands on, plundering their belongings and burning their churches and 
houses. More than one hundred foreigners perished, of  whom ten 
or twelve were whites. The anti-Portuguese movement took place in 
Sonbai, Amanatun, Pienrey (Pitai?), Ade-Manatuto and Takaip – the 
latter soon reverting, however, to the Lusitanian suzerains.60 The simul-
taneity of  the rising suggests clandestine contacts between these various 
quarters of  Timor, and the movement took on a symbolic aspect; by 
targeting churches, the Timorese targeted the spiritual identity of  the 
foreigners. Sonbai was joined by the nearby Amabi princedom, and 
together they resolved to forswear the Crown of  Portugal for all eternity. 
An embassy was dispatched to parley with the Dutch in Kupang. The 
envoys declared that they wished for the protection of  the Company 
and to submit to its authority as honest allies and subjects.61 There is 
a slight semantic problem here, since an ally is not a subject. This am-
biguity would have consequences for Dutch-Timorese relations in the 
future. 
60 VOC 1209 (1655), ff. 196b-197a. Ade and Manatuto, on the north coast of  East Timor, were still 
loosely under the domination of  Makassar, but the Portuguese claimed to have rights there since long 
before.
61 VOC1209 (1655), f. 186a; Coolhaas 1968:3.
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At this time, the efficient but careful Hendrick ter Horst had stepped 
down as opperhoofd of  Fort Henricus, and been succeeded by the some-
what rasher Jacob Verheyden. In Verheyden’s mind, this was a golden 
opportunity to finally expand the Company interests at the expense of  
their Lusitanian rivals. In late June, the rulers of  Sonbai and Amabi 
and some subordinate ‘kings’ (in this case, more so chiefs) camped with 
a grand retinue at Amabi Bay, or Kupang Bay on modern maps. In 
order to show their good intentions, the rulers came wading through 
the water to meet Verheyden when the Dutch ships arrived. Verheyden 
tried to impress his new friends by firing salutes with the cannon and 
muskets, but the Timorese seemed more curious about the Dutch hand 
grenades, still uncommon even in Europe. After a number of  parleys, a 
contract was drawn up on 2 July 1655. The two kings and the opperhoofd 
mixed their blood in a cup and drank it to confirm the significance of  
the document. This was the traditional Timorese way of  establishing 
alliances, especially when preparing to declare war against mutual en-
emies. The rulers would hence be considered of  the ‘same blood’, and 
classified as younger and elder brother – allies but still with a ritual order 
of  precedence. The kings also presented two severed Portuguese heads 
to Verheyden as an additional token.62 The non-Christian aspects of  the 
proceedings did not disturb Verheyden any more than it did other VOC 
officials who dealt with Indonesian princes, as long as the contract came 
into force. It was a rather rudimentary agreement, which stated that the 
kings were henceforth to keep the peace and remain loyal to the ‘Noble 
Company’. The enemies of  the Company were henceforth the enemies 
of  the kings as well. No gold, silver, copper, beeswax, turtle-shell or slaves 
were to be sold to the enemy. Company servants should be treated well 
and provided with any essentials whilst in the kings’ lands.63 The names 
of  the kings are given as Ama Nasse of  Sonbai and Saroro Neno of  
Amabi, together with the chiefs of  the otherwise unknown districts of  
Sigy and Roury. Ama Nasse is not known to the later pedigrees, but his 
career partly parallels Nai Tuklua Sonbai of  the oral tradition. Saroro 
Neno corresponds to one of  the first names in the royal genealogical 
62 VOC 1209 (1655), ff. 186b-187b. On blood-oaths, see Ospina and Hohe 2002:22-3.
63 Stapel 1931:75-7; Fox 1977:71. See also ANRI Timor:36, Contractenboek Timor 1616-1750. I thank 
Diederick Kortlang, Leiden, for providing a transcript of  this text.
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tradition of  Amabi, namely Salolo, son of  Neno.64 
Contracts had previously been drawn up with the Watan Lema of  
Solor in 1646, and in 1648, a contract-like agreement was made with 
the rajas of  Timu on Sawu.65 As for Timor itself, strangely there is no 
proof  of  a contract with the Helong of  Kupang, although there must 
have obviously been an agreement similar to the one concluded with 
Sonbai and Amabi. The Company anchored its political and com-
mercial network in maritime Asia with a comprehensive system of  con-
tracts that could be very detailed, but the lack of  substantial details in 
the document of  1655 points to the tentative nature of  the new-found 
Dutch-Timorese friendship. Actually, Verheyden found out soon enough 
that he had entered a morass. Sonbai, which had recently seemed set to 
dominate the island, was actually confronted by numerous enemies. The 
image of  Portuguese oppression was much less clear-cut than the Dutch 
had first thought, since several Atoni domains kept their foreign suzer-
ains: Amarasi, Amanuban, Ambeno, Amakono, Takaip and Pitai, apart 
from the unidentified Ammatasie, Ammasene (Senak?) and Ammatabo. 
Taken together, these places were considered to be much stronger than 
Sonbai and Amabi.66 The list appears to illustrate the elusive nature of  
political power on Timor. Amakono, Takaip and Pitai are included as 
components of  the Sonbai realm in later texts, but preferred here to stay 
outside the recent events.
Verheyden may have felt that it was now too late to back out, and 
promised the kings he would assist them. After having undertaken a 
64 The name of  the Sonbai ruler who signed the contract is rendered in various forms in the VOC 
papers: Ammasse, Amanasse, Ammanasj, and so on. It is perhaps to be restored as Ama Nasu, Nasu 
being a common name in the Sonbai dynasty, or as Am Manas – tradition mentions Nai Manas as ruling 
Sonbai at the time of  the initial Portuguese invasion. Being illiterate, he signed with his mark. It is remi-
niscent of  the modern mark of  the Nisnoni family of  Kupang, a side-branch of  Sonbai, and depicts two 
keladi leaves. In the opinion of  modern tradition it represents the keladi leaves with which the daughter 
of  Kune made a simple water vessel for the Sonbai ancestor when they first met (interview, Alex Kune, 
Kupang, 29 June 2006). An unpublished pedigree by Jacob C. Amabi from 1964 gives the first names in 
the Amabi king list as Neno, Salolo, Balas (reign 1732-1755), Baltasar (reign 1755-1790), and so on. It 
omits a few generations between Salolo and Balas (Amabi 1964). Another Amabi pedigree from 1901, 
reproduced in Middelkoop 1952:216-7, has the list Fini Amabi, Banao, Funan, S[a]lolo, Balthazar, and 
so on. From this it can be seen that the king-lists tend to build on largely genuine names but can contain 
gross omissions and distortions.
65 This little-known document may be found in Contractenboek 1616-1759, 1a E, ANRI. Again I am 
grateful to Diederick Kortlang, Leiden, for sharing this document with me.
66 VOC 1209 (1655), f. 187b. Amatasie might be Amentassi or Amatassy, a river and also the name of  
a settlement mentioned in 1665 as lying on the north coast of  Timor, in the later princedom of  Harneno 
(VOC 2285 [1733], f. 200).
113
4 Establishments and clashes, 1641-1658 |
scouting expedition to Larantuka, he gathered a force of  700-800 men, 
including Solorese, Helong, Rotenese and 62 Europeans. At a time 
when the able-bodied men of  some princedoms could be counted in 
their hundreds, this was a considerable force; furthermore, the ruler of  
Sonbai could allegedly muster 10,000 to 12,000 soldiers as a back-up. 
In the wars fought by the Company in South and Southeast Asia, the 
participation of  Asian soldiers was essential and contributed substantially 
to the great Dutch successes of  the seventeenth century, as providing 
large armies of  European soldiers for individual campaigns was too 
costly and risky as it depleted other garrisons (Raben 2002:188; Andaya 
2002). Verheyden marched into the land of  Sonbai in September 1655, 
believing that the Dutch only had to show their presence and perhaps 
accompany the Sonbai lord into action if  the opportunity arose.67 
Indeed the first reaction of  the Portuguese remaining in the friendly 
princedoms of  the island was one of  fear. It was suggested that everyone 
should move to Larantuka rather than face this excessive power. Once 
again, however, the role of  the Dominicans as leaders of  the community 
won the day. The padre Francisco da Conceição persuaded the soldiers 
to stay. After further council it was agreed to dispatch two captains with 
60 musketeers to apprehend the Sonbai lord and stop his forces from 
joining the Dutch. The captains were the hero from 1653, the Papanger 
(Luzon-descended) Matheus da Costa, and the half-European António 
Hornay, son of  the VOC renegade Jan de Hornay. This odd pairing, one 
of  Filipino and one of  North European extraction, would play a major 
part in the history of  the island in the decades to come (Santa Catharina 
1866:310-1).
Arriving in Sonbai, Jacob Verheyden proceeded to attack the stock-
ade of  Uis Kono, the lord of  Amakono in the mountainous eastern 
Atoni territory. The stockade was taken by storm, and as the settlement 
was consumed by fire, Uis Kono handed over his sword to Verheyden 
via Ama Fo, the executive regent of  Kupang, asking to be pardoned by 
the emperor – this is the first time this lofty title is used for the lord of  
Sonbai. Verheyden replied that a rebel acting against his emperor had 
forfeited his neck, but that he pardoned him in the name of  the emperor. 
Then, however, a tumult ensued. The Helong, assisted by a few Sonbai, 
scaled the rock where Uis Kono was held. They killed him and everyone 
67 VOC 1209 (1655), f. 189a; Coolhaas 1968:14-5. Santa Catharina 1866:311 puts the number of  the 
Company troops at 18,000 men.
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in his retinue, not even sparing the infants. Apparently the Dutch did 
nothing to stop the massacre, which cost some 500 lives.68
It appears that a small local Portuguese force held out against the 
VOC expedition for the next few days. Then, a lucky meeting between 
them and the expedition of  Da Costa and Hornay enabled them to strike 
a blow against the Company forces. In the early hours of  17 September 
1657, they and their Timorese clients made a furious assault against 
the encampment of  the Dutch, who first did not understand that it was 
their enemies. The Company troops retreated to a hill, dragging a small 
cannon with them, but were unable to withstand the steady charges. 
Verheyden stood with pistol in hand, shouting ‘Stand by me, pious sol-
diers, and do not leave me!’69 His words fell on deaf  ears, however, and 
several Europeans dropped their shotguns and ran in order to escape 
the frightening shower of  assegais. Verheyden had placed great trust in 
the qualities of  the Solorese, but the sengaji of  Terong, Lamahala and 
Lamakera were all killed, along with many of  their men. According 
to the official VOC report, Jacob Verheyden himself  met a warrior’s 
end, still clutching his pistol. A Topass soldier – in one version, António 
Hornay himself  – cut him down with a blow to the shoulder. Even the 
Dominican chronicle praised Verheyden’s fearless stance in the face of  
the Portuguese onslaught.70 
It was not the last time that a Dutch opperhoofd lost his life in conflict 
with the locals. With Verheyden fell 22 white and 400 indigenous sol-
diers, including many prominent grandees of  Sonbai and Solor. When 
the authorities in Batavia investigated the matter they found that the 
responsibility for the fiasco lay with Verheyden himself. The Company 
argued that he should have scouted the area carefully before engaging 
in such a rash expedition. Also, he should have been more familiar with 
the fighting styles of  his local allies, who were not suited to conventional 
warfare (Coolhaas 1968:253-4). One consolation was that the Timorese 
stood by the Company in spite of  their consternation over the defeat, 
68 VOC 1209 (1655), f. 189a.
69 VOC 1209 (1655), f. 189b.
70 VOC 1209 (1655), ff. 189a-189b; Santa Catharina 1866:311. That António Hornay killed Ver-
heyden is stated by François Valentijn (1726, III:125). According to De Roever 2002:260, the slayer of  
Verheyden was Gonsalvo de Hornay, a son of  the renegade Jan de Hornay. Gonsalvo established a strong 
position as merchant-prince around Mena in the mid-seventeenth century (De Roever 2002:240). The 
position of  this man is somewhat unclear in the extant sources. According to François Valentijn (1726, 
III:124) Gonsalvo was in fact the same person as Jan de Hornay, and the father of  António Hornay.
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declaring that they would not rest until the Portuguese were expelled 
from the island. The colonial and indigenous groups desperately needed 
each other, and to the hounded allies, Dutch authority appeared to be of  
a much higher order than suggested by the modest resources Batavia put 
into the Timor project. Regarding Fort Concordia, an employee sternly 
commented that he ‘had been to many countries, but still not seen any 
worse fortification’.71 While the fort in Kupang was defended by 18 
men, the garrison on Solor – still the hub of  VOC activities in the area 
– consisted of  39 men.72 The numbers verge on the pathetic, a symbol 
of  deterrence rather than illustrative of  an active force.
At this time, the Company still hoped to clear Timor of  the enemy. 
Its greatest asset was Arnold de Vlaming van Oudshoorn. This com-
mander, who bore the less than martial title of  superintendent, led the 
Company troops to victory in the Great Ambon War of  1651-1656. 
The great dissatisfaction that the Dutch policy on Ambon generated, 
led to an outdrawn and merciless conflict that ended with complete 
suppression of  the island and the resettlement of  large strata of  the 
population (Keuning 1988:391-3). After the conclusion of  the affair, the 
superintendent was ordered to take an armada to Timor to deal with the 
situation there. He arrived at Solor in June 1656, where he met Hendrik 
ter Horst, who had once again been appointed to the danger-ridden 
position of  opperhoofd of  Fort Henricus. This time, De Vlaming would 
be less fortunate.
The beginning of  De Vlaming’s Timorese expedition did not bode 
well. He sent threatening summons to the peoples of  Solor, Serbite 
(meaning Adonara), Loubale (meaning Lembata) and Pontane (meaning 
Pantar) to provide auxiliary manpower, but did not get a single person 
from the last three islands, and only a few from Solor. ‘They are’, he 
wrote, ‘a very slow, cowardly and disobedient people.’73 On Solor, a 
crude plan was drawn up for the subjugation of  Timor. The basic idea 
was to march from Kupang, with the aim of  breaking the Kingdom of  
71 Fiedler n.y.:27, H 475a, KITLV.
72 Coolhaas 1968:15; Fiedler n.y.:27, H 475a, KITLV.
73 VOC 1217 (1656), f. 323a. Regarding the peculiar names of  the islands: Serbite comes from Sarabi-
ti, a component of  the princedom of  Adonara; Loubala is Labala, the only traditional princedom on 
Lembata, situated at the southern coast (Boli Lajar 2007). As they were associated with the Watan Lema 
bond, Labala would technically be duty-bound to support the VOC suzerain, despite their lack of  en-
thusiasm. The Galiyao bond on Alor and Pantar similarly had a connection with the Watan Lema, but 
this meant very little in a situation like this.
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Amarasi on the outer (south) coast, which by now had emerged as the 
main prop of  Portuguese power on the island. Amarasi had recently 
devastated certain villages belonging to Amabi, and had even threatened 
to march on Kupang itself. Then, one way or another, the Dutch expedi-
tion should march via Amabi to assist Sonbai, attacking Amanuban and 
Batumean in the southern Atoni lands. Lifau at the northern coast was 
also a primary objective for attack. With that, De Vlaming presumed that 
the other Portuguese clients would submit of  their own volition, so that 
the whole of  Timor would be subjected to the Company. Nevertheless, 
the superintendent noted the parochial outlook of  the indigenous gran-
dees, who could only provide very vague geographical information to 
the Dutch.74 When De Vlaming speaks of  ‘Timor’ he appears to think 
mainly of  the Atoni lands – the central and eastern areas were almost 
terra incognita to the white strangers.
The expedition commenced on 15 June 1656. It was apparently the 
largest concentration of  white troops on Timorese soil prior to World 
War II. A total of  600 Europeans and about as many ‘blacks’ marched 
from Kupang. Five days later they approached the main settlement of  
Amarasi via a ridge. However, just as De Vlaming took advice to assault 
Amarasi, his troops were surprised by torrential rain, in spite of  the dry 
season. Since the equipment was soaked and the dark skies did not seem 
to break up, the Dutch decided to fall back. The retreat caused conster-
nation among the locals, who thought that the Dutch fled the enemy in 
fear. Under the circumstances, De Vlaming found it best to return to 
Kupang in order to take in more provisions.75 
A few days later the VOC troops marched anew towards Amarasi via 
Babau. Approaching Amarasi, De Vlaming was astonished to find such 
a desolate place: 
It had no more likeness with a negeri than if  we had been placed on a 
dune behind Haarlem, and then been told: ‘Here you are in the village 
De Bresaep.’ Here and there was a hut on a hill; three or four, or at the 
most five or six beside each other; a musket shot’s distance from there, on 
another hill, there would be another two; and such was the case with al-
most all the heights, ridges and hills, without there being any palisade, let 
alone fortification. It is the poorest kind of  houses that we believe humans 
74 VOC 1217 (1656), f. 324a-324b.
75 VOC 1217 (1656), ff. 326a-327a; Bor 1663:350-1.
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inhabit in the whole world. They are not unlike beehives but somewhat 
larger; or like a noopehuys76 that one sees standing in the fields of  our 
lands in the summertime.77
The houses were, moreover, deserted and there was not a penny to 
be had for the Company. De Vlaming seriously doubted that any 
Portuguese would want to stay in a beehive like that, although his guides 
told him that this was indeed the case. At this stage the Dutch and their 
allies were not optimistic, considering the efforts and costs required to 
bring the expedition along these faraway and wearisome roads. Their 
fears were well founded, for the Portuguese had sprung into action at 
De Vlaming’s aproach. The padres on the island sent the seventy-year-
old captain Balthazar Gonçalves with sixteen musketeers to assist their 
Amarasi clients, who by this time had taken on a fervent Catholic identi-
ty. Amarasi was governed by a set of  brothers of  whom the most notable 
was the executive regent Dom Agostinho, mentioned in respectful terms 
in Dutch and Portuguese sources alike.78 
From afar, the Dutch eventually saw a rock with huts on it, which 
seemed to be the main negeri. Some people were seen descending, shout-
ing like a party of  ghosts. De Vlaming ordered six companies, half  of  
his force, to move forward in three columns. One of  them marched via 
a narrow path. After a while they found a simple fortification made of  
stones, bamboo and thicket. It was so well placed that one could only 
reach it by climbing up man by man. With their wide-muzzled muskets, 
the few Portuguese inside the fortification, none of  whom were appar-
ently white European, fired grapeshots into the Dutch column with 
deadly effect. Finally the Dutch had to fall back, having lost 54 men, 
dead or wounded in the encounter. De Vlaming was deeply grieved over 
the failure, but found that he could not blame his Dutch subordinates, 
instead deferring to God’s will. Finding themselves in an unknown land 
76 The meaning of  the word noopehuys is not clear. It is perhaps a scribal error for poepehuys, a hut 
for poepen, who were poor German agrarian workers in the Netherlands. I owe this suggestion to Perry 
Moree, Koninklijke Bibliotheek, The Hague.
77 VOC 1217 (1656), ff. 332a-332b.
78 Santa Catharina 1866:313. The king of  Amarasi at this time was called António, his brothers being 
Dom Tomás, Dom Agostinho and Dom Rodrigo. The Dominican chronicle erroneously says that Dom 
Agostinho was the king, missing one aspect of  the Timorese system of  governance. Compare VOC 1252 
(1665), f. 676; Fiedler n.y.:36, H 475a, KITLV; Jacobs 1988:241. Valentijn (1726, III:125) alleges that 
António Hornay was a leading officer during the fight, which is plausible but not clear from contemporary 
sources.
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with many wounded and ill soldiers, there was nothing more that the 
expedition could do in Amarasi.79 
The expedition treaded the path back to Kupang carrying the dis-
abled in mats, but all the while closely pursued by enemy warriors. Due 
to the difficult terrain the expedition could only march in single file, and 
the Company troops managed to keep good order for some time; how-
ever, when they marched through a dense forest, the Amarasian war par-
ties suddenly appeared from all sides.80 The Dutch had difficulties using 
their muskets properly, and the Amarasians feared them no more than if  
they had been sticks. Under the rain of  enemy assegais discipline broke, 
and the soldiers trampled their own officers underfoot. The enemy stood 
so close to the Dutch column that they attacked the soldiers using their 
assegais as pikes, grabbing the muskets out of  their hands. Luckily for 
the Dutch, the Portuguese clients did not pursue the attack at length, 
and De Vlaming and Ter Horst were eventually able to reach safety after 
80 more of  their men were left dead or wounded. ‘It strikes our heart’, 
wrote De Vlaming, ‘that we were so stunningly blessed in Amboina by 
God the Lord, but were so shamefully humiliated by a party of  effete 
blacks here at the Timor post, where we however can see no advantages 
for the Company.’81
Back on Solor, De Vlaming suggested to Batavia in a letter that 
the Company would do better to establish a post on the small but 
well-provided island of  Rote. Timor could certainly be subdued, but it 
would cost an undue number of  men and amount of  money; the lack of  
Timorese profits made him unsure if  it was worth the effort (or, as he put 
it with a salty Dutch expression, ‘if  the juice was worth the cabbage’).82 
The superintendent made a last attempt to conclude a local armistice 
with the Larantuqueiros, offering them the opportunity to sell all their 
sandalwood, turtle-shell, and so on to the Company. The latter, however, 
wished to maintain a policy of  free trade, not least by maintaining the 
vital link between the still-independent Makassar and Solor-Timor. This, 
of  course, was in opposition to the monopolistic aims of  the Company 
and could not be accepted. De Vlaming dared not attack Larantuka 
79 VOC 1217 (1656), ff. 332b-336a; Bor 1663:353-4.
80 An investigation of  the terrain by Professor Hendrik Ataupah, Kupang, suggests that the assault 
took place at Noi Kasemuti, in the district Amarasi Barat (interview, Hendrik Ataupah, 24-11-2009).
81 VOC 1217 (1656), f. 338b.
82 VOC 1217 (1656), f. 341a.
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where there were 800-1,000 men armed with shotguns, and the poten-
tial refuge Ili Mandiri at the rear. An attack would not earn the VOC a 
penny, since the wives, children and valuables of  the inhabitants would 
be brought to the mountains in good time. The Dutch, moreover, heard 
a rumour – only partly true as it turned out – that the Portuguese intend-
ed to abandon their settlement and move to Lifau on Timor’s northern 
coast.83 On 17 July, the frustrated De Vlaming left Solor, leaving Ter 
Horst in charge of  a sizeable force.
The immediate effect of  the monumental Portuguese-Amarasian 
victory was that the leading Larantuqueiro officer, Francisco Carneiro 
de Siqueira, sailed to Timor in the company of  a padre to confirm 
Portugal’s authority among the client princedoms. The queen of  the 
sandalwood-producing island of  Mena, one of  Portugal’s early clients, 
was found to have colluded with the Dutch enemy. Carneiro promptly 
ordered both her execution and that of  the king. That there were Dutch 
designs on Mena can also be gleaned from Dutch records. Hendrick ter 
Horst arrived at Mena in October 1656 to parley with the leaders, but 
found that the main settlement – a good walk from the coast – had been 
deserted. Ter Horst, moreover, was not ashamed to steal as much sandal-
wood as he could before he left. The merchant and politician Francisco 
Vieira de Figueiredo, who had a great influence on Portuguese affairs in 
the East Indies, wrote that it was alright to eliminate the king and queen, 
but that it would have been better if  Carneiro had managed the situation 
clandestinely. It would be a great scandal among other kings if  they saw 
a private individual passing a death sentence over royals.84 
The new Timorese allies Sonbai and Amabi did not contribute much 
to the expedition of  De Vlaming, nor did they show any sign of  waver-
ing in their loyalty. This was the more so since the local VOC authorities 
under the direction of  Ter Horst finally decided to desert Fort Henricus 
and Solor. On the advice of  De Vlaming, the local Dutchmen were 
ordered by Batavia to erect a new stronghold on Rote or possibly on 
Pulau Semau. In other words, the general idea was to manage the affairs 
of  the region from the relative safety of  a small island. However, none 
83 VOC 1217 (1656), f. 344a-345a.
84 Boxer 1967:65-6; VOC 1221 (1657), ff. 310a-310b. Vieira’s letter is dated 12-6-1656. It is appar-
ently misdated since the defeat of  De Vlaming, mentioned in the letter, took place later in the same 
month. The queen of  Mena is probably the same as the one who was baptized in 1641. Another queen 
of  Mena is mentioned somewhat later, in 1660, as rebelling against Portuguese authority. This second 
queen was an in-law of  the Sonbai ruler (VOC 1233 [1660], f. 721b).
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of  Batavia’s alternatives seemed appealing to the Company servants 
on Solor, who instead decided to move the garrison to Fort Concordia 
awaiting further orders. It was felt that Kupang was, after all, the most 
advantageous place at hand.85 The move took place in August 1657, 
to the discontent of  Nyai Cili, the queen of  Solor. In a Malay letter to 
Governor General Joan Maetsuiker, she vented her misgivings in faintly 
ironical terms:
The [Governor] General says that we should go and live together on the 
island of  Rote. However, we from Solor are not accustomed to living in 
another land, since our forefathers have lived and died here, and we will 
not stay somewhere else. And the island of  Rote is the land of  the Com-
pany. Solor is also the land of  the Company, there is no difference […] 
Furthermore, when Governor De Vlaming went from Ambon to Timor, 
who followed him there apart from three of  our negeri, namely Lohayong, 
Lamakera and Terong? The sengaji of  Adonara arrived with two perahu 
but did not find Admiral de Vlaming and withdrew. Now, however, when 
Mr De Vlaming saw who did not follow him, why did he not punish them 
at once? For Mr De Vlaming is a great man, but I am only a woman. 
What wit or power do I possess at the side of  such a great man? Of  those 
who followed Mr De Vlaming on the expedition to Timor, who carried 
the gunpowder and bullets? Who carried the matches? Who carried all 
the goods? Was it those from Rote, or from Sawu, or from Amabi, or 
from Sonbai, or soldiers or sailors – or who were they, who carried these 
items and were wounded on [the road from] the mountains to the sloops? 
Always, it was my people who carried it. Also, all those who remained 
together [fallen in battle] on Timor with Jacob van der Heyden [Ver-
heyden] were the offspring of  sengaji and grandees. And that was only 
because of  an issue concerning the Company; not an issue concerning 
us on Solor.86
The queen was not the only one to dislike the transition from Solor; 
several Company servants felt the same. Five Dutchmen and three slave 
women deserted, indicating that Timor was not an attractive alternative. 
A boatswain was caught in the act of  escaping and condemned to death, 
but was spared on the intervention of  the kind-hearted queen. However, 
85 Fiedler n.y.:31, H 475a, KITLV.
86 Dagh-Register 1887-1931, the year 1657:226-7.
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the transition proceeded as planned, and on 11 August 1657, Kupang 
became the new residence of  the opperhoofd and his garrison. A new pali-
sade was erected with the help of  the Helong. One of  the gates led to the 
Koinino River, one of  the main benefits of  the post, while the other one 
led to the principal settlement of  the Helong people, who had by now 
moved close to their would-be foreign protectors.87
For a moment it seemed as if  the lord of  Sonbai would succeed where 
his Dutch allies had failed. Sonbai forces consisting of  250-300 men 
overran the minor domain of  Pitai and the important Amanuban, one 
of  the mainstays of  Portuguese authority, and in one version ‘the fore-
most of  all’ among the Atoni.88 As the main settlement of  Amanuban 
went up in flames, the population of  the other Atoni princedoms began 
to fear for their lives. An embassy from Batumean at the south coast ap-
peared before the lord of  Sonbai and asked for the support of  him and 
the Company ‘like in the old days’.89 The envoys were introduced by 
the executive regent (veltoverste) of  Sonbai, Ama Tomananu alias Dom 
Luíz, when the latter paid a friendly visit to Kupang in September 1657. 
The envoys asserted that they would be happy to follow the examples 
of  Sonbai and Amabi, remove the Portuguese and open their shores to 
Dutch traders. At the time, warfare had ruined Batumean’s trade, tradi-
tionally known as one of  the main sandalwood ports of  the outer (south) 
coast, and the local rulers were keen to attract Dutch merchant ships 
once more.90 Incidentally, Ama Tomananu is a figure who is well known 
in later oral tradition, and not without reason. During his long life – he 
died only in 1685 – he would prove to be among the most important 
Timorese individuals for the VOC, laying the foundations for a func-
tional, co-operative relationship with the Company. He belonged to the 
extensive Oematan clan, but was at the same time known in the Dutch 
texts as the ‘brother’ of  the so-called emperor of  Sonbai.91
A man of  no less legendary stature, however, was already attempt-
87 Fiedler n.y.:32, H 475a, KITLV.
88 Dominican report from c.1650, in H 697:a, KITLV.
89 VOC 1221 (1657), ff. 322a.
90 VOC 1221 (1657), ff. 322a-322b.
91 On Ama Tomananu, see Heijmering 1847:37 and Middelkoop 1952:243. The account of  Mid-
delkoop says that ‘the [two] fettor [of  Sonbai] were Kono-Oematan, but his younger brother was Baki To 
Amnanu [Tomananu]’. The text thus asserts that Fettor Oematan was another person than To Amnanu, 
and confirms that the latter was in a (symbolic) sense the ‘brother’ of  the Sonbai lord. Nevertheless, 
Dutch memorandums from 1698 and later explicitly make clear that any sons and further descendants 
belonged to the house of  Oymatta (Oematan); see VOC 1609 (1698), f. 49.
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ing to ruin any gains that the Company’s allies had achieved. In the 
highlands of  West Timor, the mafefa or adat experts were, in the late 
twentieth century, still recalling the exploits of  Simão Luís, capitão mor 
of  the Larantuqueiros (Ataupah 1992:160-1). This resolute Portuguese 
officer, they said, issued a summons to the Timorese rulers to submit to 
Portugal. In the ritual language of  the Atoni, with its typical parallelism, 
the summons was known as ‘Sulat Lifau ma Nainonot, Atu Lifau ma 
Nainonot’, meaning ‘message of  Lifau and Nainonot, writing from Lifau 
and Nainonot’. The early nature of  this particular tradition is indicated 
by the name Lifau, a Portuguese stronghold that was abandoned after 
1769. The princedoms that submitted to the Portuguese were given a 
tongkat (staff) with a lion’s head and a gong. This was known to the mafefa 
as ‘Uel Simão Luís, sene Simão Luís’, that is, ‘tongkat of  Simão Luís, gong 
of  Simão Luís’.92
As a matter of  fact, Simão Luís was a controversial figure. The Historia 
de S. Domingos characterizes him as ‘a person of  experience and valour’ 
(Santa Catharina 1866:315), and there is nothing in the sources to alter 
this judgement. At the same time he appears to have been ruthless, verg-
ing on the macabre in his dealings with the Timorese, something even 
acknowledged by the Portuguese themselves. These were difficult years 
for the Portuguese in Asian waters, and the ethnically mixed community 
on Flores and Timor fought with their backs against the wall, engender-
ing desperate courage coupled with stern measures against anyone who 
opposed Portugal’s cause. The Dutch would realize the consequences in 
1657 when Simão Luís managed to slip over from Larantuka to Timor 
without the VOC crafts being able to intercept him. 
On 25 September 1657, Luís invaded the Sonbai lands with hun-
dreds of  musketeers and ‘innumerable’ Timorese auxiliaries. He was 
opposed by 42 Company soldiers under the command of  the Dutch 
sergeant Lambrecht Heyman, and the forces of  Ama Tomananu and 
the king of  Amabi. On the advice of  Ama Tomananu the allies retreated 
to Gunung Mollo, a lofty massif  of  2,070 metres in the centre of  West 
Timor. The next day the forces of  Luís arrived at the mountain and 
92 Fobia 1984:63-4. The significance of  the other place, Nainonot, remains unknown. On the im-
portance of  tongkat or rattan staffs as symbols of  authority in an East Timorese context, see Ospina and 
Hohe 2002:34-7. Like the Portuguese flags, they became sacred objects kept by the various domains. A 
Simão Luís tongkat is kept by the princely Kono family in their old sonaf in Noetoko (Silab et al. 2005:64, 
67).
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proceeded to besiege the allies for five days. As the fighting spirit of  the 
Dutch dwindled, they began to think about saving their own skins. The 
whites clandestinely negotiated with a certain Ambrecht Lambrechtsen, 
who had once deserted from Fort Henricus to Larantuka ‘like a rascal’ 
and now served under Simão Luís. Ama Tomananu and the king of  
Amabi realized this and reproached Sergeant Heyman for his conduct. 
In the ensuing quarrel the sergeant slapped the face of  Ama Tomananu 
and said, ‘We do not wish to fight. We have been granted good quarter. 
Run and look for a good escape route, for the both of  you are finished.’93 
As the Dutch hoisted the white flag, the soldiers of  Simão Luís climbed 
up and rushed inside the allied camp, meanwhile shouting loudly. The 
Sonbai regent managed to flee, but the enemy attacked the corpulent 
king of  Amabi and his brother, who valiantly stayed by his side, with 
cutlasses. The king was chopped into pieces, while thousands of  allied 
Timorese were driven over the edge of  the steep mountainside and fell 
to their death. The tragedy was as complete as the Dutch disgrace; the 
mountain was impregnable to any enemy attack if  resolutely defended, 
and it was believed that ten soldiers with shotguns could have resisted the 
siege – the contrast with the successful Portuguese defence against the 
troops of  De Vlaming itself  was obvious.94
The three Dutch defeats in 1655, 1656 and 1657 were decisive for 
the political history of  Timor for almost the entire century that followed. 
The rumour of  the Gunung Mollo tragedy spread far and wide, and 
caused serious unrest on Rote where the Portuguese still had friends 
among the small nusak. In the interior of  West Timor, meanwhile, the 
importance of  Sonbai and Amabi quickly decreased. The lord of  Sonbai 
himself, Ama Tuan, was captured by the Portuguese circa 1657-1658, al-
though some members of  his family were able to escape his fate and were 
kept under the protection of  his executive regent, Ama Tomananu.95 
For the Portuguese it was a lucky strike: with the central lord in the hands 
of  his enemies the system could no longer be maintained. 
93 VOC 1226 (1658), f. 509b.
94 VOC 1226 (1658), ff. 509b-510a; Santa Catharina 1866:315. The losses of  the VOC allies were 
4,000-5,000 in the Dutch version, 1,800 in the Portuguese.
95 The captivity of  the Sonbai ruler is referred to in VOC 1233 (1660), f. 721. A missive in Coolhaas 
1971:529 indicates that Ama Tuan had been under the control of  the Portuguese since before the com-
ing of  Ama Tomananu to Kupang in 1658. The capture of  the ruler therefore must have taken place in 
1657/58. The name or title Ama Tuan (in other documents, Ama Utang) is not known to later Sonbai 
tradition. Helong tradition, on the other hand, recognizes it as a royal name. Am Tuan alias Koen Bissi 
was the first, legendary king of  Kupang (Detaq 1972:15).
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In Kupang, meanwhile, the thrifty Hendrick ter Horst finally stepped 
down from his post as opperhoofd after a dozen eventful years serving in 
East Indonesian waters. He was escorted to Solor by the new opperhoofd, 
Joseph Margits, for further transport back to Batavia. Ter Horst did not 
get along well with his successor, whom he characterized as a drunkard 
who played around with the garrison and someone who was completely 
unfit to be a leader. On Solor, some Muslim merchants came aboard the 
ship of  Margits and asked to receive merchandise to the value of  1,244 
reals. This they would trade for sandalwood and beeswax on the inacces-
sible outer coast of  Timor, an amount of  which would then be delivered 
to the Company authorities in Kupang. Margits promised to consider the 
offer. With these routine matters in mind, he returned to Kupang. When 
he arrived at the roadstead, the bookkeeper Philip Boels came aboard 
the ship to confront him with startling news about events that had oc-
curred during his absence.96
Ten days earlier, on 11 September 1658, the modest colony had been 
flooded by many thousands of  refugees: 8,000-9,000 in one estimate, 
18,000-20,000 in another. Substantial parts of  the leaderless Sonbai 
and Amabi communities had left their homes in the interior of  Timor, 
unable to cope with the pressure from the Portuguese clients. Taking 
their women, children, cattle and all they could bring along, they had 
marched down to the coast while their enemies swarmed around them 
and shouted that they would sit no safer in Kupang than they had in their 
previous lands. The destitute refugees camped a few kilometres from 
Fort Concordia like a swarm of  bees, as a witness put it, and the Dutch 
found it a truly miserable sight. Ama Tomananu was the spokesman for 
the newcomers. Together with some Amabi princes he met Philip Boels 
on the hillside above the fort. Wearing sombre expressions and with tears 
in their eyes they complained to Boels about their hunger, claiming they 
had nothing left to eat. The bookkeeper had no means to feed so many 
people, but he finally gave each of  the foremost aristocrats 100 pounds 
of  rice, for which they seemed very grateful.97 
He also provided the Sonbai and Amabi with cutlasses and axes 
so that they could begin to cultivate the soil at once. Furthermore, the 
Dutch asked their allies on Rote and Solor to bring in provisions to 
Kupang on a daily basis, in order to feed the refugees. There seems to 
96 VOC 1229 (1659), f. 851a-b.
97 VOC 1229 (1659), f. 851b-852a.
125
4 Establishments and clashes, 1641-1658 |
have been no animosity between the newcomers and the Helong at this 
stage. Land was plentiful, and was worked through the usual Timorese 
method of  slash-and-burn cultivation. The earth was dry and not very 
fertile, however, and the allies planted jagung (maize), which requires 
much less water than rice. This is an interesting point, since it is the first 
explicit mention of  maize being grown as a crop on Timor. It is known 
to have been cultivated with success in several places in the eastern part 
of  the archipelago around 1670: Ambon, Ternate, Tidore and various 
parts of  Sulawesi.98 The beginnings of  the Sonbai and Amabi refugee 
communities on the coast were at any rate grim, and reminiscent of  the 
worst conditions of  a modern famine-stricken third-world country. By 
March 1659 they could present the first cobs to Margits as a harvest gift, 
following old Timorese traditions. Nevertheless, these were very dark 
days and many succumbed to starvation; in one period it was common 
to find 20 or 30 corpses each day along the roads or under the palisade 
of  the fort. The allies also had to take the utmost care when going out 
of  sight of  the fortress. Headhunting parties from Amarasi sometimes 
captured those who wandered too far, and they had little regard for the 
weak VOC garrison.99 Eventually the refugee communities managed 
to survive the transformation from highlanders to coastal dwellers, and 
even thrive upon it. It was, in fact, one of  many historical cases of  exten-
sive migrations of  Timorese groups, the latest of  which occurred after 
the East Timorese vote for independence in 1999.
It remains to relate the fate of  the Muslim merchants who had ap-
proached Margits on Solor. Theirs was a hard fate; having received the 
merchandise they had asked for, they set sail for the eastern shores. As 
they anchored at Matayer in East Timor with the intention of  purchas-
ing sandalwood and beeswax, they were attacked by Portuguese vessels 
coming down from Makassar. Two ships were destroyed and fourteen 
men lost their lives, while the captain and fifteen men managed to save 
themselves and sail back to Solor, ‘which’, to quote a VOC report, ‘did 
not give us any pleasant tidings’.100 The disaster afflicting the merchants 
98 Boomgaard 1997:419-20. According to Boomgaard the word jagung for maize is first mentioned in 
the year 1682 in a Dutch source, a date that can now be corrected to 1658. Maize is also mentioned as 
being planted in Lembata and Pantar, in a Portuguese missionary report written shortly after 1641 (Sá 
1956:488).
99 VOC 1229 (1659), f. 858a.
100 VOC 1229 (1659), f. 859a. Matteyer or Mattayer is often mentioned in Dutch documents from the 
1650s and 1660s. It was situated between Dili and Tibar, making it modern-day Motael (Mota Ain).
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was yet a reminder that the VOC and their few remaining allies were 
stuck together on a small piece of  land for the foreseeable future.
a later perspective
The period 1641-1658 was indeed a formative one for the political 
structures of  Timor and the establishment of  an early colonial presence, 
which justifies the detailed study of  the process described above. On the 
eve of  the Makassarese invasion, relations between the external groups 
and the Timorese communities were mainly economic, but from that 
time onwards, they became increasingly political. At the end of  the pe-
riod a Portuguese network encompassed much of  western Timor, while 
the Dutch positions were reduced to Kupang, Rote, Sawu and parts of  
Solor and Adonara. The trend therefore ran completely contrary to 
the general pattern, where the Portuguese were defeated in Southeast 
Asia, Sri Lanka and much of  India. The Larantuqueiros were not full 
members of  the Estado da Índia, but rather a hybrid community that 
managed its own affairs, albeit strongly attached to Portuguese symbols. 
It was probable that it was precisely their localized position that was de-
cisive in their effort to build up their network among indigenous groups, 
a pattern that is paralleled by the role of  Portuguese mestizo groups in 
several other parts of  the world. In a lusophone mestizo context, the 
Larantuqueiros are nevertheless unusual in terms of  the politically inde-
pendent stance they took from an early stage, the result of  them having 
to fend for themselves for lengthy periods of  time. It is indeed striking 
how inefficient the VOC efforts were, and how quickly the networks that 
the Dutch attempted to forge actually crumbled. From the official Dutch 
Generale missiven it appears that Batavia, discouraged by the successive 
defeats, did not find it worth the effort to send forces large enough to 
deal with the Larantuqueiros once and for all. The Company were fully 
occupied with other commitments, and the commercial prospects were 
doubtful – the profits from the Kupang post were always much smaller 
than the costs. By 1655, cheap sandalwood was reportedly found all over 
India, and its value had decreased. Still, it was imperative to maintain 
a post in the Solor-Timor region to secure the lines of  communication 
with the important possessions of  Ambon and Banda in Central Maluku 
(Coolhaas 1968:253-4; Leupe 1856:145-6). Clove and nutmeg found 
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on Maluku had once tempted European ships to sail to this part of  the 
world, and it was imperative for the Company to maintain the monopo-
lies it had imposed. An expansion of  Portuguese might and activities in 
the eastern archipelago could disturb the Dutch positions and had to be 
checked.
During this eventful period foreign soldiers interfered in the affairs 
of  Timor, not only in the coastland, but also in the very interior. They 
supported the rise and fall of  princedoms, manipulated thrones and 
imposed their own commercial conditions on the local communities. At 
the same time, the clashes cannot simply be seen as a colonial-versus-
indigenous dichotomy. The small foreign detachments always fought 
together with larger bands of  allies or clients.101 Firearms often played a 
decisive role in battles on the still low-technology island, but this was no 
general rule; much of  the Portuguese-Timorese military success against 
the well-armed soldiers of  the Company in the 1650s can be attributed 
to the conduct of  Timorese troops. To what extent political changes in-
fluenced economic conditions at a local level, or indeed the everyday life 
of  the Timorese, is harder to tell. What we can tell is how the historical 
landscape was viewed with the benefit of  hindsight.
The Dutch-Portuguese struggle of  the 1650s did not fail to make its 
mark on oral tradition. A considerable number of  stories centre on the 
coming of  the Portuguese to the island, the establishment of  the Dutch 
in Kupang and the interconnected events. In other words, there was a 
distinct notion among later Timorese that the foreigners had not been 
present since time immemorial, but had arrived under particular circum-
stances. Unsurprisingly, there are considerable differences in perspective 
between various parts of  Timor. The Atoni lands in the west display a 
markedly hostile view of  the Portuguese, who are mostly identified as kase 
metan. The stories tend to focus on their oppressive and aggressive stance, 
which should also be seen in the context of  the inclusion of  the western 
princedoms in the Dutch sphere after the mid-eighteenth century.102 By 
contrast, stories told in East Timor often mention a generic affinity be-
tween the Portuguese and Timorese. The Mambai people south of  Dili 
see themselves as senior in a Timor-wide context, but at the same time 
101 The line between ‘ally’ and ‘client’ is moot.
102 In this book, the phrases ‘the Dutch sphere’ and ‘the Portuguese sphere’ pertain to the areas that fell 
respectively under Dutch (VOC) or Portuguese (Estado da Índia) influence or control.
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the power of  the grandees is thought to emanate from the Portuguese, 
who are incorporated into a mythologized system. The Portuguese are 
no unqualified strangers to the land; rather, they are younger sons re-
turning to the land. In other cases, the local rulers claim descent from the 
Portuguese strongholds of  Larantuka and Oecusse (Traube 1986:52-4; 
Forman 1977:107).
It is striking how some events that must have made a great impression 
on people at the time have fallen into oblivion, while others have survived 
until modern times. There are no stories reminiscing of  the defeats of  
Verheyden and De Vlaming, but a good number about the Battle of  
Gunung Mollo. The reason for this is obvious: the slaying of  the Amabi 
ruler and the relocation of  his kin to Kupang gave the event a dynastic 
dimension. It is also interesting to see how the perspective of  the stories 
is changed over time. In the earliest recorded version from 1847, the 
conflict is caused by the offensive conduct of  the Portuguese, who try 
to approach the women of  the Amabi ruler Aiputu. In the ensuing war, 
Aiputu is besieged on a high mountain in Mollo by the Portuguese and 
their clients, including Sonbai. Aiputu’s nephew, the king of  Amarasi, 
sends a party to rescue the old man. They nearly succeed until they begin 
to accompany Aiputu down the mountainside, at which point he slips 
and falls to his death. As was customary, his head was taken as a ritually 
laden trophy by the lord of  Sonbai. Later, however, the skull is returned 
to the son of  Aiputu when it proves to have an adverse effect on rainfall 
in the area. Aiputu’s son, Saroro, rebuilds the Kingdom of  Amabi on a 
smaller scale and marries princesses from Kupang and Sonbai.103
At this stage the Dutch are already out of  the picture, and Sonbai 
has become Amabi’s foe rather than its ally. Later versions, recorded in 
the twentieth century, omit the Portuguese completely from the account 
and instead concentrate on the enmity between Amabi and Sonbai. 
Some versions attribute the conflict to the Sonbai ruler Nai Tuklua 
Sonbai, who expands his power by waging aggressive warfare against 
a number of  Atoni domains (Fobia 1984:46-8; Middelkoop 1952:209; 
Parera 1994:192-3). A conflict that involves foreigners on both sides is 
thus transformed into a purely indigenous affair.
Instead, the impact of  the Portuguese is expounded in stories involv-
103 Heijmering 1847:40-3. Saroro clearly refers to Ceroroneno (Saroro Neno), named in the 1655 
contract. Either the contract was signed by the junior king, the son of  the one who was killed in 1657, or 
else tradition has mixed up generations.
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ing another Sonbai ruler, Nai Manas Sonbai. One version makes him 
the son and successor of  Nai Tuklua Sonbai, while another sees him as 
the first ancestor of  the line. In his time, Portuguese merchants appear 
in the land and behave in a rapacious way to secure the sandalwood and 
beeswax that they take aboard whilst anchored in the port of  Oecusse 
(near Lifau). Nai Manas Sonbai summons the people of  the land to a 
meeting in Nunuhenu, later known as the residence of  the rulers of  
Ambeno. It is agreed that they will wage war on the Portuguese and 
expel them. Indeed, the latter have to flee Oecusse due to the furious 
Timorese attacks. Later, however, they return in full force and establish 
their authority once and for all (Fobia 1984:62-3). In one version, Nai 
Manas Sonbai has to flee his land and move to Oecusse where he dies 
after several decades; meanwhile, the relatives he has left behind are 
killed by the Portuguese.104 These details are vaguely reminiscent of  the 
violent Sonbai uprising against the Portuguese in 1655 and the subse-
quent capture of  the ruler.105 Therefore, the stories tend to associate the 
Portuguese presence with economic oppression. They suggest that efforts 
to regulate the trade and the supply of  sandalwood and beeswax were 
burdensome enough on the local level to engender stories that circulated 
long after the lapse of  Portuguese power in West Timor.
Another set of  stories speak of  the Dutch establishment in Kupang. 
The most elaborate version dates from 1901 and was written down by 
a member of  the regent family of  Amabi. This text traces the ruler and 
regent lines of  Amabi back to Wewiku-Wehali, the conceptual centre of  
Timorese political culture, therefore also relating them to Sonbai. After 
successive migrations over the island, the Amabi end up in Kupang, long 
before the coming of  the white strangers. After some further political 
reshuffling the kase metan arrive – the ethnically mixed Portuguese. They 
104 Riwayat singkat 1983.
105 Dutch evidence suggests that Ama Tuan, or Ama Utang, reigned under the watchful eyes of  the 
Portuguese until circa1680. Two of  his sons fled to Kupang with Ama Tomananu, while two others 
were kept by the Portuguese in Lifau as dynastic hostages. At least one of  the captive sons seems to have 
been raised to the Sonbai lordship after 1680, possibly dying in 1686. Dom Pedro, alias Tomenu, who is 
documented in the period 1704-1726, belonged to the next generation again, since he was the ‘brother’ 
(cousin) of  Ama Tuan’s granddaughter, who reigned over the Sonbai community in Kupang. This Dom 
Pedro may be identified with Nai Neno Sonbai or Nai Talus Sonbai of  the later genealogies. Fobia 
1984 gives the filiation Nai Tuklua – Nai Manas – Nai Talus. Both Nai Tuklua and Nai Manas seem to 
correspond to different aspects of  the historical ruler Ama Tuan, and it must again be stressed that oral 
tradition has a tendency to mix up generations. The forced stay of  Nai Manas in Oecusse is reminiscent 
of  the Ama Tuan’s (unnamed) sons being kept captive in Lifau in the Oecusse enclave. In summary, it is 
an exceedingly tricky matter to collate the orally transmitted pedigrees with European data.
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establish Fort Concordia in Kupang with the assistance of  the local 
chiefs Nai Besi and Nai Lasi, whereupon a number of  native groups 
subsequently arrive in the Kupang area: Funai, Sonbai, the Amabi 
lord who returns after having been absent for a period of  time, and the 
Mardijkers, the partly Europeanized group. 
One day a ship from Solor turns up at the roadstead of  Kupang, 
having been driven to Timor by adversary winds. The curious Timorese 
grandees approach the captain, asking conventional Indonesian ques-
tions: ‘What news do you bring? What is your name? Where do you 
come from?’ ‘My name is Mau Dasi’, replies the captain. ‘I catch fish 
using a hook. I come from Lamakera.’ He also has interesting things to 
relate about conditions on Solor: ‘Over there we are ruled by the white 
foreigners [kase muti]. They are our friends […] All is good, nothing is 
missing.’106
To the Timorese of  Kupang, this is a tempting opportunity to im-
prove their lot. The regents of  Sonbai and Amabi accompany Mau Dasi 
on his way back to Solor and invite the white strangers to Kupang. After 
two months, a Dutch expedition appears at the roadstead to parley with 
the local grandees. Suspiciously, the black foreigners of  Fort Concordia 
ask the whites what they are doing, and are told in reply that they are 
only here for trade. As a matter of  fact, the Dutch take the grandees 
aboard the ship. They eat, drink and discuss, and soon reach an agree-
ment. The Timorese chiefs take it upon themselves to ‘acknowledge 
them [the Company] as father and mother, as prince and chief, from 
the rising to the setting sun’ (Middelkoop 1952:227). One may note 
that the Timorese text uses the word usi (usif) to denote the Company. 
Understandably, the black strangers do not accept the Timorese-Dutch 
treaty, but on the contrary make threatening gestures against Kupang. A 
decade after the arrival of  the Dutch, they attack the town with enor-
mous force but are completely wiped out by the Company’s allies at the 
Battle of  Penfui. The text draws the conclusion that the lord of  heaven 
106 Middelkoop 1952:223. A similar story can be found in Heijmering 1847:46-9; it tells how big fish 
dragged the Solorese ship to the roadstead of  Kupang, thereby making the encounter between the cap-
tain and the Timorese locals ‘fated’. Mau Dasi was a historical sengaji who ruled Lamakera in from 1721 
to 1733. A traditional list of  rulers of  Lamakera, related to the author in June 2006 by Haji Abdul Gafur, 
a member of  the sengaji line, starts with Mau Dasi and then jumps directly to the late nineteenth century. 
Mau Dasi’s historical fame apparently caused later generations to associate him with the establishment 
of  Dutch power; it should be noted that there had been a Lamakera community in Kupang for years, 
which could have provided the name to the local Timorese.
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loves and assists ‘Father and Mother Holland’ and all the Timorese grandees 
and the Mardijkers (Middelkoop 1952:229).
Many details in this story are confirmed to a lesser or greater extent 
by European documents. What is altered, in the first place, is the chro-
nology of  events. The Amabi lord is the original settler of  Kupang and 
the lord of  Sonbai also arrives to the place prior to the coming of  the 
Dutch. So do the Mardijkers, although they are actually people of  colour 
in the service of  the Company. By inviting the Dutch to be their usi, the 
Timorese are calling for a ‘stranger king’, an outsider whose foreignness 
enables him to keep the system of  several minor, and potentially rival, 
polities in place. By altering the succession of  events, the story conforms 
to a mythic theme found in many parts of  Southeast Asia and Oceania. 
Jim Fox has highlighted similar historiographical processes on Rote, 
where chains of  past events tend to be reduced to simple vignettes, which 
are then assimilated to models taken from folktales and eventually retold 
as historical narratives (Fox 1979:23). In spite of  their obvious lack of  
factual reliability, oral traditions point to important perspectives and 
themes that can be hidden in contemporary colonial documents.

5
The Topass phase, 1650s-1702
the mestizo community goes to timor
The Larantuqueiro community in easternmost Flores presents a very 
interesting case of  hybridity, to use a term popular in postcolonial stud-
ies.1 Mestizo populations were a ubiquitous phenomenon among the 
Portuguese overseas bases and played an important role in binding local 
groups to Iberian interests.2 Some parallels can be drawn between the 
Portuguese of  Timor and the Afro-Portuguese or Afro-Indian muzangos 
who spearheaded the early colonial infiltration of  Mozambique from 
the sixteenth century onwards, and established territorial chieftaincies 
called prazos. Like the muzangos, the Timorese mestizos wielded great 
autonomous power, which eventually worried the Portuguese authorities. 
Nevertheless, the vital importance of  Mozambique in economic terms 
for the Estado da Índia contrasts with the modest profits of  the Timor 
trade. Furthermore, while the Portuguese on Timor dominated the local 
princedoms, they did not set up prazos with thousands of  enslaved retain-
ers, as was the case in Africa (Disney 2009, II:198-200, 351-3).
Moreover, in the case of  Timor, the entire Portuguese establish-
ment was mestizo up until 1702. During the period under scrutiny, they 
retained a strong Catholic and Portuguese identity, even speaking a cre-
olized version of  the Portuguese language. Although they took over the 
local customs of  East Flores and Timor, they were always looked upon as 
being quite distinct from the local peoples. On the other hand, the White 
Portuguese element was quickly mixed through constant intermarriage, 
and after a few generations the community was more East Indonesian 
or Timorese than European. Exactly how this happened is not known, 
1 On diaspora and hybridity as analytical concepts, see Gandhi 1998:131-2.
2 As argued in Newitt 2005. 
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but any additions of  White Portuguese blood must in any case have 
been minute after 1613, when the community was left to fend for itself. 
A significant European addition came from the sailors and soldiers 
serving under the VOC. The Larantuqueiro community was marked 
by an open attitude in terms of  ethnic mixing, and a more flexible way 
of  life than the stricter conditions imposed on the Company premises. 
Larantuka was therefore an attractive alternative for individuals who felt 
threatened by, or dissatisfied with, their Dutch superiors, or wished to 
escape the monotony or miserable conditions of  their service. Desertions 
from Fort Henricus on Solor, or from Dutch ships sailing the region, 
did occur from time to time in spite of  the severe penalties that would 
be imposed if  the runaways were caught.3 Other groups who made 
up the mestizo community during the seventeenth century included 
prisoners from Portuguese India, Papangers from Luzon in the Spanish 
Philippines, and Christians from Maluku, besides the Florenese and 
Timorese. Unfortunately we know little about marriage patterns among 
the Larantuqueiros of  the seventeenth century, but it is known that there 
was marital exchange with local aristocracies. The Larantuqueiros could 
take the role of  wife-receivers, receiving high-status brides, which en-
tailed a commitment to support their in-laws. If  later Timorese pedigrees 
can be trusted, they could altso act as wife-givers, obviously on the condi-
tion that the local king was, or became, a Catholic in name. 
The Spanish Franciscan Juan de la Camara travelled with a compan-
ion from Manila to Larantuka in 1670, noting the ethnic mix and the 
role that language played in upholding the Catholic Lusitanian identity: 
In this port of  Larantuka live some Portuguese, and in addition, many 
indigenous Christians, to whom the clerics of  the Order of  Our Father 
Saint Dominicus give their service. We were accommodated in their con-
vent and received with much warmth and charity. And during this Lent 
we preached the gospel, not only to the Portuguese but also to the natives 
of  the land, who understood us since they know Portuguese. Because of  
that we had some work to carry out at this port. (Teixeira 1957:447.)
The situation was not as promising as it seemed, however, for the two 
Franciscans were stunned by the lack of  respect shown to the church ser-
3 Dutch desertions to the (White or Black) Portuguese can be traced until the mid-eighteenth century. 
Most of  the defections appear to have taken place in the seventeenth century.
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vants and to themselves. This may have been due to their Spanish origins 
(it should be remembered that the Larantuqueiros prided themselves on 
their Portuguese identity), but also because the Franciscans denounced 
the moral laxity of  the Larantuqueiros: in other words, they criticized the 
tolerant lifestyle that had made the town an attractive refuge for VOC 
deserters.
The Dutch establishment in Kupang in 1653, and the move of  
their regional headquarters from Solor to Kupang in 1657, worried the 
Larantuqueiros. Francisco Carneiro de Siqueira and Simão Luís were 
the first capitão mor to reside on Timor part of  the time, and not just in 
East Flores, and it was under Luís that a sizeable permanent commu-
nity was established on Timorese soil. Although they did not abandon 
Larantuka altogether, a large number of  Black Portuguese or Topasses 
– as we may call them from now on, in line with usage in contemporary 
documents – sailed over to Lifau in the late 1650s. Portuguese sources 
are reticent in describing the process, but there is an important VOC 
document from 1659 that contains a relevant description:
The Portuguese are all ready to come over to Timor from Larantuka to 
settle there and perpetrate their trade […] The capitão mor has settled at 
Lifau with 200 people and 20 of  our Dutch [renegades] who are still 
alive. In Amakono there is a company of  30 men, in the negeri of  Ama-
nuban two companies with 20 members each, which makes 40 men; in 
Amarasi 30 in one company and in Amfoan (alias Snicksnack) simply 
a priest. Together this makes 300 people among whom there are a few 
whites and mestizos, but mostly blacks with shotguns.4
The passage stresses that most of  the Topasses were not even of  mixed 
blood, but rather Asians with a Portuguese identity, casados pretos, or, in 
Dutch eyes, ‘blacks’. There is a casual reference in 1679 to a group of  free 
‘Kaffers’ (Kaffirs) in the service of  the capitão mor (Coolhaas 1971:273). 
This might refer to Africans from Mozambique, who are otherwise ab-
sent from the early sources; however, they certainly became a common 
feature in Portuguese Timor in the late eighteenth century and beyond. 
Occasional references to ‘negroes’ might not be taken as absolute ethnic 
markers, but rather as general branding of  dark-skinned people. Sources 
4 VOC 1229 (1659), ff. 864b-865a.
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like the História de S. Domingos do not hesitate to characterize non-whites 
as Portuguese without further distinction, which points to the situational 
perception of  ethnicity and race at this stage. In a Southeast Asian con-
text, such matters were hardly fixed in the seventeenth century, and eth-
nic identity could change with the circumstances. In legal terms, Asian 
Christians were on an equal footing with white co-religionists, although 
this was not always implemented in practice (Paramita Abdurachman 
1983:86). White Portuguese would pride themselves on their ‘pure 
blood’, showing that racist thinking based on physical features did indeed 
exist; religious affiliation was, however, a more obvious identity marker. 
The passage quoted above also shows how the Portuguese were able 
to keep large tracts of  land in West Timor in check. This situation would 
be reversed in the second half  of  the eighteenth century, when the focus 
of  Portuguese dominance was moved to East Timor. By placing small 
detachments armed with firearms in the various princedoms, and in 
one case ‘simply a padre’, they were able to keep the local rulers under 
a degree of  control. At the same time, the tactics testify to the ability of  
the Topasses to adapt to local circumstances. This is somewhat unchar-
acteristic with regard to the usual Portuguese policies of  keeping a chain 
of  coastal fortalezas, and not keeping close supervision over larger areas. It 
likewise differs from the Dutch policy of  maintaining a closely controlled 
system of  trading offices and avoiding direct interference outside of  these 
offices. 
The only location approximating a coastal stronghold was Lifau, a 
name that coincided with the princedom of  Ambeno (Ambenu). When 
the missionary Frei António de São Jacinto and his companions arrived 
there in 1641, they found that the royal sonaf was not situated at the 
coastal place bearing that name, but at some distance inland. It was, 
however, close enough to walk to by foot (Loureiro 1995:150-2). This 
seems to be a reference to Nunuhenu, in later times known as the royal 
residence. It was very well chosen from a strategic point of  view: three 
river branches departed from there and it also lay at the conjunction 
of  the roads leading inland.5 A Dutch notice from 1673 says that 
Nunuhenu was ‘the place of  residence of  the Portuguese in Lifau’.6 
In the early phase of  their presence, the Portuguese therefore preferred 
to stay in comparative security several kilometres from the coastline. 
5 Rouffaer 1910a, Dagboekaantekeningen, H 677 II, KITLV.
6 VOC 1301 (1673-74), Dagregister, sub 5-8-1673.
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Lifau itself, according to the Dutch descriptions of  the 1670s and 1680s, 
was a sparsely populated trade site with very few commodities. Later, a 
small coastal ‘town’ developed, the rudimentary qualities of  which were 
commented on by the Englishman William Dampier in 1699 (Dampier 
1939:171-2). Oecusse, a place several kilometres east of  Lifau, which in 
later times became the centre of  the enclave, is already mentioned in 
1673. At that time, it was a place settled by the Portuguese who had busi-
ness with the Company; its prominence as a political and commercial 
centre, though, only began after 1759.7
How, then, did the mixed Portuguese population earn a living on 
Timor? The case of  Matheus da Costa, referred to in connection with 
the events of  1653, indicates that some of  them ‘owned’ land, probably 
in line with the usual Timorese tradition of  usufruct: land was rela-
tively plentiful and was considered to ‘belong’ to the person who used it 
(Davidson 1994:127). Trade was another pursuit. Materials from the end 
of  the seventeenth century show that by then, the capitão mor had given 
permission to the Portuguese officers to appropriate certain quantities of  
the precious sandalwood, which they could sell to traders at the coast. 
The officers also received an annual pension or fee from the local kings. 
This fee, the tuthais, consisted of  a number of  baskets of  rice, pigs and 
other products which would cover their subsistence and the upkeep of  
their residences.8 The tuthais was actually a traditional Timorese tribute 
or gift that was brought by the local populations to their kings, a device 
that was quite simply adapted to the early power network maintained by 
the Topasses.
Dutch documents sometimes made a distinction between Portuguese 
and ‘blacks’ (swarten), which may correspond to the Portuguese distinc-
tion between casados brancos and casados pretos. The former could be 
either whites or mestizos, while the latter were Asians who had adopted 
Portuguese ways and customs (Schlicher 1996:83). A detailed enumera-
tion from 1665 mentions that there was just one Portuguese staying in 
Sonbai (Amakono), together with 16 or 17 blacks, who had the exacting 
task of  monitoring the behaviour of  the curbed Sonbai lord. Amanuban 
and Lifau had six or seven Portuguese inhabitants each, and larger 
7 VOC 1301 (1673-74), Dagregister, sub 23-12-1673.
8 Matos 1974a:216. Taken from a description of  Timor in 1697, these features do not need to have 
been fully developed at the early stages of  Portuguese residency, but may have been implemented in full 
during the long governance of  António Hornay (1664-93).
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numbers of  blacks. The detachments in Amarasi, Ade and Amfoan con-
tained no whites whatsoever, although a man from Macao, probably a 
Chinese, had found his way to Amfoan.9 By this time, therefore, local 
people had been incorporated in the Portuguese enterprise, to the extent 
that they filled important positions in the Portuguese network. Some of  
these ‘blacks’ were involved in local elite circles, at times even through 
marital ties. Amarasi, one of  the closest allies, was ‘occupied’ (beset) by 15 
blacks, whose captain was a Dom Diogo Rodrigo, an in-law of  the king. 
Matheus da Costa, contender for the position of  capitão mor, was married 
to a daughter or sister of  the king of  Amanuban.10 The Portuguese 
may have been harsh masters, as attested to by numerous Timorese 
complaints heard by the Dutch, but they managed to strike a balance 
between being foreign and acculturation, something that was functional 
in securing their dominance for more than 300 years. 
the rise of the hornays and da costas
All over Timor there are still people with the surname Hornay or Da 
Costa. This may imply that they are descendants from the original sev-
enteenth-century families which bore these names, but it also testifies to 
the wide prestige enjoyed by the two families: local Timorese kings often 
took up the surname as a matter of  status. In line with the Timorese du-
alism in speech, Hornay-Da Costa is a conceptual pair that often occurs 
in oral tradition, representing the power and authority of  the kase metan.
The actual circumstances surrounding the coming of  the Hornays 
and Da Costas to Timor were soon forgotten by the generations that 
followed. Instead, they were retold in a variety of  legends that bore little 
or no resemblance to documented history. A Portuguese document from 
the 1760s relates an indigenous legend that combines the first coming 
of  the Portuguese, the founding of  the port of  Lifau, and the arrival of  
the two clans. In this version, Timor was ‘discovered’ by a Portuguese 
merchant ship bound for Maluku, which encountered the island due 
to contrary winds. The two principal merchants on board were Malays 
from Malacca, who had been raised in the Catholic faith. They went 
ashore at a spot on the coast, curious to see the land, and having met with 
9 VOC 1252 (1665), f. 682. Ade was in fact still contested, and owed tribute to Makassar.
10 VOC 1252 (1665), ff. 672, 682.
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no resistance, proceeded to take occupation of  the place. The merchants 
subsequently founded a number of  settlements on the island, one of  
which was stocked with artillery and made into the principal port, where 
the Portuguese banner of  the quinas was hoisted. This was the beginning 
of  Lifau. Since then, Dominican padres had been working on the island, 
with the document specifying that the current Topass leader, Francisco 
Hornay, was a descendant of  one of  the founding merchants – the other 
one apparently being Da Costa (Silva Pessanha 1902).
There is another, less peaceful version, recorded in the late nine-
teenth century. In this case, the originator of  the two families was no less 
than the king of  Malacca, who had two sons with the unlikely names 
Djogo Warilla (Diogo Varela) and Agostinho da Gama. Due to a family 
quarrel, Djogo Warilla left Malacca for an odyssey among the islands of  
the east, finally settling in Delan in East Flores. He had a son, Domingos 
da Costa, and a nephew, António Hornay, who were brought to Timor 
due to contrary winds en route to trading in Ambon. There, they got into 
a fight with the king of  Ambeno (the hinterland of  Lifau). Domingos da 
Costa was wounded and left among the enemy. Later, when Djogo Warilla 
sailed to Ambeno with a new expedition to investigate the fate of  his son, 
he discovered that Domingos da Costa had not only survived, but had 
been given the hand in marriage of  the daughter of  the Ambeno lord. 
Djogo Warilla and his family and followers stayed at Oecusse, which was 
the beginning of  the Topass presence on Timor. In line with the ‘stranger 
king’ concept, an outsider was welcomed by the original lord of  the land, 
and his arrival was sealed through a marriage. The dynastic picture is 
complemented by the younger son of  the king of  Malacca, Agostinho 
da Gama, becoming the first ruler of  Sikka, a princedom in East Flores 
closely allied to Portuguese interests.11 Again, the ties to the old Malacca 
kingdom are emphasized, and one cannot help but see a parallel with the 
Sina Mutin Malaka of  the Wehali legends, which likewise testifies to the 
prestige of  this place as a (pseudo-)historical point of  origin. In a third 
legendary version, recorded on Timor, the pair Kosat-Ornai (Da Costa-
Hornay) were brothers of  Liurai-Sonbai, and thus Timorese people who 
11 Heynen 1876:74-85; Kleian 1891:514-22. Agostinho da Gama is not the ancestor of  the later Sikka 
rulers, though, since he left the princedom to Dom Alesu, a local. The story was picked up in Maumere 
in East Flores. The early history of  the Sikka princedom is described, based on accounts recorded in the 
twentieth century, in Lewis and Pareira Mandalangi 2008:103-38. In this version, Agostinho da Gama 
is not literally the founder of  Sikka, and is not a raja in his own right; rather he introduces Catholicism 
and acts as caretaker of  governmental affairs under Dom Alesu.
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formed an alliance with the Portuguese when the latter arrived at Lifau. 
Still, in this version the Portuguese seafarers are referred to as Black 
Strangers or Black Hats, in symbolic opposition to the White Strangers 
or White Hats, that is, the Dutch (H.G. Schulte Nordholt 1971:454).
The contemporary documents relate a different story again. The 
Hornays descended from Jan de Hornay, a European – in one version a 
Dane – who was commander of  Fort Henricus on Solor. Having embez-
zled large quantities of  money from the VOC, he escaped to Larantuka 
in 1629, where he married a Timorese woman who had been the slave 
of  the Domican padres. De Hornay built himself  a new future as a mer-
chant in the more relaxed conditions of  the Portuguese sphere, dying 
some time after 1644, and leaving behind at least three children: Sara, 
António and Francisco.12 His Timorese widow remarried a Eurasian 
from Macao. António Hornay, a man who would exercise a decisive in-
fluence on the development of  the Topass community on Timorese soil, 
was born in Larantuka around 1630-1635. He was trained in the use of  
weapons from an early age, and began to participate in campaigns on 
Timor when he reached maturity. Through his remarkable feats of  arms 
he became highly regarded, but he also made quite a few enemies among 
his compatriots. In particular, he came to enjoy a strong following in 
the important allied princedom of  Amarasi.13 By contrast, his younger 
brother Francisco Hornay was a man who inclined towards religion and 
who loyally assisted António in his long career, as his lieutenant (tenente) 
and representative.14 When at last Francisco tried to take hold of  the 
Topass community himself, the result quickly proved disastrous.
Regarding the other Topass genitor, Matheus da Costa, there is an 
unambiguous Dutch statement from 1664 which declares that he was a 
Papanger, thus descending from the island of  Luzon.15 He or his an-
cestors had presumably come to Timor from the Philippines via North 
12 Leitão 1948:237, 251; De Roever 2002:186-97, 239-40. De Roever (2002:256) concludes from his 
sources that António [de] Hornay was a grandson of  Jan de Hornay, and the son of  a Gonsalvo de 
Hornay who was established as a merchant prince on the north coast of  Timor. However, the original 
sources seen by the author strongly suggest that António and his siblings were the children rather than 
grandchildren of  Jan. The eldest sibling, Sara, was born on Solor to Jan’s baptized wife from Lamakera. 
Not much is known about her life, but she briefly visited Kupang with her daughter in 1677 (VOC 1327 
[1676-77], Dagregister, sub 15 to 17-2-1677).
13 Tange 1689, H 49:v, KITLV, ff. 6-7.
14 Tange 1688, H 49:u, KITLV, f. 6.
15 VOC 1246 (1664), f. 1577. There were also Papangers in the Dutch ports of  Southeast Asia. On 
Timor they are mentioned as a distinct group as late as 1877 (Staatsblad 1877 No. 105).
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Maluku, where there was a Spanish outpost up until 1663. He was cer-
tainly not alone, for Papangers were not uncommon in the Indonesian 
Archipelago. According to later storytellers (this story has not been 
documented in written sources) in neither of  the families is there any 
discernable connection with Malacca. The fact that the Hornays and Da 
Costas had different ethnic backgrounds, neither of  them Portuguese, 
proves once more that racial features did not determine one’s position in 
the Larantuqueiro community – anybody with ambition could rise to a 
position of  importance.
The rise of  the ‘twin families’ is connected with the machinations 
of  the merchant-adventurer Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, who took 
responsibility for co-ordinating the precarious Portuguese positions in 
Southeast Asia in the face of  the Dutch onslaught. A man of  great 
wealth and influence, he enjoyed a strong position in Makassar until the 
Dutch forced the king to expel him and other Portuguese after their vic-
tory against the kingdom in 1660. In the following years, Vieira devoted 
much attention to the affairs of  Larantuka and Timor. His task was facili-
tated by an event in Europe that was to be of  the utmost importance for 
the future of  the region: a peace treaty between Portugal and the United 
Provinces of  the Netherlands was finally agreed in 1661, and publicized 
two years later. The treaty stipulated that each part were to keep what 
they possessed at the time of  the treaty’s publication, meaning that 
Malacca, Sri Lanka, Cochin, and so on, were irretrievably lost for the 
Estado da Índia. As it stood, it confirmed the Portuguese preponderance 
in the Timor area and opened up new trading opportunities. Francisco 
Vieira conducted a skilful piece of  propaganda when he invited the 
Dutch in Kupang to send ships to Amanuban on the south coast of  
Timor in 1664, soon after the treaty became known. As three vessels ar-
rived in Amanuban, Vieira cordially treated the Dutchmen to a sumptu-
ous dinner and various courtesies, allowing them to obtain sandalwood 
in the ports under his influence under very favourable terms. In this way 
Vieira made it seem to the Timorese that not only was there peace, but 
that the Dutch were under his control and that he had ordered them to 
come from Kupang to fetch the wood.16
At the same time, Vieira was faced with a situation fraught with trou-
ble. The allies in powerful Amanuban did not salvage a good harvest and 
16 Boxer 1967:40, 88-9; VOC 1246 (1664), Dagregister, sub 13-3-1664 to 26-4-1664.
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whatever provisions there were, were stored in the lopo, or assembly halls, 
of  the villages. Nothing was delivered to the Portuguese of  Lifau, who 
would have starved to death, had not Vieira personally sent them a galley 
of  rice. The capitão mor, Simão Luís, was by now an obvious liability; he 
made many enemies due to his ruthless behaviour, and appears to have 
held little authority in Larantuka.17 With the move of  part of  the popu-
lation to Timor, tensions surfaced that proved critical during the next 
decade and beyond. Vieira drew bitter parallels with India, where similar 
unreasonable behaviour towards the natives meant the Portuguese lost 
the allegiance of  the Indians. Vieira mentions an illustrative case. One 
night the king of  Amanuban found his wife having sexual intercourse 
with a Portuguese Solorese. The enraged king killed the adulterous wife 
but dared not lay hands on a Christian, instead leaving it to Simão Luís 
to ensure that justice prevailed. The capitão mor, however, failed to react, 
subsequently allowing the culprit to go. It was left to Francisco Vieira 
to take action and issue an order to hang the fornicator from the mast 
of  a ship. As he explained, it was a necessary act so that the Timorese 
were not given reason to rise up in revenge for the affront to their king. 
Vieira subsequently met with the aristocracies of  Amanuban, Amakono 
and Amarasi, showed them great honours and bestowed large pieces of  
defeated territories on them. These three kingdoms would constitute the 
main axis of  support for the Portuguese for a very long time to come 
(Boxer 1967:87-90).
Early in 1664, Simão Luís suddenly passed away. There was no lack 
of  candidates for the post of  capitão mor: three officers in Lifau were 
brought forward, among whom was Matheus da Costa. People turned 
to Francisco Vieira, asking him to decide upon a successor in this pre-
carious situation. Styling himself  ‘major of  Timor’, he was the obvious 
arbiter in the absence of  the Estado da Índia. Vieira however ignored the 
Lifau candidates and instead promoted António Hornay to the position. 
The decision was not a popular one, neither in Larantuka nor in 
Lifau. The Topasses were suspicious of  a man whose father had been 
in Dutch service, and several officers believed they could stake a better 
claim than Hornay.18 Some of  the resentment was also related to Vieira 
himself. With his considerable financial resources and Southeast Asian 
17 VOC 1243 (1663), f. 1583. At least, this is what Lagadoni, the sengaji of  Pamakayu on West Solor, 
told the Dutch.
18 VOC 1246 (1664), f. 1587.
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network, he had a strong hold over various forms of  trade; after peace 
was established, the Lifau community wished to open trade routes with 
the Company, but had to wait for his permission. The Larantuqueiros, 
on the other hand, disliked Vieira’s favouring of  Jesuit missionaries. 
Jesuits were known to be well-educated and devoted men, the elite forces 
of  Roman Catholicism. Nevertheless, the Larantuqueiros were used to 
obeying their Dominican padres in both religious and, sometimes, secu-
lar matters. The fact that Dominicans in general had a reputation for 
being less ‘professional’ was not so important in this respect. Later the 
Larantuka community even lodged an official protest with the viceroy in 
distant Goa against the machinations of  Vieira and his protégé (Boxer 
1967:92-5). 
The result was a series of  internal clashes and coups among the 
Portuguese community that lasted until 1673. Civil war was a new 
phenomenon in the community. The Portuguese had previously been 
under siege from the VOC, which had obviously fostered unity in the 
ranks. It is apparent, though, how quickly this relative cohesion broke 
down after the publication of  the peace treaty, as António Hornay and 
Matheus da Costa began to manoeuvre against each other. It was also 
very much a Timorese affair. Hornay and his family stayed in Amarasi, 
where he enjoyed the bulk of  his support, and he also gained a foothold 
in Sonbai. An early raiding expedition turned out for the worst when in 
the summer of  1664, Hornay and his men – for reasons unknown – as-
saulted a large negeri at Liley, probably near the north coast, to gain booty. 
When they marched back towards Amakono (Sonbai), they had to pass 
between Mena and Biboki, east of  Ambeno and Lifau. Suddenly, the 
locals attacked the Portuguese with stunning success. António Hornay 
only just escaped on horseback, while his followers were defeated in 
large numbers, with the war spoils falling into the hands of  the men of  
Mena and Biboki.19 The Timorese were therefore not necessarily help-
less against Topass forces, especially when the circumstances were right. 
By 1665, Hornay nevertheless had 80 to 100 men under his command. 
It was a small but far from harmless force, especially since his men were 
19 VOC 1252 (1665), f. 1251. As seen above, the king and queen of  Mena had been executed by the 
Portuguese in 1656, and in 1660 the next ruling queen was engaged in rebellion against them, with 
partial success (VOC 1233 [1660], f. 721). In 1665, a Dutch scouting expedition characterized Mena 
as a loyal friend of  the Portuguese, meaning the faction belonging to Hornay’s rival, Matheus da Costa 
(VOC 2285 [1733], f. 200).
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largely equipped with firearms. On the other side, Da Costa was sup-
ported by his in-laws in Amanuban, which Vieira characterized as the 
most powerful kingdom on the island at the time. As a wife-receiver, he 
was in a symbolically subordinate position to the Amanuban ruler, who 
on the other hand worked tirelessly to see Da Costa installed as capitão 
mor. He was also supported by the moradores of  Lifau, who looked for a 
way to assassinate Hornay.20
As could be expected, the struggle entailed a substantial amount 
of  violence between Timorese princedoms. A party of  Amarasi envoys 
went to Amanuban but were assaulted and then burnt to death by the 
Amanuban, a deliberately provocative incident that ignited the flame 
of  war. Batumean likewise became embroiled in the struggle when its 
troops attacked Amanuban. In a way, it was a war by proxy directed by 
the respective Topass strongmen.21 
In October 1666, the two Topass leaders met on the field of  battle. 
Hornay lost some men and artillery and had to withdraw to his allies 
in Amarasi. The victorious Matheus da Costa was characterized by 
the Dutch as a brave soldier, but no politician: he allowed Hornay to 
remain undisturbed in Amarasi on the condition that he kept the peace, 
which Hornay gladly agreed to.22 In the following years the two rivals 
appear to have lived in a state of  hostile balance. Meanwhile, Francisco 
Vieira kept his base in Larantuka, where his opinion of  the combatants 
vacillated. Finally, however, he decided to place his money – a lot of  
money – on Hornay, who was promptly picked up in Amarasi by orders 
of  Vieira and shipped over to Flores. His arrival on Larantuka, on the 
Pentecost Day of  1667, was apparently without choice, since a VOC 
source specifies that he travelled in fetters. Nevertheless, the day ended 
in triumph for Hornay. In a public ceremony, Francisco Vieira held an 
‘exceedingly ugly-looking’ crown over the head of  the Topass strongman, 
and then knighted him in the name of  the viceroy of  Goa. Thereafter 
he was led in great state to his house, accompanied by the loud cheers 
of  the moradores.23 
This was one of  the last acts carried out by the remarkable merchant-
adventurer. His power over the Larantuqueiros was waning, primarily 
20 VOC 2285 (1733), ff. 202-3.
21 VOC 1252 (1665), f. 1223.
22 VOC 1264 (1667), f. 74a.
23 VOC 1267 (1668), ff. 478-9.
Genealogy of  the Hornay and Da Costa families. The family relations 
of  the two families are not entirely known from the sources.
Jan de Hornay 
d. after 1644 
m. 1 Ester from Lamakera 
m. 2 Timorese woman 
__________________________|________________________________________________
Sara Hornay [by #1] António Hornay [by #2]                  Francisco Hornay I [by #2] 
d. after 1677  capitão mor 1664-1690        tenente in Lifau 1673-90 
on Timor from 1673 capitão mor 1690-96 
capitão geral 1690-15.6.1693              d. 1.6.1697 
__________________________|______________________________________________
Pedro Hornay Francisco Hornay II        daughter  daughter
d. 1696/97  tenente general 1719-30      m. Alvare m. João 
m. daughter of        de Sousa  Cave,
Domingos da Costa I  tenente
Daniel de Cock     general 
       |  1730-
daughter m. a Hornay  1731/32
________|_____________________________________
João Hornay  Maria Hornay
tenente general  dame of Larantuka 
1749-1755/57 m. Matheus da Costa 
______|___________________________________________________
Francisco Hornay III Pedro Hornay Tomás Hornay 
lord of Animata lord of Oecusse d. after 1788 
1757-59, lord of 1777-c. 1795 
Oecusse 1759-77        | 
  José Hornay
lord of Oecusse c. 1795-after 1817 
Matheus da Costa capitão mor  
in opposition 1665-30.11.1672 
m. 1 Amanuban princess, m. 2 concubine 
_______________________________|____________________________________
daughter [by #1]  Domingos da Costa I [by #2] 
m. Lourenço Lopes  capitão mor 1697-23.2.1722 
__________________________________________________ _ _ _ _____|____________ 
Gaspar       Domingos Pascal António  dau- daughter 
da Costa       da Costa II da Costa da Costa  ghter m. Fran- 
tenente       tenente general  lord of  d. 1711 cisco 
general       1757-after 1772  Noimuti  Hornay
1732-  d. after 1769 II
9.11.1749
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because the latter were keen to open up trade negotiations with the VOC 
against Vieira’s wishes. The exact rationale behind Vieira’s trade policy 
is not clear, but he presumably wished to strengthen the Portuguese en-
terprise with other components of  the Estado da Índia, rather than to 
be increasingly dependent on his former Dutch enemies, to whom, more 
importantly, he owed a lot of  money. Regardless, the situation would not 
last for long. Vieira soon passed away from a sudden fever, and both the 
Dutch and Portuguese sources make it explicit that he was helped on his 
way by his adversaries.24
The official institution of  Portuguese Asia, the Estado da Índia, 
normally had very little to do with Timor, but after the peace treaty 
it eventually began to show a degree of  interest in this remnant of  its 
Southeast Asian possessions. Possibly as a reaction to the disappear-
ance of  Vieira, one Fernão Martins da Ponte was appointed capitão geral 
(captain-general) of  Solor and Timor by the authorities in Goa. Upon 
arrival to the region in 1669, he was readily acknowledged by Matheus 
da Costa and the moradores of  Lifau – Da Costa was known to be a loyal 
person, devoted to the Crown of  Portugal. However, Hornay and the 
Larantuqueiros bluntly refused to follow the commands of  Martins da 
Ponte (Coolhaas 1968:681). The new capitão geral, who was described as 
a strict and impetuous figure, resolved to force the would-be subjects to 
yield to his authority. He gathered together the available manpower in 
Lifau and sailed over to Larantuka, approaching the port with some large 
ships, accompanied by the beating of  drums and blasting of  trumpets. 
However, the Larantuqueiros were not so easily impressed. Six hundred 
men strong, they immediately grabbed their firearms and effectively pre-
vented Martins da Ponte from coming ashore. Afterwards, a Dutchman 
who visited the house of  António Hornay reported that the moradores 
laughed heartily at the sorry figure of  Martins da Ponte, saying: ‘We have 
not heard a single word from his mouth, but we have long since resolved 
not to heed him as our headman.’25
The Estado’s early attempt to interfere in Timorese affairs thus met 
with the first instance of  open resistance against them. During the pre-
ceding century, the localized Portuguese community had grown accus-
tomed to following their own captains and their own Dominican padres. 
While there was not exactly a Topass ‘democracy’, the elevation of  new 
24 VOC 1267 (1668), f. 479; Jacobs 1988:243-4.
25 VOC 1271 (1669), ff. 719-20.
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leaders in their communities depended on the number of  men among 
the moradores of  the main settlements that were prepared to back them. In 
this way, they were ‘men of  prowess’ rather than officials of  the Crown 
of  Portugal, and leaders from the outside were a threat to their way of  
life and the local economy. Hence, resentment against Francisco Vieira 
de Figueiredo turned to open resistance against Fernão Martins da Ponte. 
Humiliated, Martins withdrew to Konga on Flores, not far from 
Larantuka, and ordered Matheus da Costa to bring reinforcements, 
whereupon Da Costa excused himself  by alleging that the moradores 
of  Lifau would not allow him to leave. The bad temper of  the capitão 
geral was demonstrated when he had the chief  of  the fleet, capitão mor 
da mar, hanged for some perceived shortcoming. The Dutch at the time 
wrote that such strictness could seldom last long among the Portuguese. 
Martins, they commented, was a man who did not reflect on what he 
said, and who imagined a lot. From his base in Lifau he led a few suc-
cessful military enterprises against Timorese princedoms, but neverthe-
less made enemies everywhere among the Topasses. Martins finally had 
to escape on a small boat in May 1670, fleeing for his life. Travelling 
via Java he eventually made it to Portuguese India, where he was subse-
quently punished for his poor performance.26 For the next 26 years, no 
appointee of  Goa would hold authority on Timor. With more pressing 
problems to deal with, the viceroy had to accept the self-willed actions 
of  Hornay and Da Costa.
With Martins’ exit, power over Lifau was left in the hands of  
Matheus da Costa, whose loyalty to the Crown apparently had its limits. 
His tenure as capitão mor of  the Timor Topasses lasted for two and a half  
years, during which time he continued the military expansion towards 
East Timor, as will be discussed below. His relations with the Dutch in 
Kupang were strained but peaceful, and António Hornay bided his time 
in Larantuka, where he was now the undisputed master. His chance 
came when Matheus da Costa died prematurely on 30 November 1672. 
He was succeeded by Manuel da Costa Vieira – apparently no rela-
tion – who had already been brought forward as a candidate in 1664 
but declined the post due to his advanced age. During his short term as 
capitão mor in Lifau, Manuel da Costa Vieira met with resistance from 
the usually pro-Portuguese Atoni domains of  Mena and Assem on the 
26 VOC 1271 (1669), f. 720; VOC 1275 (1671), f. 664; Matos 1974a:83-4.
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north coast, and also from the rulers of  Belu, which by then appeared to 
be a vague term for Central Timor or Central and East Timor. Assem 
fared badly; the Topasses of  Manuel da Costa Vieira ravaged the place 
and killed or enslaved its population. From this point onwards there is 
not much mention of  Assem in the records. Meanwhile, the conflict 
involved a considerable part of  the island, a precarious situation for the 
new leader. His only ally was the Sonbai lord, who had been forced back 
into the Portuguese fold fifteen years previously. Manuel da Costa Vieira 
greatly feared that Hornay might be planning something.27
In actual fact, he was. Hornay had a network on Flores that stretched 
as far east as Numba, close to present-day Ende, and he was busy collect-
ing together a fleet. In June 1673, he set out from Larantuka with a con-
siderable armada of  37 armed vessels and 700 followers with shotguns. 
The ground was well prepared; he was welcomed by the Timorese, who 
resisted Manuel da Costa Vieira and accused the Lifau leader of  unjust 
behaviour with regard to Assem, which had been attacked on unproven 
allegations of  having been working with the VOC. Moreover, there was 
a split in the ranks of  the Lifau Topasses. Given these circumstances it 
turned out to be a swift affair. Hornay’s armada sailed into the roadstead 
of  Lifau while Manuel da Costa Vieira lay sick. The local Topasses gave 
battle, but when three moradores had fallen, they had had enough and sur-
rendered. Immediately after his victory, António Hornay was appointed 
capitão mor.28 With this event, the Portuguese complex of  Solor-Timor 
was once again united under one person. Hornay would rule the lands 
and peoples under his sway with an iron hand until his death twenty 
years later.
Meanwhile, the Dutch in Kupang maintained a pragmatic position. 
Since the publication of  the peace treaty, they had had irregular agree-
ments with Portuguese traders, which included Manuel da Costa Vieira 
himself. When a Company servant was sent to Lifau to settle economic 
affairs in mid 1673, the opperhoofd in Kupang provided him with two 
letters, one for Hornay and one for Da Costa Vieira; the victor of  the 
conflict was to receive the appropriate letter! On arrival, the envoy found 
that Manuel da Costa Vieira had taken a priest’s robe in order to escape 
the hand of  Hornay, whom he greatly feared. Before the Dutchman, Da 
Costa Vieira complained about the faithlessness of  his people. They had 
27 VOC 1294 (1673-74), Dagregister, sub 5-8-1673, 10-8-1673..
28 VOC 1294 (1673-74), Dagregister, sub 22-7-1673, 10-8-1673.
149
5 The Topass phase, 1650s-1702 |
enthusiastically bestowed upon him the title of  capitão mor, with promises 
to support him, and when he understood that Hornay was about to at-
tack him, he had kept the moradores gathered together for two months 
during which he had handed out generous provisions to the value of  
6,000 reals. All this was in vain, however, for when Hornay arrived, they 
had allowed him to enter Lifau without resistance as Viera lay sick in his 
house. Realizing the way in which his world had changed, he decided to 
become a man of  religion, the more so since he had no wife or children. 
He just wanted to live in peace and quiet. 
The Dutch envoy replied consolingly that such things did not only 
happen to him but also to the grandest of  princes and kings, and that 
he should try to seek comfort in the fact that it was God’s will. He then 
went on to remind the fallen leader about a debt of  154 rijksdaalders 
that he owed to the Company. Da Costa Vieira replied that Hornay 
had squeezed 9,000 reals from him, and that he did not have enough 
gold at hand. However, there were 60 bahar (approximately 10,900 kg) 
of  sandalwood in Batumean on the south coast. He promised to send a 
message to tell the locals to prepare it for the arrival of  the Company 
ships.29 The conversation suggests how essential it was to gather popular 
support in order to wield authority over the Topass community. In the 
Timorese environment, an official European title became a token of  
personal authority, to be appropriated by a man of  prowess. The record 
also provides some insight into the peculiar economic relations that 
evolved between the Dutch and the Portuguese, where the latter forced 
autonomous princedoms to deliver sandalwood to the Company that 
could not be obtained in the hinterland of  Dutch Kupang. In terms of  
this commerce, there was little or no distinction between the Portuguese 
leader’s capacity of  official and private trader. This system would come 
to full fruition during the long tenure of  António Hornay.
co-opting the atoni princedoms
As previously mentioned, it is unclear at which point the Timorese 
princedoms began to consider themselves to be submissive to the Crown 
of  Portugal. The great, albeit superficial, strides made by Catholicism in 
29 VOC 1301 (1673-74), Dagregister, sub 20-9-1673.
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the first half  of  the seventeenth century were very likely an important 
catalyst for political dependence. Acceptance of  the new religion implied 
a degree of  deference to Portuguese symbols of  authority and prestige. 
The expeditions of  1641-1642 and the notable successes against the 
Dutch in 1653-1657 made a deep impression on the local societies and 
clearly underpinned the whole process. The image of  warlike Topass 
exploits was very probably linked to indigenous perceptions of  leu musu, 
meaning sacred spirit power (leu) used against the enemy (musu) (H.G. 
Schulte Nordholt 1971:333-4; Munandjar Widiyatmika 2008:266-7). 
Timorese warfare is accompanied by ritual preparations invoking su-
pernatural powers to aid the fight, and indeed the Portuguese seemed to 
make good use of  these invisible forces against Makassarese, Dutchmen 
and local groups.30 The outcome of  the conflict with the mighty 
Company was that the latter was left in possession of  a tiny piece of  
territory in westernmost Timor, while the Atoni lands fell or were con-
firmed as being under Portuguese influence – interestingly, these were 
lands that mostly lay outside Portuguese East Timor in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.
Some observations on the most important Atoni princedoms serve to 
illustrate the process. As already noted, the source of  Portuguese power, 
Lifau, lay in the princedom of  Ambeno, positing the Ambeno ruler as 
the original lord of  the land in relation to the warlike ‘male’ outsiders, 
the kase metan. Looking at the sources of  the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, Ambeno does not seem to have been particularly powerful, 
though its geographical situation rendered it suitable for a colonial es-
tablishment. It was within easy reach of  Larantuka, and at a strategic 
location for the collection of  sandalwood. Ambeno royalty was later on 
tied to the Topass leadership through a complicated web of  marriages, 
although this is only documented from the late eighteenth century. That 
the inhabitants were remarkably susceptible to Christianity is asserted in 
glowing rhetorical terms in a near-contemporary text, Notícias de Timor 
e da sua cristiandade. According to this document, Frei António de São 
30 Since the ethnic composition of  the Topasses had developed to be predominantly Timorese or Flo-
renese by this time, indigenous ritual perceptions of  warfare quickly became familiar to them, although 
there is little that is explicitly said about this in the old documents. In highland Noimuti, traditional ritu-
als of  war were performed by lineages with the Portuguese names Melo (Meol) and Da Cruz (La Krus) 
(Munandjar Widiyatmika 2008:267). Active Topass participation in feasts honouring captured heads is 
documented during the eighteenth century (Fiedler 1931, 9:3). On the Topass acculturation, see also 
Andaya 2010.
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Jacinto baptized the queen of  Mena in 1641. At this time, the king of  
Lifau or Ambeno was dead and his widow governed in his place, and the 
Portuguese expedition decided to proceed there. They bade farewell to 
the queen of  Mena with displays of  amity and tears, embarked on the 
ships and set sail towards the west. As the Portuguese arrived on Lifau 
the inhabitants came to greet them at the shore with grand festivities, 
saying: ‘Padre, padre, we want to become Christians.’ Among them was 
the queen herself  with her four daughters and sixteen-year old son. The 
Portuguese built a few dwellings on the coast, and then Frei António and 
his assistants were led by the hand to the royal residence inland, appar-
ently to Nunuhenu. Over eleven days the priests instructed the people 
at the residence – whose language they probably did not speak – in the 
mysteries of  the holy faith. Then, in the second half  of  July 1641, the 
royal family were baptized and the heir to the realm received the name 
Dom Pedro. Many aristocrats and commoners alike followed suit, carry-
ing their small children in their arms, and so eager to arrive at the font 
first that they trampled over each other – or so the Dominican account 
states (Loureiro 1995:150-2).
One need not doubt that the details in the text are exaggerated, 
since they evoke stereotypical images of  devotion and missionary suc-
cess. Nonetheless, the episode was remembered as a key event in the oral 
version of  Ambeno history recorded in the late twentieth century. In this 
version, a ruler called Pedro da Cruz was baptized at the arrival of  the 
first Catholic preacher, who is here called António Taberu (Taveiro). This 
Pedro da Cruz is said to have been around about nine generations before 
1900, which is not inconsistent with the year 1641 (Spillett 1999:152). 
The dignity of  the event is underscored by including the name António 
Taveiro, who was actually the first known preacher on Timor circa 1556 
– this detail might however come from a Portuguese textbook rather 
than oral tradition. The arrival of  a first Christian king and the first mis-
sionary were combined into one single significant event, despite actually 
occurring almost a century apart.
The early Ambeno submission to Portuguese interests was not, how-
ever, without its problems. The oral account states that the Portuguese sol-
diers later mistreated the people, and that Pedro da Cruz therefore led his 
kingdom in revolt and expelled the whites. After a while the Portuguese 
came back by sea and ravaged the land, causing all the people to flee 
their homes. The king subsequently submitted once more, and henceforth 
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co-operated with the white strangers (Spillett 1999:153). Contemporary 
sources, too, mention a crisis that casts some light on the fragile state of  
Christianity in Ambeno. In 1670, a king called Dom Paulo passed away, 
at a time when an uncompromising priest called Duarte Travassos was 
the vicar of  the Lifau church. The nominal Catholics indulged in ‘vari-
ous superstitions’ during the funeral ceremonies, whereupon Frei Duarte 
gathered twelve native Christians and tried to impede the ceremonies. 
His zeal was not appreciated: he was pierced by assegais and his body 
thrown into a well, and his companions were dealt with in the same 
manner. Only the horse of  Frei Duarte survived and galloped back to 
the settlement of  the Portuguese, who figured out what had happened. 
The capitão geral, Fernão Martins da Ponte, assembled the people at hand 
and tracked down the culprits, who, despite their substantial numbers, 
fled; many were subsequently killed. Afterwards, the Ambeno people 
maintained that they had fled out of  fear for a Dominican who walked 
among the men of  the capitão geral. Since there was no cleric in Lifau apart 
from the slain Frei Duarte, it was assumed that Saint Dominic himself  
had descended from heaven to revenge the slaying of  his spiritual son 
(Sá 1958:443). Either before or after the battle, the new king of  Ambeno 
sent his sons to Dutch Kupang to ask for protection and assistance, while 
his people desperately fled to Amarang in the west. The VOC refused to 
consider military support but were not adverse to an exodus of  people to 
their own territory.31 This, however, did not materialize, and Ambeno led 
a rather passive existence for the next 80 years. The great responsibilities 
of  individual Dominicans are obvious from the incident: even in the hub 
of  Portuguese power on Timor, there was no more than one single priest. 
The great awe in which the locals held the priests, embodied in super-
natural stories, was equally quite apparent.
A princedom of  quite another magnitude was Amarasi, for many 
years the prime Portuguese instrument used to counter the VOC allies. 
It is first mentioned in the 1630s, when it was brought into the Catholic 
fold by the Dominicans. The princedom was held in high regard by 
Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, since its king ‘always was and remains 
our faithful friend’ (Boxer 1967:88), and it was currently the only 
domain besides Amakono that the Portuguese could trust. The meeting 
between Vieira and the Amarasi royalty led to a win-win solution, where 
31 VOC 1275 (1670), f. 678.
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the loyal stance of  the latter was rewarded with the bestowal of  most of  
the Amabi domain. Amabi was an extensive land that was left leaderless 
after many of  its men fled to Kupang in 1658. While some of  the area 
was handed over to Amanuban, the bulk of  Amabi was officially placed 
under the king of  Amarasi – in other words, Vieira acted in a very wilful 
manner in the name of  the king of  Portugal. The only condition was 
the annual payment of  ten bahar of  sandalwood, slightly more than 
1,800 kilograms (Boxer 1967:88, 90). From other sources it appears that 
a sub-division of  Amfoan, called Taebenu, was also tied to Amarasi after 
the contraction of  the Sonbai realm around 1658. The king of  Amarasi 
placed the Taebenu regent at Kupang Bay, where he acted as a buffer 
against the VOC allies.
The Dutch in Kupang rightly perceived the potential of  Amarasi, 
whose manpower consisted of  6,000 besides Taebenu. The ruler sat well 
guarded in his main settlement, which was surrounded by a threefold 
palisade made of  heavy wooden trunks.32 There were sandalwood re-
sources, and copper was reputed to have been found on two places on an 
elevated plain. The rumour should be taken with a pinch of  salt; stories 
about copper deposits recurred from time to time over the next two 
centuries, but the valuable metal always proved elusive to find. Minor 
deposits seem to have been exaggerated out of  all proportion. As Hornay 
and Da Costa were at each other’s throats in 1665, the VOC opperhoofd 
Hugo Cuylenburgh took the opportunity to sail to Timor’s outer coast 
to parley with King António, whose sonaf lay close to the shore. The ac-
count of  Cuylenburgh provides geographical details on the situation of  
Amarasi. From Kupang, the Company ship went along the south coast 
past Oysain, and then arrived at Amatiran at Hoogen Hoeck (High 
Cape), which marked the beginning of  the Amarasi princedom. Passing 
by a river and a waterless place called Peu, the ship finally reached the 
main settlement of  Amarasi, just before Witten Hoeck (White Cape, 
Tanjung Batuputih). In all these places it was not possible to cast anchor, 
due to the breakers and rocks.33 
Cuylenburgh suggested that António should tie his interests to those 
of  the Company: ‘I then spoke about the great might of  the Noble 
32 VOC 1426 (1684-85), Dagregister, sub 18-7-1685.
33 VOC 1252 (1665), f. 681. The sonaf was not in Baun, as in modern times. According to later tradi-
tion, Baun was established by the tenth ruler (mid-nineteenth century?), having been preceded by Buraen 
and Ruantef. Buraen is mentioned by Salomon Müller in 1829 (Müller 1857, II:113).
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Company, which would be able to protect him sufficiently, and said that 
if  he did this, he could become the emperor of  the whole of  Timor.’34 
The king seemed interested, but nothing was to come out of  the propos-
al. Shortly after the Dutch visit, King António died a sudden death, and 
it was rumoured that António Hornay took the precaution of  having him 
poisoned.35 The king was succeeded by his brother Dom Tomás, who 
was kindly disposed towards the Portuguese. In fact, the next generations 
would see a small-scale war between the Amarasi and the Timorese al-
lies of  the VOC. Smaller and indeed bigger war parties would be sent 
out from either side to conduct headhunting raids. The Dutch books 
of  daily annotations (Dagregisters) meticulously record the circumstances 
of  the raids, and how many heads were taken or lost each time. It was 
a type of  warfare that conformed with traditions of  the eastern part 
of  the Indonesian Archipelago. Although war was surrounded by rites 
and ceremonies as well as a martial code of  conduct, the antagonists 
preferred ambushing weaker adversaries, often civilians, thus avoiding 
larger-pitched battles. 
When explaining the close ties between the Amarasi and the 
Portuguese, religion is certainly important and cannot be reduced to 
simply a factor of  political convenience. In the case of  the Amarasi elite, 
Christianity was more than just a thin veneer. A valuable Jesuit report 
from 1670 emphasizes the piety of  the royal family. A niece of  Dom 
Tomás, called Donna Maria, stayed in ‘Solor’ (probably Larantuka) with 
a large retinue of  servants and slaves of  both sexes. The Jesuit writer of  
the report, Antonius Franciscus SJ, found her to be a very wise woman, 
admirable in her silent and modest way of  living and her zeal for the holy 
creed. Later, the priest found a suitable Portuguese husband for the lady, 
who, it seems, was the actual heir to the Amarasi princedom: ‘The con-
stitution of  the kingdom was fully applied to this woman, and as a queen 
she made use of  the income derived from the taxes of  the kingdom as 
she found fit, although, given the security of  the kingdom, she left the 
governance to her uncles and her brother.’36
Another figure of  some standing was Dom Rodrigo, one of  the 
34 VOC 1252 (1665), f. 676.
35 VOC 1257 (1666), f. 609.
36 Jacobs 1988:241. I am grateful to Erik Wiberg, who helped me translate the Latin text. Donna 
Maria’s husband was possibly Dom Diogo Rodrigo, who was an in-law of  the king of  Amarasi and was 
appointed by the Topasses as captain of  that princedom (VOC 1252 [1665], f. 682).
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brothers of  the king. At the time when Pater Antonius met him he was 
an old man of  60 years who had been a Christian since his youth. He 
did not know Portuguese and therefore could not communicate with 
the Dominicans, who had not learnt to speak Dawan. However, his 
kinsmen Dom Agostinho and Dom António da Veiga could both speak 
and read the language of  the foreigners, and they taught Dom Rodrigo 
the fundamentals of  Christianity. The prince, paying a visit to Donna 
Maria, was joyous to find a priest who had actually learnt Dawan; the 
Jesuits garnered ambitions on quite another level than their Dominican 
brethren when it came to learning the local language and conditions. 
Dom Rodrigo made a stunningly frank confession before Pater Antonius, 
which seemed to cast the local Europeans in a doubtful light. After this 
he returned to Amarasi, filled with a missionary zeal. Pater Antonius 
commented that the Amarasi princes had hitherto declined to keep 
Dominicans in their land for more than short periods. Now, however, 
they ostensibly wished to see friars clad in black and wearing black caps, 
that is, Jesuits. In spite of  the stereotypes, the Jesuit account indicates 
that Catholicism was in a way ‘self-perpetuating’ though perhaps mostly 
restricted to the elite, and that enthusiasm for the rather untutored 
Dominican priests was in no way unlimited (Jacobs 1988:242).
A third case of  co-opting an Atoni realm is presented by the power-
ful realm of  Sonbai, which fell apart during the defeats in 1657-1658. 
There is no good geographical description that clarifies the scope of  
this domain in the period under scrutiny, but one has to assume that it 
encompassed roughly the later self-ruling territories (zelfbesturende land-
schappen) of  Fatuleu, Mollo and Miomaffo (Amakono).37 Needless to say, 
borders were constantly fluctuating over the centuries, but it was a high-
land princedom endowed with considerable resources in sandalwood 
and beeswax. When part of  the population fled to Kupang in 1658, the 
elite were split. The executive regent, Ama Tomananu, went to the VOC 
taking with him two sons of  ‘Emperor’ Ama Tuan, while their imperial 
father was forced to remain in the land of  Sonbai, attentively watched 
by a Topass troop (Coolhaas 1971:528). Two further sons are known to 
have been kept under surveillance in Lifau in 1673 on suspicion that they 
might be used by the community that had settled alongside the Dutch in 
Kupang.38 Sonbai was therefore suddenly split into two branches. The 
37 For the twentieth-century borders of  these, see H.G. Schulte Nordholt 1971:154.
38 VOC 1294 (1673), f. 307.
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inland branch would later become known as Greater Sonbai (Sonbai 
Besar, Groot-Sonnebay), while the branch in Kupang was consequently 
termed Lesser Sonbai (Sonbai Kecil, Klein-Sonnebay). Although these 
terms are not documented in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
they will be used in this book for the sake of  convenience.
Ama Tomananu of  the Oematan family had so far been the effective 
ruler of  the realm, since Emperor Ama Tuan was ‘female’ and was not 
expected to take an active role in governance. With the regent out of  
the picture, a new strong leader was needed, and the Portuguese put for-
ward Ama Kono, the Kono lord, or Uis Kono. In oral tradition, Kono 
and Oematan had held their positions from the inception of  the realm, 
as the first and second regent or usif, but European sources tell another 
story. We have already met Kono as a rebellious local lord under the 
Sonbai realm, who met a grim end in 1655. His successor fared better, 
according to a VOC report: ‘the king of  Amakono was installed by the 
Portuguese as the field commander [veltoverste] over the entire Sonbai 
[domain], in the place of  of  Ama Tomananu who had fled hither [to 
Kupang].’39 Francisco Vieira de Figueredo met the man in 1664 when 
he marched down to Amanuban with 3,000 armed followers in order 
to parley with Vieira. The merchant-adventurer noted that Ama Kono 
had been defeated by the Portuguese years before, probably in 1657-
1658. Afterwards, however, he became so faithful to the Portuguese that 
he risked his life many times on their behalf. Still, he was embittered by 
the way in which Simão Luís treated him, as if  he was still a prisoner. 
Now, however, Simão Luís was dead and the pragmatic Vieira consoled 
Ama Kono by adding Batugade on the north coast to his domains – a 
place outside the Atoni area that nowadays belongs to Timor Leste. In 
return he was expected to pay 30 bahar of  sandalwood from Sonbai 
and Batugade each year to His Majesty Afonso VI – in reality, to the 
local Portuguese elite. It was also agreed that the captains staying in 
Sonbai were exempted from providing tuthais to Kono, and that all the 
sandalwood in the area was intended solely for the Crown of  Portugal. 
Otherwise, Vieira declared that the Kono lord could trade things as he 
wished since he was a free ruler – no prisoner in fact, but a proud vas-
sal under King Afonso VI himself  (Boxer 1967:89-90). The Kono lord 
seemed very pleased with this arrangement, and not without reason. 
39 VOC 1252 (1665), f. 672.
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He was now, as the Uis Kono, the executive regent of  Sonbai. In the 
VOC reports of  the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Sonbai 
domain is usually called ‘Amakono’ and the regent himself  is termed 
‘king’ of  that realm.40 A Dutch report from 1665 summarized the situ-
ation: 
The Sonbai [lord] sits sorrowful […] since he is not under the [command 
of  the] Dutch; and the Portuguese keep good watch over him so he can-
not escape to Kupang. The king of  Amakono and his people in particular 
perform the service [of  monitoring him]. He should be done away with, 
as a great enemy of  the Company. In order to do so a person has come 
to me, and explained to me that he wished to murder him by means of  
poison, and go to him as a friend since he was an acquaintance of  him. 
Otherwise he cannot be overcome, since he resides on the high rock.41
The assassination project came to nothing, and Uis Kono himself  
proved much less hostile to the Dutch than the quotation might suggest. 
According to what they heard in Kupang, Uis Kono seemed prepared 
to lean towards the VOC side if  the opportunity arose. His attitude to 
the Portuguese might therefore have been more one of  political necessity 
than Vieira’s account would suggest. As it turned out, the opportunity to 
switch sides never came, and Uis Kono remained an important prop for 
the Topass authority for several decades. Amakono became a strategic 
base for the Topass leader Matheus da Costa when he expanded the 
Portuguese sphere of  power towards the east around 1670. Part of  the 
regent’s family accepted Catholicism at some stage prior to 1702, while 
other members remained ‘heathen’. 
The Sonbai emperor was too important a symbol to dispense with, 
particularly since his descendants became rival rulers in Kupang. The 
captive lord Ama Tuan (also called Ama Utang) lived on until at least 
1680, and occasionally managed to play a political role in affairs. He at-
40 In the nineteenth century, Amakono usually denoted the north-eastern third of  the Sonbai realm, 
which was called Miomaffo in the twentieth century after Mount Miomaffo. This was the immediate 
sphere of  power of  Uis Kono, while Mollo was governed by an Oematan branch that functioned as 
second regents of  the realm. The westernmost part, Fatuleu, was dominated by the Takaip and some 
other minor aristocratic families. Oral tradition knows of  two pairs of  usif that were the backbone of  
Sonbai: Kono-Oematan and Taiboko-Ebnoni (Fobia 1984:89, 91). This mirrors the Timorese structural 
principle of  quadripartition.
41 VOC 1252 (1665), f. 679.
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tempted to enhance his position by taking sides in the internal Portuguese 
troubles, backing Matheus da Costa against António Hornay. Later on, 
in 1673, the emperor supported the short-lived capitão mor Manuel da 
Costa Vieira, again against Hornay. When victory came to Hornay 
through a swift coup, the position of  the emperor was in serious danger, 
since he expected an attack from the Topasses at any minute. Through 
a man from Lesser Sonbai he asked the Dutch if  he might be allowed to 
flee to Kupang in case his lands were overrun by Hornay’s forces. The 
opperhoofd in Kupang was doubtful, since the Dutch policy after all the de-
feats and the ensuing peace treaty was to remain restrained when it came 
to affairs in the Portuguese sphere. The matter anyway soon took a new 
turn. Later in the same year Ama Tuan submitted to Hornay, together 
with some other Timorese chiefs. Even after such an act of  submission, 
many Sonbai were suspicious of  Hornay’s intentions, since he was the 
son of  a former VOC employee. Maybe, they thought, his ultimate goal 
was for the entire island to be under the power of  the Company – an 
assumption that would be completely falsified by Hornay’s policies in the 
following twenty years.42 The action taken by Ama Tuan can be seen as 
a resumption of  the policy he had pursued back in the 1650s: an attempt 
to use the rivalries between the Dutch and various Portuguese factions to 
further his own interests. This kind of  endeavour would become a com-
mon feature among Timorese leaders over the next few centuries, and 
some developed considerable skill at steering a path between the foreign 
centres of  power. 
References to Sonbai or Uis Kono are very rare in the Portuguese 
records of  the late seventeenth century, which are not much concerned 
with indigenous Timorese affairs. In Dutch sources, the emperor and the 
Kono regent appear from time to time in a context that strongly suggests 
the extent of  their importance. Their relationship with the Timorese al-
lies of  the VOC in Kupang presents a puzzling oscillation between hostil-
ity and feelings of  amity. One may even talk about a Timorese network 
of  relationships that partly ran counter to the ‘colonial’ order of  things, 
and did not conform to the interests or dispositions of  either the Dutch 
or the Portuguese. 
The Kono lord who was appointed by Vieira finally died circa August 
42 VOC 1301 (1673), Dagregister, sub 5-8-1673, 16-10-1673.
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1687. The regent had probably developed a close relationship with 
António Hornay, who seemed shaken at the news of  his death. At the 
same time, some Dutchmen happened to be present in Lifau trading in 
sandalwood, but the regent’s authority was such that his death immedi-
ately prevented the sandalwood from being delivered to the area above 
Lifau, due to the grief  of  the population. Soon after the news was made 
public, Hornay marched to Sonbai accompanied by his armed retain-
ers, intending to take a firm hold of  the situation. Timorese funerals 
were often postponed for a lengthy time in order to wait for the right 
occasion, and it was only in November 1688 that the funeral rites for 
the ‘king of  Amakono’ were carried out. It was an event of  the utmost 
importance, and almost all the kings on Timor reportedly attended it; 
António Hornay rightly sensed its significance and appeared in person. 
The ambiguous stance of  the indigenous elite towards the VOC enclave 
is illustrated by a rumour circulating at the occasion. The VOC allies 
had recently suffered a military setback, which was magnified out of  
all proportion. Hornay and the other funeral guests were told that one 
thousand enemies and five kings had been slain by the Amarasi, and that 
it was now possible to march into the Kupang territory and capture the 
surviving women and children. Some of  the Timorese kings were joyous 
at the news, while others seemed truly sorrowful about it. Hornay him-
self, perhaps sceptical about the news, refused to send his men towards 
Kupang on the pretext that he needed his manpower to remain in East 
Timor. Afterwards, Sonbai anxiously sent a delegation to Kupang to find 
out the truth about the defeat, which turned out to be of  much smaller 
proportions than was feared.43 Later on, in 1689, it is recorded that the 
female ruler of  Lesser Sonbai, a trusted VOC ally, had been celebrating 
a mortuary feast for three years in succession in order to commemorate 
her uncle, the ‘king of  Amakono’ – either Uis Kono or, and more prob-
ably, a Sonbai lord.44 Envoys and groups of  people constantly moved 
back and forth between the two Sonbai congregations, crossing the bor-
der between the colonial spheres.
These displays of  concern for each other should not overshadow the 
fact that Greater Sonbai was frequently an outright enemy of  Lesser 
43 VOC 1460 (1688-89), Dagregister, sub 11-12-1688.
44 VOC 1481 (1689-90), Dagregister, sub 2-12-1689. The text indicates c.1686 as the date of  her uncle’s 
death. Since the Kono family did not belong to the Sonbai dynasty, the Uis Kono was presumably not 
the person being alluded to here. 
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Sonbai and the other VOC allies. The Dutch opperhoofd complained in 
1682 that the troublesome Amarasi could well have been brought to their 
knees if  Amakono (Sonbai) and others had not constantly backed them 
up.45 As a matter of  fact, the internal cohesion of  Sonbai was poor, as 
exemplified by numerous instances. In 1695, Uis Kono spoke to an envoy 
from Lesser Sonbai who had arrived inland to discuss the restitution of  
stolen cattle and the bride-price to be paid for an abducted noblewoman. 
His words illustrate the extent to which local rulers sometimes adopted 
the pretensions of  the foreign suzerains: the Sonbai community in the 
VOC area, he said, must no longer stay in Kupang, but rather return to 
live under the authority of  Portugal. Uis Kono furthermore asserted that 
the entire island belonged to the Portuguese. The authority of  the VOC 
and the king of  Kupang, he alleged, extended no further than a carbine’s 
shot from Fort Concordia. The great Dutch defeats were still remembered 
by the Timorese elite, for Uis Kono pointed out that the various Dutch 
forays on the island had each time been kept in check by the might of  
the Portuguese. Therefore, the sandalwood that the Helong had delivered 
to the VOC over the last few years actually belonged to the Portuguese. 
The Lesser Sonbai group did not comply with Kono’s summons, but 
some months later, matters took on a more serious tone. A considerable 
number of  soldiers from Greater Sonbai arrived at Ponai and Bisepu, 
some 30 kilometres from Fort Concordia. They were led by ‘black 
Christians’ and were clearly enjoined by the current Topass leader, 
Francisco Hornay, to attack the Company lands. Although their feats 
were restricted to the destruction of  some outlying houses and planta-
tions and the harvesting of  sandalwood to bring to Lifau, they proudly 
asserted the might of  Portugal in almost mythical terms, professing that 
they would send ‘an iron-clad ship with iron-clad people from Portugal in 
order to shell and demolish the Company’s fort in Kupang’.46 However, 
the Sonbai effort was far from whole-hearted; the then emperor of  
Greater Sonbai sent a secret message to his cousin or niece (nigt), the 
female ruler of  Lesser Sonbai, explaining that she must no longer stay 
in her negeri. She should leave at once for the safety of  the Dutch fort 
45 VOC 1376 (1682), f. 391.
46 VOC 1577 (1695-96), Dagregister, sub 13-6-1695. The idea that a vessel with extraordinary powers 
would one day eradicate the might of  the white foreigners circulated in Timor from time to time. A 
politico-religious resistance movement centred in Wewiku in Belu surfaced in 1920, and a rumour spread 
that a warship would soon arrive, providing assistance to the Belu, who would then expel the ‘Company’, 
that is, the Dutch authorities (Politieke Verslagen van de Buitengewesten 1895/20, Nationaal Archief).
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since Uis Kono and the Topasses wished to bring the VOC allies under 
their rule, against his own wishes.47 Moreover, there was little love lost 
between the Topass clients; a conflict arose between Greater Sonbai and 
Amanuban, whose men had raided their neighbours for cattle. At any 
rate, the invading troops suddenly turned back at the Maniki River, just 
a three hours journey from Kupang, and were unheard of  again. The 
structure of  the Timorese domains made them unreliable to use for of-
fensive action, something that would be a thorn in the side for both the 
Dutch and the Portuguese over the centuries.
The other Atoni princedoms may be summarized in briefer terms. 
Amanuban, although hailed by some early observers as the most power-
ful domain of  the island, assumed a relatively modest position after the 
accession of  António Hornay, possibly in part because of  its association 
with his enemy, Matheus da Costa. The same may be said of  its eastern 
neighbour Batumean, which made brief  overtures to the VOC in the 
1650s but in the end remained a Topass client. The name ‘Batumean’ fell 
into disuse in the late seventeenth century, possibly due to now unknown 
political changes. In its place, the name Amanatun, Batumean’s most 
important component, occasionally appears in the records. The other, 
smaller geographical part, Nenometan or Amanesi, was appropriated by 
its Tetun neighbour Wewiku-Wehali at some unknown point in time.48 
The former Sonbai dependency Amfoan or Sorbian in the northwest 
was badly ravaged by the Portuguese prior to 1673. The population was 
to a large extent depleted by death or migration, and then a further split 
took place in 1683, when a brother of  the king at that time, fearing the 
jealousy of  the latter, left Amfoan with hundreds of  subjects to join the 
VOC in Kupang. All these places produced sandalwood, and Sorbian in 
particular was reputed to yield the largest amount of  high-quality wood 
on the island, which was brought overland to Lifau with great effort and 
hard work.49 The relative strength of  Amarasi was felt among its weaker 
neighbours; migrants from the defeated Sorbian stayed in the land of  the 
Amarasi king, and people from Amarasi were harvesting the sandalwood 
in Batumean and Taebenu in order to bring it to Lifau on behalf  of  
47 VOC 1577 (1695-96), Dagregister, sub 3-8-1695.
48 Amanesi acknowledged the VOC after 1749, but in the records from the second half  of  the eigh-
teenth century there is still no hint about its dependence on Wewiku-Wehali. Nineteenth-century records 
relating to Amanatun are extremely scarce.
49 Tange 1689, ff. 4-5, H 49:v, KITLV.
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António Hornay.50
To conclude, the Portuguese were able to bind the Atoni domains to 
their cause through an interesting mixture of  military superiority and 
agreements made with local elites. From a Timorese perspective there 
was often tension between allies because of  blood-oaths and dependency, 
meaning that the network was not very stable.51 The Dutch observers 
in Kupang did their best to create a dark image of  Iberian cruelty and 
oppression, worthy of  a Bartolomé de las Casas, and it can indeed not 
be denied that Timorese groups who opposed the Portuguese strategy 
were often treated very severely. At the same time, the examples provided 
above clearly indicate that there was a sincere commitment to the cause 
of  Portugal, a commitment that could be channelled through the image 
of  the distant figure of  the king of  Portugal and the Catholic creed. The 
position of  the Portuguese authority as ‘stranger king’ inevitably comes 
to mind again. The Portuguese did achieve something that in all likeli-
hood nobody had managed before, namely holding executive (if  tenuous) 
authority over the bulk of  the Atoni domains. In spite of  the annuities 
and forced deliveries of  sandalwood, the system did offer real advan-
tages. Apart from strengthening the internal position of  several local 
leaders, the Portuguese achieved a degree of  strict stability. In times of  
strong Topass dominance, there were relatively few recorded instances of  
warfare between the clients, although disturbances inevitably occurred 
from time to time.52 Through his capitão mor in Lifau, the Catholic 
Majesty in distant Lisbon held the system in place in his own way – a 
system of  which he himself  was probably only vaguely aware.
wehali and the eastern lands
It is apparent how little the Portuguese writers care about the traditional 
heart of  the island, Wewiku-Wehali. After the defeat (or, at least, set-
back) of  the liurai of  Wehali in 1642, this realm is not mentioned in the 
published Iberian sources until well into the eighteenth century. In a way, 
50 VOC 1516 (1692), f. 771b.
51 For example, Taebenu claimed to have sworn the oath as an ally and not a subject, while the 
Topasses claimed that the princedom had been subdued through violence; see VOC 1535 (1693), n.p.; 
VOC 1577 (1695), n.p.
52 For example, in 1692 Hornay was able to avert a brawl between Sonbai and Amanuban about the 
payment of  belis (VOC 1531 [1692-93], Dagregister, sub 19-7-1692).
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the position of  Wehali was exactly the opposite of  the Topass establish-
ment. The great lord, the maromak oan, managed his authority by resting 
in the centre, eating, drinking and sleeping, while the Portuguese capitão 
mor managed it through military force. In the eyes of  the Portuguese 
priests and officers, Wehali apparently did not merit official attention, 
being an empire constructed from words and ritual deference rather than 
a political power as they knew it. In an age where absolute royal power 
was a common (if  contested) notion in Europe, Wehali simply did not 
conform.
Dutch sources at least contain a minimum of  information about 
Wehali in the second half  of  the seventeenth century. During the years 
of  rivalry between António Hornay and Matheus da Costa, the two lead-
ers maintained highly mobile forces who ran amok when faced with any 
Timorese groups in pursuit of  plunder. In the autumn of  1665, it came 
to the attention of  Da Costa that the Makassarese were in contact with 
persons of  some standing from Wewiku-Wehali and Cailaco, another 
princedom of  Central Timor. These persons presented daggers and as-
segais as a token of  their submission to the mighty kingdom in Sulawesi. 
In other words, Wehali pursued a policy of  relations with Makassar dat-
ing back to before 1642. Such a thing was utterly unacceptable to the 
Topasses, for Makassar was still a powerful and independent entity that 
must be kept out of  Timor. In November, Da Costa and his Timorese 
clients successfully attacked the two defiant princedoms. There was 
much booty to be had and any inhabitants who were captured were sold 
as slaves.53 
The destruction of  the Makassar realm in 1667 further eroded any 
possibility of  receiving assistance from that direction. Nevertheless, 
Wehali was not permanently subdued. It lay in an area where foreigners 
seldom ventured, and anyone wishing to claim authority over the land 
had to periodically reaffirm his might. The Company servant Reynout 
Wagenburgh met the ruler of  Wehali in January 1673 and noted his deep 
resentment towards the Portuguese. The king exclaimed: ‘If  I am not 
able to witness the time when I see you in my oppressed kingdom with 
assistance, then I would rather die.’ Wagenburgh consoled the dejected 
prince, saying that God would presumably change things if  they were 
not to his satisfaction. If  there were a new Dutch-Portuguese war, he 
53 VOC 1257 (1666), f. 710.
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noted, many local princes would no doubt assist the VOC in order to rid 
themselves of  the Portuguese yoke.54
Wehali was as defiant against António Hornay as he was against 
his late Da Costa rival. While Hornay prepared ships and men for an 
expedition to East Timor in 1677 – explained in more detail below – he 
welcomed Uis Kono from the Sonbai realm. The two of  them drew up 
plans to march and destroy Wewiku-Wehali, and provisions were col-
lected for this very purpose.55 As in 1642, it turned out that the Atoni 
had no qualms about violating the land of  the maromak oan – despite the 
fact that Wehali was highly respected as the imagined point of  origin of  
the Atoni royalty. The invasion began and was apparently not resisted by 
the Belu. Hornay spent several months in the Belu area collecting various 
debts or impositions from the local population, and the Wehali court sent 
a submissive embassy to the fearsome Topass leader.56 
In spite of  the initially belligerent attitude of  Uis Kono there was 
soon a rapprochement between the related princedoms Sonbai and 
Wehali. In 1687, the Kono lord agreed to give his niece, Lady Taebenu, 
in marriage to the king of  Belu – either the liurai or the maromak oan. A 
curious episode followed the marriage agreement. It goes without say-
ing that marriages of  such magnitude were carefully arranged, but in 
this case the bride-to-be proved surprisingly independent of  thought. 
Finding her future spouse too old for her liking, she escaped with a 
female slave and two male retainers, and finally ended up in Dutch 
Kupang where she asked for asylum. The local rajas deliberated with the 
opperhoofd and it was agreed that the Lesser Sonbai congregation would 
tend to her. They were admonished by the Dutch to be very discreet 
about the affair – if  António Hornay were to receive word of  it, trouble 
might flare up between the VOC and the Portuguese.57 Two months 
later Uis Kono died, which probably reduced the sensivity of  the matter. 
In spite of  the mishap, the incident indicates an intention to bind the 
two ritually superior realms of  the Atoni and Tetun together, presumably 
with the support of  Hornay who must have understood the central posi-
tion of  Wehali well. For the next twenty years there is no information at 
all about the princedom, which probably ran its own affairs.
54 VOC 1301 (1673-74), Dagregister, sub 15-12-1673.
55 VOC 1327 (1676-77), Dagregister, sub 20-5-1677.
56 VOC 1335 (1677-78), Dagregister, sub 16-7-1677.
57 VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 11-6-1687.
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The numerous small and ethnically diverse princedoms in East 
Timor had largely stayed outside of  the Portuguese orbit up until the 
1660s. Although it is alleged that some coastal places were dominated 
by seafaring Portuguese as early as 1623, they had no documented 
permanent presence there, and there were surely rivals who vied for 
influence.58 After their sea expedition of  1641 the Makassarese kept 
contact with some of  the eastern domains they had once defeated. This 
applied in particular to three territories on the north coast, Manatuto, 
Ade and Con, of  which the first two had a close mutual political relation-
ship. Little sandalwood was accessible to foreigners there, but one could 
find beeswax and slaves, second-best commodities that could possibly 
motivate the establishment of  an economic post. Turtle-shell, also known 
as karet, was a third, equally valuable product which could, however, 
never be more than marginal considering the limited supply of  turtles.59 
There were also attractive but tantalizing stories about rich deposits of  
copper, in particular the fabled copper mountain of  Ade. The internal 
structure of  the coastal princedoms was not very centralized, as can be 
gathered from a Dutch report dating from 1665. The most important of  
them, Ade, consisted of  a number of  settlements under the control of  
minor chiefs; nothing could be undertaken without the consent of  the 
others. At a higher level, there were two prominent rajas, or orangkaya60, 
namely those of  Watte Soul and Vemasse, who thus constituted a sort 
of  double princedom, a common political feature in the eastern archi-
pelago. They had a tributary relationship with the Luca princedom at 
the southern coast, but had recently withdrawn from this relationship. 
The two components of  Ade were not able to act in unity, however. In 
1665, Watte Soul refused to trade with the visiting Dutch out of  concern 
for the Makassarese, while Vemasse was inclined to welcome the VOC in 
order to get rid of  the seafarers from Sulawesi. The Dutch visitors found 
the Ade to be good-natured fellows; unlike some of  the Atoni groups they 
were, however, not warlike people.61 
After 1641, the Makassarese, and in particular those coming from 
Tallo’, sent five or six or perhaps even more ships to the north coast of  
58 A Jesuit document refers to missionary activity in Luca c.1657, but it does not seem to have been 
implemented on a continual basis (Jacobs 1988:169-71).
59 In modern Bahasa Indonesia, karet means rubber.
60 The term orangakaya, ‘rich man’, usually denotes a village or district chief  in the Southeast Asian 
Archipelago (VOC-Glossarium 2000:83). In this case it is used to denote a petty ruler.
61 VOC 2285 (1733), ff. 176, 179-80, 194-5; Hägerdal 2007b:556-7; Veth 1855:604-5.
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East Timor each year. Their presence deterred the Portuguese from act-
ing too heavily in these quarters. A missionary foray undertaken in the 
late 1650s proved fateful for some of  its members; an Ade ruler poisoned 
two Jesuits and a Portuguese captain at a reception simply because he 
coveted their ship. (Polenghi 2007:68-9). There was a tributary relation-
ship between the Makassarese and Ade, the latter of  which had to make 
an annual delivery of  50 slaves and a few picul (circa 61 kilograms) of  
beeswax. Apart from that, the Makassarese traded cloths against bees-
wax, sandalwood, turtle-shell and ambergris (Coolhaas 1968:929-31). An 
amusing story tells how the locals of  Ade did not know at first the value 
of  ambergris, and so used it to make their small boats watertight. As a 
matter of  fact this substance from the sperm whale was very valuable for 
making medicine and perfumes. When the Makassarese found out they 
immediately proceeded to scrape away the ambergris from the boats 
(Rumphius 1999:290).
Another important player in the area was the VOC, whose ships 
began to explore the possibilities of  trade in East Timor after the peace 
treaty was concluded with Portugal. They found that the locals feared 
both the Makassarese and the Portuguese, but that many seemed posi-
tive about a VOC establishment. In 1666, for example, a Portuguese ship 
from Lifau went to Ade and Manatuto with three Dutchmen on board, 
in order to purchase beeswax. Since the ship flew the Portuguese flag 
they were regarded as enemies. The locals stood on the shore, weapons 
in hand, and forbade them to step ashore. The Dutch sailors upon seeing 
the tricolour of  their homeland among the crowd, explained that they 
were Dutch subjects and that they were on board a private ship that was 
neither Portuguese nor Makassarese. In a moment the tense atmosphere 
changed and the three sailors were generously treated and offered water 
and refreshments. The Portuguese sailors, however, had to stay aboard. 
The locals asked the Dutchmen to request that their authorities send as-
sistance since they could not probably hold out against the Portuguese 
or Makassarese for more than another year. The sailors promised to do 
this.62
A VOC report from 1665 provides a valuable enumeration of  the 
north-eastern princedoms and their status, going from the east to the 
west. After Ade and Manatuto, which were lightly dependent upon 
62 VOC 2285 (1733), ff. 214-5.
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Makassar, Lacló and Hera asserted their independence from Portugal, 
although the latter was attacked and burnt down around 1660 after a 
Batavian ship arrived there. After Lacló followed the shores of  Dili – the 
first mention of  this place – and then Mateyer (probably Motael), which 
secretly kept a Dutch tricolour. Then there were Tibar, Nussepoko (not 
identified), Lanqueiro and Cutubaba, which were all occupied by the 
Topasses. Cailaco, further inland, was an enemy of  the Portuguese and 
did not trust anyone. The next four places, Balibo, Silawang, Batugade 
and Joanije (Jenilu?), had been destroyed by the Topasses, and the fol-
lowing place was Amatassy, probably Amentasi in Harneno, where 
traces of  a population were found, but no people. The king there had 
been hanged by the Portuguese since he had sold sandalwood to the 
Makassarese. There thus remained Assem and Mena, which were seen to 
be loyal friends of  Portugal, and where the Company had consequently 
few opportunities.63 All in all, it was a highly turbulent situation where 
three external powers – European, Eurasian and Asian – contended for 
influence.
What has been said may give the impression that the Company 
was perceived as a benevolent power in comparison with the others. 
Nevertheless there were also reports of  Dutch conduct being similar to 
that ascribed to the Portuguese. In 1668, the crew of  two Dutch sloops 
travelling along the north coast made a few armed landings in the vi-
cinity of  Mateyer. They destroyed some settlements and chased off  the 
Portuguese who stayed there, shouting: ‘You dogs, this is just the begin-
ning. In the coming year we will also chase you out of  Lifau.’64 By this 
time, Makassar had been thoroughly defeated by the Company and its 
allies and its archipelago-wide position was ruined by the subsequent 
Bungaya Treaty. The Dutch looked to expand their influence in the 
resulting power vacuum in East Timor. The Kupang post was too weak 
to carry out much expansion, but north of  East Timor lay the so-called 
South-Western Islands, which were monitored by the Dutch governor 
of  Banda. Islands such as Kisar, Wetar and Leti traditionally welcomed 
contact with the Timorese, and Timorese slaves were used by the Dutch 
perkeniers, or planters, on Banda.65 The local VOC office therefore cast a 
63 VOC 2285 (1733), ff. 194-200.
64 VOC 2285 (1733), ff. 178-9.
65 For linguistic connections between East Timor and the South-Western Islands, see Engelenhoven 
and Hajek 2000; Hull 1998.
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watchful eye in this direction. 
When the orangkaya of  the island of  Kisar made overtures to purchase 
slaves for the Company on Timor, veritable Dutch-Portuguese hos-
tilities broke out. The ‘reckless’ António Hornay, still only in charge of  
Larantuka, used the news as a pretext for a private pirate expedition. In 
early 1668, he gathered 12 vessels and made inroads on Kisar and Leti, 
which both belonged to the South-Western Islands and therefore stood 
under Company suzerainty. According to the Dutch version, Hornay 
killed a multitude of  cattle and people on Kisar, enslaved a good part 
of  the population, and forced the remainder to deliver gold and other 
goods. As a particular speciality, a VOC record alleges that he boiled the 
fat out of  human bodies and used it to polish the weapons, commenting: 
‘This we will do to you all since you go to Banda and mingle with the 
Noble Company.’66 The Dutch in Banda, however, proved somewhat 
more agile than their brethren in Kupang. Three VOC vessels arrived at 
Leti in early May while the pirates (as we may well call them) were still 
anchored there. Eighty Dutchmen were commanded to advance by boat 
and ruin the Topass ships. As they approached they were met by musket 
fire from the ships as well as from the encamped Topasses on the shore. 
The Dutch were defeated and had to fall back, suffering losses of  twelve 
men, either dead or wounded. The following day, a VOC flute (fluyt, a 
type of  ship), well equipped with artillery, approached the pirates, who 
now preferred to negotiate, and began to restore the prisoners. It so 
happened that the following night it was dark and rainy, and the Topass 
fleet slipped away in spite of  the Dutch crew being on the alert. The 
pirates left most of  the captives behind, miserable, but alive (Coolhaas 
1968:619-20). 
The Dutch squadron now proceeded to the Timorese coast. A few 
days later, in late May and early June 1668, they concluded six formal 
treaties with the orangkaya of  Ade, Manatuto, Hera, Laivai and Waimaa. 
The treaties were reminiscent of  the pact made with Sonbai and Amabi 
thirteen years previously, but were even more rudimentary: a vague com-
mitment by the locals to deliver their products to the Company and to 
deny external traders access to materials. In return, the VOC was to pro-
tect its new allies (Heeres 1931:394; McWilliam 2007:227-8). However, if  
the 1655 contract is seen as a partial failure, the subsequent one in 1668 
66 VOC 2285 (1733), f. 179.
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can only be classified as a complete disaster, in particular for the locals.
Firstly, the local population was deeply divided with regard to exter-
nal alliances. The old ruler of  Vemasse and his son, Ama Sili, were en-
thusiastically on the side of  the Dutch, while several other orangkaya were 
still influenced by Makassar.67 Secondly, Matheus da Costa angrily told 
VOC representatives visiting Lifau that the eastern domains had ‘be-
longed’ to Portugal since at least the age of  the old capitão mor Francisco 
Fernandes in the early seventeenth century. One version states that the 
eastern lands had been Portuguese territory for more than 60 years, in 
other words since circa 1600. The Dutch later remarked that Da Costa’s 
story did not ring true; apart from their traditional dependency under 
Luca, Ade and Manatuto had been paying tribute to the Makassarese 
for a long time with the full knowledge of  Da Costa. Now, however, the 
Makassarese seaborne empire was destroyed and from the Dutch point 
of  view, the contract with the East Timorese orangkaya was consequently 
valid. Company servants from Kupang even made the effort to read the 
articles of  the peace treaty with Makassar to the capitão mor in order to 
prove their prerogatives.68
Matheus da Costa did not care in the slightest. In the autumn of  
1668, a Portuguese fleet sailed to the east to assert their claims. The set-
tlements in Ade were set alight, as was the Dutch flag that the inhabitants 
had received. Hundreds of  people were taken away to the slave market 
and some of  the other domains, such as Manatuto, Hera and Lacló, were 
treated in the same way.69 The details are not too clear, but it appears 
that the fall of  Makassar and the provocative Dutch diplomatic foray was 
a catalyst for the Portuguese to systematically take control of  East Timor. 
In a VOC report from 1670 it appears that Da Costa proceeded to rav-
age Suai in the Tetun-speaking area, the dual princedom of  Camenaça 
which supposedly stood under the authority of  the Likusaen liurai. By 
this time, the Portuguese occupied all of  the inner coast of  Timor, and 
their authority stretched around the eastern hook of  the island to Tiris-
Serin, a coastal domain that seems to have been situated in the eastern 
67 VOC 2285 (1733), f. 178.
68 VOC 2285 (1733), ff. 179-80, 184-5.
69 VOC 2285 (1733), ff. 188-90, 218-20; Coolhaas 1968:681.
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section of  the outer coast, south of  Manufai.70 Shortly afterwards, 
early in 1671, a VOC document reported that the entire outer coast 
was now under Portugues influence and that the Portuguese were busy 
erecting small fortresses along the coast – how matters stood inland is 
unclear in the sources.71 All the places where the ships of  the Solorese, 
Makassarese and free burghers from Banda had come to trade were now 
abruptly closed. The locals were forbidden to trade with the foreigners 
on pain of  death.72 As such, these measures were not exceptional. The 
VOC had long since pursued a policy of  monopoly in the trade of  vital 
products and had an ugly record of  brutal enforcement; Maluku, for in-
stance, was a case in point. It goes without saying that this was no imple-
mentation of  colonial rule in the modern sense of  the word, for there 
was obviously no interference in the inner structure of  the indigenous 
domains. At the same time, however, the Portuguese went further than 
the former Makassarese overlords or, for that matter, the Dutch in the 
region, since they policed East Timor through small coastal garrisons.
In addition, Portuguese expansion in East Timor differed funda-
mentally from that of  West Timor. In the Atoni area their influence was 
disseminated through trade, alliances and missionary endeavours. In 
East Timor, brute force had to be relied upon to a greater extent. The 
domains were smaller and weaker than in the west, and easily fell prey 
to a determined military effort in the course of  a few years. Indirectly, 
the process paved the way for the later political division of  the island 
into a western and an eastern half. The Topasses do not appear to have 
had legitimate power in these quarters, and if  Dutch records can be 
trusted, the coastal garrisons behaved in a rapacious and overbearing 
conquistador-style, which only served to breed considerable resentment 
and to cause the migration of  minor groups to the VOC-dominated 
South-Western Islands.73 As a result, the East Timorese turned out to 
be susceptible to influence from the White Portuguese of  the Estado 
da Índia during the next century, who would eventually establish their 
centre in Dili in 1769. 
70 A map of  Timor by Godinho de Eredia, from 1613, indicates ‘Tiris Servin’ somewhere east of  
Camenaça but west of  Luca (Durand 2006:80). Later on, Tiris occurs in pair with Mauta in the docu-
ments. According to a modern tradition from Luca, the kingdom was situated 80 kilometres to the west 
of  Beacu, in other words close to the Manufai princedom (Spillett 1999:300).
71 VOC 2285 (1733), f. 208.
72 VOC 1275 (1670), f. 663.
73 VOC 1426 (1685); Coolhaas 1975:30.
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What did the Company do in the face of  all the Portuguese aggres-
sion? The answer is: practically nothing. In the late 1660s, the price of  
sandalwood dropped by a half  and there was an excessive amount stored 
in Batavia, which diminished any interests in expansion on Timor. Upon 
closer inspection, Batavia learned that the resources on Ade would not 
balance the cost of  maintaining a stronghold at this sparsely populated 
site. Being in essence a commercial company, the VOC therefore had 
to turn a blind eye to the fate of  the locals (Coolhaas 1968:677-8, 681). 
The VOC authorities were content to send letters of  complaint to the 
leaders in Lifau, letters that were subsequently replied to with counter-
claims and belligerent assertions that the Portuguese had no obligation 
to explain their behaviour to the Dutch.74 A side-effect, however, was 
that a substantial group of  people from Ade migrated to Wetar, a sizeable 
yet sparsely inhabited island under the jurisdiction of  Banda. The Ade 
prince, Ama Sili, was established as raja of  the coastal settlement Iliwaki 
and was baptized under the name Salomon Speelman. He became a very 
useful and loyal ally of  the Company in the South-Western Islands, and a 
good friend and informer of  the celebrated botanist Georg Rumphius.75 
Nevertheless he must have been frustrated by the continued Dutch re-
fusal to heed his bid to be restored in Ade with their assistance. From the 
long-term perspective, the abortive contracts of  1668 had the effect of  
supporting the positions of  the VOC. During the eighteenth century, the 
Dutch frequently referred to the contracts, which were taken as proof  
that large parts of  East Timor actually belonged to them.
Topass power in the eastern archipelago was turning into something 
loosely akin to a mandala state, a polity where the radiation of  power from 
the centre determined how far out the writ of  a ruler would be in effect, 
and where the centre would be surrounded by satellite polities whose 
loyalty was far from assured. In this case, however, it worked without the 
‘Indified’ elements usually associated with the mandala state.76 Outside 
the centres of  Larantuka and Lifau lay the dependent, if  autonomous, 
Atoni domains, which showed a degree of  loyalty to Portugal, and fur-
ther away still were the recently associated, but still recalcitrant, coastal 
74 VOC 2285 (1733), ff. 180-1, 188-90.
75 Rumphius 1999:75, 235, 280, 290. Riedel 1886:431-2 recorded oral traditions about Silisaban 
(Ama Sili). After his death in 1693 he was succeeded as raja in Iliwaki by his son, Johannes Salomonsz; 
upon his demise in 1728 no further raja seems to have been crowned on Wetar. None of  these rajas ap-
pear to have held executive power outside Iliwaki (Lamper n.y.:16; Coolhaas 1985:189).
76 On the mandala state, see Henk Schulte Nordholt 1996:9-10.
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domains of  the east. The recent acquisitions were not secure but had to 
be confirmed again and again in order that they did not fall out of  the 
Topass orbit. For years, Follafaik was a determined centre of  resistance, a 
place in Central Timor adjacent to Maucatar, whose king was a relative 
of  the fugitive Ama Sili of  Ade.77 Matheus da Costa attacked the negeri 
on no less than three occasions, but being situated on a rock it man-
aged to survive the sieges despite the fact that the defenders were only 
equipped with bows, arrows and blowpipes. Da Costa ignominiously had 
to retreat each time, suffering losses. 
When António Hornay united the Topass congregations in 1673 he 
vigorously followed the eastern policy of  his predecessor. He first pres-
sures the recalcitrant princedoms Suai, Fohoterin, Fatulete and Leteluli 
into paying three chests of  gold as a fine and ravaged Leteluli when it did 
not yield quickly enough.78 Next, he turned his attention to Follafaik. 
A VOC report states that in 1675 he sent a huge force of  30,000 men 
to deal with the defiant princedom. The numbers were probably exag-
gerated, but the story indicates the great effort required to root out East 
Timorese resistance.79 
The seriousness of  the resistance is also clear from a report of  the 
following year. By this time the easternmost areas were rioting. The 
inhabitants were killing all the Portuguese they could find, together with 
their families and slaves, and were defiantly flying Dutch flags. This time 
Hornay went in person with twelve or thirteen ships. He had hoped for 
assistance from his brother-in-arms, Uis Kono of  the Sonbai realm, but 
the Sonbai greatly feared that their realm would be attacked by the rash 
Follafaik if  there were no men left at home. The ambivalent nature of  
Hornay’s personalized rule is apparent here: his charisma demanded 
that he lead his Topasses in person lest the conflagration would spread 
out of  control. On the other hand, he was not strong enough to use his 
clients’ manpower without the consent of  the principal lords.80 After 
such an expedition in 1677, possibly connected in some way with the 
simultaneous campaign against the central realm of  Wehali, resistance 
finally petered out, with inaccessible inland areas like Matebian hold-
77 Follafaik (Follefait, Folyfay) may have been based around present-day Fatolúlic in south-western 
Timor Leste (Pélissier 1996:182). In the nineteenth century it was seen as a dependency of  Suai (Brou-
wer 1849-50, H 731, KITLV)
78 VOC 1301 (1673-74), Dagregister, sub 16-12-1673.
79 VOC 1319 (1675-76), Dagregister, sub 17-8-1675, 8-9-1675.
80 VOC 1320 (1676); Coolhaas 1971:240.
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ing out for at least a few years longer.81 Hornay organized rudimentary 
posts to monitor East Timor. A captain with 40-50 men was stationed 
in a fortress at Ade. Further to the west, on the so-called Belu Coast, 
there were two further companies of  the same size. All over, there were 
no less than 23 banners and about a thousand men stationed on Timor 
in the late 1670s, all of  them equipped with awe-inspiring firearms. As 
a mobile resource, Hornay kept people from Flores with him, which 
he brought over every year around March from Larantuka, Konga, 
Sikka and Gege. Together with Rotenese, free ‘Kaffers’, Timorese 
Christians and Portuguese slaves, they made up another thousand men, 
all armed with shotguns – a formidable force in the hands of  a man like 
Hornay.82 
the outer islands
Although the Topasses are primarily associated with Timor, it must be 
remembered that their political network stretched over an extensive area 
in the eastern archipelago. Their authority, although not exactly sover-
eignty, was imposed from central Flores to the eastern cape of  Timor, 
roughly the distance between Paris and Marseilles. Their territory en-
compassed West Solor and much of  Adonara and Lembata, and they 
contested interests in Sumba and the Alor group of  islands. Not surpris-
ingly their interests frequently collided with those of  the Dutch and the 
seafaring peoples of  Sulawesi. The peace of  1663 lasted to the extent 
that there were few, and only minor, direct clashes between Company 
employees and Topasses up until 1749. As on Timor, however, there 
81 In this campaign, which was directed against certain mountaineers, the kings of  Assem and Ba-
tumean participated along with their men (VOC 1327 [1676-77], Dagregister, sub 9-6-1677). The exact 
fate of  Follafaik is not revealed by the sources, but it obviously had to surrender in the end. Ama Sili’s 
brother Ama Saba was still holding out on a rock in Baucau, east of  Ade, in March 1677; however, the 
best archers and spearmen had already dead, and many women and children had been enslaved. It 
would therefore be more than doubtful if  Ama Saba could maintain Baucau when the Portuguese at-
tacked again (VOC 1327 [1676-77], Dagregister, sub 2-4-1677). Willem Tange’s report from 1689 (H 49:v, 
KITLV) states that Ama Saba was murdered in cold blood. The Ade-affiliated mountain area Matebian 
was severely threatened but remained independent in 1692 (VOC 1531 [1692-93], Dagregister, sub 24-
12-1692). One is reminded of  the fact that the inaccessible Matebian was the last major Fretilin (Frente 
Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente) territory to fall to Indonesian forces in 1978.
82 VOC 1328 (1677), f. 343b; Coolhaas 1971:273. Rote was, of  course, under VOC rule. Some of  
the nusak on the island still supported the Portuguese, either openly or clandestinely, and many Rotenese 
ended up in the Portuguese sphere.
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were continuous encounters between their respective clients, which bred 
mutual suspicion and led to many a diplomatic protest. 
After acquiring Lifau in 1673, António Hornay found the means to 
control Timor and the outer islands through an annual routine. Having 
been born in Larantuka, he resided there for much of  the year, while his 
reliable younger brother Francisco Hornay served as his tenente in Lifau. 
Towards the end of  the rainy season António Hornay would gather a 
fleet of  ships and travel to Lifau to attend to Timorese affairs for as long 
as was necessary, after which he would return: Lifau had a poor harbour 
and provided little protection for the ships during the rainy monsoon 
season. The system needed a strong hand for it to work well, and in 
fact, collapsed shortly after Hornay’s death. There did remain a degree 
of  tension between Florenese Larantuka and Timorese Lifau, which 
was temporarily suppressed but would be visible during the eighteenth 
century. 
In Hornay’s time, Larantuka was a semi-foreign military and com-
mercial settlement where Portuguese was the main language. By the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries at the latest, a local version of  
Malay was spoken in the town, while the original Lamaholot lan-
guage was spoken in easternmost Flores and the Solor Islands. The 
Larantuqueiros themselves made little or no attempt to govern the 
surrounding indigenous population, but left it to an indigenous ruler 
who was based in Lewonama, close to Larantuka, and who had been 
converted to Catholicism. This raja was also the overlord of  West Solor; 
during the late colonial period he held authority over parts of  Adonara 
and Lembata.83 Oral tradition mentions a long pedigree of  rajas of  
Larantuka, starting with Sira Demon, from whom the Demon group 
take their name. The ninth generation in the line, Ola Adobala, would 
have been educated and baptized by the Portuguese under the grandiose 
name Dom Francisco Dias Vieira Godinho.84 Traditionally, his bap-
tism was said to have taken place during the age of  the prince-regent 
of  Portugal, that is, Pedro (regent 1668-1683), but there may be better 
reason to identify him with a raja of  Larantuka called Olle or Olla, who 
83 For a voluminous discussion of  traditional society in Larantuka, see Dietrich 1997.
84 Heynen 1876:3-9. In one version the dynastic ancestor Patigolo belonged to the family of  the maro-
mak oan of  Wewiku-Wehali (Collectie Wertenbroek n.y., Number 7, H 1341, KITLV). That indicates a degree 
of  Wehali prestige far outside Timor itself, although the story was only recorded in the 1950s.
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is mentioned in VOC sources of  1732 and 1759.85 As a matter of  fact 
Dom Francisco was not the first Catholic raja, for European sources 
record a Dom Constantino from at least 1625 until 1661, a Dom Luís 
in 1675, and a Dom Domingos Vieira in 1702.86 At any rate, the Dias 
Vieira Godinho family governed as rajas of  Larantuka until 1962, when 
the Indonesian republic abolished traditional forms of  governance in the 
region. There is no suggestion in either oral or documentary sources as 
to how the Portuguese Larantuqueiro settlement merged with the indig-
enous Larantuka kingship. A distinct Larantuqueiro community led by a 
Hornay or Da Costa can be traced up to the 1760s, but then somehow 
vanishes. By this time the cultural differences between the Topass and 
indigenous elites may not have been so vast, and the raja may therefore 
have emerged as the natural leader of  the Larantuka settlement. All 
the same, Larantuka henceforth retained a strong and institutionalized 
Catholic identity.
In terms of  economic relations, the Larantuqueiros did not systemati-
cally uphold the old ideas of  mare clausum (searoads closed to outsiders), 
as shown by the activities in Larantuka and Lifau.87 Nevertheless they 
imposed a degree of  control over the areas they dominated, as is ap-
parent from an incident recorded in a Dutch source from 1675. When 
opperhoofd Jacob van Wijckersloot visited the VOC allies in Solor in that 
year, he received complaints about the behaviour of  the native ruler of  
Larantuka, Dom Luís. A ship from Lamahala, one of  the Watan Lema 
princedoms, had gone to Konga south of  Larantuka to purchase rice 
and other foodstuffs, which could not be grown at home. As the sailors 
arrived in Konga they were promptly forbidden to trade; in addition, 
their merchandise was confiscated. The VOC allies claimed to have pre-
viously traded with the Portuguese without problems. Van Wijckersloot 
promised to speak with the Larantuka ruler, whom he met the next day 
through the intermediation of  a Dominican padre. Dom Luís excused 
himself  by referring to the orders issued by António Hornay: the in-
habitants of  Konga were now only allowed to trade with the mountain 
85 VOC 2239 (1732), f. 205; ANRI Timor:43, Brieven Kerkenraad Koepang 1739-1779, Letter from the 
Church Council of  Kupang to the clerical authorities in Batavia, 5-10-1759.
86 Barnes 2008: 348; VOC 1319 (1675-76), Dagregister, sub 18-7-1675, 19-7-675; Matos 1974a:230. 
Dom Luís is called signadje van Larentoeque. His predecessor Dom Constantino is called payam or payão in 
the Portuguese documents, a term most probably derived from the Javanese-Malay term payung, ‘para-
sol’, which was a symbol of  authority (Barnes 2008:348).
87 On mare clausum, see Villiers 2001:156.
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people. In order to acquire foreign goods, the Topass dependents in the 
Florenese districts of  Sikka, Krowe and Paga had to attend a particular 
bazaar that had been constructed in Konga where they were allowed to 
exchange goods.88 Again, the economic policy of  Hornay is visible in 
the VOC efforts to control the flow of  commerce in their dependencies. 
In the Larantuqueiro settlement, there was likewise a strong dependency 
on the mountain people to obtain necessary items. When a Dutchman 
from Kupang visited Larantuka in 1681, he found that the prominent 
Portuguese were either in Lifau with Hornay, or else in the mountains 
purchasing rice and other provisions.89
A little bit further to the west lay Sikka. According to legend, the 
founder of  this princedom was the uncle of  the first Hornay and Da 
Costa, and indeed the relations to the Portuguese were close.90 Topasses 
from Sikka are mentioned from time to time, and in the late seventeenth 
century they seem to have been a highly movable group that performed 
long-distance sea journeys, travelling in all directions; for example, they 
brought sandalwood from East Timor to Larantuka.91 The Sikka had 
a reputation of  being good soldiers and frequently served on Timorese 
soil under the Portuguese, being organized in particular companies.92 
Conditions in the central parts of  Flores are difficult to follow in any 
detail due to the dearth of  sources, but it is nevertheless clear that 
Portuguese authority was contested there by the Ende, an ethnic mix of  
locals and migrants from Sulawesi, who came together after the fall of  
Makassar. The principal negeri in the Ende region, Barai, claimed to stand 
under the Company, although this meant little in practice. The claim was 
apparently the result of  an old relationship that existed between the 
Ende and the Watan Lema league on Solor-Adonara. In general, Flores 
was logistically important to the Topass realm; as its very name implies, 
the volcanic island is, on average, more fertile than Timor, and was bet-
ter suited to the production of  foodstuffs. When starvation threatened on 
88 VOC 1319 (1675-76), Dagregister, sub 19-7-1675.
89 VOC 1375 (1681-82), Dagregister, sub 4-9-1681.
90 On Sikka, see Dietrich 1989:37-9; Lewis and Pereira Mandalangi 2008. Somewhat to the west of  
the negeri Sikka, on the Florenese south coast, is Paga, a domain that was loosely connected to Sikka. 
The local lords of  Paga claimed to have descended from Ornay da Costa, of  Topass origin. (interview 
with the Da Costa family, Paga, June 2006). In one version, this Ornay da Costa was the son of  António 
Hornay (Lewis and Pareira Mandalangi 2008:147-8, 172-3).
91 VOC 1531 (1692-93), Dagregister, sub 14-3-1693.
92 A document by the bishop of  Malacca, in Matos 1974a:229, mentions a Sikka company loyal to the 
Estado in 1702. It was captained by António da Silva, a relative of  the royal Da Silva clan.
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Timor, surplus rice could be brought in from the south coast of  Flores. 
A report from 1689 indicates that Hornay and the Company post in 
Kupang engaged in a minor competition to attract Florenese traders to 
their respective ports (Coolhaas 1975:262-3).
Sumba, alias Pulau Cendana, alias Sandelbosch (‘sandalwood for-
est’), was a largely unknown entity to the outside world in the seventeenth 
century. A brief  missionary foray was made there in 1658, but it was no 
more than a minor incident (Jacobs 1988:171). In political terms, it was 
split into a large number of  small domains or chiefdoms which were 
often at war with each other. The Ende went there on an annual basis, 
in the first place to Memboro on the north coast, which had a reason-
ably good roadstead. They sold cotton to the local people, from which 
the women wove sarongs and other cloths – this is the first reference to 
the famous Sumbanese weaving traditions.93 The sultan of  Bima on 
Sumbawa was considered to be ‘the right hereditary lord of  the entire 
island’,94 but there is reason to believe that this was just another claim 
as a result of  loose overlord-ship, a ubiquitous feature of  Southeast Asian 
political rhetoric. In 1685, the sultan tried to enforce his would-be suzer-
ainty over Manggarai, some further coastal parts of  Flores, and Sumba. 
The first two areas actually acknowledged his authority, but in the case 
of  Sumba the locals turned him away. Coolhaas (1971:800). The alter-
native names of  the island hint at vast resources of  sandalwood, and for 
a while, the Dutch indeed believed that sandalwood could be found in 
abundance on the island. A VOC visit in circa 1685, however, ‘found the 
various things to be quite to the opposite. The truth was that there grew 
very little sandalwood. It was useless, and completely lost its smell after 
it had been cut.’95 The Dutch report added that the Larantuqueiros 
would surely have profited from sandalwood forests, if  there had been 
any, for they were already visiting the eastern part of  Sumba and thus 
familiar with local conditions. The Sikka also played a role, and not al-
ways a peaceful one, in this early Portuguese presence. In 1693 a certain 
Pasqual Prego is mentioned, a native of  Sumba who went on to have a 
dramatic career. When he was young he was captured in a Sikka raid on 
Sumba. He subsequently grew up in Sikka and was eventually baptized 
93 VOC1335 (1677-78), Dagregister, sub 14-6-1678.
94 Tange 1689, H 49:v, KITLV, f. 1. The claim was documented for the first time in 1662 (De Roo van 
Alderwerelt 1906:189).
95 Tange 1689, H 49:v, KITLV, f. 1.
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by his masters. His knowledge of  one of  the local languages made him 
useful, and he participated in the Sikkanese expeditions which visited 
Sumba from time to time. From the same source it appears that the Sikka 
were finally able to acquire a shipload of  sandalwood at times, which 
they brought to Larantuka.96 The document also describes a dark side 
of  the history of  Sumba, namely the capture of, and trade in, slaves. The 
anthropologist Rodney Needham has argued that the slave trade had a 
very disruptive effect on Sumbanese society, especially in the nineteenth 
century when the centre for this trade tended to move eastwards from 
Bali. The inaccessible location of  Sumba did not save it from slave raid-
ers originating from Makassar, Bima, Flores, the Malay world or, later 
on, Dutch Timor.97
Moving to the islands east of  Solor, the Topasses lay claim to parts 
of  the Lamaholot-speaking island of  Lembata, but these were highly 
contested. Kawela in the west remained defiant against the Portuguese 
authority in the late seventeenth century, and even made overtures to be 
acknowledged as an ally of  the VOC.98 During the late colonial period 
Kawela was included under the possessions of  the raja of  Larantuka, 
but there is no concrete information how this came about. What we do 
know is that the raja tried to expand his power via Portuguese symbols, 
bestowing a Portuguese flag on the Watan Lema-affiliated princedom of  
Labala in 1692, with unknown results.99 In the north-east, the Kedang 
domain is known to have fought against the Watan Lema league in the 
late seventeenth century, although this does not necessarily mean that it 
favoured the Topasses. Later on, it was contested between the Dutch-
allied princedoms Lamahala and Adonara.100
Finally, the Alor group, mainly consisting of  Pantar and Alor, con-
tained a number of  small coastal domains whose inhabitants lived in 
periodical conflict with the mountain people. Among the earliest descrip-
tions of  Pantar and Alor is one included in a Portuguese missionary text 
written after 1642. Galiyao, which here appears to allude to Pantar, is 
mentioned together with Lewotolok and Kedang on Lembata, as a place 
inhabited by pagans and Muslims. There was a little commerce, as the 
96 VOC 1531 (1692-93), Dagregister, sub 13-4-1693.
97 Needham 1983; VOC 1531 (1692-93), Dagregister, sub 17-12-1692.
98 VOC 1375 (1681-82), Dagregister, sub 26-9-1681.
99 VOC 1531 (1692-93), Dagregister, sub 28-10-1692.
100 Barnes 2001; Keterangan toeroenan radja (n.y.).
179
5 The Topass phase, 1650s-1702 |
locals would come to Larantuka with beeswax, turtle-shell and slaves; the 
latter were probably captive mountain people. The locals also had plenty 
of  foodstuff, including rice, maize, and other edible plants. Alor, which is 
called Malua in the text, is described as a much less attractive place, with 
few opportunities for commerce and a heathen cannibal population.101 
Presumably the distinction Galiyao-Alor should be understood as a dis-
tinction between the five coastal domains of  Galiyao and the mountain 
people. Galiyao was partly Islamicized and had Pandai on north-eastern 
Pantar as the senior component, an area similar to Lohayong among 
the Watan Lema princedoms of  Solor.102 In opposition were the state-
less tribal groups in the highlands, mostly on the larger island of  Alor. 
Considering the slave raids carried out by people from other islands, it 
is not unthinkable that these tribal groups cultivated a fearful reputation 
to ward off  intruders.
Since Galiyao was linked to Watan Lema, it was consequently claimed 
to be within the Dutch sphere. Nevertheless, Company ships very rarely 
ventured there, and many Portuguese traders appeared in Pantar and 
Alor during Hornay’s time. The Portuguese bought the local products in 
exchange for iron, cutlasses and axes.103 Later on, in the early eighteenth 
century, they made a brief  attempt to establish a base on Alor, yet this 
was not followed up. In nineteenth-century ethnographica, the inhabit-
ants of  Pantar and Alor acquired a reputation for ferocious savagery that 
again included such unsavoury activities as cannibalism. Much of  this 
remains unproven, but the Portuguese seafarers indeed lived dangerously 
in certain circumstances. In 1663, two or three Portuguese ships set out 
from Lifau with cargoes of  sandalwood. In order to avoid the Dutch, 
since the peace treaty was not yet in place, they sailed to the north via 
the Alor group, in order to reach Larantuka. There, however, the ships 
101 Sá 1956:487-8. Barnes 1982 and Dietrich 1984:319 argue for Pantar as the most likely equivalent 
of  Galiyao. The findings of  Gomang 1993:28 and Rodemeier 1995:439 indicate that this is only partly 
correct, although the centre of  gravitation of  the Galiyao league lay on Pantar rather than Alor. Ru-
mours of  cannibalism on Malua-Alor are already mentioned in 1522 by Pigafetta of  the Magellan ex-
pedition, who castigated the inhabitants as the most brutish in the Indies (Pigafetta 1923:231). Although 
the phenomenon of  anthropophagy has been reported for Alor over the centuries, the reality behind the 
rumours has not been clearly documented. It is possibly explained by the custom of  drinking blood from 
the enemies killed in warfare in order to avert retribution by the slain spirit (Emilie Wellfelt, Linnaeus 
University, personal communication).
102 For documentation on Pandai as the leader of  the league, see VOC 1335 (1677-78), Dagregister, sub 
11-8-1677.
103 VOC 1335 (1677-78), Dagregister, sub 18-8-1677.
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were crushed against the rocks just off  the coast. Most of  the Portuguese 
were then promptly killed by mountain people who had descended to 
the coast, and only a few survivors were able to get away to Larantuka 
in a small boat.104 This was possibly related to the coastland-inland 
dichotomy where Portuguese traders would be associated with coastal 
dwellers in the eyes of  the mountain people.
From all this it can be seen that the Portuguese or Topass group 
tended to be one step ahead of  their Dutch rivals in exploring the eco-
nomic possibilities of  the outer islands. While the Company servants 
knew almost nothing about some of  the areas they claimed belonged 
to the VOC, the Portuguese and their clients were well aware of  the 
resources available that could be used to make profits through trade or 
slave-raiding. At the same time, it must be admitted that these resources 
were limited. Though there might have been sandalwood on the Solor 
Islands during the initial period of  European presence, it was in that case 
quickly depleted, and on Sumba the profits derived from this wood were 
doubtful at best. In the end, what counted in the commercial relations 
with Macao and the VOC was the amount of  wood to be obtained on 
Timor itself. Beeswax and slaves, although far from being unsignificant 
items, could only be of  secondary importance.
the uncrowned merchant prince
António Hornay was hardly an innovator. He knew, however, how to 
perfect the methods used by his predecessors, and how to take advan-
tage of  the peculiar political situation that arose with the peace treaty 
of  1663: a globally resourceful but locally weak VOC, and a multiethnic 
Portuguese establishment that was ‘stranded’ in a corner of  Southeast 
Asia with little or no influence from the Estado da Índia. Together with 
Matheus da Costa, he was, in a sense, the conqueror of  Timor in its 
near-entirety. Unlike his rival he enjoyed a long and successful career that 
only ended with his death, at ripe old age, on 15 June 1693,. He is there-
fore a seminal figure in Timorese history whose tenure can moreover be 
traced in great detail through the Dutch material, which is particularly 
104 VOC 1243 (1663), f. 1594.
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abundant from the 1670s to the 1690s.105 The Portuguese material for 
this period, important as it is, is less systematically preserved, no doubt 
due to the absence of  the Estado da Índia.
Dutch opinion about Hornay was ambivalent, to say the least. On the 
one hand they noted the routine brutality that he used to quell any pro-
tests against his rule – a part of  the ‘black legend’ of  Portuguese Timor 
that the latently hostile Dutch proceeded to forge. On the other hand, 
they reluctantly admired his ability to create order in the Portuguese en-
terprise. A visitor to Lifau in 1677 commented that Hornay kept better 
order among his Topasses than the former officers, and provided more 
freedom for the Timorese themselves;
since no Portuguese do any harm to the Timorese, in the form of  requisi-
tions of  foodstuff  or otherwise. Instead, everything is ordained, including 
how much and in what way the Portuguese buy things from the inhabit-
ants, such as paddy, jagung, pigs, buffaloes or anything else that they may 
require from them; purchases are not allowed if  they do not pay. Through 
this he [Hornay] ties the subjects to himself  in such a way that currently, 
he is treated by these people as if  he were an idol [affgodt], so that little 
advantage [for the Dutch] can be expected in these times.106
Towards the end of  Hornay’s life, in 1689, the perceptive Dutch opper-
hoofd Willem Moerman summarized the situation of  Portuguese Timor 
in terms that indicated the great skills of  the capitão mor, but also the 
fragile balance that he had managed to maintain over many years and 
which could easily be disturbed under a less capable leader. Moerman 
noted that there was no paid servant of  the Crown of  Portugal in the 
entire region, and that the number of  White Portuguese in Lifau and 
Larantuka did not exceed 30.107 In addition to that there were a number 
of  men who originated from Macao, Goa, and Malacca, apart from all 
the mestizos and ‘Portuguese Christians’, that is, indigenous people who 
had adopted Portuguese religion and selected customs. 
Three hundred kings were claimed to have stood under Portuguese 
105 In the first place, this is due to the Dagregisters, most of  which are preserved for the period 1673-
96. These valuable books of  daily annotations offer a multitude of  details about Dutch affairs with the 
Topasses not found in the ordinary VOC reports, let alone in the scattered Portuguese documents. 
106 VOC 1327 (1676-77), Dagregister, sub 10-6-1677.
107 Fifty men according to Tange 1689, H 49:v, KITLV, f. 7. 
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authority. The number seems excessive, even for Timor with its many 
domains, and obviously includes sub-rulers. By this time, says Moerman, 
the kings had adopted Christian names and wore outward symbols of  
Christianity, like crucifixes. However, the mass of  people followed their 
native customs. Moerman furthermore asserts that Hornay had divided 
Timor into provinces, and had put a lieutenant in charge of  each of  
them. This information may refer to the division into the two large 
‘provinces’ known from later sources, namely Servião and Belu. If  the 
division was originally the initiative of  Hornay himself, it might explain 
why Servião encompassed more than just the Atoni lands, and why Belu 
did not include the all-important Belu centre Wehali – it would have 
been a case of  political expediency. The captains that Hornay placed on 
the island were mostly indigenous Christians, thus people who were not 
even mestizos. The native Catholics on the island, disapprovingly called 
‘rice Christians’ by Moerman, numbered approximately 10,000. 
Hornay himself  was a veritable authoritarian leader who would allow 
nobody else to issue orders. He knew how to keep Timor in strict defer-
ence with the little resources available. Like the Dutch in their corner of  
the island, he had practised the custom of  bestowing gifts of  cloths and 
such things upon the more powerful kings in order to keep them happy. 
When there was a rebellion in one or various of  the innumerable prince-
doms, he could then use Timorese clients to wage war upon them, with-
out having any excessive costs himself. Those who had benefited from 
Hornay’s generosity would take up arms on his demand and attack the 
rebels. The spoils of  war, large and small, would subsequently be shared 
among the warriors who participated on the Portuguese side, which of  
course increased their ties to the capitão mor. Hornay could therefore 
manage Timor without the assistance of  any white compatriots, as long 
as there were no attacks by an external power.108
Moerman’s account may raise the question of  whether this was co-
lonial rule at all. White Portuguese might have been present as scribes, 
traders and padres, but they had relatively little say in relation to Hornay, 
himself  a half-Timorese by birth. The affairs of  the Topass complex 
were to a great extent run by people without a drop of  European blood 
in their veins. 
As explained before, a system of  traditional Timorese tuthais or gifts 
108 VOC 1461 (1689), ff. 553-4.
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was applied to the power network operated by the Topasses, a rough trib-
ute system more than a bona fide colonial rule. The pre-colonial political 
economy of  Southeast Asia included slave-raiding and coerced trade as 
its foremost components, where coastal polities would compel inland 
groups to deliver local products (Hoskins 1996:3). In these respects, the 
Topass establishment slots well into the pre-colonial pattern. However, 
we should not underestimate the importance of  elements of  Portuguese 
culture. In spite of  the local character of  daily life and governance there 
was a Portuguese identity that gave the system a certain colonial taint 
(Dampier 1939:164, 171-2). 
In the same way, the inclusion of  Portuguese Timor in a commer-
cial network offers a somewhat ambiguous picture. On the one hand, 
an early colonial system was at work, where the Portuguese traders of  
Macao tried to make up for the loss of  the Japanese trade by purchas-
ing sandalwood for the South China market. The Topass complex 
depended upon the Macao connection to prosper, although the sandal-
wood was also sold to the VOC and private traders. On the other hand, 
there was, up until 1702, no external system of  extracting produce from 
Timor – in other words, no colonial rent-seeking system. The Topass 
leaders managed their affairs as local merchant princes, akin to many 
a native Southeast Asian coastal ruler: ordering deliveries of  sandal-
wood to be brought down to the coast so that they may be picked up 
by foreign traders; they did not yield anything of  consequence to the 
Estado da Índia as such. True, António Hornay would sometimes send 
donations of  sandalwood to Goa in order to keep the viceroy in a good 
mood.109 He also promised to donate his possessions to the Crown of  
Portugal upon his death, thereby emphasizing the temporary nature of  
his hold over Portuguese authority. This, however, seems to have been 
an attempt to show an amenable face to the Estado rather than a sign 
of  true submission: if  the Estado should miss this point, an event in 
1677 illustrated the true notion. One João Antunes Portugal arrived 
with a patent from the king and the viceroy to be installed as capitão mor 
after Hornay. As it turned out, Antunes Portugal was ‘quite contempt-
ibly’ insulted by Hornay, and was so badly treated in Lifau that he soon 
set sail and left again (Matos 1974a:135; Coolhaas 1971:612). In spite 
of  such incidents, the viceroy implicitly recognized the state of  things 
109 Tange 1689, H 49:v, KITLV, f. 6; Leitão 1948:244.
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by endowing the redoubtable Topass leader with the title capitão geral in 
1690, while his brother Francisco Hornay received the dignity of  capitão 
mor of  Lifau.110
Threats to the rule of  Hornay came from other directions. In his 
conversations with the Dutchmen, he often complained that the mighty 
Amarasi had grown to think independently and that they cared little for 
the Topass leader’s decrees. Partly, this should be regarded as a façade 
to avoid responsibility for the aggressive stance of  Amarasi vis-à-vis the 
Company allies. However, it also aptly highlights the problem of  main-
taining continuous surveillance over the Timorese domains through the 
indirect and informal system of  ‘colonial’ dominance that was available. 
In East Timor there were disturbances in 1686-1687 and 1691, which 
were bloodily suppressed by pitting loyal Timorese troops against the 
rebels (Coolhaas 1975:30, 116; De Roever 2002:286). More vital threats 
appeared to derive from Arung Palakka, the king of  Bone on Sulawesi. 
After the fall of  Makassar in 1667, he was the principal ally of  the 
Company in an area previously dominated by the Makassarese.111 In 
1682 it was suddenly reported that one of  Arung Palakka’s captains was 
preparing to sail towards Larantuka and the Solor and Alor groups, ac-
companied by fourteen perahu, with the intention of  forcing them to pay 
tribute. Hornay hastened to reinforce Larantuka, which normally had 
no fortifications, and placed artillery at the shore.112 As it turned out, the 
invasion never took place, and the question remains as to whether such 
a project had ever been endorsed by the judicious and diplomatic Arung 
Palakka, who would hardly have risked his working relationship with 
the Company for these little-known quarters. There was nevertheless a 
degree of  Sulawesi-related piracy off  the coasts of  Flores in the 1680s. 
By 1675, Ende, on the central south coast, served as a base for seafar-
ers from these quarters; this region had a nominal connection with the 
Watan Lema of  Solor and hence with the Company, and some of  the 
inhabitants were Muslim, as were the newcomers from Sulawesi. Finally, 
in 1686, Hornay sent a message to Arung Palakka and suggested that he 
should only allow those ships with VOC passes into Timor. In that way 
one could counteract the adventurers at sea who misused the name of  
110 VOC1481 (1689-90), Dagregister, sub 14-3-1690.
111 For Arung Palakka, see the detailed monograph of  Andaya (1981).
112 VOC 1375 (1681-82), Dagregister, sub 11-2-1682.
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Arung Palakka in their dubious business.113 As a matter of  fact, the inof-
ficial Bugis-Makassarese activities were not stopped that easily.
The system maintained by Hornay ran counter to the ambitions 
of  the VOC in maritime Southeast Asia to achieve a monopoly on the 
most lucrative products, since trading ships from a variety of  geographi-
cal places were allowed to take in sandalwood and other commodities. 
The sandalwood, beeswax, slaves, and so on that were acquired in the 
Portuguese sphere, were brought to Lifau for sale, although trade with 
the outer coast also continued from Amarasi, Amanuban and Amanesi-
Batumean.114 The Dutch were not prepared to enter into conflict with 
Hornay in spite of  the latter’s support of  the enemies of  the Company 
allies. There were regional as well as global reasons for this passive 
stance. The weakness of  the VOC positions in Kupang and Solor was 
apparent, and Hornay was, after all, a nominal subject of  the king of  
Portugal. Portuguese diplomatic overtures to France and England, where 
King Charles II married a Portuguese princess, did not encourage the 
1663 peace to be broken. Timor was too marginal to be worth risking 
a diplomatic crisis in Europe, something pointed out repeatedly by the 
VOC authorities in Amsterdam and Batavia. In a report from 1689, the 
official, Willem Tange, told about his experiences with Hornay, which 
were not of  the most amicable kind. From his discussions with the Topass 
leader, Tange could see that Hornay was prepared to confront the VOC 
when the time was right. His ambitions seemed to stem from a firm be-
lief  in his own courage. Tange cautiously suggested that Hornay should 
be kept content, so that he should have no reason to create trouble and 
impede the Company.115 
Rather, Dutch envoys from Kupang regularly asked the mighty 
capitão mor in humble terms to be allowed to purchase the valuable 
wood. António Hornay would thereby decide the trading quota and the 
prices. From the 1670s to the 1690s, VOC officials, and occasionally the 
opperhoofd himself, stayed for long periods in Lifau as the guests of  the 
Portuguese in order to wait for the sandalwood to be brought down to 
the coast. The wait was often long, and the reports frequently complain 
113 Andaya 1981:163; Coolhaas 1975:36. A number of  Makassarese sea migrants placed themselves 
under Hornay’s command circa1681 (VOC 1367 [1680-81], Dagregister, sub 9-4-1681).
114 Tange 1689, H 49:v, KITLV, f. 3.
115 Tange 1689, H 49:v, KITLV, f. 9.
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about the delays before the precious wood was actually delivered.116 
Willem Tange contemptuously wrote that the arrangement was unwor-
thy, for in case of  trouble with the Topasses:
that bastard, conceited, tyrannical and filthy rabble would stand, looking 
down their noses, since the servants of  the Noble Company stand there 
as nothing less than cowards and with uncovered heads. Nay, they are 
begging to collect the small amount of  sandalwood and beeswax, which 
is a half  or a quarter of  a picul, in order to keep the Supreme Govern-
ment here [in Batavia] content with their service; which is quite absurd, 
given the respectful status of  the high and honoured government of  the 
Noble Company.117
A good example of  the commercial vicissitudes that the Dutchmen suf-
fered in their trade with Hornay is the prolonged visit that the official 
Willem van Couwenhoven paid to Lifau between May and July 1681. In 
early April he arrived in Larantuka where Hornay kept a residence, and 
asked him for permission to buy sandalwood in Lifau. Hornay replied 
that it was too early for him to go to Lifau, and that the sandalwood had 
not yet arrived there from other parts of  Timor. However, he encour-
aged his Dutch colleague ‘after old habit’ to purchase sandalwood in his 
domain. He told him that there were no less than five other ships wait-
ing to buy sandalwood, and that the large ship from Macao had already 
received its share. Van Couwenhoven was about to ask Hornay if  he had 
forgotten about his previous, considerably more generous promises but at 
that very moment, Hornay had to attend the church service and left the 
Dutchman standing in embarrassment. Later discussions gave no better 
result than that Hornay provided Van Couwenhoven with a licence to 
trade freely at Lifau – as he pointed out, the inhabitants were not allowed 
to sell any sandalwood without his approval.118
The Dutch official set sail and made the brief  trip to Solor where 
the allied princes turned out to oppose the dispositions of  the Company 
in various ways. At Lamahala, he became suspicious when he found 
Portuguese, Makassarese and Florenese ships, but had no time to inves-
tigate their business with the VOC allies and see if  there was any illicit 
116 See for instance VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, ff. 194-221.
117 Tange 1689, H 49:v, KITLV, f. 9.
118 VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, sub 3-4-1681, 8-4-1681.
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trade involved. Armed Solorese detachments marched intermittently 
along the seashore and deterred the Dutch by shooting in their direc-
tion.119 Van Couwenhoven left Solor in a bad mood and finally arrived 
in Lifau on 2 May 1681. At the roadstead lay ships from Banten, Batavia 
and Makassar, all with official VOC permits to trade in these waters. 
The Dutch searched the beach for a house where they could stay during 
their wait for the precious wood, but with no success. Finally, they man-
aged to rent a ramshackle hut with large holes in the gewang roof  from 
the Makassarese who had stayed there. They soon found out that little 
could be done without the presence of  Hornay, and that several traders 
had attracted the attention of  the locals by offering better prices than the 
Company servants could do. Hornay himself  only arrived with his fleet 
forty days later, but even his presence did not bring Dutch difficulties to 
an end. In the meantime, some Company sailors had died; they were 
buried at the edge of  a forest so that their graves would not be desecrated 
by the Catholic-minded locals. The hands of  Van Couwenhoven turned 
lame so that he could hardly write his Dagregister – he was the only fully 
literate person in the crew. Nevertheless, Hornay was in a cheerful mood 
towards his Dutch guests and even paid a friendly visit to the frugal hut 
of  Van Couwenhoven. Trading was finally able to begin when Hornay 
ordered the local free traders to sell whatever sandalwood they had to the 
Company servants, against cloths at the standard VOC price. The last 
part of  the order aroused dissatisfaction among the purveyors, since that 
price was much less than they were used to.120 
Their Dutch rivals turned out to be just as annoying to the VOC ser-
vants as any other competitor. While commerce was in progress, the free 
trader Johannes de Hartogh arrived with two ships, without lowering his 
colours or firing a salute. At first Hornay was furious and barked at the 
Dutch representative, Van Couwenhoven: ‘Do you honour me so little 
that it is too much for you to lower your flag in my roadstead? Then I will 
have to withdraw my favours.’ The Dutch official managed to calm down 
the capitão mor, but he later had his own quarrel with De Hartogh who 
had not bothered to acquire a proper VOC permit to trade. De Hartogh 
came ashore with sixteen armed men and snapped at Van Couwenhoven 
that he would like to see who would stop him from selling his cloths. 
The two Dutchmen were nearly at each other’s throats when Hornay 
119 VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, sub 13-4-1681, 15-4-1681, 16-4-1681.
120 VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, sub 2-5-1681, 12-5-1681, 12-6-1681, 17-6-1681, 23-6-1681.
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intervened with the words, ‘this is a free roadstead for everyone, and I do 
not want a brawl for that reason.’ Two days later Van Couwenhoven saw 
to his great irritation how De Hartogh’s men carried a bass, violin and 
other instruments ashore and performed chamber music before Hornay 
to get him in a good mood. The following days, the strong-willed mer-
chant sold lots of  cheap guinea cloths while the pricier Company cloths 
remained unsold. Finally, the frustrated Van Couwenhoven set sail on 
30 July and arrived back in Kupang four days later, after an absence of  
more than four months.121 The trip had not been an unqualified success. 
The main commodity that the Dutch could offer the Topass community 
was cloth, but in this respect they were largely outsmarted by the traders 
from Macao. In spite of  numerous complaints about the arbitrary be-
haviour of  António Hornay, and the increasing difficulties experienced 
in acquiring enough sandalwood from the dwindling resources, the visits 
recurred year after year.
In 1668, when the Hornay-Da Costa rivalry was still in full swing, 
sandalwood was being transported to Goa, Macao, Vietnam, and Siam; 
from Siam it was brought via Tenasserim to the Coromandel Coast in 
South India (Coolhaas 1968:621-2). The main economic partner within 
the Estado da Índia was Macao, whose traders sold their cargoes to the 
Chinese of  the southern provinces. As the Dutch noted, ‘the Chinese 
cannot miss this wood, especially if  it consists of  large and fine pieces’.122 
After the loss of  the Manila market and above all the important trade 
with Japan (1639), the Crown monopoly on voyages from Macao ceased 
for some time. From 1672 until 1678, then, Macanese trade on Timor 
was perpetrated on behalf  of  the Royal Treasury of  Macao. However, 
the Estado da Índia soon realized that this new attempt at a monopoly 
aroused anger among the Topasses and Macanese alike. The provid-
ers on Timor would rather sell their sandalwood to the VOC under 
the conditions that the Estado tried to implement. Trade was therefore 
opened up to Macao merchants under a system called pauta-bague, which 
remained in place until 1784 (Souza 1986:170-1; Matos 1974a:176). In 
1689, Willem Tange noted that no royal ships went to Timor, but only 
private Macanese ones.123 That Timor was relatively important for the 
121 VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, sub 2-7-1681, 18-7-1681, 20-7-1681, 22-7-1681, 30-7-1681, 3-8-
1681.
122 Tange 1689, H 49:v, KITLV, f. 4.
123 Tange 1689, H 49:v, KITLV, f. 6.
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Macanese economy is also suggested by an enumeration in 1685. At that 
time the city dispatched ten ships, four of  which went to Goa and Diu, 
three to ports in the western part of  the archipelago, and three to Timor 
(Coolhaas 1971:760). The Macanese traders brought substantial quanti-
ties of  textiles to Timor, a commodity that was in great demand among 
the local elites (Coolhaas 1971:529). Ships from Goa are mentioned in 
the era of  Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, but later, such references be-
come very rare (Coolhaas 1968:582).
Tonkin in northern Vietnam was likewise an eager buyer; by this 
point it was governed with a steady hand by the Trinh family, who kept 
some trade open with the outside world. In Tonkin, Buddhism experi-
enced a renewal in the seventeenth century; this would have a created 
an atmosphere conducive to the increased production of  incense for 
religious purposes and hence, the import of  sandalwood. Another point 
was the importance of  ships from Siam, the Thai Kingdom of  Ayudhya. 
Siam was an economic semi-peripherical country in relation to China, 
but it was the centre of  a regional trading sphere of  some importance. 
The ships arriving in Timor were both Portuguese ones stationed in 
Siam, and indigenous ones, which were appearing in the sources from at 
least 1668. Occasionally there were also Larantuqueiros who sailed the 
Siam-Timor route.124 The king even dispatched ships to make the long 
and arduous route to Lifau, which seems to suggest an interest among 
the Thai elite in acquiring the precious wood.125 When the opperhoofd 
Arend Verhoeven visited Lifau in 1687, he noted that the ships lying at 
anchor at the roadstead included three Portuguese crafts from Macao, 
Batavia and ‘the coast’, and two ships from Siam. One of  the captains 
of  the Thai ships had a Christian name, the other a non-Western name 
(‘Pattasje Saara’).126 Trade could hardly have been described as compre-
hensive, although it was characterized as lucrative. Siam experienced a 
period of  openness towards the Western world during the reign of  king 
Narai (reign.1656-1688), which would have been advantageous to far-
flung trading connections. This policy was abruptly terminated by the 
revolution of  1688, which brought an end to much of  Siam’s contact 
with the outside. There are a couple of  references to trading relations 
with Siam during the first years after the revolution, but then they fade.
124 VOC 1403 (1684), f. 224. On Vietnam and Siam in a larger economic context, see Frank 1998:101-4.
125 VOC 1287 (1671), f. 1276b.
126 VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 19-6-1687.
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the ethnic dynamics of the topasses
By now, it should be clear that the answer as to how the Portuguese 
managed to maintain power in Timor for several hundred years is to 
be found in the dynamics of  the Topass group. With very little support 
from the central Portuguese colonial possessions, and with few Catholic 
priests to administer their spiritual needs, the Topasses were still success-
ful on a local basis, and displayed interesting dynamics. They clung to 
a Portuguese identity and expanded their area of  influence at the same 
time as the Estado da Índia was badly crippled by the VOC and through 
other factors. To understand how they were able to do so, it is necessary 
to look at ethnicity as a dynamic factor, and relate it to religion, political 
structure and the early colonial system.
The ethnic composition of  the Topass group was constantly changing, 
and this relates to ethnic perceptions prevalent in Southeast Asia up until 
fairly recent times. It goes without saying that the idea of  ‘belonging’ in 
ethnic terms was not perceived as it would be today. While a European-
born Portuguese would always take pride in his whiteness, there was no 
propagation of  a racial hierarchy based on intellectual, or indeed any oth-
er properties. It was therefore fully possible to alter one’s ethnic belonging 
(Ricklefs 2002:362). In line with this, people of  all skin colours were en-
titled to be part of  the Topass community. As we have seen, the founders 
of  the twin dynasties Hornay and Da Costa were North European and 
Filipino respectively, which itself  exemplifies both the breadth of  their 
ethnic origins and the possibilities for advancement regardless of  skin 
colour. This can be seen in the demographic reinforcement of  the Topass 
group during the seventeenth and early eighteenth century.
One such source of  reinforcement was, oddly enough, the VOC it-
self. The case of  Jan de Hornay has been already highlighted, but there 
were in fact many other defections from outposts and Company ships in 
the eastern archipelago. Such desertions took place both in times of  war 
(up until 1663) and peace (at least up until circa. 1750): in both cases 
the Portuguese usually provided a safe haven. It was a one-sided affair; 
it very seldom occurred that Portuguese soldiers and sailors absconded 
to the VOC, although dissatisfied Timorese clients of  Portugal some-
times did. Miserable conditions on the forts and ships were apparently 
conducive to Dutch defections, as was the natural anguish for a likely 
premature death. Malaria and other diseases took a terrible toll among 
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the Dutchmen in Kupang and on the South-Western Islands, which 
was in direct contrast with the Portuguese or Topasses, whose localized 
lifestyle potentially made them less vulnerable. The VOC records speak 
of  many attempts made by the authorities to rescue refugees from the 
Portuguese, usually without success. Even prisoners of  war often refused 
to return under the Dutch tricolour. For example, the opperhoofd Hugo 
Cuylenburgh appeared in Lifau in 1664, after the peace treaty had 
been concluded, demanding the restitution of  the prisoners that the 
Portuguese had taken. He got the discouraging answer that one of  the 
prisoners had recently died, while the other five had long since taken up 
Portuguese service. Cuylenburgh also demanded the goods belonging to 
another defector called Thielman, and asked to see the man. The mora-
dores of  Lifau replied that Thielman was not there. He had gone inland 
on Timor in order to obtain foodstuff  and cloths, which the inhabitants 
must do since conditions were scarce. Cuylenburgh had to withdraw 
without success, seeing no possible way to win the people over to his 
side.127 The story suggests that the mixed community, despite being 
politically dominant in the area, led a rather frugal existence. In spite of  
that, the defectors preferred to stay on in their company.
The informal and open aspect of  the Topass community is also 
underlined by the social position of  the White Portuguese who joined 
their ranks. A report from 1689 characterized the 50 or so whites on 
Lusitanian Timor as ‘penniless people and runaways’, implying that 
they were people somewhat on the margins of  society in Portuguese 
Asia.128 Another report from 1665 mentions prisoners from Cochin and 
Cannanore in India, who ended up in Lifau.129 Most of  these were pre-
sumably Indian Christians or people of  mixed blood, but regardless, it 
is apparent that those persons who the Estado da Índia wanted to be rid 
of, were sent to the Timor area. 
The locals who joined the Topass ranks became a separate group-
ing away from the majority of  the Timorese and Florenese population, 
which is also implied by the ethnonym kase metan, the black foreigners. 
The Spaniard Juan de la Camara, who visited Larantuka and Timor in 
1670, encountered the following situation:
127 VOC 1246 (1664), f. 1584.
128 Tange 1689, H 49:v, KITLV, f. 7. As seen above, another report from 1689 mentions 30 whites; in 
both cases their low number is accentuated.
129 VOC 2285 (1733), f. 200.
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In the month of  April of  this year we were taken to the island of  Timor. 
They are all heathen there. The principal part is dominated by people 
who, being natives of  the land, take the name of  the Portuguese since 
they are educated among them. The way that they sustain themselves us-
ing this land is by declaring war on the indigenous people, and by looking 
after those who are under their yoke, assisting them in the war against 
the others, and allowing them access to their land for sustenance, without 
caring about the rest. (Teixeira 1957:447.)
 
The domination of  the Timorese lands was thus highly indirect, and 
did not interfere with the traditional customs of  using the land. The 
account confirms what Willem Moerman wrote in 1689, namely that 
the local policing was done by people who were actually indigenous 
Timorese (and maybe Florenese). Still, they professed to be Portuguese, 
and were even educated as such. This is a point that is also stressed by a 
later visitor, the Englishman William Dampier, in 1699. In his view, the 
Portuguese of  Timor were so racially mixed that it was hard to distin-
guish whether they were Portuguese or ‘Indians’ (indigenous).
[T]ho’ they are ambitious to be called Portugueze, and value themselves 
on their Religion, yet most of  the Men and all the Women that live here, 
are Indians [indigenous]; and there are very few right Portugueze in any 
part of  the island. However, of  those that call themselves Portugueze, I 
was told there are some thousands; and I think their Strength consists 
more in their Numbers than in good Arms or Discipline […].
Their Language is Portugueze; and the Religion they have, is Romish. 
They seem in Words to acknowledge the king of  Portugal for their Sov-
ereign; yet they will not accept any Officers sent by him. The[y] speak 
indifferently Malayan and their own native Languages, as well as the Por-
tugueze; and their chiefest Officers that I saw, were of  this Sort; neither 
did I see above 3 or 4 white Men among them; and of  these, 2 were 
Priests. (Dampier 1939:164, 171-2.)
By joining the Topasses, the locals entered a military elite where profi-
ciency in the use of  muskets was a status marker. During the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, firearms became increasingly widespread on 
Timor and it would appear that they led to the disappearance of  tra-
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ditional weapons such as blowpipes, bows and even shields; however, 
in the seventeenth century there were still fascinating weapons whose 
circulation was closely restricted. The educational aspects were further-
reaching than military training; knowledge and even adoption of  the 
Portuguese language was one essential part of  the Lusitanization of  
the new ethnic elements. Orders and letters were issued by the Topass 
leaders in Portuguese and sent even to faraway princedoms inland.130 
Proficiency in this language was therefore necessary among the Topass 
functionaries. The upper elite occasionally learnt how to read and write. 
This was the case with two Amarasi princes, Dom António da Veiga and 
Dom Luís, who were both killed in a battle against the VOC allies in 
1679, and who were characterized by the Dutch as Topasses.131 Clothes 
were likewise a marker; there are very few illustrations preserved from 
the Timor area in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but Dutch 
archival sources suggest that a European-style dress was worn. For exam-
ple, three weeks after the abovementioned battle of  1679, the VOC allies 
found a dead soldier lying some distance from Kupang. He was immedi-
ately recognized as a Topass from his Portuguese clothes, and his shotgun 
which lay at his side.132 The standard dress was probably similar to the 
well-known illustration of  a ‘Topass’ or ‘Mardijker’ by Johan Nieuhof, 
who visited the East Indies between 1653 and 1670. This implied a thin, 
short jacket, long hanging trousers and a wide-brimmed hat – compare 
the Dutch nickname ‘hanging trousers’ (hangbroeken) for the Portuguese 
on Timor.133 Helmets of  a morion design were used and could be worn 
as status objects; one well-known example is the golden morion that is 
an heirloom of  the Sikka princedom, dating from 1607 or 1647.134 The 
adoption of  certain markers of  outward appearance in order to join an 
ethnic community is characteristic for Southeast Asia, and finds parallels 
in some early European societies.
130 Especially, one can refer here to the several letters issued by the later Topass lord Gaspar da Costa 
in the 1730s and 1740s and preserved in the small inland princedom of  Maucatar as valued heirlooms. 
They are now kept in Leiden (Stukken n.y., H 693, KITLV).
131 VOC 1358 (1679-80), Dagregister, sub 30-10-1679, 4-12-1679.
132 VOC 1358 (1679-80), Dagregister, sub 21-11-1679.
133 Nieuhof  1988, between pages 278-9.
134 Fox 1991b:31. The iron helmet of  a Topass leader, probably also a morion, was reportedly captured 
by the VOC troops at the Battle of  Penfui in 1749, and kept as a trophy for many years (Müller 1857, 
II:116).
A Topass or mardijker with his family. Illustration made from a 
sketch by the traveller Johan Nieuhof  (1618-1672), published in 
Voyages and travels into Brazil and the East-Indies, 1640-1649 (1732).
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The foreignness of  the Timorese-born Topasses in a native context 
is accentuated by their disregard for aspects of  the adat. In 1693, the 
Helong prince, Korang, who had been staying in Amarasi for many 
years, returned to his native Kupang, leaving the Portuguese sphere for 
that belonging to the Dutch. However, to set things straight he then re-
solved to again pay a visit to Amarasi with a sizeable Helong embassy, 
and to parley with the king. On the way to the king of  Amarasi he ar-
rived at the negeri Amatiran, whose inhabitants shouted and threatened 
him with their weapons. The prince approached the chief  of  the negeri 
and explained his intent; he also gave the chief  a silver disc to calm down 
his subjects. Korang was then invited to stay overnight in Amatiran, 
which he accepted. The next morning, however, the brother of  the king 
of  Amarasi, Dom Francisco, approached the settlement with his retinue. 
Although a prince, he was ‘the captain of  the Portuguese Topasses’. He 
looked at the Helong prince and sternly asked who had allowed him to 
come here from Kupang. Korang began to explain that he had come in 
peace, but Dom Francisco interrupted by driving his assegai through the 
chest of  the prince, and proceeded to kill most of  his retinue. This behav-
iour was clearly shocking to the Timorese, since the lives of  the envoys 
were protected according to Timorese custom. Thus Dom Francisco 
violated indigenous codes of  conduct in spite of  being the brother of  the 
king, apparently acting according to the wishes of  the Topass leader.135
The fluent ethnicity of  the Topasses can be related to another ele-
ment of  Topass identity: religion. More so even than blood, religion 
would seem to have been an identity marker. One is reminded that the 
very word ‘ethnic’ in early modern European dictionaries referred to a 
pagan, non-Christian concept, rather than a notion to do with racial 
origins and material culture (Kidd 2004:261). The great influence of  
the Dominicans among the local Portuguese group has already been 
noted. Franciscans likewise stayed in the region from time to time, but 
the Dominicans were generally opposed to sharing their field with oth-
ers (Meersman 1967:145-54). However, after the rise of  Hornay and 
Da Costa in the 1660s they appear more restricted to their religious 
roles than before, a pattern that would once again change in the early 
eighteenth century. António Hornay’s attitude towards the priests was 
ambivalent. Before the Dutch he sometimes emphasized the Catholic 
135 VOC 1531 (1692-93), Dagregister, sub 24-12-1692; VOC 1553 (1693-94), Dagregister, sub 8-12-1693.
196
| Lords of  the land, lords of  the sea
identity of  the Portuguese community; thus it was out of  the question to 
extradite VOC deserters to the Kupang authorities if  they had already 
converted to the papal creed. In such situations, Hornay would defer to 
the great authority of  the padres whom he did not dare to go against, 
yet he could also behave in a brutal and arrogant way against individual 
priests. In 1668 Hornay settled a score with some padres in the Florenese 
villages of  Lewonama and Gege with whom he bore a grudge. He reso-
lutely went there with two Portuguese and a number of  armed villagers 
to attack the hapless clerics. It also appears that the priests would some-
times meet with pronounced disrespect if  they ventured to denounce 
what they conceived as moral laxity among the locals (Visser 1934:159; 
Meersman 1967:179). 
The process of  joining the Topass ranks naturally required one 
to be baptized, but according to a Jesuit report this was facilitated by 
certain parallels between Christianity and the traditional religion. Pater 
Antonius Franciscus pointed out in 1670 that ‘apart from all the quali-
ties that the natives possess, there is particularly one that the Timorese 
have, namely that they do not acknowledge or worship anyone but the 
God of  Heaven. They identify him as the creator of  heaven and earth; 
thence almost all wish to be Christian. May the Lord himself  support 
them and help me to serve Him’ (Jacobs 1988:248). The statement refers 
to the deity that is known among the Atoni as Uis Neno, which indeed 
means lord of  heaven. Unlike what the Jesuit pater asserts, however, Uis 
Neno is not a monotheistic god, but rather, the supreme godhead among 
other supernatural beings. Uis Neno could serve the missionaries as a 
point of  reference when adapting or translating Christianity in a way 
understandable to the local mind. At the same time, the small number 
of  padres on Flores and Timor ensured that local belief  customs were 
not overly disturbed by baptism. Juan de la Camara in 1670 complained 
that the church service was restricted to Lifau, Amanuban and two or 
three other places, and that Christians generally lived like pagans (Visser 
1934:159). In spite of  this critical remark, it is clear that Catholic sym-
bolism remained important on the island, not only among the Topasses, 
but also among the various princedoms affected by the Portuguese. This 
symbolism was tied up with the image of  Portuguese kingship in spite of  
its obvious distance.
This observation leads us neatly to the role politics played on Timor 
in the period under scrutiny. The king of  Portugal may have been the 
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revered overlord, but a Topass dynastic dynamic evolved in the second 
half  of  the seventeenth century, where the Hornay and Da Costa fami-
lies henceforth monopolized leadership of  the community. The genealo-
gies of  the two families remain insufficiently known, but it is certain that 
they intermarried after circa 1700 and that relations by that time became 
quite convoluted. Later still, at least from the second half  of  the eigh-
teenth century, the twin dynasties intermarried with the royal family of  
Ambeno, which further confirmed their inclusion into the local Timorese 
elite. By the eighteenth century, the sources begin to attribute occasional 
princely nomenclature to the Topass leaders; thus the son of  Matheus 
da Costa, Domingos da Costa (d.1722), was characterized as ‘the black 
prince’ (Pinnell 1781:55).
Regarding the turbulent politics of  the Timorese domains with their 
frequent inner crises and defections, the Topasses appear as a relatively 
stable group. In spite of  their ethnic diversity, they were able to achieve 
a degree of  inner solidarity. In the prevalent literature on Timor the 
Hornays and Da Costas are sometimes described as rival families, but 
this is not quite borne out by the contemporary documents. After 1666 
there are few, and only very brief, instances of  Hornay-Da Costa clashes 
that we know of. The establishment of  the Estado da Índia on Timor in 
1702, which was detrimental to Topass interests, seems to have helped 
them bond as a coherent group.
In sum, the Topass community, in spite of  its darker aspects such as 
arbitrary behaviour towards local societies, constitutes a fairly successful 
case of  identity-formation among a congregation forged by manifold 
ethnic elements and unique economic and political opportunities. From 
an early stage, in the seventeenth century, it was the sole Portuguese ex-
ecutive authority on the islands, which made its inclusion in an imagined 
Portuguese nation unproblematic. It was a community that both was 
and was not ‘colonial’ in character, and it was decidedly less so after the 
dramatic events of  1702. The foundations of  Topass authority on Timor 
and Flores would be reversed with the coming of  the Estado da Índia 
less than a decade after the death of  its great architect, António Hornay.

6
Kupang and the fi ve loyal allies, 1658-1700s
the formation of the five allies
The Dutch post in Kupang was typical of  the fortified trading offices that 
dotted the map of  maritime Southeast Asia. It was a coastal stronghold 
situated by a river, which had an inter-dependent relationship with the 
local inhabitants populating the hinterland. A fortress strong enough to 
deter local adversaries housed a rudimentary administration staff  that 
attempted to follow the statutes and orders from Batavia as well as it 
could, considering the limited resources available. The commander, or 
opperhoofd, headed a council consisting of  four trusted Dutchmen, and 
managed both the administrative and purely commercial affairs. The 
commercial side of  his duties was accentuated by the fact that along with 
his position as opperhoofd, he was also onderkoopman (under-merchant). The 
opperhoofden were normally appointed by Batavia, and for the most part 
were people with no previous experience of  Timor. However, mortality 
rates were high at this distant post as there were illnesses from which the 
Dutchmen were unable to protect themselves. Many opperhoofden died in 
office after a few years or even months, and were succeeded by a locally 
residing Dutchman, the second in command, on a temporary basis. All 
this did little to foster continuity in Fort Concordia, whose soldiers could 
usually be counted in numbers of  two digits. Rather, such continuity 
would be found among the allied princes on Timor and Solor.
In line with the usual lines of  development for VOC offices, a small 
settlement slowly evolved around Fort Concordia, which hardly seemed 
to merit the name ‘town’ until late in the eighteenth century. The settle-
ment was not predominantly a European affair, or at least, not a ‘white’ 
one. In the early decades of  the Kupang post there were small congrega-
tions from the allied islands of  Rote and Solor. European soldiers and 
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sailors who had ended their service would sometimes obtain a permit 
allowing them to settle as free burghers and make use of  the limited trad-
ing opportunities. Timorese were occasionally included as free people 
or slaves. The ethnic picture will be discussed more fully in the next 
chapter. Interestingly, there was some minor trading activity by Timorese 
aristocrats from the allied princedoms. A few princes even owned ships 
and plied the waters for trade between Kupang and Pulau Semau, Rote, 
and the Solor and Alor groups. They used mixed Solorese and Timorese 
crews, the former having a reputation as good seamen, something which 
evidently does not endorse the commonly received notion that the 
Timorese always avoided the sea.1
From Batavia’s viewpoint, Kupang was definitely not a place that 
was financially viable. The financial accounts for the Company, which 
are noted year by year in the documents, almost always indicate a loss in 
the course of  the VOC period. The sums involved, however, were very 
modest in relation to other eastern posts like Banda and Ambon, the 
deficit usually being several thousand guilders, but sometimes more than 
10,000. In spite of  the interest in sandalwood, the actual volume of  trade 
was hardly sufficient to hold the attention of  Batavia and Amsterdam 
and thus make them maintain the small and unprofitable post; neither 
were the doubtful ersatz commodities, beeswax and slaves. Rather, there 
were strategic aspects at play. As argued by Governor General Joan 
Maetsuyker in 1659, Kupang must be kept because of  its proximity 
to the more valuable islands of  Banda and Ambon. Another professed 
reason was that only a Dutch stronghold could prevent the Portuguese 
from overrunning the VOC allies in the area (Coolhaas 1968:255; Van 
Dam 1931:258).
Dutch outposts usually depended upon agreements and contracts 
forged with local polities in the hinterland. These could be compara-
tively strong sultanates like Palembang on Sumatra or Banjarmasin on 
Kalimantan, or perhaps a system of  medium- or small-sized kingdoms 
like those in South Sulawesi, close to the Makassar trading post. Yet an-
other possibility was that the inhabitants of  the hinterland had formed 
tribal communities or chiefdoms, which would normally mean a low-
technology and illiterate society. Examples of  this were the Minahasa in 
1 VOC 1375 (1681-82), Dagregister, sub 26-9-1681; VOC 2133 (1729), Resolutions, sub 2-11-1728. 
A ship owned by the Sonbai regent Nai Sau in 1728 was manned by eight Timorese and six Solorese. 
Small-scale shipping is also mentioned in relation to the Helong people of  Kupang.
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North Sulawesi, and part of  Taiwan. The Timor example lies somewhere 
between these two types: a system of  polities exhibiting certain features 
of  early states, but lacking the characteristics of  the more sophisticated 
Muslim and Hindu states elsewhere in the archipelago. 
For the allies around Kupang, ‘the Company’ was a concept that 
remained long after the VOC was formally dissolved in 1799-1800. Up 
until the early twentieth century, Timorese stories would refer to the 
Dutch colonizers as Mother and Father Company. The idea that the VOC 
was the mother and father of  its allies, is found in documents that were 
written as early as the seventeenth century.2 While the contracts them-
selves were quickly forgotten, the acknowledgement of  the polities as 
subordinate allies was keenly remembered up to the twentieth century 
in words that at least vaguely referred to historical events. Individual 
opperhoofden were also forgotten by posterity with just a few exceptions, 
and the VOC was referred to in just the same way as any other dynastic 
polity – Sonbai, Kono, Takaip, et cetera. In other words, the VOC was 
set in a vague, de-historicized past, where the concept of  the Company 
included the totality of  the successive opperhoofden and their followers, 
who in turn represented a Batavian kingship of  sorts. The allies used the 
Dawan term usif when referring to the VOC. Documents from the VOC 
period reveal that the Governor General and his council in Batavia were 
a main point of  reference, and seemingly above criticism, in contrast 
with the individual opperhoofden. In their relations with the Timorese, the 
local Dutch officials sometimes referred to the Prince of  Orange as the 
ultimate symbol of  authority, but the latter remained a vague figure, 
nothing remotely comparable to His Catholic Majesty in the Portuguese 
sphere. Nevertheless, a stranger king was precisely what the Company 
was – an arbiter of  power whose foreignness was an asset rather than a 
problem in its efforts to mediate between the local princedoms.
By 1658, there were three allies inhabiting the modest Dutch coastal 
strip: Kupang (the Helong princedom), Lesser Sonbai and Amabi, 
whose populations lived a far from affluent existence based on animal 
husbandry and slash-and-burn agriculture. Showing perhaps conscious 
disregard to traditional concepts of  hierarchy, they were ranked after the 
date upon which they concluded an alliance with the Company. In that 
way Kupang held the first place. On the other hand, the king of  Kupang 
2 VOC 1414 (1685), f. 157.
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was the original lord of  the land (Touwang Tana off  heer van ‘t land), with 
some parallels to the Kune lord of  the original Sonbai lands.3 He had 
freely received first the Company and then the other allies, and even 
gave a princess in marriage to two Dutch employees in succession.4 
Sonbai and Amabi allied simultaneously, but Sonbai was seen as more 
important, probably since it enjoyed the greatest resources of  the two. 
In general, Amabi does not appear as a particularly active political pro-
tagonist; it tended to follow Sonbai in most issues and seldom created any 
problems for the Dutch administration.5 
The Helong princedom, on the other hand, often caused headaches 
for the opperhoofden. Like most Timorese domains it had an immobile king 
and an active regent at the top, but the two positions were constantly 
wracked by succession disputes up until the early twentieth century. The 
old Ama Pono dynasty was mostly headed by minors after 1660, and died 
out in 1731. New branches ascended the throne in 1733, 1760, the early 
nineteenth century, 1858, with regular intervals in the late nineteenth 
century, and finally in 1908, before the Dutch authorities abolished king-
ship in 1917. Every dynastic change was accompanied by squabbling 
between rival branches and attempts to convince the Dutch arbiter of  
their rights. In the late colonial period the colonial officials would compile 
extensive pedigrees and check local adat before making judicious decisions 
on such inflammatory issues. During the VOC period, however, such 
information was only acquired piecemeal by the authorities, and the data 
contained all the traps of  oral tradition. The records show the difficulties 
the Dutch had in grasping the dynastic picture, and how they sometimes 
accepted patently incorrect versions of  history.6 Nevertheless, the Dutch 
almost always managed to stop the conflicts from turning violent.
3 VOC 2991 (1760), Resolutions, sub 26-1-1760.
4 This was Pieternella (d. after 1714), a daughter of  King Ama Pono II (d.1660), the king who first 
received the newcomers. She was married first to Thomas Jacobsz, and later to Floris Jansz. 
5 Part of  the Amabi population remained in the Portuguese sphere, around the negeri Oefeto, and 
were considered to fall under the king of  Amarasi. They had occasional contact with their compatriots in 
Kupang (VOC 1437 [1687], f. 313). An oral tradition recorded in 1948 says that Amabi originally con-
sisted of  two tribes under two brothers. After being defeated by the Oematan clan and Amanuban, they 
moved from Mollo to the west. One group headed by chief  Loe Mananu settled south of  the Siki River 
and founded the Amabi-Oefeto domain, while the other proceeded to Kupang where they received land 
(Nota van toelichting 1948, H 1025, KITLV). In this tradition the Portuguese impact has been phased out 
of  the story.
6 See especially VOC 2991 (1760), Resolutions, sub 9-4-1760, where an incorrect version was 
brought forward by the rival Pulau Semau branch in order to dispute the legitimacy of  the then king 
Karel Buni.
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The reputation of  the Helong was not the best among the Dutch of-
ficials, and they were perceived as quarrelsome people. When the refugees 
from Sonbai and Amabi arrived in 1658 they appear to have settled down 
unopposed, and the Helong very likely understood that this new source of  
manpower could guard the area from the Portuguese clients in a way that 
they could not do themselves. During the VOC period, both the Dutch 
and the Portuguese acknowledged that the Kingdom of  Kupang fell un-
der Dutch jurisdiction. No formal usurpation of  territory had therefore 
taken place, but rather, a functional relationship developed between an 
original insider lord and a new stranger lord, the latter of  which had 
supervised the settlement of  immigrant groups. The Timorese tradition 
of  usufruct was decisive here: the Helong were few in numbers, while the 
Sonbai and Amabi groups numbered many thousands. The newcomers 
started cultivating the available plots of  land, as the size of  the land was 
sufficient, although not too fertile. Although they did occur, land rights 
were seldom an issue in the VOC documents; wielding power over the 
people was more important.7 That relations were far from friendly be-
tween the Helong and the newcomers is nevertheless apparent from time 
to time, with the Helong believing that they should have earned privileges 
as the original residents. In the early years of  Fort Concordia they were 
unwilling to contribute to the construction work, which they considered 
to be the responsibility of  the new Atoni immigrants. One of  the main 
duties of  the Helong themselves vis-à-vis the Dutch was to deliver pigs to 
the fort at a fixed price. In the early nineteenth century, it was the duty 
of  the Helong king to check that every household kept at least three pigs 
and 30 hens to be sold to the Dutch if  needed. For the same reason, every 
household had to plant 25 coconut trees.8
For years, the Kupang princedom had a relationship with Amabesi 
which seems to have been centred on Kreba to the south of  the settlement. 
In the mid-seventeenth century, relations vacillated between friendship 
and enmity, but this changed in 1653, when the entire Amabesi popula-
tion moved to Kupang and relations became more friendly. Members of  
7 In the late colonial period, B.A.G. Vroklage (1953, I:21-2) did an anthropological study in Belu, 
which was less influenced by European administration. He found that land was attributed to those who 
cultivated it, or more precisely, to the ancestors of  these cultivators. Similar concepts prevailed in Por-
tuguese Timor before the onset of  true colonial rule (Davidson 1994:127). Land issues in Kupang occur 
in the documents in the second half  of  the eighteenth century, but more in connection with European 
demands than between the various princes.
8 Timor 1824, Collection Schneither, Nationaal Archief.
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this group settled partly on mainland Timor, and partly in a village on 
Pulau Semau, an island that was mostly used by the Dutch as a source for 
wood. The ethnic mix was not entirely happy, at least at the level of  the 
elites. The Amabesi leader, known as Ama Manis or just Ama Besi, had 
pretensions to power that were incompatible with those of  the Helong 
king and his executive regent, which soon made for serious conflict.
Sonbai was regarded as the most important VOC ally, although it 
was only the second in rank, since it had allied with the VOC after the 
Helong princedom of  Kupang. Sonbai was, however, strongest in terms 
of  manpower and was considered to be the most warlike congregation 
in Kupang. The Sonbai settled down at a number of  places outside Fort 
Concordia.9 A later enumeration of  settlements from 1832 listed ten 
temukung who lorded over places that were named ‘Miomaffo’, ‘Mollo’ or 
‘Nai Bait’ (Manubait) – actually names of  parts of  the Greater Sonbai 
realm.10 That probably means that the settlement structure of  the im-
migrants followed their areas of  origin inland. The rulers’ residence was 
initially situated on a peak to the east of  Kupang, close to Oeba, which 
was known as the Rock of  Sonbai. Much later, around 1740, the Sonbai 
ruler moved his sonaf to Bakunase on the top of  the hill south of  Kupang, 
where his descendants still reside. The polity was in effect led by Ama 
Tomananu from its establishment in 1658 until Tomananu’s death in 
1685, and then by his kinsmen in the Oematan family. After his death 
there were usually two regents, one senior and one junior, in accordance 
with the structural principles of  the Atoni domains. At the beginning, the 
individual regents could shift their position from junior to senior, but dur-
ing the late colonial period the two positions were fixed to two branches 
of  the family, Saubaki and Loewis.11 To complicate matters further, the 
regents were sometimes considered as mere caretakers for the adolescent 
9 A note from 1736 included the Sonbai district of  Fatuleu, east of  Kupang Bay, as part of  the sphere 
falling under the Company’s control (VOC 2883 [1736], f. 141). This was probably no more than a weak 
claim. The true area of  the Lesser Sonbai settlement was limited to scattered places within the sespalen 
gebied.
10 Francis 1832, H 548, KITLV. The ten temukung lorded over seven settlements, of  which four were 
Mollo, two Miomaffo, and one Manubait. The preponderance of  Mollo settlements is not surprising 
since the Oematan, the family to which the executive regents of  Lesser Sonbai belonged, were associ-
ated with Mollo. The Manubait settlement might have arisen as a consequence of  the coming of  the 
Manubait lord and his followers to Kupang in 1711.
11 The Saubaki family today claims to belong to another family than Oematan, but VOC records are 
quite explicit on this point (interview, Marthen Saubaki, Kupang, 6-2-2005). The Loewis family appears 
to have lapsed into complete obscurity, and I was unable to trace its whereabouts during my visits to 
Kupang.
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heirs of  a former regent. For example, Ama Tomananu’s son Ama Babu 
governed as second regent until his death in 1700, when he was in turn 
succeeded by a brother called Nai Sau. When the senior regent, Ama 
Baki, died in 1708, Nai Sau took over his position, and left the junior post 
to a kinsman called Domingo. The two regents were then in charge until 
1739, when they both passed away. In their place, a senior regent called 
Sau Baki, who had actually been the right heir during the long tenure of  
the predecessor, was appointed. In spite of  this intricate system of  gov-
ernance, there is very little evidence of  serious internal divisions among 
the Oematan. Relations between these regents and the Dutch authorities 
were usually constructive, if  not always cordial. Long-serving figures like 
Ama Tomananu and Nai Sau governed for several decades and served as 
trusted advisors to the opperhoofden, inducing a sense of  continuity when it 
came to handling affairs in colonial Kupang, where the white man usu-
ally did not live until old age. 
There would be no Sonbai without Sonbai royalty. As symbolic am-
munition, Ama Tomananu brought members of  the Sonbai dynasty to 
Kupang in 1658. Foremost among them was the junior king, who was 
obviously the son of  the old captive emperor, Ama Tuan. In the eco-
nomic system that the Company tried to cultivate, the Sonbai and Amabi 
were expected to collect and deliver sandalwood in spite of  the unstable 
conditions outside Kupang. The Dutch appetite for the precious wood 
soon cost the life of  the prince: when he led a party to the area east of  
the fort to collect the sandalwood in 1659, his party was attacked by the 
Amarasi and he was violently killed.
The Sonbai mourned him by tearing their clothes and cropping their 
hair. Since the body of  the junior king was kept by the enemy, they had to 
bury a piece of  wood instead, dressing it in his own clothes and adorning 
it with valuables.12 In his place, a younger son of  Ama Tuan I was made 
the symbolic head of  the Lesser Sonbai community. He was likewise 
known by the name or title Ama Tuan II, but was an anonymous figure 
who passed away in 1672, leaving few traces in the official records.13 
The VOC records are more detailed regarding his successor, who was 
actually a female ruler, an empress (keizerin) in Dutch parlance. Ama 
Tuan II had three daughters, the eldest of  which, Usi Tetu Utang or Bi 
12 VOC 1229 (1659), ff. 862a-863b.
13 VOC 1294 (1673), f. 307a. In later tradition he was called Nai Utang, Baki, or Nisnoni – possibly 
due to confusion with a later royal refugee called Nisnoni, mentioned in 1748 (VOC 8341 [1748], f. 8).
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Sonbai, would head the kingdom-in-exile until her death in 1717 at the 
age of  51. Female rulers are not uncommon in Timorese history, either 
as widows or as monarchs in their own right. They were probably not 
acceptable as executive ‘male’ regents (there is in any case no evidence 
for this in the sources), but as inactive, notional ‘female’ rulers they could 
be appointed when there were no male relatives (Pelon 2002:36; Castro 
1862:478). Bi Sonbai normally adhered to the passive role assigned to 
her by Timorese adat and Dutch policy, but on a few occasions she acted 
as a peace broker and a stern critic of  Dutch abuses – in both capacities 
with some success. Her exalted position apparently made her unfit for 
marriage, which was otherwise a universal institution in the social world 
of  Timor. Her death therefore necessitated an exchange with the Greater 
Sonbai group in the Portuguese sphere in order to find suitable princes, a 
gesture that seemed to be in complete opposition to the colonial division.
The VOC gained a fourth ally in 1683. This was a minor part of  
the Amfoan group that inhabited the land of  Sorbian-Servião on the 
north coast. Some sources suggest that ‘Amfoan’ and ‘Sorbian’ are inter-
changeable concepts, but in fact it appears that the former is originally 
a dynastic term, while the latter is a geographical term. Amfoan had a 
close relationship to Sonbai, and its king was described as the brother of  
the Sonbai lord in a document from 1665, perhaps meaning no more 
than a perceived relative.14 Later oral stories mention a conflict between 
two royal brothers over a woman. When the elder brother went to visit 
Kupang, the younger brother seized his prospective bride. A battle en-
sued in which the younger brother was victorious; he then went on to 
rule most of  the land, known as Timau. The elder brother had to be 
content with a small settlement on the coast called Naikliu (H.G. Schulte 
Nordholt 1971:315). The story can be checked against VOC records, 
which confirm that the division arose because of  fraternal strife. On 16 
August 1683, Prince Nai Toas appeared in Kupang with 154 followers 
and requested asylum, explaining that he was the brother and regent 
of  the king of  Amfoan. Thanks to his good and fortuitous governance 
he came to be held in higher esteem among the subjects than the king 
himself. When the king became aware of  this, he tried to capture Nai 
Toas in order to put an end to his career, and the prince was forced to 
flee for his life. At a general meeting, the Dutch opperhoofd noted that Nai 
14 VOC 1252 (1665), f. 677.
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Toas was accorded great honours by the allied regents, in particular by 
Ama Tomananu of  Sonbai. In this period the Company was not averse 
to strengthening the manpower of  the allied Timorese by accepting 
refugees from the Portuguese sphere. They therefore let Nai Toas and 
his people stay. Nai Toas speculated that his other subjects, some 1,000 
people, would follow when they heard about the positive reception given 
to him.15 This did not happen, and the VOC-allied Amfoan community 
remained relatively small, settling at Oesapa, east of  Kupang – there is 
no mention of  Naikliu in the early sources.16 To the Dutch understand-
ing, this ‘nation’ was also a kind of  Sonbai, but with their own ruler.
As in the case of  Sonbai and Amabi, there was therefore a division 
between a Portuguese-affiliated group that remained in the old home-
land, and a splinter group that migrated to Kupang. In a Timor-wide 
context, such splinter movements were common, due to internal con-
flicts, colonial pressure, collisions between means of  livelihood, et cetera. 
The relationship between the two Amfoan groups was rather ambiguous. 
The junior line in Oesapa sometimes referred to the old Amfoan land 
as its property, but this was little more than a pretension. The Dutch, for 
their part, anxious not to antagonize the Portuguese, made no forays in 
this direction until much later in the 1740s. 
The fifth and last of  the five loyal allies was Taebenu, which is some-
times confused with Ambeno. Like Amfoan, this group originally settled 
in Sorbian. The leaders held the status of  siko, ‘executive regents’, in 
their land. In an interview with the Dutch opperhoofd Willem Moerman in 
1693, the aristocrats of  Taebenu explained aspects of  their own history. 
Half  a century before, in the 1640s, their land was conquered by Sonbai, 
and they moved to the land of  Amarasi. Around 1660, the Sonbai again 
abandoned Sorbian, clearly as a consequence of  the Portuguese on-
slaught. Subsequently, the Taebenu regained possession of  the territory 
they had once lost. They were still dependent on Amarasi, however, and 
spent much time there. One of  the Taebenu princes married a relative of  
the Amarasi ruler, who also made the aristocracy swear a blood oath to 
the Portuguese. They also had to agree to make periodic sandalwood de-
liveries to the Portuguese.17 As early as the 1670s, they made overtures 
15 VOC 1385 (1683), f. 439.
16 In nineteenth-century sources, the king stayed for much of  his time in a residence in Maniki, also 
situated some distance to the east of  Kupang.
17 VOC 1535 (1693), n.p.
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to the Company, and some Taebenu aristocrats visited Kupang along 
with a large retinue.18
Tradition holds that the Taebenu moved to Kupang after a conflict 
with neighbours over a cattle theft. Interestingly, this detail is confirmed 
by VOC records. In 1686, a party of  Taebenu was hunting buffaloes 
when they encountered some Topasses and their Timorese clients. A 
fight ensued, probably over the ownership of  the buffalo, and some 
Taebenu were killed. King António II of  Amarasi and the Portuguese 
leader António Hornay tried to settle the conflict by offering golden discs 
as compensation, but the attempt at mediation failed.19 The Taebenu 
royalty had already maintained close but clandestine contacts with the 
VOC for some years, and part of  the domain now opted for migration 
to Kupang. In 1688, hundreds of  Taebenu under the regent Tanof  ar-
rived in the Dutch area of  influence, where they were allowed to stay. 
Meanwhile, another part of  the congregation, under Tanof ’s nephew 
Manaffo, moved to his in-laws in Amarasi. These two exoduses virtu-
ally depopulated the land of  Sorbian. Tanof  and his temukung officially 
declared Sorbian to henceforth belong to the Company.
There were indeed reasons for the VOC to desire Sorbian. The east-
ern side of  Kupang Bay lay close to this territory, where the most usable 
sandalwood was to be found. If  the area could be secured, the wood 
could easily be brought down to the bay and loaded onto Company ships 
during the west monsoon. Nevertheless, this gesture was as empty as that 
of  Amfoan: the small VOC post had no means to penetrate the rather 
inaccessible lands to the north-east of  Kupang Bay, and the allies proved 
unwilling to take the risk.
As it was, the Taebenu were officially confirmed as ‘friends’ of  the 
Company in 1694. They mostly resided at Baumata outside Kupang, 
but also restored ravaged crop fields in the Faffome area. Together with 
other VOC allies, some Taebenu settled at the Maniki River, where 
they built settlements and gardens, which, however, were destroyed by 
Portuguese incursions. The Taebenu royalty was considered to have 
Sonbai origins, but in spite of  that, an atmosphere of  bitterness existed 
18 VOC1346 (1678-79), Dagregister, sub 28-10-1678.
19 Müller 1857, II:203-4; VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 13-9-1686.
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between Taebenu and Sonbai.20 The king of  Taebenu was expected to 
perform ritual submission before the Sonbai ruler but bluntly refused to 
do so, in contrast with the more complaisant king of  Amfoan, who saw 
the Helong kingdom of  Kupang as a friend and ally, possibly for histori-
cal reasons.21 The Dutch perceptively noted this latent conflict, which 
served a divide et impera purpose: Kupang and Taebenu were a counter-
weight to the two stronger princedoms of  Sonbai and Amabi.
Therefore, by the late 1680s, a system had evolved whereby Fort 
Concordia was surrounded by five allies who functioned as a loyal cordon 
sanitaire against the Portuguese clients. The allies’ land was surrounded by 
hostile Portuguese clients, in particular Amarasi, and a low-scale state of  
warfare prevailed from the 1650s until the demise of  the Topass system 
in the mid-eighteenth century. The weak Dutch garrison did not engage 
in the hostilities, and the Portuguese clients for their part claimed to 
live in peace with the Company, in spite of  the latter being the suzerain 
of  the five allies. It was a contradictory and fragile situation, especially 
since the peace between the United Provinces and Portugal was not to be 
disturbed. For the five allies, the tiny Dutch fort was nevertheless a guar-
antee for their survival, and their basic loyalty to the Mother and Father 
Company would last as long as the period of  colonialism.
the pattern of warfare
The pattern of  Timorese warfare, which was typically a low-scale affair, 
is clearly set out by the Dagregisters. At the end of  the seventeenth century, 
the five allies could muster as many as 8,000-10,000 able-bodied men 
with more than 200 muskets and pistols for defence, but such large gath-
erings of  people only occurred in times of  the utmost danger.22 Led by 
their meo, parties of  warriors from one or several of  the five allies would 
set out in the direction of  Amarasi, with or without the approval of  the 
20 The idea of  a Sonbai connection is also found in certain later traditions. According to a story 
rendered in a Dutch memorandum from 1912, the Taebenu group originated from the Oematan of  
Gunung Mollo and was later established in Lelogama in Amfoan. Due to disputes the group moved to 
Kupang, and its old territory was occupied by the Anpupu Po U tribe from Pitai (Memorie van het eiland 
Timor 1912:46, KIT 1272, Nationaal Archief).
21 One is reminded that the grandfather of  Tanof  had allied himself  with Kupang against Amabi, and 
subsequently ceded the area east of  Kupang Bay to the king of  Kupang as a reward for his assistance 
(VOC 1535 [1693], n.p.).
22 VOC 1579, ff. 3-4.
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opperhoofd. If  they were lucky, they would trap a small group of  adversar-
ies and take as many heads as possible. If  they were less fortunate, they 
would encounter determined resistance and would have to flee the field 
with losses of  their own. If  they managed to bring a number of  heads to 
Kupang they would be cheerfully received, and the heads would be made 
the centre-pieces of  a ritual feast. An early account of  victorious head-
hunting champions was penned by the VOC commissioner Paravicini 
in 1756. A party of  VOC allies came back from the inland in triumph,
all cheering and jumping, carrying two severed enemy heads of  so-called 
orang berani [meo] on long pikes, which were brought to the dwelling of  His 
Excellency. There [the regent] Don Bastian picked the aforementioned 
heads and offered them to the commissioner with deep reverence and 
a dignified speech, as proof  of  the bravery and valiant character [of  his 
men]. However, the heads were a grisly sight and His Excellency refused 
to receive them. They were therefore impaled again. A ring [of  people] 
was formed around them, and they sang and danced and made several 
fearsome and threatening gestures with their bodies and swords against 
[the heads]. All these warriors were very beautifully adorned in their way. 
On their head they had a white linen cloth instead of  a handkerchief, 
adorned at the top with peacock feathers, and on their feet they had 
bound small silver bells which […] caused a not unpleasant sound.23
Thus the Company was part of  the ritual of  headhunting, whether it 
wanted to be or not. After a raid, the allied regents invariably occurred 
at the opperhoofd’s residence and reported back details about the enter-
prise, stating how many heads had been taken or lost. If  successful, they 
would ask the Dutch for arrack, a highly appreciated drink among the 
Timorese. There is almost no evidence that the Dutch officials tried to 
prevent the custom, which is stoically reported in the Dagregisters without 
sign of  either approval or disapproval. At the most they tried to stop 
the worst excesses, since women and children were often targeted in the 
raids. In a letter to Batavia dictated by the regents in 1682, we read: 
‘Meanwhile, Your Excellencies [the Governor General and his council] 
have [ordered] that henceforth neither children nor women are to be 
killed when the fury of  war happens, which is the Dutch manner; that, 
23 VOC 2941 (1756), f. 533. Paravicini wrote about himself  in the third person.
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too, shall be complied with.’24 In this context, the Dutch concern was 
probably less about the civilians living in the Portuguese sphere than 
about the population of  Rote, where the Company used Timorese aux-
iliaries to subdue the rebellious domains. 
A detailed case from January 1679 indicates the degree of  violence 
that accompanied the pursuit of  headhunting even among acquain-
tances. A Helong called Ratty Sassy worked as a messenger during the 
negotiations between Kupang and Amarasi, and when the negotiations 
broke down he became a target for revenge. Together with his wife he 
worked the fields outside of  Kupang where he built a hut in the trees for 
reasons of  security. Three men approached the field, and asked Ratty 
Sassy for maize to eat. Ratty’s wife provided them with some food which 
she tied to a rope that was lowered from the tree hut. The three men ate 
it together with some buffalo meat they had brought with them. They 
then asked Ratty Sassy to come down and bring them a piece of  tobacco. 
His wife begged him not to climb down, but Ratty Sassy knew the three 
men, who were defectors from Kupang, and descended from the tree. 
Hardly had he joined the men when they attacked their defenceless host 
and cut off  his head. They grabbed the severed head and rushed off  so 
hurriedly that they forgot the buffalo meat and their assegais. Watching 
the horrendous scene the wife screamed loudly, thereby causing the three 
murderers to hurry away even faster. No Helong people were in the 
neighbourhood, but she finally descended from the tree and ran to the 
main negeri by the fort, still screaming in grief.25 
These skirmishes and attacks alternated with some larger battles, 
but they were few and far between; such battles were not the Timorese 
style of  warfare. In small-scale societies like the Timorese domains, the 
aim was not to take a calculated risk of  losing many warriors in a single 
large encounter, and what the Europeans condemned as cowardice, was 
completely logical from a Timorese point of  view. In a polity where 
manpower might be counted in the hundreds rather than thousands it 
was essential to avoid losses or serious risks, especially if  the adversary 
possessed firearms. 
One of  the few major confrontations on Timor took place in August 
1664. At this time 400 refugees from the old Sonbai land journeyed 
towards Kupang; in their way lay the territory of  Amarasi, which consid-
24 VOC 1376 (1682), f. 406b.
25 VOC1346 (1678-79), Dagregister, sub 29-1-1679.
212
| Lords of  the land, lords of  the sea
ered these people a free-for-all target. When he heard that the refugees 
were approaching, Ama Tomananu’s son, Ama Pot, went out with as 
many people as he could gather in order to protect them. His men en-
countered the Amarasi army and after engaging in heavy fighting with 
them, they managed to drive them off  the field while the refugees took 
another route to safety. The Sonbai pursued the fleeing Amarasi into 
their own territory and captured no less than 73 heads. Their joy did 
not last long, however, as they suddenly noticed some detachments ap-
proaching. The troops were marching under red flags with white crosses, 
and some Portuguese were among their ranks. The psychological effect 
of  this scene was devastating. As bullets started to whistle past their 
ears, the Sonbai took flight. In the end they lost 63 men in addition to 
34 of  the refugees they had tried to protect. It was clear that traditional 
Timorese troops could not stand up to organized and well-equipped 
detachments.26
In 1678, a reconciliation seemed to be underway. The king of  
Amarasi claimed via envoys that certain incidents in the recent past 
impeded the conclusion of  a peace treaty: a Sonbai called Ama Thoos 
had slapped the face of  the king seven years before, a truly terrible insult. 
Moreover, the Dutch allies had taken away sandalwood that actually 
belonged to the Amarasi. Nevertheless, the conflict could be settled if  
Ama Thoos lay his shield and assegai before the feet of  the opperhoofd as 
an admission of  his guilt, and the allies paid 200 golden discs and 1,800 
buffaloes in compensation – an expensive fine indeed.27 It was in some 
respects fortunate that one of  the Amabi regent’s sons had recently been 
killed by the Amarasi, a hideous act that nonetheless meant that coun-
terclaims could be lodged.
Ama Besi, the most active prince in the Helong kingdom, was chosen 
as the main peace broker. The Dutch were not entirely happy about this, 
as they perceived Ama Besi as a troublemaker, but Ama Besi maintained 
that he alone would be able to bring about a peace deal. After some 
diplomatic trafficking, a sizeable troop of  Amarasi approached Kupang 
in October 1678, headed by a prince. The Dutch account of  what subse-
quently happened sketches a lively picture of  ceremonial interaction be-
tween Timorese domains at this time. A meeting was arranged on open 
ground outside Bakunase, which at this time was the residence of  Ama 
26 VOC 1252 (1665), ff. 1250-1.
27 VOC 1346 (1678-79), Dagregister, sub 14-10-1678; Coolhaas 1971:275.
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Besi. The Amarasi troop was met by the Helong, Sonbai and Amabi, 
who stood with their weapons in their hands, within firing range. There 
was resentment and discontentment among the Helong that Sonbai 
took the foremost position in the negotiations, since Helong royalty took 
pride in their role as lords of  the land, a notion reinforced by the official 
Dutch ranking. The Sonbai, however, pointed out that this was the fairest 
arrangement, since the Amarasi War had come about because of  them. 
Now, the leaders from Amarasi and Sonbai went towards each other 
and greeted their counterparts with loud shouts and hugs. After standing 
there for a quarter of  an hour, a dog and a buffalo were brought forward, 
slaughtered and cut into pieces. The Sonbai aristocrats then withdrew 
and made place for the Amabi and finally the Helong, who also per-
formed their ceremonies. The Dutch found it remarkable that not a 
word was uttered during the procedure; the only sounds they heard were 
shouts. After the ceremonial part of  the affair, all the aristocrats parleyed 
inside Bakunase, and it was agreed that the Amarasi troop would come 
to Kupang the following day.28
At the appointed time the Amarasi arrived at the fortified settlement 
of  Pono Koi, the young king of  Kupang. There was no sign, however, of  
the peace broker, Ama Besi, which made the Dutchmen suspicious. The 
garrison of  Fort Concordia was on alert, their fingers on the trigger, and 
backed up by reinforcements of  sailors. The Helong troops welcomed 
the visitors with flying banners and the beating of  drums. A Helong 
man walked forward, drew his cutlass and cut one ear from a pig that 
was stood there, tied up. The blood was collected in a young coconut. 
The man then broke off  a branch of  wild fig and walked among the rows 
of  Amarasi, sprinkling the mixture of  blood and juice over them – not 
unlike the holy water sprinkled over believers by Catholic padres, as the 
Dutch later remarked. When this was done, the principal Amarasi went 
to a balai (assembly hall), while the Helong fired musket salvos in the air. 
The hosts brought the indispensable sirih and pinang (betel and areca) and 
some chairs to sit on – like muskets, drums and banners, a European 
import for a privileged few – and negotiations followed. Towards the 
evening the king of  Kupang sent his ceremonial staff  to the opperhoofd as 
a sign of  authority, with a request for arrack: alcohol, too, was a standard 
ingredient in such congresses.29 
28 VOC 1346 (1678-79), Dagregister, sub 11-10-1678.
29 VOC 1346 (1678-79), Dagregister, sub 12-10-1678.
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Over the following days the situation looked promising as the ami-
cable Amarasi roamed around the settlements of  their VOC allies, 
consuming many pigs and buffaloes during the course of  grand feasts. 
Then something went awry, for the Amarasi prince suddenly stole away 
without bidding farewell to either the opperhoofd or the regents, an insult 
in both European and Timorese eyes. Shortly after this, Ama Besi se-
cretly left his sonaf at Bakunase during the night. He took with him not 
only his own men, but also some of  Pono Koi’s subjects, a total of  250 
men plus women and children, cattle and provisions. This number may 
look small but in a local Kupang context it was a very considerable loss 
of  manpower; as a result, Pono Koi had no more than one hundred 
fit men left under his authority.30 Ama Besi now openly took the side 
of  Amarasi and henceforth supported his new suzerain against the 
VOC allies. The only explanation that the Dutch opperhoofd Jacob van 
Wijckersloot could find for the conduct of  Amarasi and Ama Besi was 
pure ambition. Amarasi entertained great hopes of  making Ama Besi the 
paramount king of  Kupang, Sonbai and Amabi, an utterly unacceptable 
idea considering the strict aristocratic hiearchy. A partial explanation for 
the defection might be found in the person of  Jacob van Wijckersloot 
himself: his high-handed conduct had engendered much dissatisfaction 
among the allied regents a few years before, and Van Wijckersloot dis-
played a hostile attitude towards Ama Besi.31
The usual state of  hostility between Amarasi and the VOC allies 
was therefore resumed. By August 1679, it was clear that a compre-
hensive army of  Portuguese clients had gathered under the leadership 
of  the king of  Amarasi, at a time when the VOC and their allies were 
crippled by sickness and death. The role played by António Hornay 
in all this is unclear; while the Dutch were visiting Lifau, his brother 
and stand-in, Francisco Hornay, at the same time received the VOC 
servants, displaying an attitude of  ‘business as usual’. At times António 
Hornay complained to the Dutch that the Amarasi were slow to follow 
his decrees; indeed, the very structure of  the Timorese domains must 
have made it difficult to take full control of  everything that happened 
there. Nevertheless, the circumstances indicate prior knowledge on 
Hornay’s part. The Amarasi army also consisted of  men from Taebenu, 
Amanuban, Batumean, Amabesi and other princedoms, and also in-
30 VOC 1346 (1678-79), Dagregister, sub 21-11-1678, 28-11-1678.
31 Compare Dagh-Register 1887-1931, the year 1674:224-6.
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cluded a number of  Topasses.32 Hornay may well have adopted a wait-
and-see policy at his base in Larantuka; he could always plead ignorance 
of  the affair, and besides, the conflict was with the VOC allies rather 
than with the VOC itself. If  the allies were crushed, the position of  Fort 
Concordia would be untenable or, at least, it would be at the mercy of  
the Topasses.
On 30 October, the army approached Kupang, split into two divi-
sions, one of  which was headed by the king of  Amarasi and his literate 
Topass brothers António da Veiga and Luís. The tiny weak Dutch gar-
rison hid behind the walls of  the fort, which was well equipped with artil-
lery. They had received no orders from Batavia to engage in Timorese 
wars unless they were directly attacked, but Jacob van Wijckersloot 
nevertheless felt that he must do something for his allies. He therefore 
sent a mounted trumpeter into the forest where the Timorese forces 
were gathering, to play the Wilhelmus and a Dutch military marching 
song. To an outsider the scene may seem ridiculous, but the allied leaders 
were probably familiar with the rousing tones of  the Dutch anthem, an 
authoritative symbol for the white stranger kings upon whom they could 
count for moral support. 
Smaller in number, the allied forces first searched out an enemy de-
tachment that was encamped on the lowland, near to the sea. From the 
surrounding heights they rushed down and managed to kill and behead 
seven Topasses, dealing a psychological blow to the mixed Amarasi army, 
as the Topasses were considered to be the elite soldiers of  the island. A 
second attack took place, targeting the core troops of  the enemy, and this 
time António da Veiga was killed. The headhunting ritual was grotesque-
ly complemented by one of  arm-hunting; the arms of  the slain Amarasi 
prince were severed and made into pipes. The left flank of  the attacking 
army mostly consisted of  subjugated Taebenu and Amabi, who were re-
luctant to participate in the campaign, especially since the Taebenu ruler 
had undergone the all-important ritual of  mixing and drinking blood 
with Ama Tomananu of  Sonbai. Before a shot could be fired, the king of  
Taebenu suddenly opened his arms in full sight of  his troops, holding his 
shield in one hand and an assegai he had received from Ama Tomananu 
in the other. This was a sign to his men to flee as fast as they could, which 
32 A note from 1680 mentions that António Hornay ordered 30 Topasses to act as personal body-
guards for the king of  Amarasi (VOC 1367 [1680-81], Dagregister, sub 16-9-1680), illustrating that he 
probably had a degree of  insight into the affairs of  this princedom.
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they did, leaving only the half-beaten core troops to the right, who tried 
to defend themselves behind the fence of  the burnt-out settlement. The 
allies had few shotguns but repeatedly attacked with their assegais; in 
time, their adversaries ran out of  musket ammunition and resorted to us-
ing their firearms as clubs. When the king of  Amarasi was shot through 
the legs and carried off  the field, the remaining troops finally fled. The 
victors took 103 heads and 53 shotguns by way of  trophies, and joyfully 
marched to the seashore by the fort, brandishing their spoils.33
The battle showed that the VOC allies were better in combat than 
had previously been presumed, and that they were even able to conquer 
Topasses in moments of  danger. It also highlighted the problems cre-
ated by gathering soldiers from many domains for extended campaigns, 
something which ran counter to the Timorese way of  warfare. The 
defeat inspired fear in the Amarasi ruler and in Ama Besi.34 No direct 
attack of  this kind would be undertaken against Kupang for a third of  
a century, and the low-scale enmity with Amarasi became permanent. 
The moral consequences were soon obvious, since the defection of  
Ama Besi was more than compensated for by the arrival of  new refu-
gee groups from the Portuguese sphere. By the end of  the seventeenth 
century, this resulted in the completion of  the association of  the five 
loyal allies.
kingship in the shadow of the company
Chapter three illustrated the general structure of  Timorese kingship. It 
now remains to be seen how this kingship was perceived by the Dutch 
and how it was altered by the early colonial presence. Although the opper-
hoofden interacted with the Timorese kings and regents on almost a daily 
basis, there are very few straightforward descriptions of  their preroga-
tives and functions. Information has to be gleaned from a broad range 
of  seventeenth- and eighteenth- century sources and carefully compared 
with later ethnological literature. In general, the Dutch sources present 
33 VOC 1358 (1679-80), Dagregister, sub 30-10-1679; VOC 1359 (1680).
34 VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, sub 20-12-1680. According to a Timorese witness, 500 Ama-
nuban arrived in Amarasi in November 1680, commanded by some Portuguese from Lifau. The general 
intention was to storm the enclave of  the VOC allies together with Ama Besi. However, as the Ama-
nuban became aware of  Ama Besi’s self-doubt, they promptly returned to their own land.
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two images of  local kingship: either despotism or a lack of  executive 
power and state. According to Jean-Baptiste Pelon, writing in 1778,
The one who carries the name of  king would have too much power over 
his subjects to be called despotic, and not enough to be called monarchi-
cal. He is surely the only one with an arbitrary will, but his powers are so 
restricted that he never dares to encroach on the liberties, goods or lives 
of  his subjects, at least in instances where he is not able to conceal his 
conduct from direct or indirect accusations. (Pelon 2002:33.)
He also noted that all matters rotated around one or two ‘ministers’ (usif, 
‘regent’) who were likened to the major domus of  late Merovingian France. 
In 1756, the VOC commissioner Johannes Andreas Paravicini con-
sidered it a bonus for the Company that the executive regents were 
hereditary and in some aspects like kings; he believed they were viewed 
like fathers by their subjects. In strained situations the people would not 
take up arms against the regents or temukung, but rather against the king. 
According to Paravicini, the best way to therefore keep the allied kings in 
check, was to maintain good communications with their regent. A case 
in point was the then king of  Kupang, Karel Buni (reign 1749-1760). 
Karel explained to Paravicini that when he was a minor, his regent sold 
a piece of  land to the corrupt opperhoofd. This was plainly against the old 
adat; neither the king nor the regent or temukung had the right to dispose 
of  land or the heirlooms of  the realm. Paravicini replied that the regent 
in that case had to be arrested and sent to Batavia to be sentenced. 
Karel shuddered and spoke in a different tone, ‘Milord, do not do that. 
Otherwise my people will rebel because of  that and maybe take my 
life.’35
The outward appearance of  the allied kings and regents is seldom 
mentioned in the VOC reports and there are almost no illustrations pre-
served.36 The Spanish missionary Juan de la Camara wrote in 1670 that 
the aristocrats of  the island wore a large, round golden plate around their 
neck. In their hair they fastened a bamboo comb with cock’s feathers 
and flower adornments. On their forehead they wore a golden crescent. 
From top to toe the aristocrats would wear wooden bangles, and below 
35 VOC 2941 (1756), ff. 259-62.
36 See, however, the two aquarelle paintings illustrating the formal meeting between Paravicini and the 
princes in 1756. The Timorese lords seem to be dressed in European-style clothes (Leeuwerik 1992).
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the knees they tied goat’s beards that fell to below the shin. De la Camara 
also noted their appreciation for coral collars, muti salak, which were even 
more valued than gold (Teixeira 1957:452). The discs, crescents and muti 
salak are occasionally mentioned in Dutch texts as well, and the account 
shows that the well-to-do attire was not dissimilar to that which was doc-
umented in nineteenth-century ethnographic literature and illustrations. 
Many visitors also commented on the frugal conditions in which the al-
lied kings lived, and it would perhaps be prudent to quote the best known 
of  them, Captain William Bligh of  the Bounty mutiny.37 During his stay 
in Kupang, in 1789, Bligh paid a visit to the sonaf of  Lesser Sonbai where 
he met the ruler, Bernardus Nisnoni (reign 1776-1795).
The chief  of  the natives, or king of  the island, is by the Dutch stiled Key-
ser (Emperor). This prince lives at a place called Backenassy [Bakunase], 
about four miles distant from Coupang. […] His dwelling was a large 
house which was divided into only three apartments, and surrounded by 
a piazza: agreeably situated, but very dirty, as well as the furniture. The 
king, who is an elderly man, received me with much civilty, and ordered 
refreshments to be set before me, which were tea, rice cakes, roasted In-
dian corn, and dried buffalo flesh, with about a pint of  arrack, which I 
believe was all he had. His dress was, a cheque wrapper girded round his 
waist with a silk and gold belt, a loose linen jacket, and a coarse handker-
chief  about his head. (Miller 1996:65.)
It was nevertheless in the interests of  the Company to provide a certain 
amount of  royal luxuries, not least in the face of  visitors to Kupang. The 
kings and regents received cloths, weapons and other valuable items as 
annual gifts, besides tokens of  dignity such as drums, ceremonial staffs 
and flags. The Dutch also respected the Timorese concerns about the 
right of  succession, where a ruler had to be of  princely blood on his fa-
ther’s as well as on his mother’s side. Both the Dutch and the Portuguese 
recognized the importance of  keeping control over the Sonbai royalty as 
37 A note from 1680 gives some insight into the frugal standards of  Timorese royal households in the 
Portuguese sphere as well. The wife of  the Taebenu lord, who still resided in the north-west, quarrelled 
with the co-wives of  the lord. A few ceramic objects, saucers and plates (piring) were broken in pieces 
during the tumult. The lord threatened his wife, saying she must acquire similar objects or else she would 
pay with her life. Since she could not obtain the saucers and plates, she ran away out of  desperation. 
After four days of  roaming the wilderness, she arrived in Kupang and sought refuge among the Sonbai 
elite (VOC1367 [1680-81], Dagregister, sub 17-8-1680).
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instruments of  prestige. A purported envoy from Portuguese-controlled 
Greater Sonbai appeared in Fort Concordia in October 1680. He asked 
to take the little empress, Bi Sonbai, and her sisters to their grandfather 
who resided inland, since he wished to see them before he died. Since 
António Hornay had approved of  the idea, the Dutch had good reason 
to think that the Topass leader wished to capture the valuable girls, and 
angrily snubbed the envoy. What followed, however, suggests that the 
envoy was sincere in his deference to the name of  Sonbai:
When [the envoy] Ama Naki asked to see the empress (being a girl of  
14 years with her two under-age sisters), I asked her to come to the great 
hall (as she was already in the fort with the widow of  the late Mr. Wijck-
ersloot). They came accompanied by the baptized daughters of  the field 
commander [veltoverste] Ama Tomananu, Anna Maria and Susanna, all 
adorned in their best attire according to their fashion, with silk patolas38 
around the waist and with golden crescents and discs on their head. They 
were politely received by all of  us, and seated at the ordained place. Then 
38 A patola is a double ikat from Gujarat in India, a fine garment that is mostly made of  silk (VOC-
Glossarium 2000:88).
Kupang as it appeared to a British visitor in the early 1790s. Illustration 
published by Roy Schreiber, Captain Bligh’s Second Chance (2007).
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Ama Naki came, half  creeping, towards the girls. With great humility he 
kissed the feet and hands of  them, which was imitated by his entourage 
of  seven or eight men.39
Feasts and ceremonies on a princedom-wide level were recurring events 
that broke the monotony of  life and involved the participation of  
Company servants. In particular, the Dutch stranger lords were strongly 
expected to participate in funerals, where great store was set by the sa-
lutes of  the fort’s cannon and by the military detachments. Arrack was 
a favourite Timorese drink that was not made locally, and every funeral 
of  a person of  standing would be preceded by allied demands for this 
costly spirit. The first detailed account of  a Timorese funeral comes from 
June 1740, when the Sonbai regent Nai Sau was buried. According to 
custom, the corpse was laid out for an extended period of  time, while 
the Timorese mourners waited for the best moment for the funeral. After 
eleven months, the day of  the funeral finally arrived and the opperhoofd 
and council went there with other friends of  the deceased, escorted by 16 
Sonbai soldiers. They strolled between two rows of  indigenous soldiers 
into the yard of  the sonaf. Once they had arrived they sat down for about 
half  an hour, at which point the corpse was brought out from the sonaf 
in a heavy wooden coffin. It was carried three times around the grave, 
which was situated within the encircling wall of  the dalem (residence com-
plex). While this took place, young and old wailed loudly. Eventually the 
coffin was lowered into the ground, accompanied by three musket salutes 
by the European soldiers, and a cannon shot from Fort Concordia. The 
soldiers returned to the fort and the tables were laid. The emperor and 
the allied regents now asked the opperhoofd to have supper with them, 
and the Dutch stayed at the feast until ten o’clock; when they left, both 
parties exchanged mutual thanks.40 The details correspond closely to 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century studies on mortuary rites, but what 
makes the account intriguing is the way in which Dutch paraphernalia 
and participation were integrated in the ceremonial framework. It shows 
how an external entity was successfully localized in order to support the 
flow of  life of  the local Timorese polities.
39 VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, sub 26-10-1680. 
40 VOC 2501 (1740), Dagregister, sub 16-6-1740.
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rote
To fully understand the early colonial system forged by the Company, it 
is necessary to take a look at the other geographical components: Rote, 
Sawu and Solor. Of  these, Rote, alias Lesser Sawu, exhibits many simi-
larities with the Helong and Atoni in terms of  language, culture, social 
structure, political traditions, religious organization, ceremonial life and 
legends about the island’s origin.41 Nevertheless, its early colonial ex-
perience was quite dissimilar to that of  the five loyal allies of  Kupang. 
In actual fact, Rote was the place that cost the Dutch the most effort to 
maintain. There was not a trace of  unity among the many small nusak 
on the island, which were often engaged in warfare, with the Company 
siding with one or the other of  them. Nine different dialects of  Rotenese 
can be identified, each displaying considerable differences.42 The first 
available enumeration of  nusak, from 1660, contains nineteen names 
but the number of  domains acknowledged varied over the centuries.43 
Like the Timorese domains, the nusak had a dual structure: there was a 
raja at its head, known as manek, with an executive regent (called fettor in 
late colonial texts) at his side. VOC texts often refer to these two func-
tions as ‘regent’ and ‘second regent’. The manek, however, had a more 
active role than his counterpart on Timor. In social terms as well, the 
distance between ruler and ruled was less pronounced here than among 
the Timorese, with weak or obnoxious lords wielding little authority over 
their subjects. Apart from all the inter-nusak conflicts that afflicted Rote, 
the VOC period presents an unending succession of  divisions within the 
petty domains.
All this was closely interconnected to the ecological situation of  the is-
land. According to opperhoofd Cuylenburgh, writing in 1662, the Rotenese 
lords were generally related to each other through blood and marriage 
41 Fox 1977:56. The Portuguese knew the island as Lesser Sawu (Sabo Pequeno), while the Dutch 
referred to it as Rote (Rotty). Neither name was traditionally used by the locals.
42 See the language map appended to Hull 1998.
43 VOC 1233 (1660), f. 725a. This report, by the commissioner Johan Truytman, lists Ringgou, Ba-
tuisi (alias Oepau), Bilba, Thie, Bokai, Landu, Korbaffo, Termanu, Oenale, Lole, Dengka and Baä, 
which occur in the later enumerations; and Bondale, Dauckeya, Mede, Dekedale, Bohaydale and Hore-
daly, which subsequently disappear as domains in their own right. The list of  acknowledged nusak sub-
sequently included Ossipoka (alias Lelain), Diu and Ndao, the latter being a small island off  the west 
coast of  Rote. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a number of  nusak split off, leading 
to the creation of  Keka, Lelenuk, Talae and Dehla as nusak. By 1900, the number of  nusak was therefore 
nineteen. For a map of  the various nusak, see Fox 1977:41.
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ties, ‘whereas the reason why these people could not live in peace, even 
if  they had forgotten it, is that some years ago almost all their cattle, 
lontar palms and crops of  the fields, were destroyed by the hard winds, 
so that many people died from starvation’.44 The hard wind referred 
to here was a cyclone, which still hits the island from time to time with 
devastating consequences. Natural calamities led to intensive rivalry for 
scarce resources. As can be seen, the lontar palm was a cornerstone in 
the local economy together with agriculture and livestock; a note from 
1694 specifies that the lontar palms formed their principal means of  
livelihood.45 The palm was tapped of  its sugar juice, known as gula, 
which constituted a principal form of  nutrition and which also led to the 
semi-jocular characterization of  the Rotenese as the ‘non-eating’ people 
(Pelon 2002:56; Fox 1977:1). The gula was preserved in jars that were ex-
ported to Timor in times of  food surplus. The Dagregisters contain regular 
records of  boats arriving from Rote, stocked with gula, which was then 
sold to the locals and especially to the VOC establishment. In exchange 
the Rotenese received textiles, which for external traders was by far the 
most important import product in the eastern part of  the archipelago. 
In the late seventeenth century, this trade was worth around 100 rijks-
daalders per annum, so it was a rather modest affair.46 In addition, the 
boats were frequently captained by the rulers of  the domains, who took 
advantage of  the economic opportunities that were on offer, something 
which differed from the Timorese rulers who seldom engaged in trade. 
The Dutch used the gula for brewing sugar beer (goelabier), but also for 
feeding their slaves. Small-scale trade in air gula is still carried out today 
by the Rotenese.
In order to keep check of  their Rotenese allies, the Company, like 
elsewhere in their far-flung Asian realm, drew up contracts with the 
various manek. Four of  the more important nusak were approached by 
Hendrick ter Horst; contacts were facilitated by the bonds that already 
existed between the western Rotenese and the Helong, thanks to dy-
nastic marriages between the islands (De Roever 2002:257). Unlike the 
Timorese in general, the Helong used boats, and sometimes sailed to 
Rote to acquire foodstuff. Some of  the eastern nusak maintained ties 
with the Portuguese clients on Timor, and were temporarily suppressed 
44 VOC 1210 (1662), f. 876.
45 VOC 1553 (1693-94), Dagregister, sub 1-5-1694.
46 Tange 1688, H 49:u, KITLV, f. 3.
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through violent Dutch interventions in 1654 and 1660. This was fol-
lowed by a contract two years later. In line with general monopolistic 
VOC policy, the Rotenese were forbidden to receive Solorese, Bimanese, 
Makassarese or Portuguese traders without a permit, or to sail to the 
lands of  enemies of  the Company. In particular it was made clear that no 
slaves were to be sold to unlicensed foreigners – slaves were a commodity 
that was available on the densely populated island.47 
The Dutch never placed a permanent garrison on Rote in spite 
of  their early plans to do so. Instead, they acquired hostages from the 
various petty domains in order to keep control over them, hostages who 
were kept in Fort Concordia and were often baptized. Furthermore, 
they used to keep a European interpreter stationed there, accompanied 
at times by a few more soldiers. The place chosen for this tiny Dutch 
presence was Termanu, a nusak on the north-western coast. The close 
Dutch-Termanu relationship went back to the first years of  VOC influ-
ence, when the ruler Kiu Lusi formed an alliance with the Company to 
defeat the Portuguese-orientated nusak Korbaffo in 1654. Although Kiu 
himself  was killed in the battle, his kinsmen henceforth upheld a precari-
ous precedence with Dutch help.48 This was a precedence that was not 
rooted in any traditional Rotenese concepts that we know of, and the 
other nusak eagerly looked for the means to rid themselves of  what they 
regarded as Termanu tyranny. As a matter of  fact there were repeated 
VOC campaigns on Rote in the late seventeenth century, when the small 
garrison of  Kupang offered far from sufficient defence. On a few occa-
sions, hundreds of  European and Indonesian Company soldiers were 
brought in from other parts of  the archipelago in order to deal with the 
situation. In spite of  its small size, Rote was a difficult island to master, 
and it could take years to suppress a recalcitrant nusak. The settlements 
tended to lie on lofty rocks that were hard to climb, and due to the 
bushy vegetation interspersed with high trees, access to the settlements 
was restricted to narrow and slippery paths (Olivier 1833:261). Batavia 
issued orders in 1692 and 1693, stating that the opperhoofden should visit 
the island in person once or twice a year, and act as ‘the law’ there.49 
47 Heeres 1931:212-4. New contracts were concluded in 1690-91 and 1700.
48 VOC 1301 (1673), f. 915b-916a; De Roever 2002:257. After Kiu Lusi, the lordship was inherited 
by a cousin, Kila Seni (r.1654?-1673). All the later manek were descendants of  him and his brother Edon 
Seni, while Kiu Lusi’s descendants henceforth enjoyed the position of  executive regents or fettor. For more 
on the way in which this genealogy is reflected in later oral historiography, see Fox 1971.
49 VOC 1826 (1712), f. 31.
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In fact, by 1700 Rote was provisionally pacified by the Company and its 
Termanu ally, but the entire eighteenth century was interspersed with 
recurring political crises that could turn into bloody affairs.
Late colonial texts often display a marked Dutch preference for the 
Rotenese as compared to the Timorese and other groups in the region. 
Johannes Olivier, who briefly visited the island in the 1820s, alleged that 
‘the inhabitants are handsomer than the Timorese. Also, their women 
are prettier and whiter, and their local language is much more pleasingly 
sounding than those of  Timor and the other neighbouring islands […] 
Also, the inhabitants of  this island are much more steadfast, valiant and 
clever than the Timorese.’50 Other nineteenth-century Westerners also 
characterized the Rotenese as intellectually agile and good soldiers in 
contrast with their neighbours, a view that was not least dependent on 
their openness to Christianity. In the early colonial era this positive image 
was largely absent from the records; not least, their courage and military 
qualities were drawn into question: ‘very timid people whom one could 
not lean on’.51 The Topass leader, Domingos da Costa, characterized 
them as ‘devilish and wild people’, mutinous and rapacious.52 Whenever 
there was a major crisis on Rote the Dutch would prefer to use Timorese 
auxiliaries, especially the Sonbai, who were regarded as the most formi-
dable of  allies. On the other hand the eastern nusak, which were gener-
ally adverse to any VOC involvement, tended to call in warriors from 
Amarasi and even Topasses, who spearheaded the anti-Dutch and anti-
Termanu movements. Besides successive intra-Rotenese conflicts, the 
island was thus also plagued by two wars by proxy: Topass versus VOC 
and Amarasi versus Sonbai.
The Dutch did not always have the best of  it. In 1688, the Dutch lieu-
tenant Jan Franssen led an expedition that consisted of  221 Europeans 
– a large number in these quarters – and a few thousand Balinese, 
Makassarese, Rotenese and Timorese. Expecting the VOC troops, the 
men from the recalcitrant nusak Bilba, Ringgou and Korbaffo were 
50 Olivier 1833:261. They also, however, had a reputation for being voluptuous and shameless, and 
were considered to outdo the population of  Maluku in that respect. It needs to be stressed that this char-
acterization only appears in the nineteenth century, when the emergence of  ethnographic categorization 
was combined with greater European awareness (or imaginations) of  racial features. Some of  Olivier’s 
information on Rote is taken from Pelon’s 1778 account, via Hogendorp, but his positive judgment of  
the Rotenese is not from that source.
51 VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 28-9-1686.
52 Matos 1974a:309. Da Costa called them sabos, Rote being Sawu Minor in Portuguese parlance.
Rotenese characters in 1829. Illustration from the expedition of  
Salomon Müller, published by C.J. Temminck, Verhandelingen over de 
natuurlijke geschiedenis der Nederlandsche Overzeesche Bezittingen (1839-44)
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encamped on the Lagai rock where Franssen’s troops attacked them in 
March 1688. The defenders were thought to be a mixture of  white as 
well as coloured Portuguese (although António Hornay later pleaded 
ignorance of  this matter to keep good relations with the Company), 
and the VOC attack turned into a costly fiasco. Jan Franssen and the 
Timorese allies provided different versions of  what had happened, 
and blamed each other for the failure of  the expedition. According to 
the Timorese version, the lieutenant had no head for logistics: he did 
not consult the allies, he did not provide them with provisions and he 
started the attack before the chiefs had had time to gather their forces. 
Franssen, moreover, over-estimated the ability of  the European troops to 
defend alone against the adversaries, and subsequently lost 56 dead and 
wounded in a short while, while the auxiliaries attacked on the other side 
of  the fortification. At dusk the Timorese found it best to retreat, and the 
humiliated Franssen saw no other way than to conclude the expedition 
and return to Kupang.53
The Timorese auxiliaries were much feared by the locals, and not 
without reason. Service on Rote promised the opportunity of  gaining 
booty among relatively weak enemies, and the VOC expeditions were 
therefore popular among the Timorese allies. On one occasion, in 1681, 
the allied Timorese were asked to contribute 500 soldiers for a campaign 
against the nusak Dengka and Oenale. When it was time to embark at the 
roadstead of  Kupang, the volunteers crowded onto the beach so that the 
Company servants and Ama Tomananu had to drive them back. Part of  
the volunteers had to be left in Kupang, otherwise the overloaded ship 
would have run aground.54 On Rote, a VOC force of  2,300 men went 
out to search for the enemy, some of  whom hid in caves in a mountainous 
part of  the island. They were told to surrender, and three Rotenese came 
out. The others refused to give themselves up, and the Sonbai and Amabi 
proceeded to throw in burning torches, which suffocated another eigh-
teen. The survivors shouted from inside the cave: ‘You Sonbai hounds of  
hell, make any mischief  you want. If  you remain here for a year we will 
still not yield to the Noble Company.’ In the end the VOC troops secured 
another 42 enemies, dead or alive, but were unable to clear all the caves 
of  enemies.55 When the resistance was finally suppressed, the manek of  
53 VOC 1461 (1689), ff. 567a-568b; Coolhaas 1975:210.
54 VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, sub 18-4-1681.
55 VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, sub 19-5-1681.
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Oenale had to comply with the VOC’s request for a certain number of  
slaves, to be delivered to the Company. Later in the same year the manek 
reported that he was unable to fulfil this task, since his subjects had been 
massacred in their settlements or murdered in the caves by the Sonbai. 
One third of  the houses in his nusak were now deserted due to a lack of  
people.56 It might be added that the Dutch commander of  the expedi-
tion, Blanckelaar, appears to have set a bad example; he was accused by 
the Timorese of  gross misconduct, including, among other things, the 
beheading of  an old woman for no particular reason.57
In the small world of  Rote, neutrality was not an option, and the 
various struggles involved the minor nusak whether they wished it or not. 
In 1685, a chief  in the important nusak Ringgou rebelled against the 
VOC and brought over his men from his hiding-place on Pulau Semau, 
intending to attack the Dutch clients with Amarasi help. Together with 
men from Bilba and Korbaffo he arrived at Batuisi, a minor domain that 
usually kept to the VOC system. ‘Come’, he said to the villagers, ‘go with 
us! We will set our course and invite the Amarasi in order to fight the 
Noble Company’. The Batuisi reportedly replied, ‘Why should we rise 
against our father and mother? For the Noble Company is our father and 
mother.’58 When the others heard this defiant answer, they attacked the 
Batuisi and killed six men. Half  of  the population then chose to follow 
the pro-Amarasi forces, while the other half  was forced to resettle in the 
VOC-friendly nusak Landu.59 This state of  unrest dragged on until circa 
1690, and cost the tiny nusak dearly.
Rote, in sum, was a place that was richly equipped in terms of  
foodstuffs and that was of  strategically vital importance. However, of  all 
the VOC dependencies in the Solor-Timor region, it suffered most in 
terms of  colonial intervention, which sometimes resulted in very severe 
massacres of  the local population. One cannot escape the impression 
that some of  the conflicts were deliberately fueled by the Company and 
its supporters in order to acquire slaves, a commodity to which we will 
return later. The methods of  some of  the Company servants connected 
with Rote were such that even the Supreme Government in Batavia 
56 VOC 1375 (1681-82), Dagregister, sub 24-10-1681.
57 VOC 1368 (1681), f. 468. On the misconduct of  Blanckelaar, see also VOC 1376 (1682), ff. 406a-
406b.
58 VOC 1414 (1685), f. 157.
59 VOC 1414 (1685), f. 157.
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found that they had overstepped the boundaries. Thus the trouble that 
flared up in 1685-1690 was considered to be a consequence of  the 
behaviour of  the notorious temporary opperhoofd Willem Tange, whom 
Batavia thought it necessary to sack from his position. The govern-
ment decreed that no unnecessary blood should be spilled, and that the 
conquered nusak should not be subjected to unbearable fines (Coolhaas 
1975:166). These were admonitions that were more easily issued than 
implemented, but indeed the worst of  the violence had receded by the 
end of  the seventeenth century.
sawu
In the middle of  the unruly Sawu Sea lies a small island, known by 
its inhabitants as Rai Hawu, or by the outer world as Sawu, Savo or 
Sabo. While Sawu is often mentioned as a counterpart of  Rote, it dif-
fers from the latter island in many respects. While Rote is culturally and 
linguistically related to western Timor, Sawu has more in common with 
Sumba and the small island of  Ndao, west of  Rote (Fox 1977:56). The 
consequences of  this affiliation are seen throughout its history during the 
period in question. In linguistic terms, it is also more coherent than Rote, 
where there are no less than nine dialects; on Sawu and the adjacent 
island Raijua there is only one language. The Sawunese believed that 
their island was basically uniform in nature, while the Rotenese prefer 
to emphasize the differences between their various nusak (Fox 1977:81). 
What is similar between the two islands, however, is the ecological ad-
aptation that the Rotenese and Sawunese managed to achieve on their 
deforested lands. 
In contrast with Rote, Sawu could not, and indeed still cannot, be 
easily reached from Kupang, and military interventions were conse-
quently rarer since they demanded extensive logistical planning. The 
VOC records show that the Dutch kept a regular check on what was go-
ing on and visited Sawu at regular intervals after the inception of  friendly 
relations in 1648. Other than that, the island was largely left to tend to 
its own affairs, and it was only in the 1750s that a Dutch interpreter was 
permanently placed there. It has been argued that the Company only 
had to intervene very rarely because the Sawunese had little reason for 
rebellious conduct. Moreover, the island was of  limited strategic value 
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due to its location – ‘a lump of  stone in an immense sea’, according to 
one Dutch visitor (Fox 1977:126).
Like Rote, Sawu was divided into a number of  small domains. A 
study of  oral tradition, which displays an amazing degree of  reliability 
as far back as comparisons can be made, suggests that hereditary rulers 
were only appointed after the arrival of  the Portuguese at some point 
in the sixteenth century (Duggan 2008:70, 206, 225, 287, 326). On the 
main island there were five domains (Timu, Seba, Menia, Mesara and 
Liae), while the tiny island of  Raijua off  the western cape was a domain 
of  its own. Unlike Rote, however, there was a political hierarchy among 
the domains. The easternmost domain of  Timu was considered the 
highest in status, and its ruler was known to the Company as ‘the regent 
of  Sawu’.60 In the central part of  the island lay Seba, which at times 
was engaged in political rivalry with Timu. In the late colonial period it 
was Seba that held most of  the political power, and in 1915 its ruler, or 
duae, was eventually appointed Raja of  Sawu by the Dutch. In the early 
decades of  VOC suzerainty it was not always clear who was the actual 
‘raja’ of  a particular domain. Confused Dutch officials might mention 
two people, both of  whom had ruling prerogatives, without being certain 
who was the highest in command. As a matter of  fact, a domain would 
have its own hierarchy with various ritual functionaries, the highest being 
the deo rai (lord of  the earth) and apu lodo (descendant of  the sun). They 
were associated with the agricultural cycle of  the year. Since the ritual 
obligations of  the deo rai made them unfit for conventional lordship, the 
VOC acknowledged the apu lodo as their counterparts in political affairs, 
or in other words ‘rajas’; in the VOC records they are also variously 
known as kings, penghulu61 or regents. Since the apu lodo-ship, too, was 
incompatible with political rule, separate raja branches of  the respective 
families gradually emerged.62
Early Dutch opinions of  the Sawunese were far from positive. They 
were described as savages, and their rulers were characterized as stub-
60 Pelon 2002: 61. Curiously, there is no trace in modern tradition of  the precedence of  Timu (Gen-
eviève Duggan, National University of  Singapore, personal communication).
61 Penghulu is an old Malay princely title, later used for village chiefs or the leaders of  mosques (VOC-
Glossarium 2000:89).
62 Fox 1977:85-7. The various clans (udu) that provide rajas are extensively traced in Duggan 2008. 
Judging from her investigation, shifts of  ruling clans occurred among some of  the domains in the seven-
teenth century.
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born and untrustworthy.63 Later on, the image of  the islanders improved 
considerably. Both James Cook ( writing in 1770) and Jean-Baptiste Pelon 
(writing in 1778) lauded them as industrious and courageous people with 
comparatively high morals; for example, they took no more than one 
wife. In Pelon’s view, they were an improvement on the Rotenese (Fox 
1977:115-26; Pelon 2002:61-4). It is hard to say if  something in particu-
lar changed between the seventeenth and the late eighteenth century; 
most likely, the variations in description depend on the attitude of  the 
European observer rather than the behaviour of  the locals. Neverthless, 
there were certainly events in the early decades of  the Kupang post that 
made the Dutch distrustful of  the Sawunese – and vice versa.
The Company post in West Sumatra needed slaves to work in the gold-
mines of  Salida, since the locals were considered ‘too lazy’ to work for a 
wage. This was a rare opportunity to make the Kupang post pay for itself, 
and Batavia requested slaves from the Timor area. On Sawu, the Timu 
domain promised to deliver this commodity to the Dutch, if  they, in ex-
change, would then mediate between the Timu and Mesara. In July 1672, 
the Company servant Reynout Wagenburgh therefore went to Sawu to 
settle the affair. After some preliminaries, the Mesara attacked the Dutch 
and their companions, but were driven back by the musket fire of  the 
Europeans. Wagenburgh proceeded to set the negeri of  Mesara on fire, and 
then returned, after Timu had promised him 100-150 slaves, who would 
be available on the occasion of  the next VOC visit (Coolhaas 1968:845-6).
In early 1674, the same Reynout Wagenburgh accepted the delicate 
mission to sail from Kupang to Batumean on Timor with a delegation of  
allies. The idea was to engage in diplomatic talks with the Amarasi ruler 
and António Hornay. When they arrived at the outer coast of  Timor, 
the Dutch encountered a hornet’s nest of  intrigue. At precisely this time 
certain Atoni were conspiring with the malcontent Portuguese to murder 
Hornay. Adherents of  Hornay warned him about what was going on, 
and the stern Topass leader proceeded to take the plotters into custody. 
Under these circumstances Hornay had no time to travel the long way 
to Batumean, so there was nothing more to do for Wagenburgh, who 
turned back again. On the return trip his vessel encountered a storm and 
was driven off  course. The crew was forced to seek shelter in Timu, but 
Wagenburgh found out too late that he was not welcome there. When the 
63 VOC 1428 (1686), ff. 274b-275a.
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Dutch and their Timorese allies came ashore they were butchered by the 
Sawunese, who were led by two persons, Talo and Lifkone.64 The reason, 
according to what was later said, was the excessive number of  slaves that 
Wagenburgh had demanded on his first visit, an act which had enraged 
people in this small community.65 
When the news reached Kupang, the reaction among the Timorese 
allies was one of  fury since several aristocrats were among the victims. 
It was not until 1676, however, that Batavia was able to provide the men 
for an expedition forceful enough to punish Timu. With 220 Dutchmen 
at hand, the VOC demanded 700 warriors from Kupang, Sonbai and 
Amabi. The desire to take revenge for the massacre, and the opportuni-
ties for a good booty, ensured that there was no lack of  recruits, and in 
the end 1,100 Timorese crowded onto the Company ships. After having 
subdued four refractory nusak on Rote on the way, the armada proceeded 
to Sawu. It is significant that the Dutch brought Minggu, the manek of  
the small island of  Ndao, with them. The language and culture of  Ndao 
is close to that of  Sawu, and Minggu was useful as an interpreter in the 
negotiations that were to follow. Arriving on Sawu, the expedition was 
welcomed by the leaders of  the domain of  Seba, who saw an opportunity 
to ingratiate themselves with the Dutch to the detriment of  their rivals 
in Timu. The allied army thereupon marched against Timu. At first it 
seemed that Ama Rohi, the duae of  Timu, wanted to negotiate with the 
Dutch, but it soon became apparent that this was but a common stalling 
tactic. The population withdrew from the main negeri to a fortification 
strengthened with no less than three walls, one outside of  the other. They 
announced that they did not want peace, but would instead wait for the 
Dutch to come. The Company forces attempted to storm the first wall 
but were halted by the furious resistance put up by the defenders. On the 
next day they fared better, but only by applying the latest in European 
military technology. While two Dutch companies charged the fortifica-
tion at one point, a group of  VOC sailors, using grenades, fire jars and 
fire pikes, scaled the first wall. The second wall soon fell too, but the 
defenders of  the innermost wall still fought back desperately. An officer 
spoke to the Sawunese, and Ama Rohi appeared on the parapet with a 
peace flag, shouting ‘Sudah berkelahi’ (Enough fighting).66 
64 VOC 1311 (1675), f. 246.
65 VOC 1319 (1675-76), Dagregister, sub 15-5-1676.
66 Coolhaas 1968:108; VOC 1319 (1675-76), Dagregister, sub 9-5-1676.
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Under the cover of  negotiations, a new power game now ensued. 
Ama Rohi promised to deliver 300 slaves – men, women and children 
– as a fine for the massacre, and to extradite the instigators, Talo and 
Lifkone. Moreover, Timu would have to pay 150 taëls (5.6 kg) of  gold 
and 150 taëls of  muti lawati or coral beads to the Timorese auxiliaries 
– as we have seen, coral was greatly valued by the populations in the 
region.67 Once again, however, the deliveries were delayed, following 
tactics employed by the Sawunese. Ama Rohi knew fully well that the 
Dutch were in a miserable position and could not stay much longer on 
the island; fever rapidly spread among the troops and the majority of  the 
Europeans were too ill to march long distances. At last a captain was sent 
to the negeri with 20 soldiers and a lieutenant to settle the matter once 
and for all. He rapidly collected the people there, forcibly disarmed ev-
ery man, and gathered them all on a plain outside the settlement, where 
they found themselves surrounded by the majority of  the Company 
troops. The captain requested that the chiefs select who would become 
VOC slaves, and turn them over. The fateful selection lasted far into the 
evening, until 240 poor souls had been picked out. Then the chiefs told 
the Dutch officer that there were no more slaves in the crowd, but only 
free-born men. Considering what had happened to Wagenburgh, the 
Dutch found it unwise to aggravate the situation further and so allowed 
the rest of  the population to go back to the negeri. The remaining number 
seemed content with the outcome since the best they had hoped for was 
to be brought to Batavia as slaves. Hostages were given to ensure the 
good conduct of  Timu, and the fleet hastily left Sawu without having 
caught the actual murderers.68
Never again would the Company return in full force to Sawu. In stark 
contrast with Rote, this remained the only major expedition to the area; 
given the circumstances, one can understand why. In order to give cre-
dence to what they had threatened to do, considerable European forces 
had to be allocated, which in this case took no less than two years to im-
plement. Plagued by poor health and facing a spirited resistance, it was 
hazardous for foreign troops to stay long on Sawu (Fox 1977:113). For the 
next few hundred years the island was very much left to its own devices 
and the political problems that arose from time to time were solved by 
Dutch mediation as far as possible. The continuity of  Dutch-Sawunese 
67 For more on these muti lawati or muti salak, see Rumphius 1999:279-81.
68 Coolhaas 1968:108-9; VOC 1319 (1675-76), Dagregister, sub 9-5-1676, 15-5-1676, 16-5-1676.
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relations was also sustained by two exceedingly long reigns in the lead-
ing Timu princedom. Ama Rohi was followed by his son Rohi Rano 
(reign1678-1731), who in turn was succeeded by his grandson Hili Haba 
(reign1731-1798), who apparently has the longest documented reign in 
Indonesian history.69 None of  them escaped the perennial problem of  
domestic struggles, but throughout their amazing 120 years in power 
they were referred to as upper regents of  Sawu and generally maintained 
amicable contacts with the VOC. In the course of  the eighteenth cen-
tury, moreover, the Sawunese would provide a great service: they saved 
the skin of  the Dutch in Kupang, and subsequently raised their status.
solor
Considering its status as the original Dutch stronghold in the region, it 
is striking how the eastern half  of  Solor was left almost defenceless after 
the transfer to Kupang in 1657. Fort Henricus was allowed to fall into 
disrepair for the simple reason that too little manpower was allocated 
to Timor to allow even a very small garrison to be stationed there. The 
only European presence on Solor to Kupangconsisted of  two artillerists 
(bosschieters), who stayed there to mark the presence of  the Company. 
Their task was not entirely without danger, since the periodically recur-
ring disturbances sometimes put the life of  the Europeans at risk. Later 
on, in the eighteenth century, the Dutch interests were represented by an 
interpreter. The main lifeline between the Company and Solor were the 
visits that the opperhoofd occasionally undertook to Rote, Sawu and Solor, 
where all kinds of  local issues would be vented.
Governance was therefore basically in the hands of  the Lamaholot 
population. Among the Watan Lema princedoms, the rulers of  Lohayong 
held the highest rank as lords and dames of  Solor, at least up until 1700. 
The ambitions of  Lohayong were strengthened by the Dutch policy. It is 
difficult to comprehend the exact prerogatives of  these lords before the 
onset of  early colonial dominance, but in later tradition, the seventeenth 
century was remembered as the age of  a veritable sultanate. The his-
torical Kaicili Pertawi (reign before 1613-1645) was known as Sultan Sili 
69 His accession is noted in VOC 2192 (1730-31), Dagregister, sub 11-3-1731, 7-6-1731. His son and 
successor Jara Hili asked the VOC for investiture in 1798, in a letter preserved in LOr 2238, UB Leiden. 
Oral traditions about these personages are discussed in Duggan 2008:227-32.
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Pertawi and was said to have miraculous local origins; he was the alleged 
brother of  the founder-sultans of  Solo, Malacca, Gowa, Buton, Ambon 
and Bima.70 His widow and successor, Nyai Cili (reign 1646-1664), was 
legitimized by an oral tradition that closely followed the stranger king 
theme which is so common in this part of  Indonesia. The story is inter-
esting since it was recorded by the Dutch as early as 1706, and was used 
as an argument in a succession issue in Lohayong.
The story has it that the ancestor of  one of  the claimants once ruled 
over Lohayong and all of  Solor. At this time Nyai Cili, a woman from 
Keeda (Kedah, or possibly Kedang on Lembata), was expelled from her 
birthplace and subsequently sailed to Solor with a number of  retain-
ers. Arriving in Lohayong she met the lord of  the land who received 
his guests politely. Firstly, he gave the upper part of  his residence to the 
foreigners to sleep in. Nyai Cili felt embarrassed and pointed out that 
he was the chief  and regent, and that this was not proper behaviour 
regarding newcomers. The lord insisted, however. When it was time to 
eat, the lord of  the land served the lady a buck’s head. Again Nyai Cili 
remarked that the host, as a headman, should have the right to eat the 
head. Again the lord insisted that she keep the buck’s head. Nyai Cili 
then commented, ‘If  you want things that way [then so be it]. Once the 
upper place, once the head, then always the head.’ From that point on-
wards, she was given the reins of  power over Solor. Adherents of  the old 
lord of  the land proposed to have her killed, but the lord impeded their 
intent with the words ‘Why would we want to have that blood upon our 
hands?’ It was decided that she and her bloodline were to govern Solor 
henceforth. Only if  it became extinct, could the descent of  the lord of  
the land again stake a claim.71
The legend points towards a ritual division between an original 
owner of  the land, and a newcomer who gains executive powers by cer-
tain abilities, a theme that closely parallels the relationship between, for 
example, the Kune lord and the Sonbai ancestor. Historical documents 
clearly depict Nyai Cili as the wife rather than honoured guest of  the old 
Kaicili Pertawi, meaning perhaps that history may have been altered to 
suit the stranger king theme. The semi-detailed Dutch records also show 
that the historical Nyai Cili was resolute in her defence of  the lands that 
the Dutch neglected, at the same time as being good-hearted by nature 
70 Dietrich 1984:320-1, 324. Ambon, of  course, was in fact no sultanate. 
71 VOC 1728 (1706), ff. 138-40.
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and someone who strove to avoid the spilling of  blood when possible. 
Even if  she did not exactly match the criteria of  the legend, she would 
be, in a way, worthy of  the legend.
The closeness of  East Solor to the Portuguese-dominated Demon 
territories made for continuous trouble. Like on Timor, Rote and Sawu, 
low-scale violence and regional factionalism was endemic, underpinned 
but not solely conditioned by the early colonial rivalries. Already in 1659, 
two years after the Dutch sortie, the Dutch renegade Jan van Adrichem 
led a Larantuqueiro raid to Solor with seven perahu. He burnt the Solorese 
ships and, performing the ultimate blasphemy, torched the mosque of  
Lohayong. Maintaining a state of  hostilities was clearly not in the interest 
of  local society, and the elderly but enterprising Nyai Cili proceeded to 
make peace with the Larantuqueiros of  her own accord, without discuss-
ing the matter with Kupang. She promptly forced the other sengaji to sail 
with her to Larantuka in March 1661. Although the visit was marred by a 
bloody incident with a Catholic priest, the enterprise seems to have borne 
fruit. While the Dutch may have perceived this as a suspicious act, as the 
visit involved contact with a Portuguese client, to the Solorese it was seen 
as the most practical thing to do at that point in time.72 
Local and Dutch understandings of  Solorese kingship were at odds 
with each other, as indicated by the events surrounding Nyai Cili’s death 
in March 1664. When she felt her end approaching Nyai Cili wrote to 
the Governor General in Batavia and asked for five picul of  white cloth 
for her funerary shroud, and an elephant tusk to use as her ‘pillow’ 
when she was dead, all in accordance with Solorese adat. Since she stood 
alone in the world, she said, she bequeathed her land to the Company. 
The visibly moved Governor General Joan Maetsuyker replied with a 
glowing letter in which he proposed that Dasi, the sengaji of  the whaling 
village Lamakera on easternmost Solor, should be made the new lord of  
the league. At that moment, Dasi was visiting Batavia where he made 
a very good impression on Maetsuyker, who judged him to be a loyal 
and capable man. On Solor, however, something completely different 
happened when the queen passed away. After two months the Dutch 
opperhoofd Hugo Cuylenburgh – a man who did not get along well with 
either his fellow countrymen or the locals – arrived at Fort Henricus to 
take stock of  affairs. To his astonishment, he heard from the gathered 
72 Dagh-Register 1887-1931, the year 1661:218-9.
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Solorese grandees that not Dasi but rather a young granddaughter of  
Nyai Cili had been appointed as ruler of  the land, ostensibly according 
to the last wish of  the deceased queen. When Cuylenburgh asked Dasi 
about the matter, he first kept quiet. When the irritated opperhoofd repeat-
ed the question, Dasi craftily replied, ‘Why do you ask me?’ Upon closer 
enquiry, Cuylenburgh found that the Dutch had gravely misunderstood 
issues of  precedence and that Dasi certainly was appreciated among the 
Lamaholot, but held no high status. If  indeed Dasi had been appointed, 
the only result would have been a general tumult.73
The Solorese kingship was upheld by the new female ruler Nyai Cili 
Muda (reign 1664-1686), and then by her nephew, sengaji Cili (reign 
1687-1700). Neither of  them had the authority of  their illustrious fore-
bear, and in particular Nyai Cili Muda had problems keeping internal 
peace among the individual members of  the Watan Lema league.74 
When sengaji Cili succumbed to an epidemic that ravaged the islands in 
1700, the idea of  having one paramount power weakened. Two families 
competed for governance and attempted to draw in the Company as ar-
biter. In the end, this led to a split where one faction governed Lohayong 
and were recognized as sengaji by the VOC, while the other faction gov-
erned the nearby village of  Menanga. The sengaji of  Lohayong kept the 
first rank in the political hierarchy, but they were no longer referred to 
as ‘lords of  Solor’.
The other four princedoms included in the Watan Lema league 
(Lamakera, Lamahala, Terong and Adonara) were often at each other’s 
throats. For long periods, they constituted a graver danger for each other 
than the Demon territories under Portuguese influence did. Lamakera 
warred with Lamahala directly across the strait, and Lamahala in turn 
lived in periodical hostility with the neighbouring village of  Terong. 
Adonara, on the north coast of  the island with the same name, usually 
took no part in these troubles but was occasionally drawn into them. When 
the Dutch officials made their regular visits they summoned the various 
sengaji to Fort Henricus (although Adonara usually failed to appear) and 
73 VOC 1246 (1664), ff. 1585-6. The sengaji dynasty of  Dasi might have been recent at the time; at 
least, modern tradition points out Dasi as the ancestor of  the later sengaji (interview, Haji Muhammad 
Hasan, Lamakera, 16-6-2006). The first sengaji of  Lamakera, according to tradition, was Juang Meto, an 
immigrant from Sikka on Flores, whose family was subsequently replaced by that of  Dasi. Possibly this 
Juang Meto refers to Dom João, known to have governed Lamakera in 1598. Compare with Abdul Kadir 
Sika, n.y.
74 VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, sub 18-11-1680.
237
6 Kupang and the five loyal allies, 1658-1700s |
admonished the aristocrats to obey the lord or dame of  Lohayong. 
From a Dutch point of  view, Lamakera was the most reliable of  
these domains to prop up VOC authority on Solor. However, looking 
at it from a different point of  view, sengaji Dasi and his descendants 
pursued a consistent policy of  leaning towards the Dutch side in order 
to strengthen their regional network. Dasi himself  enjoyed a long reign 
from circa 1655 to 1701, and therefore became a symbol of  continuity 
during the first formative half-century of  VOC influence. While he was 
not always popular with the individual opperhoofden, he knew how to make 
himself  indispensible. He repeatedly travelled to Batavia on Dutch keels, 
something that very few other rulers in the region did. In later oral tradi-
tion this was even given a mythologized slant, as the sengaji was alleged 
to have walked across the water to Java where he exchanged ceremonial 
tongkat with a sultan.75 Since the Solorese were considered to be the only 
truly skilful seamen in this part of  the archipelago, they were useful to 
the Company in a number of  ways. In the early years of  the Kupang 
post, it was agreed that a community of  Lamakera could stay in the area 
henceforth known as Kampung Solor, a few hundred meters east of  Fort 
Concordia; there they caught fish at the behest of  the Company. The 
sengaji of  Lamakera sometimes stayed in the kampung too, to the irrita-
tion of  the Dutch, who believed that the sengaji were more useful back 
home. The Solorese were able to sail great distances with their small 
boats: when the Dutch opperhoofden suddenly passed away in 1714 and 
1740 respectively, at times when it was not possible to send Dutch vessels 
to Batavia, the sengaji in person undertook the demanding (but creditable) 
trip to communicate the news to the Governor General.76
Lamakera’s relations with its neighbour Lohayong were not always 
positive, as they both competed for the overlord-ship of  Solor (Coolhaas 
1976:73). The Lamakera nevertheless carefully avoided direct confronta-
tions – after all, Lohayong was home to Fort Henricus and the two Dutch 
artillerists. In 1682, Dasi made a rash attempt to persuade the Dutch 
to make Lamakera their new Solorese centre. In a letter to Governor 
General Cornelis Speelman, he tried to cast Nyai Cili Muda in a dubious 
75 Interview, Haji Muhammad Hasan, Lamakera, 16-6-2006. Oral tradition refers to him as Nene 
Dasi. That this must be the same figure as the historical Dasi is shown by the enumeration of  his five 
sons, four of  which are also found in VOC documents: Kana Puis, Karaeng Barang (d. after 1693), Abu 
Bakar (reign 1701-21), Subang Pulo (Jacob alias Pulo, d. after 1694), and Bajoamang (Jan Rotterdam 
alias Bayama, d. after 1688).
76 VOC 1853 (1714), ff. 9-12; Van Goor 2004:645.
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light, and declared that he had built a new fortification in Lamakera that 
he had given the glorious name ‘Groot Hollandia’. He was only waiting 
for the Company to come and live there, he said, and he strongly sug-
gested that Speelman should allocate a scribe, four soldiers and some 
merchants.77 The Company was obviously not taken with the idea, 
but Groot Hollandia is occasionally mentioned in the documents from 
this time. The fortress was presumably made of  wood, for unlike Fort 
Henricus, nothing remains of  it today.
Dasi forged a comprehensive network in the region. With his seaborne 
villagers he assisted the Dutch in their dealings with Alor and Pantar, 
where he had economic interests. He was also given an official trading 
pass that enabled his ships to frequent Rote, Sawu, Bima and Wetar – in 
other words, a rather extensive area. The condition that was imposed, 
was that the trade should not be harmful to Company interests. After 
some years, the Dutch authorities changed their minds and forbade Dasi 
to go to Wetar, which lay within another VOC residency.78 Nevertheless, 
the Dagregisters of  Kupang frequently mention Lamakeran trading ex-
peditions that went to Rote via Kupang. These expeditions were fully 
approved by the authorities, and were usually headed by members of  the 
sengaji family. They offered Rotenese items such as coconuts, beans and 
trai oil, and sold it for gula and salt.79 Among Dasi’s several wives was an 
aristocratic Rotenese lady, possibly from Ringgou, and indeed, Dasi was 
used by the Dutch in their complicated dealings with the Rotenese. Due 
to his personal network of  contacts, Dasi could speak with recalcitrant 
princes on behalf  of  the Company, and he took an active part in the ex-
pedition to Rote and Sawu in 1676. His dynastic network even extended 
to Timor, since his son Jacob was married to the daughter of  the Helong 
regent, Ama Susang.80 How these marriages with non-Muslim spouses 
were compatible with the Muslim creed of  the Solorese is not specified, 
but it is likely that religious differences were still of  limited importance 
in a context like this; Dasi himself  moreover gave two of  his sons the 
Christian Dutch names Jacob and Jan Rotterdam. It is significant that 
oral tradition was not content to retell his prosaic death in March 1701 
77 Dagh-Register 1887-1931, the year 1682:1188-90.
78 VOC 1609 (1698), f. 62.
79 VOC 1481 (1689-90), Dagregister, sub 24-9-1689.
80 Coolhaas 1971:105-10; VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 27-5-1687, 20-8-1687; VOC 1553 
(1693-94), Dagregister, sub 26-11-1693; VOC 1663 (1702), f. 72-3.
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at a ripe old age, but instead gave it a supernatural aspect connected to 
his frequent travels overseas. After visiting his Dutch allies in Kupang, his 
craft returned to Solor, but had an accident at sea, just off  Lamakera. The 
ship capsized, but Dasi was a good swimmer and managed to reach the 
shore. Meanwhile, the Lamakera assumed that their lord had drowned 
and prepared a mortuary feast. When Dasi approached Lamakera, alive 
and well, he perceived that something unusual was going on. He asked 
a fisherman why they were organizing a feast, and got the answer that 
it was for him. On hearing this, the sengaji was overcome by shame and 
disappeared in a moment without leaving a trace (hilang).81 
One might expect the Dutch-Portuguese peace of  1663 to have en-
sured that there would be no more aggression from the Larantuqueiros 
against the Watan Lema. As it turned out, this was not quite the case. 
There were in fact continuous raids and counter-raids between the 
coastal Paji and land-oriented Demon territories, which were carried out 
with varying degrees of  success. In the 1670s, a vendetta arose when the 
Larantuqueiros attacked and burnt the negeri Adonara, abducting two 
women in the process. It appeared that António Hornay had no hand 
in this raid, yet nor did he care to punish the perpetrators. However, 
the princes of  Lamakera and Terong decided to exact vengeance of  
their own accord without asking for permission from the opperhoofd in 
distant Kupang. In 1679, they set forth with five perahu and sailed over to 
Kawela on the nearby island of  Lembata, which was under Portuguese 
control. Kawela probably had nothing whatsoever to do with the raid, 
but for the sengaji this was less important. The Solorese were fiercely 
resisted and the sengaji of  Terong and his son were killed on the shore, 
while the Lamakera commander only barely escaped, thanks to his loyal 
retainers (Coolhaas 1971:407). Years later, Dasi of  Lamakera report-
edly created trouble on Ataúro, an island north of  Dili that belonged to 
the Portuguese sphere. In 1689, Hornay complained bitterly about the 
Solorese when he met the Dutch opperhoofd Willem Moerman in Lifau, 
and demanded Dutch consent to take revenge on the troublemakers of  
Lamahala and Terong. Moerman replied ‘that His Excellency was more 
than well acquainted with the character of  these people, and their thiev-
ish nature and inborn villainy’. This villainy, he pointed out, pertained 
not only to theirs but also to Hornay’s clients.82 Hornay made no further 
81 Interview, Haji Muhammad Hasan, Lamakera, 16-6-2006.
82 VOC 1481 (1689-90), Dagregister, sub 14-6-1689.
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comments but switched subjects to discuss trade, and the conversation 
indicates the very negative generalizations that were made about non-
Christian populations. Although they were long-time allies, the Solorese 
were little more than an innate problem in the eyes of  even an able of-
ficial like Willem Moerman. 
As for the obnoxious Lamahala and Terong, they were dealt with 
six years later when António’s brother Francisco Hornay was in charge 
of  the Topass community. Forty-eight perahu, manned with Timorese, 
Dutch deserters and other Topass clients, departed from Larantuka in 
September 1695. They stormed the two coastal villages after facing 
only weak resistance, and returned to Larantuka with a booty consist-
ing of  ships and artillery. The Dutch did nothing about this apart from 
issuing mild requests to cease the hostilities and extradite the Dutch 
renegades.83 As in the case of  the Amarasi invasion of  1679, it was im-
plicitly understood that the acting combatants were the Larantuqueiros 
and Lamahala-Terong, not Hornay and the VOC.
Dutch anxiousness also extended to other areas. From a VOC point 
of  view at least, there were distant threats against the balance they 
were trying to achieve in the Lamaholot world. Although the double 
kingdom of  Gowa and Tallo’ had been ruined through the campaigns 
of  1667 and 1669, the defeated populations of  South Sulawesi were far 
from cowed. Makassarese and Bugis refugee groups went overseas in all 
directions, from Sumatra to Maluku, and were even able to found new 
kingdoms and dynasties. There were also a large number of  traders 
from Sulawesi, collectively known as Makassarese, who plied the waters 
of  the archipelago to seek their fortune with or, especially, without, 
Company passes. Trade without passes was of  course considered highly 
detrimental to Company interests, and one professed aim of  the Timor 
post was precisely to stop the Makassarese network from expanding into 
this part of  the archipelago. The matter was complicated by the weak-
ness of  the garrison of  Fort Concordia. The local Company authorities 
had very few ships to hand, and were consequently unable to perform 
the type of  policing expeditions that the posts in Makassar and Maluku 
undertook. The result was that they had to trust the more loyal Solorese 
allies, in particular Lohayong and Lamakera, to keep watch against 
suspect seafarers. The arrangement was not always successful, however, 
83 VOC 7905 (1696), ff. 12-4.
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for unauthorized ships did arrive from time to time. 
The sultan of  Buton, a VOC ally since many years, had a stake in 
the conquest of  Solor back in 1613, and still cultivated interests in the 
Lamaholot area in the second half  of  the seventeenth century. In 1681, 
Sultan Zainuddin dispatched a fleet that carried letters to António Hornay, 
Lamahala and the sengaji of  Belagar on Pantar. The Solorese allies used the 
Buton connection to complain to the sultan about the hostile Portuguese 
attitude.84 The protection granted by the VOC and laid down in the vari-
ous contracts and agreements apparently did not suffice. Solemn asser-
tions that the land of  Solor was the land of  the Company turned out to 
be worth very little when the Larantuqueiros and their clients on Adonara 
and Lembata staged violent forays. The shared identity of  Islam was a 
factor in these contacts. Curiously, in the letters that Sultan Zainuddin sent 
to António Hornay, he appears to have conferred the Solorese lands to 
Hornay. On receiving these letters, Hornay employed his usual policy of  
ambiguity: he announced their existence to the Kupang authorities, who 
were naturally incensed about the impertinent declaration of  the sultan, 
but then declined to show one of  them to the Dutch officials under the 
pretext that he had lost it.85 From other sources we know that Buton com-
peted for influence over various spots in the archipelago with the sultan 
of  Ternate. As the defiant Ternatean ruler Sibori Amsterdam was appre-
hended by the Dutch in 1681, the Butonese attempted to strengthen their 
positions. In 1683, Sibori Amsterdam had to sign a contract that turned 
Ternate into a VOC fief, where it was specified that the old and ostensi-
bly unfounded claims on ‘Solor and so on’ were nullified.86 As a matter 
of  fact, the Butonese did occasionally support the Solorese over the next 
decades, much to the resentment of  the VOC authorities but with very 
limited consequences for the political status of  the area.87
From an economic point of  view, Solor and the adjacent VOC allies 
had little to offer the colonial apparatus. The merchandise brought to 
84 VOC 1375 (1681-82), Dagregister, sub 11-11-1681; VOC 1400 (1683-84), Dagregister, sub 10-10-
1683. On Sultan Zainuddin, see also Sejarah dan adat, II, 1977:67-9. Indigenous Butonese sources say 
nothing in particular about the sultan’s interest in Solor.
85 VOC 1400 (1683-84), Dagregister, sub 7-3-1684; Coolhaas 1971:612.
86 Stapel 1934:310-1. In the same contract it is specified that the Butonese were officially forbidden to 
frequent Solor from the beginning of  1683. Limited possibilities to police the seas made the prohibition 
ineffective.
87 Sultan Liauddin Ismail of  Buton was deposed in 1697 as a consequence of  his poor conduct during 
a relief  expedition against Lifau and Larantuka (Coolhaas 1975:786). Butonese sources allege that he 
stepped down due to old age (Sejarah dan adat, II, 1977:74).
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Kupang was mainly intended for local consumption, and only a limited 
number of  slaves were acquired by the Solorese on the coast of  Flores 
and on Lembata and the Alor group, either through trade or petty 
warfare. When the customary gifts of  the allies were collected to be 
transported from Kupang to Batavia, the contribution from Lohayong 
and Lamakera would consist only of  a few slaves. The internal Solorese 
economy is only patchily documented in the VOC records, since it was 
of  little interest for the Dutch. What we can tell, however, is that this 
seafaring people had an area of  activity that stretched from mid-Flores 
to Wetar in Maluku, where fishing, whaling and petty trade played 
an important part. The relations between the Paji and the Demon 
and Portuguese were not just marked by constant hostility, but also by 
amicable commercial intercourse – what the Dutch opperhoofden would 
frequently castigate as ‘smuggling’.
the alor group
A letter from the queen of  Solor in 1682 presented her claims in the 
following words: 
The headman, Johannes van den Broeck, in your fortress in Kupang is 
my witness that Nyai Cili Muda reigns with honour and respect over the 
land of  Solor from the mountains, to the shores of  Alor and through to 
Ende; and that all this stands under the government of  Nyai Cili Muda, 
with any good or bad, right or wrong that Nyai Cili Muda commits. But 
all this is under the control of  the Company, since the land and waters of  
Solor are Company land. (De Roever 2002:284.)
The idea that the queen ‘reigned’ over the Alor group, let alone Ende, 
was exaggerated, but not entirely plucked out of  thin air. Other records 
show that there were indeed forms of  exchange between the Solorese and 
Alorese, epitomized in the twentieth-century tradition that the two leagues 
of  Watan Lema and Galiyao, with five members each, were like two open 
hands with their ten digits. The complicated nomenclature is indicated by 
the reference in a VOC source to ‘Pantar, otherwise called Alor’.88 Alor re-
88 VOC 1252 (1665), f. 667.
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ferred to a domain in the north-western part of  the island that today bears 
the same name, but it was also understood as a general name for Pantar 
and Alor, the latter of  which was usually known as Malua or Ombai.
That the Solorese actively intervened there is first stated in a VOC 
report from 1665. The enterprising Dasi of  Lamakera promised the 
Company he would deliver sapanwood, a wood used for dyeing and as 
a ballast on European ships. Solor did not have any sapan forests, so 
Dasi led an expedition to Pantar, where he stayed for three months, and 
enjoyed good relations with one of  the Galiyao rajas whom he offered 
armed assistance. The sapanwood only grew far up in the highlands, 
and when the Solorese marched uphill with some local pathfinders they 
were met by stout mountain people – Alphoeren in the Dutch terminol-
ogy. The mountain people proved hostile to foreign visitors and attacked 
Dasi’s men, causing some of  the pathfinders to be injured and the ex-
pedition to retreat to the coast. Dasi later commented that the valuable 
sapanwood could be readily acquired if  only the Solorese were accom-
panied by a few Company soldiers carrying muskets. The opperhoofd was 
not taken by this idea, however.89
Apart from a brief  visit by a free burgher in 1675, the first foray un-
dertaken by the Kupang post occurred in 1677. It had all the character-
istics of  a voyage of  discovery to the islands over which the VOC claimed 
indirect suzerainty. The official Johannes van den Broeck – born in 
Taiwan and thus probably a Eurasian – sailed to Solor where he joined 
forces with Dasi, who wanted to purchase warships (backaleys-prauwen, 
perahu berkelahi) at Alor. After a few days travel the expedition arrived at 
Pandai on north-eastern Pantar. Its ruler was characterized as the over-
lord of  the surrounding negeri, and also of  the negeri Alor on the opposite 
coast. The local ruler, Sako Mede, appeared overjoyed at the Dutch visit, 
which he had long been waiting for.90 He said he would be happy to sell 
89 VOC 1252 (1665), ff. 667-8. The term ‘Alphoeren’, Alfurs, was used for various low-technology 
groups in eastern Indonesia, especially in Central Maluku.
90 There was already a history of  diplomacy concerning the Alorese leaders. The Dutch opperhoofd 
Jacob van Wijckersloot met a certain Nae Saku ‘of  Alor’, who visited Kupang in 1673. This is a different 
figure than Sako Mede; he governed as Kapitan of  Dulolong close to Alor Besar and is a legendary figure 
on Alor to this day. Nae Saku asserted that the negeri Alor, Pandai, Belagar and Barnusa had stood under 
the authority and protection of  the Company for years, and even kept Dutch flags. For some reason Kui, 
in modern accounts described as the fifth component of  Galiyao, is not mentioned here. Later in history, 
Kui sometimes claimed to be an adherent of  the Portuguese. The composition of  the Galiyao bond may 
have fluctuated over time. Reynout Wagenburgh later met Nae Saku on Solor and noted his enthusiasm 
at receiving a Dutch delegation (VOC 1301 [1673-74], Dagregister, sub 2-10-1673, 15-10-1673).
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beeswax and slaves in return for cloths; upon closer inspection, however, 
the goods he could offer turned out to be rather modest: three picul of  
beeswax and three slave girls. Van den Broeck handed over a Dutch flag 
as a token of  vassal-ship and sailed over the strait to the negeri Alor. The 
merchandise there turned out to be just as frugal, but the chief  explained 
this was due to the fact that the mountain people preferred to ignore the 
coastal rajas in the west. Instead they brought the beeswax to the eastern 
coast, where the Portuguese bought it. The chief  suggested the Dutch 
bring 5,000-6,000 cutlasses and axes to Alor next time to use as objects 
of  exchange. In this way, the coastal dwellers could perhaps attract the 
mountain people and persuade them to deliver the beeswax to them.91 
In the seventeenth century, there was no more peace between the 
Galiyao domains than between the Watan Lema components. At the 
time of  Van den Broeck’s visit, Alor had been at war with Belagar in 
south-eastern Pantar for five years. The circumstances shed an interest-
ing light on the role of  the ruler of  Lohayong in relation to Galiyao. 
Alor declared that it would not make peace with Belagar unless Nyai 
Cili Muda herself  came there and mediated. The queen had already 
sent a peace flag (a symbol of  peacemaking) to the chief  of  Belagar, 
but this was not deemed sufficient.92 Thus, while the queen of  Solor 
had no governing authority in these quarters, her position was still very 
significant when it came to the resolution of  conflicts. Her functions 
thereby partly parallel those of  the maromak oan of  Wehali on Timor, 
and certain other ritually revered, but politically weak, paramount lords 
in the archipelago.
The Alorese maintained sporadic contact with the Company dur-
ing the following generations. Enterprising rajas sailed to Kupang in 
person in order to sell coconuts, areca nuts and other items of  little 
consequence.93 During certain periods in the first half  of  the eighteenth 
century, Pantar and Alor were often visited by merchants from Kupang, 
a trade that only seems to have taken off  when Chinese people began 
91 VOC 1335 (1677-78), Dagregister, sub 11-8-1677, 15-8-1677, 18-8-1677. The famous moko (drums) 
of  Alor, which were essential objects in marital exchanges, are not explicitly mentioned in the VOC 
sources. In the late colonial period they were imported by Makassarese traders together with gongs. 
There is a reference in VOC 1663 (1702), f. 7, to the Makassarese import of  gongs to Alor, and the Dutch 
term gommen may loosely include both gong and moko.
92 VOC 1335 (1677-78), Dagregister, sub 18-8-1677.
93 VOC 1358 (1679-80), Dagregister, sub 6-7-1680, 17-7-1680. It was noted that the Alorese princes 
extended their trading activities to Wetar and Ataúro to obtain slaves and beeswax for the Company.
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to settle there. On the other hand, the Alorese had no real intention of  
sustaining the monopoly policy of  the distant Company whose flags they 
had received; Dutchmen who visited the Portuguese ports of  Lifau and 
Tulang Ikan in the eighteenth century sometimes found Alorese boats 
at the roadstead. The authorities of  Kupang had an interest in keeping 
Makassarese and Portuguese visitors away from the island group, but 
otherwise had no intention of  intervening. From the mid-eighteenth 
century there is very little information available on Alor, but what little 
there is suggests that the Company no longer had any insight into local 
affairs there. In 1785 the governor of  the Banda Islands complained 
to Batavia that the people of  Wetar were harassed by marauders from 
Galiyao.94 The complaint was forwarded to Kupang, whose opperhoofd 
came to the conclusion that ‘this place […] does not belong to the island 
of  Great Timor, but is situated on the island of  Alor on [read: opposite] 
the north coast of  Timor, and has no connection with the Company; for 
that reason it is outside our capabilities to impede these people from go-
ing to Wetar or elsewhere.’95
problems of surveillance – a case study
For a garrison consisting of  far fewer than a hundred Europeans, it was 
a demanding task to monitor the various dependencies or semi-depen-
dencies, especially considering the rough and tricky sea roads. A detailed 
case from 1686-1687 may illustrate how matters could easily slip out of  
control for the Company, and how the problems of  surveillance were 
aggravated by the failure of  the European staff  to adhere to the rules 
and regulations.
Floris Jansz was a sailor from Katwijk who was established in Kupang 
by the 1670s and later on served as an artillerist at Fort Henricus. After 
94 Today there are still disputes between Alor and Wetar over access to mother-of-pearl resources.
95 VOC 3810 (1788), f. 50. According to a Dutch report from 1847 (ANRI Timor: 57, Register der 
handelingen en besluiten, sub 14-11-1847), the comprehensive Sepulu Pantai league, comprising the five 
Solorese-Adonarese and the five Alorese-Pantarese princedoms, was split up in 1820 due to internal 
conflicts. After that, a Dutch posthouder called Evers was placed on Alor-Pantar. Finally, this post was 
liquidated by the commissioner Emanuel Francis in 1831. By the 1840s, some of  the Alorese domains 
were susceptible to Portuguese political influence, especially via the old Topass stronghold of  Oecusse. 
The Alor issue was one of  the factors in the diplomatic discussions which eventually, in 1851, led to a 
first division of  areas into a Dutch and a Portuguese sphere of  influence; the division was confirmed in 
1859 (Pélissier 1996:27-9).
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his service for the VOC had ended, he remained in Kupang as a free 
burgher. One set of  circumstances made him a person of  note in the 
small port community that evolved around Fort Concordia: in 1679 he 
married the widow Pieternella, who was nothing less than a Helong prin-
cess, and the daughter of  King Ama Pono II. Marriages between local 
aristocrats and Europeans were not uncommon in seventeenth-century 
Kupang, and similar marriages were conducted by the Portuguese. It was 
clearly a strategic choice made by the royal and regent families to secure 
matrimonial ties with the stranger lords, thereby improving their bar-
gaining position. The European husbands were important channels of  
interaction, even if  they were roughshod characters as was the case here. 
In the extant documents, Floris Jansz usually appears as a troublemaker 
who regularly violated the rules set up by the Company administration, 
and who could behave quite rudely towards his Timorese in-laws. In 
1693 or 1694 he asked the Helong regent Ama Susang to let his horse 
graze on Pulau Semau for a while. After a while Jansz ordered the horse 
to be shipped back to Kupang, but since it was found to be quite emaci-
ated, he claimed that this was not his mount. He led the horse to the door 
of  Ama Susang’s sonaf, and the king appeared. The Dutchman drew his 
cutlass and struck the animal dead with a furious blow, yelling to the re-
gent: ‘Now, eat the horse with hide and hair!’ Brandishing his cutlass he 
rushed into the sonaf with the apparent intention of  killing Ama Susang, 
who hastily escaped with his wife and child. His son-in-law Jacob, the son 
of  sengaji Dasi of  Lamakera, was injured, and deep scores in the pillars of  
the sonaf henceforth reminded its inhabitants of  the incident. Only after 
a few days had elapsed, did Ama Susang dare to return to his residence. 
That such a matter could go unpunished indicates, of  course, the liber-
ties that certain Europeans could afford to take, even towards the local 
aristocracy – although in this case it is important to note that Jansz’s wife 
was of  higher birth than Ama Susang.96
Several years before this incident, in late August 1686, three Dutch 
96 VOC 1623 (1699), ff. 72-3. The story was written down by Paulus van Coupang, a local Christian 
who served as a krankbezoeker (visitor of  the sick, a low clerical position), and was one of  the few literate 
Timorese in early colonial Kupang. Ama Susang was the uncle of  Pieternella, and thus a (classificatory) 
brother of  the deceased ruler Ama Pono II. He was the regent of  the Helong kingdom from before 1673 
to 1698, and was known to the VOC authorities as the ‘king’. Nevertheless, he was probably of  low birth 
on his mother’s side, and had no real claim to the actual kingship. As for Floris Jansz, he also traded 
alcohol in his own house in Kupang to the detriment of  the Dutch leaseholder of  such a business (VOC 
1460 [1688-89], Dagregister, sub 2-10-1688).
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ships left Kupang for Solor. After six days the sailors arrived before Fort 
Henricus and the Dutch leaders arranged a routine meeting with the 
Solorese sengaji. When this had taken place, two of  the vessels departed 
from Solor again, leaving the sloop De Steenbocq with assistant Hendrick 
Tilingh as captain. Tilingh brought along his wife, the Christian Kupang-
born woman Dina Cornelisz. Dina viewed the journey as a pleasure trip, 
an opinion she would soon have reason to alter. Floris Jansz was also on 
board, and as De Steenbocq lay at anchor off  Lohayong he ordered some 
valuables belonging to him to be taken on board: nine slaves (eight male 
and one female) and a few picul of  beeswax. In this period many slaves 
were acquired from Flores, while some originated from Lembata and the 
Alor group. Back in Kupang they could either be used in domestic work 
or sent on to Batavia for a modest profit. The artillerist Jacob Cevelaar 
questioned the arrangement, but Jansz asserted that this had been per-
mitted by the council in Kupang. Hendrick Tilingh agreed with Jansz, 
and Cevelaar did not dare to make any further protests. The sloop even-
tually set out for the return trip to Kupang on 10 September.97
At first the slaves were kept in cages, but once the ship had reached 
the middle of  the Sawu Sea they were allowed to stay on the deck. 
The sailors hid any potential weapons like axes. At daybreak on 15 
September, Tilingh and his wife lay asleep in a tent on the deck, where 
the weapons were also kept. The cook Barent Pietersz was already awake 
and in the process of  washing some rice to cook for breakfast, and at the 
helm stood his mate Isaaq Barents. Suddenly they became aware of  a 
violent tumult. One way or another, the slaves had located the chest in 
the tent. Helping themselves to the cutlasses and axes, they made a con-
certed attack on the baffled Europeans. Barent Pietersz ran towards the 
tent but found nothing to defend himself  with, and jumped overboard 
with a gash in his side. Isaaq Barents grabbed the rudder-pole, but real-
izing the poor odds he, too, decided to jump overboard. The entire crew, 
seven people in total, managed to reach the barge that was tied to the 
sloop. Tilingh shouted to Dina to jump overboard, but to no avail: either 
she was afraid of  the sea or else the slaves had taken her.98
The set-upon Dutchmen managed to steer the barge towards Solor. 
En route, two of  them died of  their wounds and were cast into the sea, 
and when they finally reached the coast and waded ashore, Tilingh 
97 VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 9-10-1686.
98 VOC 8310 (1686-87), ff. 4-5.
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drowned in the breakers while his exhausted shipmates were unable to 
save him. Floris Jansz and the three others were helped by a boy and 
brought to the settlers in the hills, and thence back to Fort Henricus. It 
was now disclosed that the transport of  the slaves had not been permit-
ted by Kupang at all. In his daily recordings, the Dutch opperhoofd Willem 
Moerman later cursed the careless conduct of  Hendrick Tilingh and 
the deception of  Floris Jansz, which had cost the Company dearly.99 As 
for the slaves, they brought De Steenbocq to Leva on a part of  the coast 
of  Flores that belonged to the Portuguese sphere. The boat was burnt 
by the locals, probably to avoid trouble, and the slaves headed for the 
highlands where no VOC force would be able to reach them. They took 
Dina Cornelisz with them and ended up in a village called Wolowea.100 
Weak as they were, the Dutch in Kupang were not willing to let an act 
of  defiance of  such magnitude go unpunished. Given the circumstances, 
the only option was to send the two artillerists of  Solor to Larantuka 
and ask their less than reliable friend António Hornay for assistance. 
Hornay promised to send any perpetrators that his people might catch 
to Kupang. Not long afterwards, the artillerist Cevelaar heard from the 
capitão mor that one of  the slaves had actually been caught by Jumat, an 
orangkaya from Barai in the Ende area, which had a nominal connection 
with the Watan Lema and the Company.
So far, things looked hopeful for the Dutch authorities, but then 
something went awry. Jumat sailed from Ende to Lohayong, carrying a 
letter written by the dominee (priest) of  Barai to inform the Dutch about 
the capture.101 Arriving at Lohayong he was confronted by a grandee 
called Tulitamma, who took the letter and forbade the Ende to deliver 
the message to the artillerists on pain of  death, reportedly saying: ‘What 
concern is it to the Dutch dogs? If  they are dead, then let them remain 
dead. The slaves have made a quest for their freedom.’102 Jumat was 
scared and hastily returned to Ende. The issue nevertheless came to the 
attention of  the Dutch, and they called the man back to Lohayong, where 
he told them about Tulitamma’s threatening behaviour. On the following 
day the grandees of  Lohayong were summoned by the artillerists, who 
99 VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 9-10-1686.
100 VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 2-1-1687.
101 Dominee is a Dutch term, which in this case might refer to a Muslim imam or shaykh. If  so, then the 
letter was probably written in the Arabic-derived Jawi script, which was also used on Solor.
102 VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 24-3-1687.
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questioned Tulitamma over the matter. The latter could give no satisfac-
tory explanation, and the two Dutchmen declared that they would have 
to send him to Kupang for further investigation. Tulitamma now wished 
to leave since it was time to eat. ‘You shall remain here’, replied Jacob 
Cevelaar, ‘Your boys may bring you food.’ Tulitamma then rushed away, 
with Cevelaar pursuing, hot on his heels. Just when Cevelaar was about 
to grab the Solorese grandee, another man attacked the Dutchman 
with a knife and cut his throat. It turned out to be Tulitamma’s son-
in-law, Sabon, who was the son of  a sengaji from Lamahala. The other 
artillerist, Lieve Cornelisz, hastily ran to the palisade where he spent an 
anxious evening. The slaves of  Tulitamma crept outside the palisade and 
threatened to treat Cornelisz in the same way as his compatriot. In the 
middle of  the night, Cornelisz mounted a horse and galloped to the loyal 
Lamakera.103
That same night a party arrived across the strait from Lamahala. 
Their leader was kapitan Assam, a chief  who was well known to the 
Dutch authorities. Little love was lost between him and the Company, 
which had burnt Lamahala to the ground back in 1676 when the negeri 
did not appear submissive enough in Dutch eyes.104 Kapitan Assam had 
previously quarrelled with the Company representatives, who insulted 
him with rudely-worded reproaches. Similar to Dutchmen like Floris 
Jansz, Assam cared very little about contractual stipulations when it 
came to economic transactions. He went so far as to declare that he 
would have nothing to do with the Company, but was instead his own 
man. Among other things, he had brought Makassarese and Malay 
merchants from the roadstead of  Larantuka to Lamahala in front of  the 
very noses of  the Dutch, and sold slaves to them.105 All this was done in 
the name of  the prevailing spirit of  the independent-minded Lamahala 
princedom, which was averse to the VOC-minded Lamakera and rather 
sought contacts with the Makassarese. Now, the Lamahala threatened to 
burn the Company buildings in Lohayong. The situation did not escalate 
103 VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 17-4-1687.
104 VOC 1319 (1675-76), Dagregister, sub 28-5-1676. The destruction of  Lamahala was carried out by 
the same squadron that intervened in Rote and Sawu between March and May 1676, in conjunction 
with allied forces from Lohayong, Lamakera, Terong and Adonara. The scattered Lamahalans fled to 
Labala and Kedang on Lembata, and Belagar, Barnusa and Pandai on Pantar. (VOC 1327 [1676-77], 
Dagregister, sub 16-7-1676). The negeri was subsequently rebuilt and re-incorporated in the VOC-allied 
league, but subsequent relations with the VOC were far from positive.
105 VOC 1426 (1684-85), Dagregister, sub 24-9-1684.
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that far, however, for the rest of  the Lohayong chiefs stayed loyal to the 
VOC. However, the new opperhoofd Arend Verhoeven found it necessary 
to allocate four sailors, all skilled in the use of  firearms, to Fort Henricus 
in order to protect the sorely tried Lieve Cornelisz.106
The incident introduced a brief  spate of  turbulence among the 
Watan Lema princedoms. A Chinese immigrant called Ziko encountered 
kapitan Assam in a Solorese kampung and shot him dead. When Sabon’s 
father, the sengaji of  Lamahala, tried to save Assam he received a serious 
bullet wound to the foot. Meanwhile the sengaji of  Adonara delivered 
Tulitamma to the hands of  sengaji Dasi, who in turn presented him to 
the VOC representatives for due punishment.107 All this appears to have 
been an eruption of  simmering local contradictions among the Solorese 
grandees, combined with the wish of  certain protagonists to curry favour 
with the Company. 
The fate of  the runaway slaves remains somewhat unclear. A let-
ter from 1692 claims that they were still at large under the authority 
of  Hornay and Amarasi, and had thus been brought over to Timor.108 
However, papers from 1689 indicate that four surviving ‘murderers’ who 
had escaped in 1686 were arrested in Amarasi on Hornay’s orders and 
turned over to the Dutch. If  these were the slaves from the Steenbocq inci-
dent, as seems likely, they came to a harsh end in Kupang in December 
in the same year. The Timorese priest Paulus van Coupang tried to ef-
fect their last-minute conversion to Christianity, and while two of  them 
proved willing, the two others declared their wish to live and die follow-
ing the beliefs of  their ancestors. Two days later they were brought out to 
the place of  execution. The Company did its utmost to state an example 
in the European tradition of  ‘complicated death penalty’, lest other 
slaves might get similar ideas. Their right hands were chopped off, and 
their bones were broken with an iron from the ground upwards. Finally, 
they were beheaded and left on the wheel for the birds. Incidentally a 
comet appeared the same morning in the form of  a cutlass, causing 
106 VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 18-4-1687.
107 VOC 1437 (1687), ff. 321-2. One may ask if  kapitan Assam (alternatively Asan or Assan), who can 
be described as gallant or villainous depending on one’s point of  view, is the historical prototype of  La 
Asan (alternatively La Asang). This character figures prominently in Solorese legend and lore. In one 
version, he left Lamahala when he was accused of  witchcraft or corpse eating, and migrated to the negeri 
Adonara on the north coast, where he gained a strong political foothold (Barnes 2001:299). There are 
numerous variants of  this story. 
108 VOC 1531 (1692-93), Letter, Batavia to Kupang, 19-2-1692.
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opperhoofd Willem Moerman to make this sombre comment: ‘God have 
mercy in the face of  the well-deserved punishment that threatens the 
human race.’109
Although the affair ended in a moderately satisfactory way for 
Kupang, it indicated the weaknesses of  the network that the Company 
had constructed. Individual Europeans on Timor built up a position of  
authority that sometimes ran counter to official VOC policy. An incident 
caused by their fraudulence, and only marginally connected to Solor, 
was subsequently blown out of  all proportion. It quickly transformed 
into a Dutch-Solorese, and then into an internal Solorese affair, with 
connections to Flores and Hornay’s Topass complex. As it happened, 
the murderer Sabon remained at large for many years to come, and so 
did some of  the slaves, without the Company being able to deal with 
them; moreover, a local Florenese chief  kept Tilingh’s widow as his slave 
or mistress and refused to return her to the Dutch authorities until years 
later.110 Despite all this, however, the VOC network did not break down. 
This and similar incidents always ended with the Company managing 
to strike a delicate beelalance in spite of  its lack of  force. The foreign 
suzerains, with their lack of  insight in the local adat or conflict patterns, 
remained an entity that could engender, but also solve, conflicts among 
the local and deeply divided populations. In that respect, the Dutch East 
India Company was more than functional.
109 VOC 1481 (1689-90), Dagregister, sub 5-8-1689, 5 to 7-12-1689. As such the executions were not 
exceptional by the standards of  the day. The same punishment was meted out for serious crimes com-
mitted by black slaves in the British colonies in North America (Hunt 2007:78).
110 As pointed out by the Solorese sengaji in a somewhat later letter (VOC 1497 [1691], ff. 699b-700b), 
they simply lacked the power to carry out the arrest of  Sabon, who apparently resided in or around 
Lamahala in defiance of  the Company. In the late 1690s, Sabon was finally extradited and brought to 
Batavia. From there he was sent into exile in South Africa like many perceived troublemakers of  the East 
Indies (VOC 1609 [1698], f. 12). As for Tilingh’s widow, she was eventually returned to Kupang through 
Hornay’s assistance, by 1693 (Coolhaas 1975:624). Although a native Timorese, she would by virtue 




Life and death in Kupang
the population of kupang
During the VOC era in maritime Southeast Asia, the evolving port 
towns were the meeting place for several different cultures, which were 
blended together within the very economic apparatus that was their rai-
son d’être. A number of  characteristics have been suggested in terms of  
defining the colonial port: urban concepts implemented by Europeans; a 
heavily fortified area; a separation of  European and indigenous spheres; 
pluralistic features; ethnicity as a defining category; numerous migrants 
among the population; a male majority; a large slave population; an 
urban centre that was relatively poorly integrated with the hinterland 
(Hussin 2007:334). It should be borne in mind that these criteria – apart 
from the first – does not necessarily set the colonial port apart from other 
Asian settlements. Non-colonial port towns functioned in similar ways, 
as proven by such examples as Pontianak in Kalimantan, founded by a 
seafarer of  Arab descent. In the Timorese context, the prefix ‘colonial’ 
nevertheless maintains a degree of  relevance: there were virtually no 
similarities between colonial towns such as Kupang, Larantuka and 
Lifau, and other settlements in the region.1 In fact, the list of  charac-
teristics above is more or less relevant for the settlement that was founded 
outside Fort Concordia and which developed into a small town during 
the eighteenth century.
During the first half-century of  growth certain defining features 
evolved in Kupang. Compared to most Dutch port settlements it was a 
1 The term ‘externally induced settlements’ has been suggested for this type of  town. Whether initi-
ated by Europeans or others, the settlements did not develop from within the local society itself, but were 
founded by outside forces which needed an entry port that gave them access to the products of  a certain 
geographical region; see Hussin 2007:335.
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very small place, and although no one seems to have taken the trouble 
to count the population in this early period, a rough estimate for the 
eighteenth century can be given. In 1752, Kupang housed 62 European 
and 765 indigenous Christians, which suggests an overall population of  
maybe a few thousand.2 By this time, therefore, it had developed into a 
modest, but by Southeast Asian standards, fairly populated place. French 
visitors in 1801 counted 60 to 80 houses, which may look like an under-
statement but it must be remembered that Kupang had been destroyed 
by British artillery four years previously (Lombard-Jourdain and Salmon 
1998:398-400). 
The number of  Company employees varied greatly according to the 
circumstances. On the eve of  the Makassar War in 1667, there were 
157 soldiers, sailors and other employees. Most of  these were sent to the 
theatre of  war in Sulawesi, much to the consternation of  the Timorese 
allies.3 Henceforth the number of  soldiers usually fluctuated between 
40 and 75 men, with the total being more often closer to the first number 
than to the second. Mortality rates were high, at least during the early 
phases of  the fort, and at times the VOC authorities even admitted that 
disobedient soldiers received lenient punishments due to the weakness of  
the garrison – the opperhoofd had to be economical with his manpower.4 
Those who survived their service could obtain permission to settle as 
white free burghers; this category, however, never seems to have been 
large, which meant the great majority of  the urban population were 
non-European or Eurasian. At times, the government in Batavia was 
expressly opposed to ex-servicemen becoming new, free burghers, the 
reasons for which are pointed out in a missive from 1717:
when they are not married, they subsequently and at first opportunity 
marry one of  the daughters or relatives of  the allied rajas or grandees 
of  the land. They then usually become bold and have grand pretentions. 
This is often very harmful for the Noble Company, and also causes a lot 
of  trouble with [the rajas and grandees] as well as among themselves. 
(Coolhaas 1979:267.)
2 ANRI Timor:43, Brieven Kerkenraad Koepang 1739-1779, Table of  Christians in Dutch Timor, 8-9-
1752.
3 VOC 1264 (1667), f. 73b.
4 VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 12-9-1686.
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Here, the Governor General alludes to the Timorese marriage system. 
Timorese kings often took several wives from various noble lineages, 
which would help bind the various parts of  the princedoms more closely 
to the central ruler. It also meant that the family who acted as the wife-
giver assumed a position of  precedence, as they had the right to ask the 
wife-receiver for assistance. In the same way, daughters of  regents and 
even kings married Company servants in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, and at least six cases are documented.5 These 
marriages were arranged – they were certainly not spontaneous love 
affairs – to bind the Dutch to the interests of  the Timorese elite. There 
was even a tendency for regular barlaque relations to develop since at 
least three descendants of  the Sonbai regent Ama Tomananu married 
Dutchmen. The difference with the bona fide barlaque system was, of  
course, that the Dutch bride-receivers belonged to different families, 
although they may have been seen as collective representatives of  the 
Company, that is, the stranger lord.
Few, if  any, European-born women accompanied the soldiers and 
sailors to Timor. Wives of  the opperhoofden are mentioned from time to 
time but their ethnic background is not usually stated. What is known for 
sure is that inter-ethnic marriages were common, not only among free 
burghers but also among employees, who were able to marry with the 
permission of  their superiors. The Dagregisters make regular mention of  
Company servants who appeared before the opperhoofden with their local 
spouses-to-be to ask for permission to marry. Such consent was regularly 
given, although the authorities sometimes hesitated when a Dutchman 
requested marriage to a girl from the highest level of  the aristocracy. 
At certain stages, the Supreme Government in Batavia was decidedly 
opposed to intermarriage between Company servants and locals and 
insisted on approving every single marriage, although this may only 
have resulted in an increase in the practice of  having concubines.6 The 
pattern of  intermarriage can be studied by reading the baptismal book 
5 Namely, the first marriage of  Pieternella, sister of  King Pono Koi of  Kupang, to Thomas Jacobsz; 
the second marriage of  Pieternella to Floris Jansz; Anna Maria, daughter of  Ama Tomananu of  Son-
bai, married the surgeon Isaacq van Doorne; Eva, niece of  Anna Maria, married Pieter Bruyn; Aletta, 
granddaughter of  Ama Tomananu, married the soldier Jan Schroff; Maria, daughter of  Paulus van 
Coupang, married Jan van Geervliet.
6 Such restrictions are mentioned in the Generale missiven under 1714; see Coolhaas 1979:49.
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from Kupang that covers the period 1669-1732.7 Leaving out some 
cases of  obvious liaisons with concubines, between 1669 and 1679 there 
were eleven clear cases of  mixed parentage (Dutch father, Asian mother) 
recorded, which may illustrate the practice.
Marcus Danielsz – Cornelia from Korbaffo
Abraham Gabriel – Petronella from Paliacatte (in India)
Idier van de Velde – Elisabeth from Sonbai
 Dirk Jansz van Aerde – Andresia Perera (presumably a Portuguese 
mestiza)
 Thomas Jacobsz – Pieternella, princess of  Kupang (later remarried 
to Floris Jansz)
Isaacq van Doorne – Anna Maria, daughter of  the regent of  Sonbai
Leendert Welcken – Maria from Rote
Roelof  Pietersz – Cornelia from Kupang
Michiel Siedelman – Janneke Marius from Kupang
Pieter Noorman – Sibilla from Ndao
Albert Gillisz Buijsman – Maria Marcus from Kupang
Of  the 119 mothers of  probable Asian origin in the baptismal book, 
no less than 53 came from Rote, which could be partly because of  their 
reputation for being beautiful, with fair skin and Malay features. They 
also often came from nusak that had been forced to deliver slaves for the 
Company. Indeed, the Dagregisters occasionally point out that the spouse-
to-be was a former slave woman, who naturally had to be manumitted 
and baptized before marriage. In striking contrast to the pattern of  the 
1620s, there were no more than two women identified as Solorese, de-
spite there being a Solorese kampung in Kupang. It is possible that the 
Solorese and other peoples in the area became more aware aware of  a 
Muslim-Christian dichotomy over the course of  the seventeenth century, 
especially in family matters. Kupang is a common point of  origin, as it 
is expressly indicated that 27 mothers out of  the 119 came from there, 
but in most cases it is not possible to tell whether the woman in question 
was Helong or just born at the place. For the rest, there is a very mixed 
group of  mothers, coming from Sonbai, Amfoan, Taebenu, Sawu, Flores, 
Tanah Bugis, Batavia and India, among other places.
7 Doopboek Timor (Baptismal book of  Timor), 1669-1732 AD, ANRI. Transcript kindly provided by 
Diederick Kortlang, Leiden.
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The wives and offspring of  the Europeans, once baptized and inte-
grated into urban society, had their given legal rights. Types of  racialism 
were just as present in Dutch as in Portuguese colonial society, but in 
both cases they were relatively vague and ideologically undefined: rather, 
the phenomenon was highly utilitarian. When it suited their interests, 
the Dutch overseas would emphasize ethnic or racial hierarchy in order 
to secure privileges for their own group (Jones 2003:7, 38-9, 69-70). For 
example, the free burghers who stayed in Kupang would typically be 
characterized as mixties burger in official papers if  they were Eurasian – a 
contrast to the Portuguese materials where such distinctions are rarely 
made. In practice, the mixties label in the Dutch East Indies would signify 
not only mixed blood but also lower class (Bosma and Raben 2008:35). 
Given the lack of  European women, however, the inter-ethnic marriage 
pattern could not be avoided; this made it necessary to accept those 
non-whites and Eurasians who were part of  the Dutch social orbit. 
According to Dutch law, widows and children of  Company servants and 
free burghers were able to inherit, and the same law was applied in case 
of  family conflicts. Normally, however, a non-white wife and her chil-
dren could not travel to the Netherlands once her husband’s service had 
ended (Taylor 1983:17), a regulation that gave rise to awkward situations. 
According to the British visitor George Tobin (1792), the wives were 
‘jealous to a degree unknown in colder regions and have been known 
to administer poison to their husbands on their quitting the country for 
Europe’ (Schreiber 2007:160).
In spite of  the Calvinist moral that officials in the East Indies tried 
to uphold, daily reality was far removed from the Calvinist ideals of  
family life and sexual prudency. Consulting the baptismal book one 
finds that many Eurasian children had mothers who were not baptized, 
and therefore could not have been married to the European father. 
Unsurprisingly, slaves were kept as concubines, but so, too, were free 
women. This pattern of  a loose moral life is well documented in other 
areas under VOC control; during the initial phase of  a Company post 
in particular, the Dutch soldiers and sailors tended to lead a ‘licentious’ 
life, much to the consternation of  the authorities. Official measures 
would be imposed sooner or later, since the keeping of  concubines and 
the practice of  having casual sex debased both the Christian faith and 
Dutch prestige, and might incur the wrath of  God (Bosma and Raben 
2008:28). When Anthony Hurt was appointed opperhoofd in 1665, he 
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submitted a report that vividly described the immoral life of  his com-
patriots. His predecessor, Hugo Cuylenburgh, had taken some prisoners 
on Rote while the latest trouble was suppressed there. Among them 
were relatives of  a grandee called Sebille. Cuylenburgh then married a 
daughter of  Sebille according to Rotenese custom, which was of  course 
highly reprehensible from an official Dutch point of  view. However, 
since his wife was not faithful, he put her in irons and acquired another 
mistress. The father, Sebille, then appeared before Fort Concordia and 
asked for his family to be returned to Rote. When the opperhoofd did not 
respond, he furiously announced that he would walk through the vari-
ous nusak and preach against the despicable Dutch and their Termanu 
friends.8 Anthony Hurt made some particularly poisonous remarks 
about Cuylenburgh:
Furthermore [the garrison] spent its time in the fort, as I was told and 
partly as I saw with my own eyes, with drinking and futile loose habits, 
that Mr. Cuylenburgh was able to engage in one day after another. They 
were so troublesome that it appeared difficult for him to set foot outside 
the fort. It is true that his impotency has impeded him somewhat, but this 
is hardly caused by anything else than such a way of  living.9
With Calvinist fervour, Hurt proceeded to evict the concubines to outside 
of  the area guarded by the sentries. The surgeon, carpenter and smith 
were summoned to appear before the new opperhoofd on which occasion 
they insisted that Cuylenburgh had permitted them to keep a maid. The 
latter, however, denied this. It came as no surprise, commented Hurt, 
that the more lowly Company servants indulged in a loose life, when 
their master behaved the way he did. 
Dutch moral order was not easily implemented in the generations 
that followed either. The Helong sometimes sold sexual services to Dutch 
soldiers, as is documented in a case from 1688. One night in October, 
the soldier Martinus Coccius secretly left the ramshackle palisade around 
the fort by removing a plank. He went into the Kupangese negeri and had 
sexual intercourse with a woman, perhaps a slave girl, but afterwards 
refused to pay for her services. This caused much consternation in the 
8 VOC 1252 (1665), ff. 1226-7.
9 VOC 1252 (1665), f. 1227. Impotentie (impotency) could mean both lack of  power in a general sense, 
and sexual infirmity.
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negeri and Coccius barely managed to run back to the fort. To leave one’s 
post was, strictly speaking, an offence that could lead to death by hang-
ing, but in the end Coccius was only sentenced to six months of  hard 
work in chains. The fornication as such was apparently considered a 
minor issue here.10 
Far into the eighteenth century there was still, at least from an official 
perspective, a problem with concubines. By 1745, there were a number 
of  children who had been begotten by Europeans and ‘black’ mistress-
es.11 After the death of  their fathers they were left under the supervision 
of  a band of  ‘drunken, beastly and hideously living’ mothers, as one 
source put it.12 Allegedly, these women tended to neglect their maternal 
duties, instead leaping around in the wilderness outside Kupang, amus-
ing themselves with the Timorese. The youngsters, especially the girls, 
‘roamed the roads like sheep’, and indulged in various immoral activities. 
The opperhoofd at the time, Jan Anthony Meulenbeek, admonished the 
wayward mothers, urging them to send their offspring to school, so that 
they would learn something or at the very least, not cause such mischief. 
Since his words fell on deaf  ears, Meulenbeek subsequently decided to 
apprehend these so-called ‘wild running European children’ and turn 
them over to an Indonesian schoolmaster to be brought up properly.13 
That previous opperhoofden had not taken action on this issue may, of  
course, imply that they did not see the upbringing of  Eurasian children 
an issue worthy of  attention.
Men who were placed under Dutch jurisdiction were known as 
Mardijkers. In VOC times, they stayed in two kampungs: one was called 
Mardijka and located outside of  Kupang; the other was called Fattu 
Fetto and situated within the town. Later on, in the second half  of  the 
eighteenth century, the VOC cultivated new land in Babau, further to 
the north-east.14 Mardijkers were often Christians, but not necessarily 
so;15 unlike on Ambon, in Batavia, and so on, they did not have any 
recognizable Portuguese connection, but rather bore Dutch names and 
10 VOC 1460 (1688-89), Resolutions, sub 15 to 16-10-1688.
11 ‘Black’ could mean any native Southeast Asian, as opposed to Europeans and Chinese.
12 VOC 8339 (1746), f. 100.
13 VOC 8339 (1746), f. 100, 182-4. Meulenbeek himself  was killed on Rote one month after writing 
this report; it is unclear whether his principles were upheld by subsequent opperhoofden.
14 Kartodirdjo 1973:405. According to a source from the 1840s this was because the Sonbai popula-
tion increasingly placed pressure on the old lands.
15 Compare Coolhaas (1979:280), who refers to ‘Christense en heydense mardijckers’ (Christian and 
heathen mardijkers).
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had never been identified as Catholics. Mentions of  Mardijkers are few 
and far between in the second half  of  the seventeenth century. The 
Mardijkers appear to have derived from the Timorese congregations or 
from the other islands connected to the VOC.16 Some are recorded as 
manumitted slaves, but there were also aristocrats among them.17 One 
case is Fredrik Hendrick, clearly named after the Prince of  Orange. He 
was presumably a Helong since he resided in the ‘Kupangese negeri’. He 
was baptized in the early 1670s and was married to Susanna, a daughter 
of  Ama Tomananu, the Sonbai regent. The latter bore the Portuguese 
name Dom Luíz for a while, but subsequently dropped it and did not 
henceforth appear as a Christian. Nevertheless, he did allow several 
members of  his family to be baptized by Dutch clergymen. The fact that 
the transition to a Christian semi-urban status was not always easy, is 
seen from Fredrik Hendrick’s turbulent family life. 
On 7 August 1673, Fredrik Hendrick arrived at Fort Concordia and 
approached the opperhoofd, Jacob van Wijckersloot. He complained about 
a certain bijvrouw (co-wife) whom he had kept before his marriage to 
Susanna, but who was now incompatible with Christian standards.18 
The co-wife, however, continued to cause trouble for the pair and as-
saulted them verbally in a blasphemous way. Fredrik Hendrick suggested 
that the Company should keep her in a particular slave house for a while, 
where she could fetch water for the garrison. The opperhoofd found that 
he could not refuse this request, and the woman was consequently taken 
into custody. Her plight did not last long, however. Five days later Fredrik 
Hendrick came back and asked for the woman to be released, though 
on certain conditions: she must never again live in the house belonging 
to Fredrik Hendrick and Susanna, or even speak to them, and if  she 
married someone in the future according to the non-Christian adat, then 
she should pay back a sum in gold that Fredrik Hendrick had previously 
given her. Moreover, if  she ever again acted aggressively towards the pair, 
and this could be proven by witnesses, she would become a slave belong-
16 By the first half  of  the nineteenth century local tradition explained that a Mardijker community 
had existed from before the Dutch arrival. They would have built the perahu that the envoys of  the king of  
Kupang used to sail to Solor to invite the Company. From this point of  view, the Mardijkers were origi-
nally Rotenese and Sawunese people who had remained on Timor for one reason or another (Sartono 
Kartodirdjo 1973:405). Rotenese Mardijkers are expressly mentioned in 1688 (VOC 1460 [1688-89], 
Dagregister, sub 10-9-1688).
17 VOC 1553 (1693-94), Resolutions, sub 21-5-1694.
18 At least incompatible in theory, considering all the concubines kept by Dutchmen in Kupang.
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ing to the Company.19 The strictly personal dimensions of  the conflict 
remain unknown to us, but it was underpinned by the clash between the 
Western principle of  monogamy and the Timorese adat. Although one 
wife was the norm in the traditional system, wealthy people could afford 
several. Marriage on Timor involved an economic exchange where a 
bride-price was paid to the family of  the bride, often over a long period 
of  time. When a Christian marriage was carried out and the old rela-
tion was nullified, the received wealth was in question; the belis had to be 
returned if  the ‘co-wife’ remarried.
The outward appearance of  the Mardijkers was far from stately. 
Although they obviously adopted elements of  Dutch dress and habits 
like their Batavian counterparts, a notice from 1742 indicates that they 
were difficult to distinguish from the lowest strata of  early colonial soci-
ety. At that time, the slaves of  Kupang did occasionally escape, yet they 
were seldom caught by the Timorese allies living in the surrounding 
area. One reason was that the Mardijkers were accustomed to enter-
ing the Portuguese sphere without notifying the VOC authorities, and 
the Timorese could simply not tell the difference between a Mardijker 
and a slave. The authorities tried to solve this problem by forcing the 
Mardijkers to carry a licence whenever they made such outings. Since 
both Timorese and Mardijkers were generally illiterate, the licence con-
sisted of  a paper with a red seal. The village leaders were to check those 
who passed by, and if  they failed to stop the eloping slaves, they should 
be apprehended themselves.20
Other ethnic components of  early colonial society in Kupang that 
were mentioned, were the Rotenese, both slaves and free men. Some of  
the latter were hostages complete with retinue and they did occasion-
ally undergo baptism. In the early days of  Fort Concordia they were 
quite simply lodged in the fort’s magazine, proof  that their numbers 
were small. Of  vital importance for the Kupang community were the 
Solorese, who stayed in the quarter that, to this day, is still known as 
Kampung Solor.21 The free Solorese were either fishermen or tempo-
rary residents who carried out small trade, and during the early days 
of  the port they complained about poor treatment at the hands of  the 
19 VOC 1301 (1673-74), Dagregister, sub 7-8-1673, 12-8-1673.
20 VOC 8335 (1742), f. 19.
21 Nowadays the Solorese identity of  this quarter has vanished.
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Dutch.22 As was usual in the Dutch port towns, Malay – not Dutch – 
was the daily language of  communication. It is doubtful whether even 
the Mardijkers understood any Dutch.
the chinese impact
In the early days of  the Dutch establishment on Timor, the Chinese ap-
peared to be more involved with the Portuguese than with the Company. 
The commercial network of  the Topasses included Siam, where there 
was a sizeable Chinese population, and it is known that the Chinese 
worked in the sandalwood trade at Lifau.23 Likewise, the ship that ar-
rived annually from Macau must have been partly manned by ethnic 
Chinese, with individual Macanese choosing to remain on Timor. In the 
same way, a number of  Catholic Chinese stayed on Flores where they 
lived as seafaring merchants.24 The Makassarese connection was still 
important here; a Chinese junk joined Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo in 
1663-1664, sailing from Makassar to Timor and also visiting Kupang.25 
Chinese people did not, however, settle permanently in Kupang until 
quite late in the seventeenth century. Under the entries for 1687, the 
baptismal book mentions a non-Christian woman called Anna from 
Taiwan, who had children with two different Dutchmen, but apart from 
her, no mothers in this document are indicated as being Chinese.26 In 
the same year, as related above, a Chinese person staying on Adonara 
did the Company the service of  shooting the troublesome kapitan Assam. 
As is well known, the overseas Chinese (huaqiao) were an important com-
mercial player in much of  Southeast Asia during the Ming and Qing 
dynasties, despite official disapproval of  overseas migration. They were 
well established in the port towns of  Java long before the coming of  the 
Europeans, and along with the rise of  Dutch power, their position was 
22 VOC 1428 (1686), f. 279a.
23 Lombard-Jourdain and Salmon 1998:394; VOC 1426 (1685-86).
24 The Macanese Lourenço Lopes married a daughter of  Matheus da Costa and the Amanuban 
princess, and went on to play an important role in Timorese politics (Leitão 1952:11): the exact ethnic 
background of  Lopes is not clear, however. A certain mestizo from Macao married Jan de Hornay’s 
Timorese widow some time after 1644 (Leitão 1948:251). For more on the Chinese on Flores, see VOC 
1531 (1692-93), Dagregister, sub 8-4-1693.
25 VOC 1246 (1664), Dagregister, sub 12-3-1664.
26 Coming from Taiwan, Anna (also spelt Ama) could of  course have been a non-Han Chinese, as a a 
number of  Austronesian groups inhabited the island.
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strengthened since they were able to secure a monopoly on providing 
certain economic functions. Their success was not solely due to their 
skills, but also due to the fact that they were able to take the place of  
indigenous peoples whose commercial activities had been destroyed 
by the impact of  the Dutch. In early colonial Batavia the Chinese set-
tlers provided much of  the human infrastructure, serving as merchants, 
shopkeepers, agriculturalists, and so on; the VOC establishments in Java 
would have been rather helpless without the benefit of  their skills (Pan 
1999:152-3; Furnivall 1944:45).
The Chinese junk trade on Batavia seems to have peaked between 
1690 and 1730 (Gupta 2001:122). It is therefore not surprising that 
Chinese seafarers and merchants begin to appear in the Kupang records 
towards the end of  the seventeenth century. For example, four Chinese 
sloops arrived in March 1694 from Batavia, duly furnished with official 
trading passes. Four years later six minor sloops, also from Batavia, 
made a stopover at Lifau. By this time, the Portuguese traders from 
Macao still tended to obtain the best quality shiploads of  sandalwood 
(Souza 1986:182). By the end of  the century, the available sandalwood 
supplies were almost depleted and in 1698, the Chinese could not ac-
quire more than 8 to 10 bahar (up to approximately 1,800 kg). One 
ship ventured to go to Belu in the east and trade directly with the locals, 
thus avoiding the, sometimes trying, stay in Lifau.27 This was typical of  
Chinese entrepreneurship in the East Indies: they explored commercial 
possibilities that the Dutch merchants and sailors declined to even at-
tempt. Periodical shipwrecks testified to the potential dangers of  their 
enterprises. A Chinese called Soim Ko28 sailed from Batavia towards 
Timor in 1698. At the north-eastern cape of  Flores, Tanjung Bunga, his 
craft was lost and all his goods were stolen by the locals. That Tanjung 
Bunga came under the authority of  the sengaji of  Adonara and hence 
nominally under the Company’s authority was of  little or no help. Soim 
Ko eventually made it to Kupang, where the authorities permitted him 
to go back to Batavia on another keel in the company of  one of  his 
men.29
27 VOC 1609 (1698), f. 42, 98.
28 Without seeing the hanzi characters I cannot confidently restore the Chinese names to their normal-
ized pinyin form. The element ko is an honorary suffix typical for Hokkien people originating from Fujian; 
compare with Mandarin ge, ‘elder brother’.
29 VOC 1609 (1698), f. 42.
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Several Chinese ships henceforth sailed from Java to Timor, normally 
on an annual basis. Indeed, the bulk of  private long-distance trade was 
carried out by the Chinese. While the Portuguese factions were fighting 
each other from 1702 onwards, the huaqiao merchants began to gain an 
advantage over the Macanese traders. Since a large part of  the Timorese 
wood went to Batavia, and from there to China, the price of  sandalwood 
tended to drop.30 A list of  incoming ships to Kupang in 1714 is illustra-
tive of  this, while also showing the rather limited volume of  shipping to 
this port:
-  Laurens Lucasz from Osbeek, free burgher on Timor with his sloop, 
six lasten [6 x 1250 kg], and furnished with Their Excellencies’ pass. 
Leaving on 23 August 1713, via Java’s east coast, arriving here on 1 
September this year.
-  Que Tsiam Ko, nakhoda, with his sloop, about 35 lasten, and furnished 
with Their Excellencies’ pass. Leaving on 21 September, via Sema-
rang and Java’s east coast, arriving here in the Babau Bay on 28 De-
cember in the same year, and in the same evening appearing here 
with his sampan. Going directly to Batavia on 28 April this year with 
our knowledge.
-  Tio Pian Ko, nakhoda, with his sloop, about 35 lasten and furnished 
with Their Excellencies’ pass. Departing on 29 September 1713 from 
Batavia, via the east coast of  Java. Arriving here in the Babau Bay 
on 28 December this year. The nakhoda Tio Pian Ko passed away in 
Larantuka. In the past year [the ship and goods] have been sold at a 
public auction to the burgher Laurens Lucasz who resides here, and 
is still kept here.
-  Tjet Ko, nakhoda, with his kunting31, about 16 lasten and furnished with 
Their Excellencies’ pass. Departing from Batavia on 9 October 1713, 
via the east coast of  Java, arriving at this roadstead on 25 February 
1714. Departing with our knowledge on 4 May this year, going di-
rectly to Batavia, bringing 30 picul of  sandalwood.
30 Souza 1986:182-3. Much sandalwood from Malabar in India was likewise brought to East Asia, 
forcing down prices further.
31 A kunting (gonting) is an open, broad ship, often used for fishing with a dragnet, but also for trade 
(VOC-Glossarium 2000:66).
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-  Que Pan Ko, nakhoda, with his kunting, about 14 lasten and furnished 
with Their Excellencies’ pass. Departing on 23 December via Sema-
rang, arriving here at this roadstead on 29 March 1714.32
Like their white counterparts, the Chinese were periodically deterred 
from settling permanently in Kupang. In 1717, the Governor General 
ordered eighteen Chinese and their families to return to Batavia, stating 
the reason that from time to time, they were found to have stayed there 
without official permission, ‘while this greatly self-assured and bold na-
tion has manifold pretentions and is therefore very dangerous in various 
respects when they are numerous, and is never to be much trusted’.33 
Apart from the Christian and non-Christian Mardijkers, no more than 
four Chinese men were permitted to stay in the port town. This restric-
tive policy soon obviously slackened since references to Chinese settlers 
steadily became more common in the following decades. By the end 
of  the VOC period there were twice as many Chinese as there were 
Dutchmen (Schreiber 2007:160). The reason is not hard to find. As the 
small port town developed and urban routines were becoming more so-
phisticated, the Chinese emerged as an indispensable element of  society, 
regardless of  the European distrust of  them that can be gleaned from 
the above quotation. Since Malay and Makassarese merchants were not 
welcome in the region, the Chinese could fill their role. Much of  the 
economic activity lay in their hands, not least when it came to merchant 
trips to other islands and ports in the region, and as middlemen in the 
early colonial structure, they could hardly be replaced. From a wider 
perspective, the eighteenth century saw increasing activity by overseas 
Chinese in Southeast Asia, in spite of  such incidents as the Dutch mas-
sacre of  Chinese in Batavia in 1740 Furnivall (1944:46). The opperhoofd 
Elias Jacob Beynon described the situation of  the local Chinese com-
munity in 1758 – a situation that was of  mixed benefit for those involved 
– as follows:
The Chinese who stay here provide a good service as regards the com-
merce, and keep the shipping alive. In the same way, the leasing out [of  
32 VOC 1853 (1714), ff. 13-4.
33 Coolhaas 1979:279-80. This followed a resolution issued by Batavia on the same subject (Lombard-
Jourdain and Salmon 1998:397). In the same year, 1717, the Company issued a general prohibition 
against marriages between Chinese and non-Chinese (Pan 1999:153).
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economic activities] is favoured and kept in a good state by them. How-
ever, most of  them are poor and unable [for productive work]. They have 
a lieutenant who is in charge of  them, and pay an annual fee.34
Some conclusions can be drawn about relations between the Chinese 
and the Dutch and other ethnic groups. Like everywhere else in the 
VOC sphere, the Chinese community was expected to live in seclusion 
from other ethnicities, and they depended on Dutch protection to thrive. 
The opperhoofden thought that the Chinese lived disorderly; they were 
forever coming and going with their sloops, which made it impossible to 
carry out the required checks on them. In view of  this, the authorities de-
cided that any Chinese who leased commercial monopolies must also be 
in charge of  their fellow countrymen and monitor their movements;35 
moreover, it was ordered that the gates to the settlers’ quarter must be 
closed every night (Schreiber 2007:160). The suspicion was mutual. In 
January 1741, a message from Batavia arrived at Kupang with news 
that a Chinese rising against the Company had failed and that most of  
the Chinese in the city had been killed. Upon hearing the news about 
the massacre, some of  the Kupang Chinese panicked, gathered their 
most valuable items and fled into the wilderness. The Dutch second-in-
command approached those who remained and told them to stay inside 
their houses. The local Dutch, he asserted, did not intend to do them any 
harm as long as they behaved properly.36 Within a few days, everyday 
life resumed in the little port, but the incident pointed to the vulnerable 
position of  the Chinese; at least, they were prepared to believe that their 
non-Chinese neighbours might re-enact the horrors of  Batavia.
The Dutch authorities were in fact keen to keep the Chinese com-
munity contented. This can clearly be seen in a legal case from 1745. 
To the right of  the Koinino River, close to Kampung Solor, lay an area 
that the lord of  the land, the Helong king, had long ago given to the 
Chinese to use as their graveyard. However, in 1743 the yard was taken 
over by the burgher Gabriel Vent,who built a fence around it and began 
to plant maize. Vent did not care to remove the graves and the Chinese 
complained to the opperhoofd. Vent alleged that the land had been turned 
34 VOC 3033 (1758), f. 1855a.
35 Van Goor 2004:507. As in Makassar, the rights to manage the trade in lucrative commodities and 
extract customs fees on their export were auctioned off  to individual traders (Jacobs 2000:35).
36 VOC 2534 (1741), f. 145-6.
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over to him by a written deed, but the Helong king knew nothing about 
this. Closer investigation produced a document stating that the Helong 
executive regent and the king of  Amabi had bestowed the graveyard 
on Vent. The validity of  this paper, however, was extremely dubious, 
for Amabi was an immigrant community that had no right to make 
deeds. After a period of  deliberation between the council and the allied 
regents, it was decided that the deed was invalid and that the graveyard 
was to be given back to the Chinese. If  the VOC were to argue with 
the Chinese, they might just move out of  the area completely and into 
the Topass stronghold, Tulang Ikan. The opperhoofd pointed out that this 
would be a major disadvantage to the Dutch; without assistance from 
the Chinese ‘nation’, they would not be able to carry out their business. 
Henceforth, land transfers could only take place with the consent of  the 
original lord of  the land, the king of  Kupang, and with the knowledge 
of  the opperhoofd.37
There was also much economic co-operation, as evident from the 
Dagregisters. Partnerships between Europeans and Chinese as well as oth-
er ethnic groups were very common when it came to shipping. A Chinese 
might use the ship of  a burgher or a Mardijker to sail to the Portuguese 
ports, possibly employing a Solorese crew, as the Solorese were known 
to be good sailors.38 In 1737, we even have a case of  a ship that was 
owned by the Sonbai regent Nai Sau, which was rather unusual given the 
Timorese distrust of  the sea. The trader Lo Tam Ko obtained permis-
sion from the local authorities to use the regent’s craft in order to go to 
Alor for trade.39 In spite of  the policy of  separation of  the nationalities 
mixed marriages between the Chinese and non-Chinese population did 
occur. In May 1732, a burgher called Dirk Tielman applied to the op-
perhoofd and council to marry the Chinese lady Tsij Nio. The council had 
no objections, but ordered that she must first be baptized. It was decided 
that the holy act should be carried out the coming Sunday and then the 
37 VOC 8339 (1746), ff. 209-11. Similarly, witnesses from the early nineteenth century asserted that 
small trade was completely in Chinese hands and that they were the best artisans (Lombard-Jourdain and 
Salmon 1998:409). Nation in this case is what today would be termed an ethnic group.
38 VOC 8332 (1738-39), Dagregister, sub 25-9-1738, 12-3-1739.
39 VOC 2049 (1736-37), Dagregister, sub 22-2-1737.
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two could be legally married.40 How much religious instruction could 
be given during this short period of  time is of  course debatable, with the 
marriage following a common pattern in pre-modern society of  allowing 
the wife to follow the husband’s religion by social routine.
Although they may not have been rich in terms of  average wealth 
owned, the economic entrepreneurship of  the Chinese often caused 
envy, which in a few cases led to murder. A particularly ugly case oc-
curred in 1731. The victim was one Tsiong Tsay, who had been ship-
wrecked at Dehla on Rote and henceforth remained in Kupang. One 
April morning he went out with his modest merchandise, consisting of  a 
few knives and handkerchiefs, to sell them in the neighbourhood. Later 
that same day he was found dead by a fountain. Beside the body were a 
few fragments of  a cutlass and a comb with a plume, similar to those the 
Helong used as head decoration. For seven months nothing further was 
found that might solve the murder case, but in November, the Sonbai 
regent Domingo brought one of  his subjects, Nai Loppo, to the fort. 
Domingo suspected that Nai Loppo, who was also a cattle thief, had 
killed Tsiong Tsay. By implication, the Helong comb was a deliberate 
red herring. After due interrogation Nai Loppo admitted to the VOC 
authorities that he and his friend Nai Tanes had been present on the oc-
casion, but that they were only the henchmen of  a Rotenese called Olu 
who stayed in Kupang as a Mardijker. Nai Loppo stated that Olu had 
murdered the Chinese, while the two frightened Sonbai had run away at 
the sight of  the crime. Olu was taken into custody, although he denied 
any knowledge about the matter. Suspicions against him grew when it 
appeared that the fragments found at the side of  the body were a fit with 
his cutlass. Olu claimed to have lent the cutlass to Nai Tanes, to use in 
a raid against the Amarasi. To the VOC council, the matter seemed a 
dark affair, while all that remained was to capture Nai Tanes, which was 
subsequently done a few weeks later. Nai Tanes confessed that he was the 
actual murderer, assisted by Nai Loppo, but emphasized that he and his 
friend had done it at the request of  Olu. Olu, it transpired, owed Tsiong 
Tsay a sum of  money, a fact confirmed by an entry in the official Boek van 
40 VOC 2239 (1731-32), Dagregister, sub 6-5-1732. She was baptized as Helena van Batavia and mar-
ried Tielman, who was himself  a Eurasian born in Kupang, one and a half  months later. The couple 
already had a young daughter born out of  wedlock. See the baptismal book of  Kupang 1669-1732. 
There might be a connection to the Tielman family of  the late colonial period, members of  which held 
high positions in the Kupang administration.
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gedagtes (‘Book of  thoughts’, a legal protocol book) Olu denied the debt in 
spite of  the evidence of  the book.
In this way, the perpetrators had been identified, but Olu’s role in the 
matter was still not clear. The allied Timorese regents, who were pres-
ent at the legal proceedings, decided that little trust should be placed in 
the two Sonbai: if  they listened to such attempts to identify accomplices, 
many innocent people might be drawn into the affair. They therefore 
gladly left it to the opperhoofd and his council to pass a sentence. In the 
end, Nai Loppo and Nai Tanes were sentenced to death, but the execu-
tion was left to the Sonbai leadership to carry out, since legal practice 
prescribed that the allies only punished their own subjects. The two men 
were thus disposed of  according to the ‘ancestral laws or the customs 
of  the land’.41 The VOC authorities still had grave suspicions about 
Olu, and he was instructed to return to Rote and never again appear in 
Kupang. To all this might be added the fact that the goods stolen from 
the dead body of  Tsiong Tsay consisted of  three handkerchiefs and nine 
reals, far from a lucrative haul even by frugal Timorese standards. The 
reputation, therefore, of  general Chinese prosperity crumbled upon 
closer inspection.42
Apart from this and a few other incidents, relations between the 
Chinese and other ethnicities do not stand out as being particularly 
strained in the VOC documents. By far, the most trouble for the Chinese 
traders could be expected from the Portuguese of  Lifau, who occasion-
ally held up ships suspected of  contravening the rules, and lodged com-
plaints to the opperhoofd about matters such as the Chinese trafficking of  
arms.43
slaves
Slavery is a global phenomenon, which has afflicted almost all complex 
human societies. One might wonder whether there is a human (or, one 
might say, inhuman) impulse to relegate other human beings to a state 
41 VOC 2239 (1732), Vergaderingen, 1-4-1732.
42 VOC 2239 (1732), Vergaderingen, 22-11-1731, 12-12-1731, 8-2-1732, 1-4-1732.
43 See for instance VOC 8332 (1739), ff. 23-6. The evidence, including sworn witness statements by 
some East Timorese kings, suggests that the accusations of  trafficking may not have been altogether 
unfounded.
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of  permanent dependence, or even to the status of  a commodity. Certain 
economic factors have been suggested as general explanations of  the 
phenomenon of  slavery. A classic theory sees it as a combination of  the 
limited supply of  labour and the availability of  land, which would make 
for a ‘rational’ use of  socially inferior manpower resources. More re-
cently it has been argued that the keeping of  slaves was often irrational in 
economic terms and instead was closely related to the status of  the slave 
owner (Boomgaard 2003:88). Southeast Asia in general, and Timor in 
particular, provide plenty of  evidence for these two historical rationales. 
A study of  slavery in Southeast Asia indicates a considerable breadth 
and variety in the use of  dependent manpower, which questions the cus-
tomary Western distinction between free and unfree. Indeed, there were 
degrees of  dependency on patrons and masters, rather than a clear-cut 
set of  circumstances. In much of  Southeast Asia we can see a rough 
division between a relatively hard, chattel form of  slavery, and a milder 
form of  dependency. The latter gave the dependents certain rights that 
were laid down in both tradition and through a legal framework. On the 
one hand, in areas like Sumatra and Thailand it was not uncommon 
that people gave themselves up as slaves, since corvée labour and other 
hardships might prove more oppressive than being enslaved, which at 
least secured a measure of  protection by the patron. On the other hand, 
there was a considerably harsher type of  slavery, which involved people 
who had been taken as prisoners of  war, those reduced to slavery due to 
offences committed or rebellious conduct, or those who had been cap-
tured in slave raids. This is what could be termed true Southeast Asian 
chattel slavery, where people became a commodity to be bought and sold 
arbitrarily (Reid 1988:129-36). The most menial work was reserved for 
these people. There were even comprehensive economic systems of  slave 
raiding, such as those conducted by the Iranun pirates from the southern 
Philippines in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Similarly, the 
capture of  slaves was a significant by-product of  the expansion of  the 
VOC in the early modern period. 
From examining Portuguese documents, it appears that Timor con-
formed to the Southeast Asian pattern of  having both milder and 
harsher forms of  slavery. In Tetun, the lingua franca of  much of  the 
island, there was a conceptual division between the lutu-hum and the ulun-
houris. The lutu-hum worked the fields and tended the cattle of  the lords 
and grandees. They could not move from their current land, but neither 
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could they be bought and sold, and they are therefore similar to those 
people who were called serfs in Europe. The ulun-houris, however, were 
the chattel slaves, usually war cap tives. The name means ‘living head’, as 
these slaves owed the fact that their heads were not chopped off  to their 
captors and subsequent masters.44 As in other places in the world, it was 
far from certain that a prisoner of  war was allowed to remain alive. The 
Timorese ritual practice of  headhunting meant that defeated enemies, 
and even women and children, would frequently be beheaded in order 
that their heads be used in feasts. If  you were kept alive you would owe 
your life to your captor and subsequent masters. On the other hand, if  a 
master died without direct heirs, his slaves would automatically be freed 
and incorporated in the clan of  the master – not, however, if  it was a 
princely lineage. The early anthropologist Henry Forbes, who visited 
East Timor in the 1880s, did not consider the fate of  the non-free popu-
lation to be particularly harsh (Forbes 1884:417).
In the local VOC records, the distinction between the two catego-
ries is less clear. Their Timorese allies, newly arrived from the inland, 
professed to have very few slaves among them, probably meaning that 
there were few chattel slaves. The documents use the terms slaven and 
lijfeigenen (serfs) arbitrarily, although they are actually two slightly different 
concepts; this perhaps indicates that the Company servants had difficul-
ties in grasping the local situation. At any rate, chattel slaves were an 
interesting commodity for the VOC. As the acquisition of  large profits 
from the sandalwood trade remained uncertain, slaves became an obvi-
ous ersatz product from the Timor region. Since the five loyal allies were 
weak in terms of  manpower and had few slaves to offer, the Company 
had to look elsewhere to obtain human cargo. The constant troubles 
which brewed on Rote, Sawu and the Solor Islands meant there was the 
opportunity for a supply to be brought to Batavia. As should be evident 
by now, life on the islands of  eastern Indonesia was far from pristine or 
harmonious. On the contrary, no one was safe anywhere: the eastern 
islands were beset by internal violence and external raids for as far back 
as detailed records exist.
With their superior technology and ability to transport many people 
44 Serrão and Oliveira Marques 2006:396-7; Matos 1974a:190. Vroklage (1953, I:549), says that pris-
oners of  war were regarded as the highest among the categories of  slaves among the Belu of  Central 
Timor. This, however, applies to the era of  late colonialism, when slavery and slave trade had long since 
been officially abolished by the Netherlands and Portugal.
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over large distances, the Dutch, Portuguese and Makassarese could fully 
take advantage of  the political fragmentation of  eastern Indonesia, thus 
changing the character and scale of  the slave trade. The case of  Rote 
may aptly illustrate the Western impact. Already in 1654 the Kupang 
post had sent 142 war captives to Batavia to prove that the unprofit-
able Timorese stronghold at least had something to give in return. One 
hundred and forty-two was in fact no small number for this period, 
given the small populations of  the towns. The Governor General, how-
ever, found that the Rotenese were not a very desirable addition to the 
population, either in Batavia or on the plantations of  the Banda Islands 
‘due to their wicked and murderous character’ (De Roever 2002:257). 
In other words, the Rotenese seemed to be so independent, that the 
Company felt uncomfortable dealing with them. Nevertheless, the quest 
for slaves continued into the coming years, with the need for manpower 
and profit apparently triumphing over any doubts over the Rotenese 
character. 
In 1660, the commissioner Johan Truytman intervened on Rote and 
forced Tullia, the ruler of  the nusak Dengka, to agree to deliver slaves. At 
least according to the Dutch interpretation of  the agreement, the ruler 
was to bring 100 slaves to the reliable VOC ally Termanu, from where 
they would be shipped over to Kupang. It was up to the ruler to decide 
from where the slaves would be taken. Soon afterwards the opperhoofd 
Hugo Cuylenburgh complained that Dengka did not wish to fulfil the 
agreement, and in spite of  sending reminders, the Dutch had only ac-
quired thirteen people.45 At the same time, another manek, Sode of  Lole, 
had promised to take charge of  a number of  people who had belonged 
to an executed grandee, and to then deliver them to the Company. Sode 
proceeded to gather 80 or 90 people, but then regretted it and set them 
free with the words ‘Should I deliver my friends as slaves to the Dutch? I 
would rather give them […] humans to eat.’46 The sequel to this story is 
best told by Hugo Cuylenburgh himself  in a report:
Since the sailors and the soldiery had to rest idle [in Kupang] for some 
days, I had them gathered and pointed out to them that this was not 
efficient. Since King Sode had fooled the commissioner in a false and 
rascal way […] one should attack him with weapon in hand in order to 
45 VOC 1236 (1661), f. 506.
46 VOC 1236 (1661), f. 507.
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inspire terror in this nation [the Rotenese]. It was then decided to take 
the entire force, consisting of  936 men, namely 307 soldiers and sailors 
and 629 Sonbai, Amabi and Kupang, who were to assault Lole. […] On 
18 October, [1660,] we marched there. On the 19th we attacked them at 
daybreak. We cut down about 500 people without losing a single man of  
our own, God be thanks, and with only two wounded. The destruction 
of  the negeri Lole has inspired fear all over Rote, and made them fulfil the 
contracted delivery of  slaves. On 2 January 1661 King Tullia came here 
with the remaining ones, so that the Noble Company got its 100 slaves 
from Dengka.47
The obvious cynicism that appears in the related case should probably 
not lead us to believe that the Dutch – or Europeans, since a good part 
of  the VOC employees came from other Western countries – were more 
inhuman than anyone else. Slavery was, quite simply, a phenomenon that 
was so self-evident that hardly anyone questioned its morality. Western 
abolitionism, it should be remembered, only gained ground towards 
the late eighteenth century (Hunt 2007:160-7, 205), and in the largely 
underpopulated area of  Southeast Asia, slaves were the most obvious 
source of  mobile labour (Hoskins 1996:4). Similar attitudes to slavery 
were found in the Portuguese sphere of  influence, especially when East 
Timor was subjugated in the 1660s and 1670s. A number of  female 
slaves found their way to Macao, but their import was stopped by the 
local bishop in 1748; this was primarily an attempt to avoid the sexual 
licentiousness that allegedly accompanied their presence (Disney 2009, 
II:349). Somewhat later, in 1772, a French visitor noted that the only 
commerce of  the native East Timorese was the deliveries of  slaves to the 
Makassarese in exchange for cutlasses and daggers (Lombard-Jourdain 
1982:100).
Nevertheless, there were ways to obtain slaves other than through 
warfare and raiding. The Timorese rulers did not exactly wield absolute 
power, since the resources to monitor and control their subjects were 
limited and they had to act within the frames of  the adat. Still, they could 
take measures against people whom they did not like. Pelon’s initiated 
report of  1778 states that the rulers sometimes falsely accused a person 
of  black magic, theft or adultery. Without any further formalities the 
47 VOC 1236 (1661), f. 507; compare Fox 1977:96.
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suspect would be declared a slave, along with all his family members. 
The ruler appropriated the goods owned by the family, and was careful 
to sell the new slaves to foreigners in order to keep them out of  the way. 
Sometimes friends of  the victim could release him by paying an amount 
of  gold. The Timorese aristocrats who lived close to Fort Concordia used 
to bestow the slaves on the opperhoofd, as a part of  the gift economy that 
emerged between the VOC and its allies (Pelon 2002:33). The Chinese 
bought slaves from among the local populations in exchange for firearms, 
which were being increasingly disseminated on Timor. On Captain 
William Bligh’s second visit to Kupang in 1792, the British noted the ea-
gerness of  the Chinese to purchase weapons from them for this purpose 
(Schreiber 2007:160).
The amount of  slaves brought annually from the Timor region to 
Batavia and others greatly varied, with figures in the VOC records sug-
gesting that it was not usually significant in demographic terms. In 1704, 
the number of  slaves transported to Batavia was 20, in 1705 it was 23, 
in 1706 it was 14, and so on (Coolhaas 1976:299-300, 354, 423). By far 
the worst case of  slavery occurred in 1756 when the VOC commissioner, 
Johannes Andreas Paravicini, attacked the disobedient nusak Landu on 
Rote and captured more than 1,000 people. Such events, however, were 
quite rare. When in 1758 the authorities in Batavia ordered the Kupang 
post to send 200 slaves to the perkeniers in Banda, it proved impossible 
to dispatch more than 30; at the time, there was no war going on of  
the magnitude that could have supplied the Company with such great 
numbers of  prisoners. The perkeniers, on the other hand, found the slaves 
from this area to be of  poor ‘quality’ and by the 1760s they were unwill-
ing to pay even the original price for the manpower brought in from 
Timor. Finally, in 1768, it was decided that the trade be abolished.48 As 
for Batavia, the number of  slaves from the Timor region was small com-
pared to the greater slave contingents from Bali, Sulawesi, et cetera. Out 
of  615 slaves brought to Batavia in 1652, there were less than 25 from 
this part of  the archipelago (Niemeijer 2005:402-3). The French traveller 
Baudin, who visited Timor in 1801 and 1803, asserted that the Kupang 
post was able to deliver a regular supply of  200 per year to the head-
quarters of  the VOC, being ‘nothing but well-shaped children who are 
intended for the pleasures of  the local personnel and the rich people’. 49 
48 VOC 2941 (1756), ff. 715-46; Fiedler 1931: 33-5; VOC 3249 (1769), f. 36.
49 Baudin, quoted in Pelon 2002:13.
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The words appear to suggest sexual abuse of  minors, though the number 
of  children affected is probably exaggerated. The conditions of  freight 
transport from Kupang to Batavia were as appalling as the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade, with death being common on the month-long trip; being 
uprooted from their domestic environment, the captives succumbed to 
the lack of  hygiene and proper food on the tightly packed ships. Due 
to sickness and apparent psychological stress, the new environment cost 
the lives of  many Timorese slaves en route to Batavia. The fate of  the 
survivors remains to be studied, but one must assume that they, like 
other groups, were used as house servants, artisans, shop assistants, dock 
labourers, and so on. Skilful slaves were taken from India to Batavia up 
until circa 1660, but after that the VOC preferred Indonesian slaves.50 
As in Batavia and other port towns, a large part of  the population of  
Kupang itself  consisted of  slaves. How many slaves there actually were 
in the VOC period is a moot question, but in 1836, the number of  slaves 
directly owned by the Dutch was 1,200. By comparison there were 800 
European and ‘coloured’, and 200 Chinese households. This, it might be 
added, was 18 years after the official abolition of  the slave trade, so the 
proportion of  slaves would have been higher in previous years. The op-
perhoofd Hans Albrecht von Plüskow, who died in 1761, personally owned 
around 140 slaves, half  of  which were sold after his death. Of  the nearly 
70 slaves which remained, about 23 were Timorese, at least 24 were 
Sawunese and at least six Rotenese. There were also people from faraway 
places like Bali and Mandar.51 The high number indicates that, as in 
Batavia, slaves were not only a matter of  economic rationality. Rather, 
high status was associated with owning a large amount of  people; it was 
a way to display wealth and resources (Boomgaard 2003:86).
While the bulk of  the slaves of  Kupang were owned by individu-
al burghers, Mardijkers and others, there was a smaller category of  
Company slaves. They stayed in a particular slave house within the 
precinct of  the fortress. Those who ended up there were often physically 
weak, had been rejected by the burghers, and were not fit enough to be 
shipped to Batavia – one might almost consider this to a fortunate turn 
of  events considering the high mortality rate of  the slave transports. By 
50 Rodriguez 1997:366. Anecdotal evidence, as in Barchewitz 1730:583-6, suggests that the girls 
sometimes ended up as prostitutes. The lives of  a few Timorese household slaves are briefly mentioned 
by Jones 2003:195-202.
51 VOC 3251 (1769), ff. 522-4.
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the mid-eighteenth century there were roughly 50 in number, emaciated 
figures who had the task of  serving the soldiers in the fort. The Company 
and private slaves were partly fed with gula, which was brought over from 
Rote.52
There is reason to believe that in general, the slaves were poorly 
treated by the burghers, Mardijkers and Company servants. Perhaps this 
was to be expected, however, for the statutes of  Batavia prescribed quite 
draconian measures for slaves who spread rumours about their masters 
or threatened them.53 Black slaves in British North America in this pe-
riod were castrated and mutilated for serious offences, and as late as the 
1740s, they could be broken on the wheel or slowly burnt to death – all 
perfectly legal since the English Bill of  Rights of  1689 did not cover 
non-free people (Hunt 2007:78). Such atrocious punishments are rarely 
found in the Kupang documents, but the wretchedness of  life as a slave 
is illustrated by the very frequent attempts at escape. When going outside 
of  the fort, the Company slaves were usually chained two by two and 
guarded by a soldier, which is indicative of  their plight. The authorities 
quite correctly suspected them of  trying to run off  at the first opportuni-
ty. Those who managed to escape tried to pass the allied Timorese settle-
ment and reach the Portuguese sphere. Topass strongholds like Lifau and 
later Oecusse were common destinations where the slaves could hope 
for shelter. The Portuguese leaders and the Dutch were both unhelpful 
when it came to returning refugees to each other; in the Portuguese case, 
this was especially so if  the slaves accepted the Catholic religion. After 
the mid-eighteenth century, the stream of  runaway slaves to Oecusse 
became demographically significant and had grave consequences for the 
Dutch position on the island, as will be shown in Chapter IX.
That the slaves took a great risk in attempting to escape is indicated 
by an event in 1694. On the morning of  3 May that year, the badly hurt 
slave girl Raja, 12 to 13 years of  age, was brought inside the walls of  
the fortress. Together with her mother, Kapy from Sawu, she had tried 
to escape a week earlier but had been captured again. The two women 
were brought before the opperhoofd Willem Moerman. The latter observed 
52 Fiedler 1931:27; compare Fox 1977. In the late seventeenth century the slaves are sometimes de-
scribed as performing heavy tasks such as maintaining ovens for producing lime. It is therefore possible 
that their physical capability decreased over time, the best slaves being acquired by the burghers and 
Mardijkers.
53 Harrison 2007:486; on the poor treatment of  slaves in Batavia, see also Niemeijer 2005:191.
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that both had wounds on their bellies, as if  they had been stabbed. Kapy 
alleged that they had been hurt by sharp branches, falling over in their 
haste as they tried to escape. Moerman let someone treat the wounds. 
The next day, however, Raja passed away, and the surgeon found that she 
had a lethal wound that went deep into the body. Suspicious, Moerman 
interrogated Kapy as well as the Rotenese settlers who had witnessed the 
two women’s attempt to escape. Step by step, a tragic story unfolded.54
It all began one night in late April, when seven slaves ran away from 
Kupang. The exact reason for their flight is not mentioned, but one of  
the owners was the notoriously aggressive Floris Jansz. The Dutch imme-
diately dispatched a party of  Rotenese, who reached the refugees by mid-
morning, in the wilderness outside of  Kupang. The slaves scattered into 
the forest in order to escape from their pursuers. Raja and Kapy were 
slower than the rest, and the Rotenese approached them. The thought 
of  what their master would do with them made the terrified Raja ask her 
mother to end her life. Kapy took her knife, ‘inspired by the devil’ as she 
later said, and stabbed her daughter and then herself. The two women 
fell to the ground before the eyes of  the pursuers, who, terrified by the 
macabre scene, ran back to Kupang and fetched more people at their 
hamlet. When they returned they saw blood but no people, and there-
fore withdrew to Kupang empty-handed. The women had come round 
and had crawled away to hide. After hiding in caves and rocks for two 
or three days, Kapy was found by some Timorese who brought her to 
Kupang. Raja was subsequently found and handed over to the authori-
ties despite dying in front of  their very eyes. The mother recovered from 
her self-inflicted wound, but her miseries were not over. It was decided 
she would be sent to Batavia, where the authorities would investigate the 
case. Her final fate is unknown.55
This event is rather unusual, since it was investigated in some detail. 
The tragedy, however, does suggest there was a fear of  reprisals among 
runaway or disobedient slaves. Runaways that were caught were rou-
tinely whipped, a harsh punishment that was meted out to deter other 
potential escapees.56 In view of  this, suicide was seen as an attractive 
alternative, even for young people. At the same time, the case shows 
that a comparatively dutiful official like Willem Moerman took time 
54 VOC 1553 (1693-94), Dagregister, sub 3 and 6-5-1694.
55 VOC 1553 (1693-94), Confession, sub May 1694; Report, sub 21-5-1694.
56 VOC 1367 (1680-81), Dagregister, sub 27-2-1681.
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to investigate serious incidents in a bureaucratically adequate manner. 
The type of  slavery that the VOC dealt in was more impersonal than 
the traditional forms of  Southeast Asian slavery, but the early colonial 
apparatus did, after all, adhere to a set of  rules that were sometimes 
applied, even in distant Kupang. This is indicated by another incident 
involving the opperhoofd Jacob van Wijckersloot. Although he was accused 
by the Timorese allies of  oppressive behaviour, he maintained some strict 
principles in the area under direct Dutch jurisdiction.
One late evening in March 1679, the corporal Leendert Welcken, 
reeling drunk, arrived back at the house where he stayed with his 
Rotenese wife, Maria Theunisz, and their young son when not on duty 
in the fortress. The corporal was hardly an exemplary husband; he was 
of  a violent nature and Maria later claimed that she often feared for her 
life. As Welcken entered the house, he threw out his wife and son and 
grabbed the slave girl Trijntje, who was nine years old at the most. He 
smeared her genitals with coconut oil and then proceeded to rape her. 
Maria Theunisz, however, immediately took action and reported the 
violation to Van Wijckersloot. The surgeons of  the fort had a look at the 
girl and found that her female organs had been badly injured. Welcken 
defended himself  by stating that he had been very drunk, that it was the 
middle of  the night, and that he actually believed he was penetrating his 
wife. Van Wijckersloot commented that Welcken deserved to be hanged, 
and that such a thing ‘had never been heard of  even among these wild 
and brutal heathens, let alone in a well-ordered state of  governance’. In 
the end he was flogged, bound to a pole and sentenced to forced labour 
for 99 years. Maria Theunisz was allowed to divorce him and to keep the 
house.57 An indigenous woman could thus obtain a legal advantage over 
her European husband, as long as she was a member of  the Christian 
community. It would appear that Van Wijckersloot wanted to make an 
example of  him; if  such behaviour were to be left unpunished, the con-
sequences could be very harmful for the small VOC settlement. 
In spite of  its (more or less) urban character, Kupang was in many 
respects imprinted by local geography and society; after all, the great 
majority of  the population originated from the Timor area. One may 
ask, then, if  conditions for the slaves differed substantially among the 
neighbouring Helong and Atoni groups. Fragmentary evidence sug-
57 VOC 1346 (1678-79), ff. 14-17.
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gests there were both similarities as well as differences. A less benevolent 
system of  dependency than the one prevalent in East Timor appears 
to emerge, at least when looking at the situation superficially. One case 
has survived – , presumably because a Mardijker family was involved, 
which drew the VOC administration into the issue. Fredrik Hendrick’s 
wife, Susanna, the daughter of  Ama Tomananu of  Sonbai, appeared 
before Willem Moerman in December 1692. She complained about a 
Solorese man called Wuring and a relative of  hers called Taly. Taly and 
Wuring had tied up a slave woman, some distance from Kupang, who be-
longed to Susanna, and they had beaten her so badly that she had died. 
Moerman took care to investigate the case, the more so since Susanna 
was an aristocrat and a Christian. The following day he asked the people 
involved why the slave had been treated in such a cruel way. Susanna’s 
brother replied that the two perpetrators did not intend to kill the slave, 
but had only meant to chastise her, since she had been disobedient and 
had tried to escape. ‘Now that she has died’, he proceeded, ‘no one has 
lost anything except the owner who [ordered to] chastise her, and the 
customs of  [the perpetrators’] land gave them complete power over the 
life and death of  their unfree.’58
Moerman, again displaying a sense of  responsibility, was not content 
with the reply, and the following day, summoned a meeting with the 
allied kings and regents. Moerman asked what punishment would be 
meted out in the instance of  a slave being killed. The regents replied that 
they were not used to punishing this type of  misdemeanour as everybody 
was able to treat their slaves as it suited them. This was true not only 
for slaves, but also for commoners. Every temukung could condemn his 
subjects to death or allow them to live without there being a need for a 
legal case. The regents told Moerman about several similar cases where 
they themselves had been involved. Some days previously, the regent of  
Amabi had beaten a woman from another domain to death, since she 
had married his subject but subsequently attempted to escape from her 
husband. The assembled aristocrats pointed out that previous opperhoofden 
had never discussed such issues in the council. The woman’s fate, they 
assured, would not cause the least bit of  commotion among the locals. 
Moerman reluctantly had to set Wuring and Taly free. He admon-
ished the princes not to treat their subjects with such cruel punishments, 
58 VOC 1531 (1692-93), Dagregister, sub 5-12-1692.
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but rather, to use discretion and kind words. That same evening he wrote 
in the Dagregister that the Supreme Government in Batavia had ordered 
the Kupang officials to interfere as little as possible in the business of  the 
locals. It was therefore best to let the matter rest, since the regents were 
used to this cruel but ingrained custom. Moreover, the perpetrators and 
Susanna’s family were ‘heathens’.59
Moerman’s account might be biased and self-justifying, but apart 
from this it is possible that the princes exaggerated their own authority 
over the life and death of  their subjects and slaves. They had an inter-
est in keeping the Company away from their internal business, instead 
restricting its interventions to the mediation of  larger conflicts. The adat 
may have permitted a measure of  arbitrariness, but the decentralized 
and scattered power structure also kept a check on the range of  actions 
undertaken by the aristocrats. Abuse of  this might have easily lead to the 
ubiquitous Timorese phenomenon of  them voting with their feet.
While both indigenous and Dutch forms of  slavery might appear 
harsh in retrospect, the system also entailed a degree of  social mobility: 
slaves were not given their status of  non-free on a permanent basis.60 In 
a long letter to Batavia, Paulus van Coupang, the Helong aristocrat and 
Christian priest, set out to prove his rights to the regentship of  Kupang 
by emphasizing the slave ancestry of  a rival branch of  the regent family:
Furthermore, Ama Tano alias Snik Snak pretends that he descends 
from the princes of  Pulau Semau via his father and mother, but that the 
mother of  Rasi Fo [Paulus’s father] is from a simple family. However, it is 
not as Ama Tano pretends, but like this. Ama Tano’s grandfather on his 
mother’s side was from Sumba, and was a slave called Somma. Together 
with his son Tirrou he went with a perahu from Sumba to Dengka [on 
Rote]. The Dengka, however, took hold of  them. They subsequently both 
escaped from Dengka to Termanu, and were likewise taken into custody 
by the Termanu. The father, Somma, died there, and the son Tirrou 
fled from Termanu to Pulau Semau, where he was taken into custody by 
Kapuli Attawanek. He remained there, and that is Ama Tano’s ancestry 
from his mother’s side.61
59 VOC 1531 (1692-93), Dagregister, sub 6-12-1692.
60 As, for example, in Batavia, where a slave woman under VOC jurisdiction could end up being the 
wife of  a low-ranking Company servant (compare Taylor 1983:16-7).
61 VOC 1623 (1699), f. 73. 
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Another letter by Paulus indicates that an offspring of  Somma called 
Bare Somma (Tirrou of  the first letter?) married the daughter of  a mi-
nor Helong chief  and begot the mother of  the pretender Ama Tano.62 
Although the letters are intended to castigate Ama Tano, Paulus presup-
poses that a slave could substantially climb the social ladder and marry a 
nobleman’s daughter, finally ending up as the in-law of  a princely family.
Manumission by locals is mentioned in the Dutch legal documents 
from Kupang, particularly in cases where it involved economic trans-
actions that in turn led to disputes. A case from 1694 tells of  how a 
Rotenese man called Baffy Horry fell in love with the slave woman Kilo 
Anak in the early 1660s. She belonged to a Helong lady who was the 
aunt of  the regent, Ama Susang. The owner agreed to hand over Kilo 
Anak to the Rotenese as his wife, on condition that she was exchanged 
for two slaves. Baffy Horry delivered one when he received his wife, and 
would provide the other one at a later occasion; only then would Kilo 
Anak be legally free. However, after some time Baffy Horry passed away 
without having delivered the second slave to the Helong lady. By then, 
the lady had died, but Kilo Anak was reclaimed by the regent family of  
Kupang nevertheless; she was placed at the disposition of  Ama Susang 
himself, residing at his sonaf.63 In other words, the adat system was more 
regulated than the Dutch accounts usually gave them credit for, and the 
testimonies heard by the VOC authorities show that people went to great 
lengths to prove the distinction between free and dependent status.64
To sum up, slavery in Kupang and its Timorese neighbourhood was 
similar to the complex of  slavery and dependency that flourished in early 
modern Southeast Asia. Forms of  dependency that were built upon a 
personal relationship between master and dependent occurred along-
side a harsher and non-personal type of  chattel slavery. The Dutchmen 
maintained their port under modest circumstances and had no desire 
to interfere in the local system. The cultural encounter, however, may 
have contributed to making slavery in the Dutch – and, for that matter, 
Portuguese – area relatively more severe. Slaves became a type of  mer-
chandise that could be bought and sold in a way that had no counterpart 
62 VOC 1623 (1699), f. 79.
63 VOC 1553 (1693-94), Resolutions, sub May 1694.
64 The Dutch records from Kupang in the nineteenth century contain many cases describing long and 
detailed investigations, instigated by Timorese aristocrats, to determine to whom certain individuals and 
groups actually belonged. See for instance ANRI Timor:55, Register der handelingen en besluiten, sub 16-6-1845.
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in the traditional system. One can only speculate on the impact of  the 
firearms that were distributed among Dutch allies and Portuguese cli-
ents, which in turn had ramifications for the power resources and ability 
of  the ruling classes to maintain control. Slave trade in the Dutch East 
Indies was formally abolished in 1818, and slavery itself  in 1859-1860, 
while Portugal forbade slavery in its colonies in 1869. The actual imple-
mentation of  the central decrees was, however, slow. In fact, it is fair to 
say that, until recent times, the Timorese have been aware of  those who 
are descended from slaves.65
The psychological consequences of  the slavery system can be found 
in the deep suspicions towards foreigners harboured by local popula-
tions. The foreign congregations appeared to have as few moral doubts 
about trading in humans as the local aristocracy, and perhaps even fewer. 
This is what the French global explorer Péron discovered on his visit to 
Kupang in 1801, the year after the end of  the VOC; Péron became ac-
quainted with a pauperized aristocratic Helong family which had been 
ruined through the greed of  an opperhoofd and now made a modest living 
from fishing. In particular he befriended the youngest son Cornelis, and 
asked if  he would like to accompany him on his trip back to Europe. At 
first Cornelis seemed enthusiastic, but soon he was overcome with dark 
thoughts. With his hands he made a number of  piles of  sand of  differ-
ent sizes in order to illustrate his point to Péron. With expressive words 
and gestures he went on to explain the predicament that might follow on 
from such a trip:
In Kupang the man Péron is the friend of  Cornelis; but in the country 
of  France a man comes and tells you: ‘Sell this red [brown] man to me’, 
and he shows such a large sum of  money to you [pointing at the smallest 
pile of  sand]. You reply: ‘This red man is a friend of  the man Péron.’ You 
give the same answer to those who come and offer you these other piles of  
sand; however, finally someone gives you a sum of  money as large as the 
last [and biggest] pile of  sand, and you say: ‘May the red man become a 
slave.’ Then I will not further see the man Péron. I am forced to work in 
65 Knaap 1995:200-2; McWilliam 2002:141-2. I understand that this is also the case in the Solor Is-
lands (Siti Dasi, ’s Hertogenbosch, personal communication, 2007). Riedel 1885:9 writes that the Dutch 
domains of  Kupang, Funai, Taebenu, Amabi, Amarasi and Lesser Sonbai only had crown slaves (leksaän) 
by the late nineteenth century, whose origins could no longer be traced. Everywhere else private slaves 
were found, due to ongoing petty wars which the Dutch were unable to prevent.
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misery, and the poor Cornelis, who is far away from his father Neas and 
his brother Pone, dies from sorrow and sickness. (Péron 1807:158-90.)
arenas of interaction
We will now have a closer look at the forms of  interaction between the 
VOC authorities and their Timorese allies. The VOC drew up a great 
number of  contracts with the various rulers of  maritime Asia, and were 
perceptive enough to grasp the importance of  local ritual and custom 
when concluding them. The Company officials on Timor found they 
were able to ignore the non-Christian aspects of  a blood oath that the 
allies promised would be ‘followed and upheld as sacrosanct, and con-
sidered by our subjects to be unbreakable’ (Heeres 1931:75-7). The du-
rability of  such agreements would have obviously been enhanced if  the 
Dutch co-opted the local community by building upon old perceptions 
of  alliance and precedence. The rather rudimentary contract of  1655 
and the extensive and detailed one achieved by the diplomat Paravicini 
in 1756 were hardly remembered by the illiterate aristocracy. What was 
remembered was that there were white foreigners from the Company 
who, at some point in the past, had concluded an agreement with the 
five allies over the territory owned by the original lord of  the land, the 
king of  Kupang. 
The opperhoofd and his council remained in regular contact with the 
allied kings and regents, who were encouraged from the start to allow 
their children to be educated in Malay, a language commonly under-
stood by the opperhoofden.66 The preserved Dagregisters reveal that meet-
ings with the aristocrats initially occurred on an ad-hoc basis, with one 
or several regents appearing before the opperhoofd whenever there was a 
need to raise one issue or another, or else they could be summoned for 
a meeting with the council, a vergadering. The opperhoofd saw the regents 
several times each month and therefore had a general idea of  what was 
going on among the allies. Or to be more precise, he heard what the re-
gents decided to tell him. A wide range of  topics were discussed: external 
threats from Amarasi and the Topasses; news from the inland; internal 
disputes; the death or subsequent accession of  persons of  importance; 
66 VOC 1229 (1659), ff. 865b-866a.
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corvée service; agricultural issues; runaway slaves, and so on. 
During the ordered term of  governance of  Willem Moerman (1686-
1699) the routines for interaction between the VOC and the Timorese 
were institutionalized. Moerman decreed that the regents of  all the five 
princedoms must appear at a vergadering in Fort Concordia once a month. 
During these regular meetings any disputes that might have arisen be-
tween the princedoms were straightened out.67 For obvious logistical 
reasons the princes of  Rote, Sawu and Solor were not usually present. 
In the assembly hall each regent or king had his particular seat, and in 
accordance with the dual structure of  the Timorese domains, the regents 
would normally attend rather than the kings themselves. The plaintiffs 
would speak for their cause, and this would be followed by deliberation 
among the regents and the opperhoofd and his council. The VOC scribes, 
proficient in Malay, kept minutes of  the meetings, which have partly 
survived in Dutch translation, and offer an invaluable insight into the 
political culture of  an early colonial hybrid society with its insoluble 
mix of  foreign and local perceptions. Moerman also started the valu-
able practice of  writing a memorandum for his successor, including a 
systematic survey of  the various Company dependencies and their char-
acteristics. These measures, of  course, were not unique within the VOC 
system; in South Sulawesi, for example, the Dutch authorities similarly 
had to maintain a grid of  regional kingdoms and economic interests 
that demanded steady lines of  communication with the local elites. But 
while South Sulawesi suffered endemic rivalries, minor conflicts and, at 
times, even major eruptions, the Kupangese situation was comparatively 
manageable (Knaap and Sutherland 2004:13-5).
Company-owned ships from Batavia used to appear twice a year, in 
spring and late summer. Care had to be taken in order that they were 
not hit by the monsoons, and so they were eagerly awaited by Dutch 
officials and Timorese rulers alike. The notes in the Dagregisters reveal 
the increasing anxiety of  the opperhoofden if  for some reason the ship was 
delayed. The ships were their lifeline to the outer world and brought 
much-needed supplies and reinforcements for the fort. They were also 
an important part of  the economy of  exchange that constituted part of  
Dutch-Timorese relations. In the time leading up to the arrival of  the 
ship in the late summer, the allies of  Timor, Rote, Sawu and Solor col-
67 VOC 1609 (1698), f. 51.
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lected an amount of  gifts in kind to be sent to Batavia. Since sandalwood 
was not usually available, the gifts from the Timorese rulers consisted of  
a few picul of  beeswax, sometimes complemented with slaves, gold, or 
an amount of  snakewood, which was used for medical purposes.68 In 
the eighteenth century, they also included a limited amount of  beans; 
beeswax and beans were similarly the standard products given by the 
Rotenese rulers.
In exchange, Batavia sent luxury goods to the aristocrats that corre-
sponded to the value of  the gifts. These included shotguns, gunpowder, 
drums, ceremonial staffs, cloths, buttons, liquor, and the like. The kings 
and regents eagerly looked forward to these counter-gifts, and were 
quick to inform the authorities if  Batavia had forgotten to send someone 
his due share. Communication with Batavia was maintained by means 
of  letters, which became part of  an annual routine by the 1690s. They 
were written in Malay by persons trusted by the kings and regents, who 
then signed them collectively with crosses.69 The letters themselves paid 
homage to the stranger lord in Batavia, who was addressed in terms 
that portrayed him as an entity of  standing: Tuan Bangsawan yang 
Mulia Gouvernadoer Djindraal dan Tuan Raden van India (The Noble 
Aristocrat Lord, the Governor General, and the Lords of  the Council 
of  India).70 
Another arena of  interaction was the church (for an overview of  
Reformed Christians on Timor, Rote and Sawu in the eighteenth centu-
ry, see Table 1.). As a trading organization the VOC had a limited inter-
est in proselytizing, but in a few places like Ambon, Menado and Batavia 
sizeable reformed communities developed (Boxer 1990). In the Company 
dependencies of  the Timor region, the growth of  such a community was 
modest. Dominican sources allege that Frei António de São Jacinto bap-
tized the king and most of  the people in Kupang during the first half  of  
the seventeenth century, but the superficial nature of  these conversions 
soon became apparent (Biermann 1924:40). The aristocracy of  the early 
68 Some years the regents did manage to obtain some sandalwood. For example, in 1709 the allies 
delivered 11,233 pounds of  the valuable wood as a gift (VOC 1776 [1709]). Incidentally, this collection 
occurred during a brief  period of  peace between the VOC allies and Amarasi.
69 Only a few ruling Timorese princes are known to have been literate enough to sign with their own 
names, all at the end of  the VOC period: Jacob Liskoen of  Funai (d. after 1806), Don Jacobus Albertus 
of  Amanuban (d. after 1809) and Alphonsus Adrianus of  Greater Sonbai (d.1802).
70 For a preserved original written in Malay, see, LOr 2238, UB Leiden, Letter from the emperor of  
Greater Sonbai, 1800.
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VOC period generally posed as non-Christians, and so did the Sonbai 
and other immigrant aristocracies. The opperhoofden might have made 
disapproving remarks about the paganism of  the allies at times, but they 
did not interfere in their domestic way of  life. Christianity was also al-
lowed to develop at its own speed. Fully ordained Dutch priests stayed on 
Timor for comparatively brief  periods of  time, and church services were 
therefore usually taken care of  by the krankbezoekers. The latter were of  a 
lower clerical rank and were often non-whites from places like Ambon.71
Table 1. Reformed Christians on Timor, Rote and Sawu, eighteenth century
 1752 1779
European council members 5
Native council members 44
All council members 35
Commoner Europeans 57
Commoner natives 402
All commoner Christians 520
Native children 257
Native non baptized children 49




All Sonbai Christians 210








71 The clerical persons staying in Kupang since 1670 are enumerated in Valentijn 1726, III:127.
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Lole, all baptized 1,223











Timu, non baptized children 51
IN SUM 3,155 5,950
Source: ANRI Timor: 43, Letters from the Church Council of  Timor
Over the course of  the eighteenth century the allied kings and regents 
began to accept the reformed religion. The first to do so were the 
Sonbai co-regent Domingo (reign 1708-1739) and the king of  Amfoan, 
Dom Manuel (reign 1708-1718). In both cases it seems that we have a 
Portuguese entry to Christianity. Domingo and his sister were baptized 
as children in 1675, being the offspring of  Dom Domingos Sonbai and 
the pagan woman Babyllas. Dom Domingos in turn was the eldest son of  
the old regent Ama Tomananu, who was initially known as Dom Luíz. 
Looking at his name, he appears to have retained a Christo-Catholic 
identity, as is also indicated by the early baptism of  his children.72 The 
72 Doopboek Timor (Baptismal book of  Timor), sub 16-2-1675; VOC 1579 (1695). Domingo’s sister 
Aletta later married the VOC soldier Jan Schroff. The latter was an intermediary between Sonbai and 
the Company (VOC 1961 [1721], f. 5).
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characteristically Portuguese name Dom Manuel likewise suggests that 
the princely family of  Amfoan was acquainted with Catholicism since 
before its migration to Kupang in 1683.
Other princes soon followed suit. An important event in this respect 
was the baptism of  the emperor of  Sonbai in 1720, where the opperhoofd 
Barend (Bernardus) van der Swaan and Domingo’s sister Aletta were 
baptismal witnesses. The nine-year-old emperor, who bore the Atoni 
name Bawa Leu, was henceforth known as Bernardus de Leeuw. From 
this point onwards the so-called emperors were baptized, either before or 
at the time of  their accession.73 The process, however, was very uneven: 
while the royalty of  Sonbai and Amfoan opted for Christianity, the kings 
of  Kupang, Amabi and Taebenu were only occasionally baptized, re-
maining attached in reality to their traditional religion until the late nine-
teenth or early twentieth centuries. There is an interesting distinction 
between princely and regent families in this respect. In the case of  Amabi 
and Taebenu, the executive regents bore Christian names from the early 
eighteenth century onwards, in stark contrast with the kings themselves. 
This is hardly surprising, though, when we consider the structure of  the 
Timorese princedoms. The ‘female’ kings were figures who were given 
the tasks of  keeping custody of  leu, and performing the right rituals (H.G. 
Schulte Nordholt 1971:371-4). Their duties obviously made them less 
susceptible to religious conversion than the ‘male’ regents who handled 
daily affairs – at any rate if  Christianity was to become a serious practice 
rather than simply something to which lip service was paid.
The situation was somewhat different on Rote. Conversion of  the 
unruly island started late, but in 1720, Benjamin, the heir to the impor-
tant nusak Thie, was baptized.74 When he later became manek of  Thie 
(1729-1746), Benjamin attempted to take advantage of  his position as 
a Christian prince, and with Dutch assistance, looked for the means to 
expand his power at the expense of  Termanu. The opperhoofden did not 
always appreciate their enterprising ally, but after a series of  particularly 
73 That is, at least until the end of  the VOC era. Some of  the rulers of  Lesser Sonbai in the nineteenth 
century only appear under their Atoni name (genealogy appended to Ruychaver 1918). For example, 
Mesie Nisnoni (reign 1839-1860) is known to have been a ‘heathen’ although his father, Pieter Babakase 
(reign early 1820s), had a Christian name (Raad voor de zending n.y., 1102-1:1403, Archief  van Utrecht; 
ANRI Timor:55, Register der handelingen en besluiten, sub 16-6-1845). As the number of  Dutch records 
outlining the inner conditions of  the dependent princedoms declines in the first half  of  the nineteenth 
century, it is difficult to draw conclusions on this point.
74 Doopboek Timor (Baptismal book of  Timor), ANRI, sub 26-5-1720.
289
7 Life and death in Kupang |
bloody events in 1746-1749 – discussed below – the opperhoofd at the time, 
Daniel van der Burgh, decided that conversion was the best antidote to 
rebellion. He requested the presence of  no less than ten or twelve school-
masters who were to cover the Rotenese missionary area and educate 
the children in the reformed religion. 75 As studied in detail by James 
Fox, the Rotenese actually developed their own system and processes 
to aid Christianization and the spread of  education (Fox 1977). Nine 
Rotenese domains had manek with Christian names in the second half  of  
the eighteenth century. The Christian character of  the Rotenese partly 
explains why many European visitors in the nineteenth century preferred 
Rotenese people over other peoples in the region. As for the Muslims 
of  Solor, the Company avoided any attempt at introducing Christianity, 
and on Sawu direct Dutch interference only commenced in the late nine-
teenth century. An interesting detail about Sawu is that the sub-regent 
Dangka was baptized in 1720 at 31 years of  age, due to a peculiar family 
set-up; his step-father was a Dutchman called Frans Brockaerd.76
What did the conversion of  rulers mean, therefore, apart from them 
henceforth bearing a Christian name? Not much, some would argue. 
Willem Morman in 1692 found that those who had been baptized sel-
dom went to church, and he angrily admonished them at a gathering 
in the fort where their knowledge of  the creed was examined by the 
krankbezoekers and schoolmasters.77 The French engineer Pelon found 
that Christians in the late eighteenth century hardly merited having a 
denomination: ‘I do not think there is a country in the world where the 
Christians are more ignorant and superstitious than in Timor and the 
neighbouring islands’ (Pelon 2002:42). Among other things he noted 
that the aristocrats decided through divination whether it was auspi-
cious or not to baptize their offspring. The missionary Reint Le Bruyn 
arrived on the island in 1819 as the first regular clergyman since 1802, 
and found little or nothing that distinguished Christians from non-Chris-
tians.78 Nevertheless, evidence from the eighteenth century suggests that 
Christianity played a functional role in Dutch-Timorese relations; having 
a Christian identity was strongly associated with a particular outward 
75 VOC 8342 (1749), ff. 91-2; VOC 8343 (1750), ff. 83-6.
76 Baptismal book of  Kupang, sub 26-5-1720.
77 VOC 1531 (1692-93), Dagregister, sub 22-7-1692.
78 Nagedachtenis 1830; Coolsma 1901:823; Raad voor de zending n.y., 1102-1:1394, Archief  van Utrecht. 
Le Bruyn, however, was not more unfavourable to the locals, as he married Jacoba Manoh, a daughter 
of  the king of  Amfoan (ANRI Timor:51, Register der kommissien [1834]).
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appearance that in turn tended to engender a certain kind of  royal au-
thority. In a letter from 1747, the king of  Kupang asked Batavia to send 
a coat, camisole, trousers, hat, sword and two muskets, since he intended 
to convert to the Christian religion. In the same way, an emperor of  
Greater Sonbai who was a Christian and stayed in Kupang in the mid-
eighteenth century, was remembered in later tradition as Nai Sobe Kase, 
‘Mr Foreign Hat’.79
There is also ample evidence that several persons from the princely 
families took the new religion seriously. One example is Paulus van 
Coupang, pretender to the Helong regentship in 1698, who served as 
krankbezoeker and schoolmaster for many years and led the church service 
in Kupang at a time when there were no European clergymen in the port 
town. When Warnerus van Loo was dispatched by the clerical authorities 
of  Batavia in 1732 to inspect church, school and religious service, the 
priest found the following situation:
He [Van Loo] has found it necessary, because of  the death of  the elder 
Johannes Tano [regent of  Kupang] and the deacon Erasmus Hans, to re-
place them with the elder Leendert van Dijk in order to restore the church 
council. This has the following constitution: two elders and two deacons, 
so that in cases of  death, there will still be one or two members of  the 
assembly to monitor the church. To that end I [Van Loo, changing to first 
person] have, after the aforementioned nomination, appointed people 
who are good-natured, humble and lead a pious life, in order to lead in 
concert the true Christian reformed religion and to be church deputies; 
namely Raja Daniel of  Amfoan as elder, and Cornelis Zegers as dea-
con. And regarding that the deacon Amos Pietersz Thenoe80 has turned 
to debauchery, and that his character and life has consequently turned 
very un-Christian and bad, which is unsuitable for any deputy let alone 
a church servant, I have after much deliberation decided that Thenoe is 
unworthy to serve in this position. Therefore we have appointed Tobias 
79 VOC 8340 (1747), ff. 109-11; Fobia 1984:81. Nai Sobe Kase’s place in the pedigrees suggests that 
he could be identified as either of  the historical rulers Don Bernardo (reign 1752-1760) or his brother 
Albertus Johannes Taffy (r.1760-1768).
80 Amos Pietersz Thenoe was a disciple of  François Valentijn, spoke good Dutch and was proficient 
in the Arabic-derived Jawi script. He had served in Kupang since 1717 as krankbezoeker and interpreter, 
and performed valuable services to the VOC. He was nevertheless a wayward figure and a notorious 
wife-beater (Valentijn 1726, III:127; Troostenburg de Bruyn 1884; Taylor 1983:46; VOC 2239 [1732], 
ff. 68-70).
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[regent] of  Amabi as deacon in his place. This, being the church council 
of  this place according to the maxims of  the church of  Batavia,which 
are mostly followed in the eastern churches, has been considered to be 
presented to the opperhoofd and the council for their approval.81
We can therefore see that the church organization at this time leaned 
heavily on the authority of  individual pious aristocrats of  the Kupang, 
Amfoan and Amabi princedoms, who were even given leading posi-
tions in the local church community. Of  the other persons mentioned, 
Amos Pietersz Thenoe was an Ambonese and Erasmus Hans probably a 
Mardijker. Clearly, religious space was a meeting-point where important 
interactions took place between Europeans and Timorese – in spite of  
the official Dutch attempt to keep these two worlds apart. 
room for negotiations
We have seen that there were well-defined arenas of  interaction, but did 
these permit the Timorese allies to successfully negotiate their duties and 
rights? Were they able to achieve solutions favourable to themselves and 
their princedoms? The minutes from the vergaderingen are careful to render 
the arguments of  the regents in detail. Of  course we do not know how 
faithful these were, especially since they tend to allow the opperhoofd the last 
word, but it is nevertheless evident that the Company officials deemed it 
worthwhile, and perhaps even essential, to be aware of  the Timorese mind-
set. There are a number of  cases recorded in which the five allies bluntly 
refused to follow the recommendations of  the opperhoofd and his council, 
and the vergadering was dissolved without having reached a consensus. 
On a vergadering in September 1745, Buni, the king of  Kupang, 
unexpectedly stood up and declared that he intended to marry a prin-
cess from Taebenu. As he explained, Kupang and Taebenu had an old 
wife-giver and wife-receiver relationship. Everything was ready for the 
wedding celebration ‘in accordance with their devilish practice’ and his 
subjects were already gathered within his palisade. The opperhoofd Jan 
Anthony Meulenbeek, a far from tactful figure, retorted that the wed-
ding was most untimely, especially since Buni had not yet been properly 
81 VOC 2239 (1732), f. 111.
292
| Lords of  the land, lords of  the sea
installed with regnal powers. The king must therefore wait for a licence 
to arrive from Batavia. Buni upheld his cause and the other four allied 
regents intervened on his behalf. They pointed out to Meulenbeek that 
Buni must be installed at once and then proceed with the wedding, or 
else there would be plenty of  trouble from his subjects, who had deliv-
ered cattle and other necessities for the feast, and from the Taebenu 
wife-giver. In the end Meulenbeek reluctantly complied with the request 
in order to avert any calamity in ‘this weird and fickle country’. Buni 
was triumphantly installed inside Fort Concordia and then in his negeri.82 
From a Timorese point of  view, this was all completely logical; the mar-
riage had been preceded by ritually laden preparations and negotiations 
carried out behind Meulenbeek’s back. To cancel the wedding would 
indeed have sparked trouble, as the opperhoofd eventually realized.
The vergaderingen were the normal arenas for discussion. In case of  
lasting disagreements one could, however, apply directly to the Governor 
General in Batavia. While the opperhoofden quickly came and went, the 
Supreme Government remained the Father and Mother Company, an entity 
with royal connotations. On a few occasions the allies managed to deliver 
letters directly to Batavia without them being screened by the opperhoofd. 
This was for instance the case in 1674, when the allies were fed up with 
Jacob van Wijckersloot, the opperhoofd at the time:
We kings and orangkaya let the Noble General know that it has pleased 
God the Lord to send us grasshoppers, and in such amount as the hairs 
on our heads. They eat all the foodstuff  that we have sown and planted, 
so that we now suffer hunger, to the point of  being on the verge of  death, 
and have nothing at all to eat. Above that, Jacob van Wijckersloot pun-
ishes us much harder than God the Lord, and does so in manifold ways. 
We work day and night with our wives and children and have made three 
lime ovens. Above that we have to break coral stones and carry lime. 200-
300 people have to carry large trunks of  trees, climbing up and down 
the mountains without getting a mouthful to eat. He also punishes us 
very hard when a slave belonging to the Company or one of  its associ-
ates escapes. He summons all the orangkaya to the fort and demands one 
or another of  us in exchange. And when we very amicably declare that 
we do not want to do that, and say that we are not obliged to watch his 
82 VOC 8339 (1746), ff. 39-43.
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slaves, he does not listen to us, and wants us to give him another one 
instead. […] Likewise he punished a certain raja from Kupang called 
Bissiso.83 The raja made a large house. He was summoned to the fort 
and asked: ‘Where did you get so many spikes?’ The raja then answered: 
‘O Mister Commander, the previous captain gave me all these spikes in 
exchange for beeswax.’ The commander did not believe him. He said: ‘I 
have witnesses.’ Having heard them, the commander let him loose. How-
ever, when he wanted to go to his house, the sergeant came and dragged 
him along to the dark hole, where he became seriously ill from sorrow. He 
asked to be released since he was almost dead from sickness. He would 
give him gold, slaves or pigs, but the commander did not accept it. How-
ever, afterwards he asked for eight picul snakewood and when he received 
them, he let the commander loose, who, as time passed, became sicker 
and died. Also, the rajas had heard that Van Wijckersloot had increased 
the price of  rice more than the Company, asking 56 heavy rijksdaalders 
for a last. All the rajas then went to the fort and asked the commander to 
decrease the price and again sell it like before. He said he could not do 
that, but that they must pay three kwartjes for a ration. They had to go 
away and could not obtain any food. However, the Commander sells to 
the Portuguese as he wishes, and fills the bellies of  the Company people. 
[…] Jacob van Wickersloot lets his soldiers roam around, and his slaves 
roam through the entire negeri, shooting hogs, bucks, sheep and hens. 
They also steal tobacco, eggs and ubi. They bring it away, and when the 
people ask for money, they stab and beat them and chase them away.84
Van Wijckersloot partly describes the same events in the Dagregisters, 
in such a self-righteous manner that it shows him to be of  stern char-
acter. In fact he remained in charge until he fell victim to the dreaded 
Timorese fever in 1680, and his popularity visibly increased towards the 
end of  his term. The letter was signed by six Timorese lords, first among 
them Ama Besi, who might have taken the initiative for the diplomatic 
coup. It was the same Ama Besi who voted with his feet four years later 
and then stubbornly fought the Company and its allies until his death in 
1688. Indeed the complaints of  the allies are remarkably similar to those 
made by the opperhoofden against the Portuguese. Backbreaking corvée 
83 Bissiso was no upper ruler. ‘Raja’ should be understood here in a more general sense, presumably 
as an equivalent of  the Dawan word usif.
84 Dagh-Register 1887-1931, the year 1674:224-6. Ubi is an edible tuber (VOC-Glossarium 2000:119).
A group of  Timorese soldiers. Illustration based on a sketch by Johan Nieuhof.
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work, extortion, economic exploitation and undisciplined encroachment 
were darker sides of  the asymmetric relationship of  an early colonial 
milieu, but there were also control mechanisms in place; Batavia could 
not afford to let unsuitable opperhoofden drive the local allies to rebellion.
This is seen by the sad career of  the temporary opperhoofd Willem 
Tange a few years later. Three princes from Sonbai, Kupang and Amabi 
travelled to Batavia in 1684 and brought a new letter of  complaint to 
the Governor General. Tange was accused of  corrupt behaviour, since 
he had accepted bribes and had incited Rotenese princes to take up arms 
against each other. He also forbade the Timorese locals to travel to the 
surrounding islands, forbade them to raise sheep, and demanded exces-
sive corvée labour. Added to this, he was accused of  being a particularly 
rude figure, who used bad language to the aristocrats. This time Batavia 
reacted swiftly, for obvious strategic reasons. If  Tange’s machinations 
brought unrest in Rote, the VOC system in this part of  the archipelago 
could potentially break down. The obnoxious opperhoofd was therefore 
recalled, and spent his next years ‘unhappily trudging’ while writing re-
ports on Timorese affairs, all of  which were useful for later historians.85 
Three Company servants who defended Tange’s conduct commented 
that the Timorese lords became arrogant when they were ordered to 
carry out some duties, saying: ‘We do not want to do it! We will write to 
Batavia!’86 While the Dutchmen interpreted this attitude as unbecom-
ing and stubborn, it equally shows that the Timorese leadership was well 
aware of  its rights, and would take action if  these were contravened.
The self-assured attitude of  the local princes stunned one of  the 
next opperhoofden, Arend Verhoeven. In early 1687, the newly appointed 
Verhoeven sailed from Batavia to Solor. Aboard the Dutch jacht (fast-sail-
ing vessel) was also the widely-travelled sengaji Dasi of  Lamakera. When 
the ship finally reached the roadstead of  his home village, Dasi asked to 
take his goods ashore, which Verhoeven gladly agreed to, ‘the more so 
since we were salvaged from a great stench and filth’. Then, however, 
the sengaji insisted that he must stay for some days to be with his wife, as 
he had not shared a bed with her since his departure last year. A sharp 
exchange followed between Verhoeven and Dasi, since the opperhoofd 
needed him at once as a diplomatic presence on the unruly island of  
Rote. In the end Dasi stepped into the barge that would bring him ashore 
85 Now kept in Leiden as H 49:u (1688) and H 49:v (1689), KITLV.
86 VOC 1414 (1685), ff. 158a-162b.
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and snarled at the opperhoofd: ‘You are just a new resident and you should 
not act so sternly already, or else we will complain about you and see to 
it that you are recalled again.’87 Verhoeven seethed with anger, but the 
jacht had to proceed to Kupang without Dasi; later, however, the sengaji 
did loyally serve the Company on Rote. In Kupang, Verhoeven heard a 
similar comment from Ama Kobo, a regent’s son from Amabi. For the 
princes, the Supreme Government of  Batavia was more than an ally; it 
constituted a distant stranger kingship, a benevolent body of  appeal to a 
much higher order than the sometimes unreasonable opperhoofden.
A further incident in this vein occurred in 1713. The allies had just 
suffered a devastating Topass invasion and living conditions were not 
easy. According to the Timorese, the situation was aggravated by the at-
titude of  the opperhoofd, Reynier Leers. Eventually the empress of  Sonbai 
repeated the strategy from the days of  Willem Tange, dictating a frank 
letter to the Governor General and his council:
The ruler of  the Sonbai nation, Nonje Sonbai [Bi Sonbai88], with her 
assistant regents Nai Sau and Nai Domingo as well as the regent of  the 
Taebenu, the loyal allies of  Your Excellencies, find themselves obliged 
to send these few paragraphs to Your Excellencies due to dire straits. 
This is otherwise not at all our custom. It is only in order to make known 
the very bad conduct and governance of  the prefect and opperhoofd Mr 
Reynier Leers. This [conduct] has never been seen among the previous 
opperhoofden, as long as we have enjoyed the protection of  the Company. 
Then, the lack of  civility of  the quoted Mr Leers before the aforemen-
tioned Nonje Sonbai is unprecedented [?]. We will not tire out Your 
Excellencies with his story, which is too verbose. We also want to relate 
that about ten months ago, when there was some need of  jagung [maize], 
we supplied the aforementioned opperhoofd Leers with this grain, as much 
as our subjects could manage, for 9 stuyvers per 40 pounds. When again 
we had to buy this grain for food, we had to buy it from the hands of  the 
opperhoofd for 18 stuyvers per the same 40 pounds. This caused great dis-
contentment among our people for, if  they wished to stay alive, they had 
to sell almost everything in order to fill their bellies, so that a large part 
87 VOC 8310 (1686-87), Dagregister, sub 18-4-1687.
88 In the documents this lady is variously referred to as Usi Tetu Utang, Bi Sonbai and Nonje Son-
nebay. The first compound of  the latter name could be either a rendering of  Nyonya, equivalent to 
Dawan Bi (Lady), or else the Dawan word Noni (gold).
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of  them, with wives and children, went over to the Portuguese. How-
ever, this is not the only reason [for discontent], but also the sharp words 
that the aforementioned opperhoofd spoke against us seven months ago: 
in case we once again picked up a fight with our enemies and [if  we] 
happened to retreat under the fortress of  the Company, then he would 
fire at us and not spare the people of  the Company allies. Because of  
this and other atrocities that may come out of  this, the aforementioned 
ruler asks Your Excellencies (in order to avoid such a sad occurrence), 
that if  the opperhoofd Leers stays here any longer, Your Excellencies in the 
coming year may allow her person [the empress] to come by way of  the 
Company ship, at her expenses, in order that she may give Your Excel-
lencies an oral account about things, since she is not at all intending to 
be lodged with her arch enemies, the Portuguese in Lifau. However, if  
Your Excellencies do not wish to take the effort to provide the ship, then 
the aforementioned Nonje Sonbai asks permission to depart from here 
in a good Chinese vessel.89
There are similarities between this epistle and the letters of  1674 and 
1684. The price of  crops is an issue, and so is the foul language of  the 
opperhoofd, which offends the honour and self-esteem of  the ruling elite. 
As in 1684, the inconsiderate acts of  the opperhoofd have disturbed the 
political balance, and some people have even left for the Portuguese area. 
This time, the native discontent coincided with a time of  serious internal 
conflict among the Dutch of  Kupang. The members of  the council re-
fused to sign the report to Batavia penned by Leers. On a late September 
evening in his chamber in Fort Concordia, the desperate Leers drew up a 
letter to his superiors, in which he castigated his compatriots: the second-
in-command and the sergeant boozed around in the Kupangese negeri to 
the scorn of  the locals, the economic balance sheet had to be drawn up 
by Leers himself, and so on. He asked Batavia to be kept on as opperhoofd, 
but to no avail. He was considered to have mismanaged the conflict 
with the Topasses, which, together with the allied complaints, led to his 
prompt replacement by a more amenable figure.90 
There was, therefore, a certain amount of  room for negotiation and 
complaint. The position of  the Dutch community was relatively weak 
and could hardly survive without the five loyal allies. Conversely, the 
89 VOC 1841 (1713), ff. 1-4.
90 VOC 1841 (1713), ff. 57-9; Coolhaas 1979:48-9.
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allies leaned on the authority of  the stranger lords to maintain internal 
harmony and deter foreign invasion. As a matter of  fact, conditions in 
the West Timorese enclave differ markedly from Rote, Sawu and Solor, 
which suffered repeated crises and resistance against the Dutch order. 
Apart from the Ama Besi incident in 1678 and a similar case relating 
to the Kupang princedom in 1743-1744, there were no open rebellions 
against the authority of  the VOC in the Kupang area. The difference 
with the unruly Portuguese area is stunning, as is the contrast with Dutch 
relations to various new Timorese allies after 1749, when the Company 
began to expand over a larger territory. In spite of  numerous causes of  
discontent and outright oppression, the bonds of  loyalty forged in the 
1650s lasted for three centuries.
the company as mediator
One important factor in these lasting bonds was the Company’s role 
as mediator. While the five allies were usually able to solve their own 
problems, the perceptive Willem Moerman identified a number of  
principaTo rol causes for disputes within and between the princedoms. 
Firstly, there was a real danger that chiefs and rulers knowingly violated 
each other’s conceived prerogatives. Timorese rulers were faced with the 
perennial problem of  keeping their people under their control. The five 
princedoms contained small populations, each of  them numbering less 
than 10,000 people in total, and sometimes substantially less than that.91 
Data from the late colonial period suggest that the population of  each 
princedom lived scattered outside Kupang, so that there were no clear 
borders between the five, but rather, a complex of  enclaves. All this made 
the retention of  people crucial for the leaders. In fact, the most common 
cause of  conflict in the Kupang area was attracting people from other 
domains and declining to return them. Other transgressions included 
91 According to the local Dagregister of  9 August 1675 (VOC 1319), there was a census taken of  the 
number of  “weerbare mannen” (able-bodied men) among the allies. According to the Sonbai aristocrat 
Ama Pot, who reported the numbers to the Dutch opperhoofd, the numbers were as follows:
1,780 in Sonba’i 
740 in Kupang
320 in Amabi
Altogether there were therefore 2,840 fit men. If this excludes slaves, it would suggest an overall population of 
perhaps 12,000-15,000 souls. The number fluctuated, however, with coming of new groups to the VOC sphere. It 
is also possible that the Timorese underreported their numbers to avoid excessive corvée service.
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cattle theft and deliberate vandalism, such as the damaging of  water 
canals. This could easily spill over into violence between the princedoms.
Secondly, mere accidents – such as the cattle belonging to one com-
munity damaging the crops in the field of  another – might ignite ani-
mosity. It was also possible that the highly inflammable houses caught 
fire and damaged other houses in the process. Thirdly, individual family 
affairs could be blown up out of  all proportion. Especially the belis was 
(and is) of  prime importance to traditional Timorese society. The adat 
requires belis to be paid in full to the family of  the bride before she is fully 
detached from her origin family; otherwise, she and her children may be 
claimed back. Moerman noted that the payment or restitution of  such 
wealth sometimes caused conflicts. Fourthly, political disobedience was 
not uncommon within the Timorese princedoms. Although there was a 
clear hierarchy in terms of  prestige and precedence, the actual exercise 
of  power took place on a horizontal rather than a pyramid-shaped level, 
with the various amaf and amaf  naek (temukung) wielding authority that was 
rarely checked by the princely centre. Thus a lesser temukung might refuse 
to obey his putative lawful overlord, either ‘abusing’ his power for his 
own end or with the support of  some other ruler or chief.92 Moerman 
observed that the Timorese elite tended to come to the opperhoofd when 
they were not able to straighten out their own disputes, which led him to 
establish the aforementioned routines of  deliberation. The vergaderingen 
conventionally ended by the drinking of  a glass of  arrack as a symbol 
of  concord.
Not least of  all these, Sonbai’s pretentious nature caused the Company 
great anxiety. While the Lesser Sonbai polity was only the second-ranked 
princedom, after the Helong lord of  the land, the elite eagerly guarded 
the position of  precedence that they claimed. The nature of  this prece-
dence is stated in rather uncertain terms in the VOC reports, but it sur-
faces in some cases of  dispute. When parts of  the Amfoan and Taebenu 
population arrived from north-western Timor in Kupang in the 1680s, 
Sonbai claimed that they had long since been its subjects.93 These 
claims led to a serious row in Janaury 1696. Willem Moerman referred 
in the Dagregister to ‘the Taebenu who are also Sonbai and also descended 
92 VOC 1609 (1698), ff. 50-1.
93 Long before the Taebenu’s migration to Kupang they were considered to be of  Sonbai affiliation. 
For example, a note from 1676 mentions ‘the Sonbai under-regent, Siko Taebenu’ (VOC 1327 [1676-
77], Dagregister, sub 22-11-1676).
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from the ancestral house of  Amfoan’. In order to elucidate the relations 
between the allied groups, Moerman asked that the empress herself, Bi 
Sonbai, appeared in the vergadering, which she did. The lord of  Amfoan, 
Nai Toas, showed his ceremonial respect for the empress in the name 
of  diplomacy. However, the Taebenu elite remained intractable. Having 
a barlaque relationship with Kupang, they preferred to come under the 
complete authority of  the Helong king and have nothing to do with 
Sonbai of  Amfoan.94 As far as Moerman could determine, Sonbai did 
not harbour any actual pretensions of  governing the Taebenu congrega-
tion. Rather, it was a symbolic issue, since the Sonbai elite demanded 
that Taebenu acknowledged the empress and brought her gifts of  food. 
The Taebenu inclination to side with the Helong created a great deal 
of  bitterness among the Sonbai elite, who launched a Timorese mission 
civilisatrice theory. Upon their arrival from the original land of  Sonbai, 
they said, ‘they had found the land of  Kupang […] to be nothing but 
scrubland and wilderness. They had made it neat and habitable. Now a 
newcomer had withdrawn from the power and authority of  his lawful 
mistress, to the pleasure of  the regent of  the land [the king of  Kupang], 
although several times we gave word of  it to Ama Susang.’95 The dispute 
involved certain objects of  authority, a drum, halberd and musket, which 
had been bestowed upon them by the Company to indicate that Taebenu 
was a subordinate ally. These objects, according to the Sonbai, had been 
wrongfully kept by the king of  Kupang, who thereby interfered with 
Sonbai prerogatives.
The dispute was left to simmer for almost ten years but then erupted 
in September 1705. Visiting the main negeri of  Taebenu, the Dutch found 
that the commoners were armed with shotguns, shields, cutlasses and 
assegais. The Taebenu leaders welcomed the white lords and bade them 
to sit down with them, going on to declare that the Sonbai had insulted 
them by decapitating a Taebenu man. The severed head underwent the 
usual ritual treatment; as the head had been taken by an ally, however, 
its ritual treatment, according to their adat, showed an immense lack of  
a great disrespect, scorn and injure for the Taebenu. They therefore now 
wished to take their revenge. The Dutch made them promise to wait un-
til a vergadering could be held on the next day. However, once the Dutch 
had gone the promise was at once broken, and a Sonbai settlement was 
94 VOC 1577 (1695-96), Dagregister, sub 2 and 3-1-1696.
95 VOC 1579 (1696), f. 8.
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attacked. Since they were much stronger in terms of  manpower, the 
Sonbai were able to repel the Taebenu and pursue them to their main 
negeri. When the opperhoofd Joannes van Alphen heard about the commo-
tion he mounted his horse and galloped back to the negeri, where he was 
met by a grisly sight. More than 20 mutilated corpses, mainly women and 
children, lay scattered in the desolate settlement. Three other Dutchmen 
rode to the empress Bi Sonbai and asked her to command her subjects 
to stop. However, although the dispute originated out of  perceived disre-
spect to her person, she was, symbolically and literally, a female lord with 
little executive power. She replied that any admonition from her would 
be fruitless, but at least supplied the Dutch with a temukung to accompany 
them. With him at their side the Dutchmen were finally able to stop the 
hostilities which, as they stressed, could have brought ruin to the entire 
VOC-led complex.96 
In fact, the dispute ended as quickly as it started. The issue was pro-
visionally laid to rest in a vergadering, although clear animosity remained 
between the parties involved, who preferred to use the Company for 
what it probably was in Timorese eyes – a stranger lord whose very 
‘strangeness’ ensured a reasonably fair mediation. Apart from the bloody 
events of  1705, the Company was generally able to stop any conflicts 
that threatened to erupt before they escalated into full-scale violence. In 
the same year, 1705, the Sonbai and Kupang princedoms were at log-
gerheads, again over a symbolic issue. An aristocratic Sonbai lady had 
been given to Ama Tomananu, the king of  Kupang (not to be confused 
with his namesake, the Sonbai regent), but he soon ignored her. She was 
therefore spirited away from the royal sonaf by some fellow countrymen, 
who felt the conduct of  the king to be an insult. The Sonbai later allowed 
her to appear wearing the attire of  an unmarried woman at a feast where 
some Helong were present. Perhaps this alluded to sexual impotency on 
the part of  the king (who died childless after a long reign). At any rate, a 
sizeable Helong troop soon marched against the Sonbai settlement to ex-
act revenge for the mockery. The Company servants, however, took im-
mediate action; they brought the parties to a halt and promised to bring 
about reconciliation at the next vergadering. This was fulfilled and in the 
end the lady stayed with the Sonbai community while Ama Tomananu 
got back the bride-wealth that he once paid for her.97
96 VOC 1728 (1706), ff. 51-2, 87-93.
97 VOC 1711 (1705), f. 28.
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What is remarkable in all this is not that tension and occasional 
violence spilled over, but that the Company was regularly able to stop it. 
The VOC reports repeatedly describe how Timorese leaders disputed 
with each other, or how armed troops, incited by a minor incident, stood 
ready to attack each other. In the end, however, they were brought to 
their senses by the Dutch. The relative absence of  outbreaks of  internal 
violence seems to indicate that Dutch diplomacy as such was only half  
the story. Surrounded by hostile Portuguese clients, the allied Timorese 
knew full well the consequences of  a breakdown of  the system, and tend-
ed to accept the Company as a mediator. In this respect the latter were 
truly stranger kings, outsiders who held a social and political order in 
place. That the five allies were sometimes self-assured and independent 
in their relations with the Europeans does not detract from the stranger 
king syndrome – one might well consider the lack of  actual obedience 
that minor lords showed prestigious polities like Sonbai and Wehali.
savages
Visible appreciation of  the allied Timorese is strangely ambivalent in 
the VOC records. While the opperhoofden seldom lauded their native 
counterparts, their reports nevertheless often suggested the image of  a 
harmonious co-habitation. The individual characteristics of  the kings 
and regents were described in rather categorical terms. Some of  the 
rulers were praiseworthy in Dutch eyes, especially those who obeyed the 
Company admonitions and decrees, and readily provided products and 
corvée labour.
This is contrasted by another set of  images depicting the Timorese as 
savages, in the sense of  being the complete opposite of  putative Dutch 
virtues. This is not an unambiguous trait in the texts but is highly situ-
ational, and the Dutch discourse varied markedly over time. It must be 
emphasized that we are not dealing with literary images – there were few 
printed works with Timorese themes – but solely with texts produced by 
administrators who were in regular contact with the allied leaders. The 
extant reports, moreover, only contain such information that was consid-
ered useful to the superiors in Batavia and Amsterdam.
The savage image was only loosely connected to the two primary 
traits usually associated with exoticism: race and religion. Racial ste-
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reotypes existed in this era, but were far less fixed or ideologically 
grounded than they became in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The physical features of  the Timorese, which often evoked comments 
by nineteenth-century visitors, are rarely alluded to in the VOC reports. 
However, one occasionally comes across rather negative descriptions of  
their character (aard), which was characterized as being wild (woest). An 
explicit but somewhat opaque denunciation can be found in the late 
eighteenth-century account of  Pelon:
Regarding their character, one may be assured that they are lazy, supersti-
tious, indolent, treacherous, rascally, mendacious and ignorant. However, 
these faults, dangerous among other nations, are not to be feared here, 
due to their lack of  genius or courage. (Pelon 2002:16.)
In the eyes of  the Frenchman, the indigenous population had many 
faults but did not act upon them sufficiently to threaten the Europeans. 
This negative judgement is not unanimously confirmed by other writers, 
The interior of  a Timorese house in Kupang. French illustration 
from the expedition of  L.-C. de Freycinet, 1818, published 
in the travelogue Voyage autour du monde (1824).
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who tend to present a wide array of  views on the Timorese and their 
character. In 1699, William Dampier described them as dexterous and 
nimble, yet lazy and only alert when it came to treachery and barbar-
ity (Dampier 1939:170). Forty years after Pelon, his fellow countryman 
Louis de Freycinet provided a more balanced judgement about the char-
acter of  the islanders, particular points of  which are at complete odds 
with those made by Pelon:
Good, timid and hospitable, although anxious and turbulent neighbours, 
such is the character of  the inhabitants of  the interior of  the island, with 
exception of  the eastern part and probably of  the mountain people of  the 
centre and the south-west, who are reputed to be vicious and unsociable. 
The Timorese is otherwise barbarian in his enmity, a skilful deceiver in 
war, although he generally loves the truth. […] Their judgement is sound 
although narrow, and their intelligence is remarkable. […] The Malay 
[native] of  Kupang is distrustful, brave, an intrepid and ferocious war-
rior; being very attached to his customs, he hardly supports a master who 
forces his habits or puts a yoke on him which is too heavy to bear; but 
since he is lazy and without ambition he easily accepts the yoke of  the 
Dutch, who do not extract direct taxes or corvée service from him. The 
nonchalance and near-hatred of  work, the love for vengeance, the cruelty 
A lady and her servants in Kupang. French illustration 
from the expedition of  L.-C. Freycinet, 1818.
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sometimes taken to the point of  cannibalism and a strong penchant for 
thievery, are the most characteristic traits of  their nature.98
An anonymous report written six years later, in 1824, asserted that 
no islanders were probably as peaceable, mild and forbearing as the 
Timorese, which was also shown by the Chinese traders who could 
traverse the land without fearing anything. Apart from in times of  
warfare, one never heard about murder or grave injuries through vio-
lence.99 Unsurprisingly, the perception of  the racial characteristics of  the 
Timorese was described with a bias towards the expectations, interests 
and type of  interaction of  a Western visitor, and has very limited ex-
planatory value in terms of  the local culture and society.
In line with this, Dutch disapproval was mostly limited to the aspects 
that were detrimental to the Dutch position. The brutality that char-
acterized the skirmishes between the allies and the Portuguese clients 
was heavily commented upon, although, as we have seen, the Timorese 
martial practices seem to have been tacitly accepted by the Company 
servants. The numerous notes in the Dagregister speak for themselves. 
On 4 September 1688, the Sonbai leader, Ama Beta, came to Willem 
Moerman and announced that his raiding party had taken the head of  
a man from Amanuban and a woman from Amarasi. He suggested that 
he deserved a bottle of  arrack for this exploit, which the opperhoofd was 
quick to provide.100 The mendacity of  the Timorese, on the other hand, 
was strongly condemned in various reports – it complicated any Dutch 
attempts at mediation between the allies when there were problems of  
any kind. 
Religion as such was usually considered to be an internal Timorese 
affair, though their ‘superstitions’ were strongly frowned upon when 
they impeded Company initiatives – such as the Timorese reluctance to 
dig for metals in the ground. For example, in 1756, when a Company 
expedition set out to look for gold-filled rivers inland, the indigenous 
population refused to go to work at Tepas near the Noelmina River, and 
could not be moved by any efforts, promises or threats. This was ‘surely 
98 Freycinet 1825:632-3. ‘Malay’ is to be understood here as any native of  Austronesia stock. A partly 
similar judgement of  the Timorese character is found in the French travel account of  Francois-Étienne 
de Rosily from 1772 (Lombard-Jourdain 1982:95). Freycinet may have been influenced by Rosily.
99 Timor 1824, Collection Schneither, Nationaal Archief.
100 VOC 1460 (1688-89), Dagregister, sub 4-9-1688.
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out of  idle and blind superstition, through which they, when they thought 
or heard about it, were caught by a horrific fear, anxiousness and agony. 
They could not be made to move, saying that they must first obtain seven 
red hogs, of  the colour of  the gold, and red rice.’ The officer Giese im-
patiently had to wait ‘until they had found the aforementioned hogs and 
therewith made their laughable pemali’.101 
Much scorn was reserved for the perceived Timorese laziness. Dutch 
complaints about indigenous inertia were occasionally heard during the 
early decades of  Fort Concordia, but did not become a mainstay until 
somewhat later. Governor General Speelman stated in 1683 that 
the Timorese are averse to all work, apart from what their livelihood  
demands. From a young age, this nation is used to handling arms and 
has no other inclination than warfare, and to pride themselves in vic-
tories with the conduct of  lengthy amusements. And if  their throat and 
belly curse their sluggish hands they would again violate their neighbour 
and unpermitted, bless themselves with his surplus. Anyway, that our Ti-
morese are such lovers of  the arms is no wonder considering their righ-
teous hatred against the Portuguese, and they regard themselves lucky 
enough as long as they are called friends of  the Noble Company and may 
live under its protection, although they also know that they must protect 
themselves. (Coolhaas 1971:529-30.)
Such remarks became more common in the eighteenth century for obvi-
ous reasons. During the course of  this century the colonial authorities be-
gan to consider ways to make this rather unprofitable outpost pay for the 
expenses involved in maintaining it. Since access to sandalwood was limit-
ed (although much improved after the political upheaval of  1749), various 
other products were brought forward as possible cash crops: beans, indigo, 
pepper and cinnamon (from Flores). Even the cultivation of  silk was 
mentioned for a while, leading to a few frustrated remarks by the Governor 
General Dirk Durven (1731). The idea turned out to be rather vain,
in a land where the [Company] servants themselves at closer explanation 
held the opinion that such a thing would have no effect. Firstly, since the 
101 VOC 2941 (1756), ff. 206-7. Pemali is a Malay concept used as an equivalent to the Atoni concept 
leu, sacred spirit power. The Tetun equivalent is lulic. Rituals connected with the collection of  gold existed 
all over Timor; see the nineteenth-century description in Lombard-Jourdain 2000:179-82.
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land was full and crawling with ants, and because of  the poor and simple 
dwellings of  the indigenous [population], which are made of  wood, cov-
ered with straw and protected with bamboo. They have their sleeping 
places upstairs and place their cattle below. Secondly, since the inhabit-
ants are so lazy by nature that for the entire year they grow nothing but ja-
gung (in the Netherlands known under the name of  Turkish flour) for their 
substance. Due to that, it is unlikely that they are to change their dwell-
ings or build houses for the purpose [of  handling silk production].102
One might add that similar views were held by Portuguese officials, who 
added a gendered perspective; a report written shortly after 1769 con-
cluded, after discussing the potential resources found in the Portuguese 
sphere: ‘All these natural advantages are of  little interest for learning 
more of  the character of  the inhabitants of  these islands, who are indo-
lent people who cultivate idleness and vices as their main passions; the 
wives are those who do almost all the domestic and rural work, which 
does not leave any more for the men to do than making holes in the 
ground where the same wives then go and spread the seed.’103 
Accusations of  Timorese inertia have been common until the pres-
ent time, and are in fact part of  a modernity-oriented discourse related 
to evolutionism. Since the seventeenth century the idea had developed 
that cultura was an opposite to the state of  nature and barbarity. Culture 
was understood as a state of  being that surpassed the state of  nature and 
was primarily associated with the Christo-European world (Nünning 
2005:106). In the eighteenth century this idea developed into a form of  
evolutionist thinking where every successive (cultured) generation was 
understood to gain in intellectual and material advancement. In this 
model of  continuous ascendency, non-European cultures in general and 
low-technology groups in particular would fall by the way side. The stern 
critic of  Timorese life Jean-Baptiste Pelon, observed that ‘these islanders 
are not at all industrious and do not even strive for the future, since they 
follow the old customs of  their ancestors, and are content with little, be 
it cloths or foodstuff ’ (Pelon 2002:16). Pelon was perceptive enough to 
102 Van Goor 1988:264-5. Illustrations of  Atoni houses built on poles may be found in Cinatti 
1987:201-4.
103 Matos 1974a:31. De Rosily in 1772 also observed that the women performed all domestic chores, 
leaving the men to wage war and look after the cattle (Lombard-Jourdain 1982:95). Compare Bastian 
1885:15.
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attribute the perceived inertia to the strength of  the adat. Innovations 
in the traditional economic system were not logical or desirable for the 
Timorese communities, that is, not under the conditions that external 
powers tried to impose. The introduction of  new cash crops failed in 
spite of  the assurances of  the opperhoofden that cultivation would increase 
the wealth of  the local elites. On the one hand, this was to do with the 
primitive agriculturalist knowledge of  the Company servants, who in-
duced locals to plant crops under unsuitable conditions. On the other 
hand, it was probably to do with the fact that this new enterprise would 
entail a great deal of  hard work, removing manpower from where it was 
previously needed and all for an outcome that was at best uncertain, and 
even hazardous. According to ethnographic literature of  the nineteenth 
century, there is a belief  in Timorese culture that one should only plant 
what one needs, since any surplus would bring sickness and misfortune 
(Bastian 1885:16).
These images of  savages and dullards, it should be pointed out, were 
balanced by an image of  alliance and trust that bound the Company and 
the Timorese together. The annual reports often contained a mantra-like 
formulation to the effect that the allied regents lived in harmony and 
peace with each other and the Company. After the British takeover of  
Kupang in January 1812, the official C.W. Knibbe summed up the situa-
tion: ‘The native princes here have no contribution whatsoever to pay to 
the Government, yet they are always very much inclined in every respect, 
to assist the Government’.104 As a collective, the kings and regents were 
sometimes referred to in very paternalistic terms: they were portrayed 
as innocent and gullible (onnozel) figures who had to be protected from 
abuses carried out by the Kupangese burghers and others. As individu-
als, however, they were sometimes even praiseworthy. Opperhoofd Barend 
Fockens noted in a memorandum from 1777 that
Daniel, presently king of  Amfoan, although young, seems to give proof  
of  truly good intentions for the Noble Company, and to follow closely in 
the footsteps of  his deceased father, Bartholomeus, due to which I have 
treated him with the same courtesy in all the issues at hand; the more so 
since he, although being the weakest of  all the regents, has been ready for 
action as often as was requested, and delivered limestone for the construc-
104 ANRI Timor:21, Engelsch archief  1812, Letter from Cornelis Willem Knibbe to Richard Phillips, 
28-3-1812. Although having a Dutch name, Knibbe was a British civil commander.
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tion of  Fort Concordia. Also, one should add to his praise that he is the 
only Christian regent whose mindset seems to have rejected most of  the 
paganism.105
Other leaders, like the long-lived Sonbai regents Ama Tomananu (died 
1685) and Nai Sau (died 1739), were referred to as indispensable council-
lors to the opperhoofden, whose terms at any rate seldom lasted more than 
five years.
Of  course the blend of  ethnic stereotypes and assertions of  harmony 
provoke questions about the real feelings of  trust between the Company 
officials and their supposedly uncultured allies. The personal feelings of  
the writers are often rather hard to discern, but one example is found 
in the Dagregister from 1735, and reveals a rather ambivalent attitude. 
A large troop of  Topasses and Greater Sonbai warriors threatened the 
VOC domain, and an ominous rumour spread in Kupang that some of  
the allied regents had actually invited the invaders. The Dutch nervously 
suggested that the allies bring their children inside the fort, and it was im-
plicitly understood that they would be held hostage. The regents replied 
that they would gladly do so, adding that if  someone proved unloyal, 
his offspring could, as far as they were concerned, readily be sold by the 
Company as slaves. ‘So it was’, wrote the opperhoofd Gerardus Visscher, 
‘that in many minds were sorrow and worries, so that I myself  began to 
feel troubled. However, I put my trust in God Almighty, and after putting 
everything in good order I chose the the parole God is my salvation, and 
then calmly went to sleep’.106
105 VOC 3473 (1777), f. 514b.
106 Dagregister, sub 16-3-1735, H 244, KITLV.

8
The Estado strikes back, 1696-1732
a difficult heritage
António Hornay had built up a political system that encompassed most 
of  Timor, eastern Flores and parts of  the Solor Islands. Through his un-
disputed ability, and a generous use of  excessive violence, he had held the 
system in place for a number of  decades as the uncrowned true king of  
Timor. This system needed a man of  prowess, however, if  it were to last. 
Like the contest states that can be discerned in many parts of  Southeast 
Asia, authority could not be automatically inherited. Rather, effective 
leadership had to be built up again and again.1 In this way, problems 
began when the old Topass leader died in 1693; he left his inheritance 
to his younger brother Francisco Hornay, who was named procurator of  
the Crown on the Solor and Timor islands. Francisco had been tenente in 
Lifau for twenty years but was reportedly more at home with monastic 
life (kloosterlijke leven) than worldly business.2 Clearly, he was a far less 
able man than his brother: Portuguese sources characterize him as an 
inert figure, while VOC documents complain about his overbearing and 
arrogant attitude, which, if  anything, was worse than that of  António. 
From an economic point of  view, he inherited a situation that was far 
from rosy. The obtainable supplies of  sandalwood seriously decreased 
during the last years that António was in power and when the Company 
representatives approached Francisco, he had no wood to offer them 
(Coolhaas 1971:685). 
Internal Topass intrigues added to his unstable position. The sons of  
the old leaders Simão Luís and Matheus da Costa began to plot against 
Francisco; approaching some Rotenese captains and soldiers who lived 
1 This is partly similar to the Balinese case studied by Henk Schulte Nordholt 1996:4, 63, 149.
2 Tange 1688, H 49:u, KITLV, f. 6.
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in the Portuguese sphere, they enlisted them to assassinate no less than 
the emperor of  Greater Sonbai. Through such an enormous terrorist 
act they intended to provoke an uprising throughout the land, which at 
length would help them to power. As part of  the plot, the Topass pre-
tenders made contact with the king of  Amakono, the Uis Kono, whose 
powers were still formidable. Uis Kono was offered a ceremonial staff  
(tongkat) and a golden keris to actively participate in the assault. He refused 
the gifts, but apparently kept quiet about his newly acquired knowledge, 
and the objects instead went to an old Rotenese captain who stayed close 
to the emperor. By now, however, Hornay had received word of  what 
was taking place. The Rotenese who lived in and around Lifau hastily 
took to the mountains, while Hornay’s men destroyed their property. The 
emperor and Uis Kono marched down to Lifau with sizeable forces, to 
support Hornay if  necessary, while the leaders of  Amanuban and Belu 
attentively watched and waited to see what would happen next, cagily 
avoiding choosing sides.3 
Something did happen, but from an unexpected quarter. The Estado 
da Índia, the official colonial apparatus with its centre in Goa, had 
hitherto largely left Timor to its own devices. However, after peace was 
concluded with its dangerous Dutch rival, it underwent a number of  
political, economic, military and religious reforms from the 1660s to the 
1680s. These reforms contributed to a gradual stabilization of  its Asian 
possessions, now reduced in number (Ames 2000:14). Diplomatic efforts 
towards the European great powers contributed to the survival of  the 
Estado, a process that culminated with the Methuen treaties that were 
concluded with England in 1703 (Schlicher 1996:37-44). With António 
Hornay gone, the viceroy of  Goa once again prepared to master the last 
Portuguese territory in Southeast Asia. The instrument was one António 
de Mesquita Pimentel, a man who was no stranger to Timor. Back in 
1677 he was the capitão mor de mar (senior naval officer) in these waters, 
and had been on decidedly bad terms with Hornay.4 In 1695 the 
viceroy appointed him as the first governor of  Solor and Timor, and he 
sailed there with a frigate from Macao in the following year. De Mesquita 
Pimentel was immediately accepted by the Topasses of  Lifau on arrival 
and his dislike of  Francisco Hornay gave cause for rejoicing among the 
locals, and Hornay’s friends on Sonbai do not seem to have taken any 
3 VOC 1566 (1694-95), Dagregister, sub 28-10-1694.
4 VOC 1327 (1676-77), Dagregister, sub 24-3-1677.
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counteraction (Leitão 1948:265-6; Faria de Morais 1934, Appendix:44).
The delight in the new appointment soon dwindled, however, since 
De Mesquita Pimentel implemented a hard regime, which involved 
fleecing the local kings where he could; his old aversion to the Hornays 
may have played a role in this. He killed Pedro Hornay, the eldest son of  
the deceased Topass leader, and two other persons who were all accused 
of  planning his assassination. The old Francisco Hornay was forced to 
flee to the padres in the church of  Lifau. A great terror struck the mora-
dores of  the port, and some were thinking of  fleeing.5 Inevitably they 
began to conspire with their counterparts in Larantuka, which appears 
to have been beyond the direct authority of  De Mesquita Pimentel. In 
January 1697, there was a repeat of  Hornay’s 1673 coup when 40 armed 
Larantuqueiro perahu rashly landed at Lifau, to be met, however, by no 
local resistance since everyone was fed up with the rigorous rule of  the 
governor. António de Mesquita and his tenente Alvare de Sousa – a son-
in-law of  António Hornay – were captured in their houses. De Sousa 
was put in irons and despatched to Larantuka, while the governor had 
to leave for Goa, where he was promptly jailed by the frustrated authori-
ties. Meanwhile, Domingos da Costa – a natural son of  the old Topass 
leader Matheus da Costa – was hastily chosen to be the new capitão mor. 
Presumably, this was the same Da Costa who had planned to assassinate 
the emperor three years previously. His Hornay rival quickly disappeared 
from the scene, since Francisco and his secretary, Tomás Duarte, both 
died on 1 June in the same year. Their simultaneous deaths shortly after 
the Da Costa takeover give some cause to the suspicion of  foul play, but 
more detailed circumstances are not documented.6 After his success-
ful coup, Da Costa sent amicable letters to Kupang with which port he 
wished to maintain normal commercial ties.
The following years paint a picture of  chaos. Domingos da Costa 
would remain the principal leader of  the Topasses until his own death at 
an advanced age in 1722, but his career was very different from that of  
António Hornay; during a quarter of  a century he hardly seems to have 
enjoyed one day of  undisputed authority over the Portuguese complex. 
This underlines the void left by Hornay, as well as the shaky economic 
basis of  Topass authority, caused by the reckless cutting down of  san-
5 VOC 1579 (1696), ff. 73-4; Leitão 1948:266.
6 VOC 1595 (1697), ff. 12-4, 75-6; Leitão 1948:266-7. The unnamed tenente of  Belu was appointed 
tenente of  Lifau by Domingos da Costa.
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dalwood forests. It also illustrates the determination of  a provisionally 
restructured Estado da Índia to come to grips with its undisciplined pu-
tative possessions on Solor-Timor. The years at the turn of  the century 
were filled with petty fighting between Portuguese rivals, and Domingos 
da Costa did not always have the best of  it. A would-be capitão mor settled 
in Konga at the coast of  Flores where he defeated an attack by Da Costa. 
In Lifau still another capitão mor was installed by the moradores, although 
Da Costa managed to expel him in 1700.7 
At this time there were a few visits by English seafarers to the coast 
of  Timor. Apart from the Dutch and Portuguese, apparently no other 
Western nations had undertaken any previous explorations.8 The activ-
ities of  the English East India Company in the archipelago were severely 
restrained by the VOC and the rise of  English Bengal trade only took 
off  in the early eighteenth century, but there were private traders and 
pirates who explored the possibilities for profit (Kulke and Rothermund 
1998:204, 209). Though the visits had few consequences, they do provide 
information about conditions on Timor at the time. The well-armed 
Resolution departed from London in 1697 with a characteristically mixed 
cargo of  wine, spirit, Spanish reals, weapons, textiles and mirrors. Via 
South Africa and Batavia, the traders reached the coast of  Flores where 
they vainly searched for nutmeg, a spice normally restricted by a VOC 
monopoly on it in Maluku. The choice of  destination was probably 
made because Flores and most of  Timor were outside even nominal 
Dutch control. A month later the vessel anchored off  the coast of  Belu 
where the English obtained gold and beeswax in exchange for shotguns, 
hats and cloths. At this stage, however, provisions on the ship were des-
perately low and eight sailors jumped overboard. The Resolution departed 
without them and seems to have returned to Ende on Flores to take in 
cinnamon and sandalwood, the latter commodity being delivered to 
Flores from Sumba. Portuguese and Chinese seafarers sighted what they 
perceived to be a pirate ship, apparently the same vessel, which clearly 
illustrates the sometimes thin line between merchant and pirate.9 The 
English deserters went to Lifau, where half  of  them died of  diseases; 
7 VOC 1637 (1700), f. 13.
8 A few French and Italian merchants are mentioned as coming into contact with the area under 
António Hornay’s control.
9 William Dampier wrote in 1699 that Kupang and Lifau had been attacked by French pirates two 
years previously. This is not substantiated by the detailed VOC sources. Possibly Dampier mixes up the 
sightings of  pirates in 1697-98 with the attack on Lifau by Domingos da Costa in 1697.
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one of  the survivors though, Robert Bon, met Dutch visitors there, and 
it was to them that he related the story of  the cumbersome expedition.10
Less wayward was the English captain William Dampier who visited 
Timor with his vessel Roebuck in 1699, where he found a complicated 
situation in the Portuguese complex. A native tenente, Alexis Mendosa, 
governed from a place five or six miles outside of  Lifau, probably 
Nunuhenu.11 Above him was a white capitão mor who had been sent 
by the viceroy of  Goa and who resided further away at a place called 
Porto Novo. He supposedly stayed much of  the time in the mountains 
with a native army, guarding the passes against Kupang. Still another 
capitão mor resided in Larantuka; he was a very courteous gentleman who 
would have been glad to have dealt with Dampier had he gone there. 
Presumably the latter capitão mor was Domingos da Costa.12 Dampier 
describes Lifau as a rather plain place. The small church had a wall on 
only one side. He saw no more than two whites there, one of  them being 
a padre, and the rest of  the inhabitants he describes as being copper-
coloured with black lank hair. Since most ethnic Timorese do not have 
lank hair, this statement is indicative of  the ethnic mix of  the place. 
Regarding commerce, Dampier noted that Chinese merchants from 
Macao frequented Timor, some twenty minor ships going there each 
year. They traded rice, processed gold, tea, iron work, porcelain and silk 
for pure gold, beeswax, sandalwood, and so on. By contrast, only one 
ship per year used to come from Goa.13
10 VOC 1609 (1698), ff. 42, 95-7.
11 A Dutch source instead mentions an Henrique as tenente in Lifau in 1698 (VOC 1609 [1698], f. 94).
12 One may also refer to the garbled account of  the Scottish sea-captain Alexander Hamilton, who 
repeatedly visited the East Indies between 1694 and 1719. He writes that the Portuguese of  Macao 
managed advantageous trade with Timor for many years, but ran into trouble when they tried to place 
the entire government of  the island in the hands of  the Catholic Church. The Timorese chose a native 
called Gonsales Gomez, who had travelled to Macao and Goa, as their leader. Gomez acknowledged the 
king of  Portugal as the sovereign and protector of  the Timorese lands, declaring that they would be loyal 
subjects as long as their laws and liberties were respected. The outcome, however, was a war with Macao 
that began c.1688 and was still not concluded by 1703. As a result, Macao was ruined. The viceroy sent 
an embassy to Gonsales Gomez, asking him to accept a Governor General and an archbishop, though to 
no avail (Hamilton 2001:425-6). In 1698, the viceroy sent an appointed governor, André Coelho Vieira, 
but he too was turned down by the locals (Leitão 1948:289; VOC 1609 [1698], f. 99). Otherwise, it is 
difficult to know what to make of  this information, which does not match the more detailed Dutch and 
Portuguese data.
13 Dampier 1939:164, 171-2. A Dutch enumeration mentions the following merchant ships in Lifau 
in 1698 (until August): One large Macanese ship which obtained 400 bahar of  sandalwood; one minor 
Macanese ship that did not obtain any cargo; five Portuguese and six Chinese sloops whose success in 
obtaining cargo varied greatly; and one kunting from Batavia (VOC 1609 [1698], f. 98). All in all, trade 
on Timor in these years was apparently a risky business.
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the coming of the white governor
The futile attempts of  the Estado da Índia to impose its order on Timor 
in the second half  of  the seventeenth century had not been backed by 
any substantial force. In 1701, however, a new and more serious attempt 
was made. There were exaggerated ideas about the potential of  Timor, 
which, together with the Zambezi river valley in Africa, was expected 
to engender considerable wealth for the Crown. The secretary of  the 
Estado, António Coelho Guerreiro, a soldier who had served in the 
South American and African colonies for many years, was appointed as 
governor by the viceroy.14 Coelho was furnished with a comprehensive 
set of  instructions which, as noted by C.R. Boxer, reveal a somewhat 
diffident stance. The new government was to be established as well as cir-
cumstances permitted. As for the Topasses, they should be approached in 
a way that gave them no reason to resort to violence (Boxer 1968:183-4). 
The resources of  the Estado were scarce, but Coelho Guerreiro managed 
to secure 82 soldiers and considerable munitions.15 He eventually de-
parted from Macao – a city that had a vital interest in seeing an orderly 
government on Timor – and approached Larantuka with two barks in 
early 1702. His demands that Domingos da Costa submit to the decrees 
of  the Estado were met with extreme hostility. An attempted landing by 
the governor’s men was repulsed, resulting in the loss of  several men. 
Coelho Guerreiro had to withdraw, cutting the anchors in haste.16 After 
this inauspicious start, the governor sailed to Lifau which he reached 
on 14 February. The local authority there was Lourenço Lopes, a 
Portuguese from Macao who was also the brother-in-law of  Domingos 
da Costa who mainly resided in Larantuka.
Also present in Lifau was the imposing Dominican padre Manuel 
de Santo António, who was soon to become the nominal bishop of  
Malacca. Born in Goa he arrived on Timor in 1697. Described as an 
uncompromising man of  great missionary zeal, he drew the south-
eastern part of  the island closer into the Portuguese orbit through his 
activities. He stayed for years in the old and prestigious Tetun princedom 
14 In fact a number of  parallels between the colonial governance of  Timor and eastern Africa have 
been found in this period, in terms of  ideologies, experiences and missionary activities (Carneiro de 
Sousa 2001:181).
15 Many soldiers of  the Estado sent to Timor were Kanarese from the Goa region, as apparent from 
Captain Pinnell’s report from 1706 (Pinnell 1781:53).
16 VOC 1663 (1702), ff. 14-6; Leitão 1952:15-6.
317
8 The Estado strikes back, 1696-1732 |
of  Luca, and also devoted himself  to the spiritual needs of  Viqueque and 
Bibiluto. Frei Manuel managed to turn the influential king of  Viqueque, 
Dom Matheus da Costa, into what was described as a fervent Catholic. 
His spiritual authority apparently conformed to Timorese perceptions 
of  ritual power and therefore meant something rather different to them 
than it did to the Portuguese. It was of  such magnitude that he persuaded 
a number of  belligerent princes to end their mutual hostilities and make 
signs of  devotion to the Catholic Church and the Crown of  Portugal. 
Among these were Dom António Hornay of  Samoro, Dom Sebastião 
Fernandes of  Luca, Dom Pedro Hornay of  Fatuleteluli, Dom Miguel 
Tavares of  Alas and Dom Domingos Soares of  Manatuto. The position 
of  the Hornays and Da Costas is indicated by the baptismal names of  
some of  these princes, which probably does not imply physical kinship, 
but rather testifies to the island-wide prestige of  the two families.17 It is 
only by this time that Christianized East Timorese royalty appears in the 
source material by name.
Unlike some other Dominicans, this important prelate took a firm 
stance for Estado da Índia. Father Manuel mediated between António 
Coelho Guerreiro and Lourenço Lopes, who was persuaded to accept 
the authority of  both the viceroy and the governor; some inhabitants 
of  Rotenese extraction also chose to support the new white master. The 
small force of  the governor then jumped ashore and defeated the morador-
es who still resisted (Matos 1974a:309, 2001:106). A new administration 
was installed in the modest port, and the Lifau-Larantuka antagonism 
visible in earlier generations once again surfaced. The event was signifi-
cant: from this day until the Japanese onslaught in 1942, Timor would 
have an unbroken line of  officially appointed governors, although their 
authority was often tenuous in the extreme. António Coelho Guerreiro 
introduced a system of  governance and a number of  variations that 
would last until the imposition of  a thorough colonial rule towards the 
late nineteenth century. There are both parallels and differences with the 
Dutch system in the Kupang enclave. Firstly, he established a ruling body 
called Estado Maior. In 1706 it consisted of  the governor, the bishop of  
Malacca, a tenente general (lieutenant general), a capitão mor, a feitor (over-
seer), an attendant, two scribes, a surgeon, a barber and a drum-master 
17 Leitão 1952:9-10. I therefore assume that H.G. Schulte Nordholt (1971:174) is wrong in his suppo-
sition that Topass names indicated that their sons married Timorese princesses and started new dynastic 
lines in certain princedoms.
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(Oliveira 1948:207-8). Unlike the VOC council in Kupang it could not 
convene with indigenous princes on a regular basis for logistical reasons. 
Indeed, any extant reports made by the eighteenth-century governors 
have very little to say about conditions within the various princedoms.
Secondly, he established contacts with the various Timorese kings. 
Most of  the major Atoni lords chose to support the white governor, 
maybe as a reaction to the unsettled conditions of  the last five years. 
Shortly after Coelho Guerreiro’s establishment in Lifau, princes and rul-
ers from Ambeno, Greater Sonbai, Amanuban and Amanatun appeared 
with their retinues. The Sonbai emperor (o emperador Sonouay), and the 
head of  the Empire of  Servião (o imperio de Seruião), came in the com-
pany of  Dom Francisco de Taenube, the king of  Amakono ‘who is the 
governor of  his kingdom, since he is the supreme commander, and the 
Sonbai [ruler] does not have an active, nor a passive voice’.18 António 
Coelho Guerreiro received them with a banquet where the tenente gen-
eral, Frei Manuel de Santo António, and other dignitaries were present. 
Afterwards, the Sonbai and Kono lords were given presents. The emper-
or came out from the governor’s house clad in a primavera dress with gold 
and silver decorations, and a jacket and trunks made of  primavera. Dom 
Francisco de Taenube received a dress of  red cloth, a jacket and primavera 
trunks. In return the governor received hogs, rice and vegetables, which 
the feitor divided among the infantry men.19 Dom Francisco revealed to 
Coelho Guerreiro that there was a rift in the Sonbai realm. His brother 
Dom Simão was an agent for the recalcitrant Domingos da Costa and 
had sent threatening letters to various kings – literacy was rare, but not 
unknown among the Timorese elites. Dom Simão announced that he 
would arrive from Larantuka with large forces and repeat the expulsion 
of  António de Mesquita Pimentel in 1697. Dom Francisco, for his part, 
assured Coelho Guerreiro of  the loyalty of  himself  and his ancestors 
and promised to contribute 200 armed salauacos (shield-bearers) to the 
18 Matos 1974a:251. Leitão 1952:19, describes the emperor as being ‘already old’ which is not borne 
out by the printed documents but may have been an inferred addition. Two years later the name of  the 
emperor was Dom Pedro Sonbai alias Tomenu, who appears to have been a relatively youthful man – 
two of  his sons were born in c.1708 and c.1711. He was a classificatory brother (cousin) of  the ruler of  
Lesser Sonbai, Bi Sonbai. The full name of  the Kono lord is given in VOC 1691 (1704), f. 112. The 
traditional pedigree of  Uis Kono has a Nai Taenube Kono in the sixth generation (F.H. Fobia, unpub-
lished pedigree of  the Kono family); judging from his name, he was a close relation to Dom Francisco de 
Taenube.
19 Matos 1974a:251, 336. The title feitor or overseer is the origin for the Timorese word fettor, which 
could mean either an executive regent or the regent of  a district (kefettoran).
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cause.20 The indigenous authorities were subsequently militarized by 
the Estado since the kings and regents were endowed with the ranks of  
officers, appointments which held a great ritual value.21 
So far things seemed to have gone in favour of  Coelho Guerreiro, but 
his authority on Timor was soon placed under threat. This is explained 
by Topass activity as well as by his own policy. The governor, used to 
conditions in India, insisted that the various princes sent manpower to 
Lifau to assist in the fortification of  the area. Such corvée service was 
difficult to implement even in the tighter system of  colonial-native co-
operation in Kupang, and in this case it proved a failure since the labour-
ers deserted the port at the first opportunity. Furthermore, the letters of  
Coelho Guerreiro reveal a lack of  understanding or respect for the local 
elite that may have cost his cause dearly, for within them, the Timorese 
royalty are castigated as ridiculous or foolish figures. Not least, he fails 
to understand the ritual and non-active significance of  the Sonbai lord, 
as seen in a letter written to Pedro II of  Portugal in September 1703. By 
that time, the Amakono lord had deserted the governor and joined his 
enemies.
By the said list [of  local kings who had received gifts from the governor] 
Your Majesty will see the grand number of  kings who have bowed in vas-
salage on this island only; and for someone who has so many vassal kings 
it is fair that he does not entitle himself  king of  them, but rather emperor. 
To this end I am determined to make them all swear [an oath of  faith] to 
Your Majesty in a solemn way that is repugnant to no one, since there is 
no reason that there is another emperor on this island, for the one here is 
not obeyed by any king. Nor is he capable of  that, since he is a fool and is 
slow in the crime of  rebellion since he does not join in with the [lord of] 
Amakono; and had he joined me, everything would now have been put 
to rest. (Matos 1974a:335.)
20 Matos 1974a:251-2. In Maluku a solauaco was a large round shield (Godinho de Eredia 1997:250). 
The Timorese shields, however, were small and round, about 60 centimeters in diameter and made of  
buffalo hide (Vroklage, I, 1953:646). They disappeared in the late colonial period together with bows and 
arrows, probably since the proliferation of  firearms made them obsolete. They can still be seen on the 
Planta de Cailaco from circa 1726 (Durand 2006a:109; Sá 1949).
21 Matos 2005:10-1. In somewhat later documents the Sonbai emperor of  Servião bore the title of  
brigadeiro, the ordinary kings coronel, the executive regents tenente-coronel, and the datos (regional chiefs) and 
tumengões (settlement chiefs), sargento-mor or capitão.
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In addition, the Topass network proved resilient, in particular in West 
Timor. Domingos da Costa had no intention of  giving up his attempts of  
hegemony, and the arrival of  Coelho Guerreiro inaugurated a struggle 
that was to become a leading strand in Timorese political history until 
the 1780s. VOC sources distinguish between the White Portuguese 
and the Black Portuguese, with the latter term also being used for the 
Topasses. The term is built on a symbolic dichotomy rather than being 
entirely accurate, for there were mestizos and pure-blooded European 
people on both sides – including even governors.22 The Portuguese 
documents rather use the term ‘rebels’ or ‘Larantuqueiros’ for the Topass 
faction. The former term is, of  course, questionable, considering that the 
Topasses did not fight against an established order; for them it was more 
essential to retain the privileges they had secured during the previous 
century. During the skirmishes at Larantuka in early 1702, Domingos 
da Costa and his men sent a letter to António Coelho Guerreiro which 
stated the Topass claims in no uncertain terms: 
They protested that they were friends and brothers in arms of  the King 
Our Lord, denying him the name of  vassals; and they wished to consti-
tute an independent republic to decide therewith the election of  a gov-
ernment and dispose of  the fruits of  the island as they wished, without 
His Majesty having more than the name of  king. As an excuse for their 
intent they declared that their forebears had conquered it and not the 
Portuguese arms, and that they had to defend what was theirs. (Matos 
1974a:235.)
The new situation meant that Larantuka was no longer suitable as the 
principal base for Da Costa. In order to retain his influence in the face 
of  the white governor he established two bases on the Timorese main-
land. One of  these was Tulang Ikan (Tulicão, Tulaica), a short distance 
to the west of  Lifau. Situated at a river mouth by the seashore, it had 
developed as a surrogate port that accommodated Dutch and other trad-
ing ships. The other place was situated in the inland, not far from the 
Ambeno sonaf Nunuhenu. Through this residence, Animata (or Ainmat), 
Da Costa could control the hinterland and keep the Ambeno princedom 
strictly under his control, whilst also having the benefit of  ensuring that 
22 One may refer to an English travel account from 1706 (Pinnell 1781) that mentions several White 
Portuguese who came over to the Topasses.
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the governor’s stronghold was effectively kept isolated.
Recorded oral traditions do not explicitly refer to the intense struggle 
between White and Black Portuguese. For the Timorese of  the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries they all retrospectively belonged to a 
category of  foreigners, and the main themes of  the stories were their 
relations with Timorese groups rather than their soon-forgotten mu-
tual differences. Nevertheless the princedoms took care to choose sides 
according to their own interests. Among the Atoni domains, Sonbai, 
Amanuban and Ambeno soon reverted to the Topass side, while the 
strong and independent-minded Amarasi found reason to support the 
governor. The old Topass-Amarasi friendship cooled considerably in the 
years before Coelho Guerreiro’s arrival. The son of  the Amarasi king 
was kept as a hostage by the Topasses under humiliating circumstances, 
and the princedom finally concluded a peace with the VOC allies in 
1701 on its own initiative. The king even warned Kupang about plans 
by the Topasses and Greater Sonbai to attack the area under VOC influ-
ence in the same year.23 It is also interesting to note that no less than 24 
rulers of  East Timor acknowledged the authority of  Coelho Guerreiro 
and expressly claimed to be satisfied with his rule. They were spread over 
the map of  East Timor up to Sama at the eastern point, and conspicu-
ously included the lords of  Camenaça and Luca, both of  whom held 
serious and important positions (Durand 2006a:124). Only the (admit-
tedly significant) domains of  the Likusaen area sided with Domingos da 
Costa, wheras the central but inaccessible realm Wehali and its loro are 
not mentioned at all, neither as clients nor as ‘rebels’.24 The late, brutal 
but superficial Topass subjugation of  the eastern lands made the East 
Timorese look for an alternate source of  power, while Wehali simply 
distanced itself  from the affairs of  the north coast.
The strategic choice was made at great risk. Amanuban in itially 
supported Coelho Guerreiro on an expedition to Noimuti, a highland 
spot that by this time was deemed to be a part of  the recalcitrant Sonbai 
realm. The expedition failed disastrously, and the head of  an accompany-
ing Amanuban prince ended up in Larantuka; it was offered as a festive 
trophy to Domingos da Costa. Da Costa proceeded to lead a detachment 
23 VOC 1648 (1701), ff. 8-9.
24 Matos 1974a:336-9; Matos 2005:11. By 1707 Wehali resisted the then governor Jácomo de Morais 
Sarmento, who ordered the levies (arraiais) of  the loyal domains to attack it (Leitão 1952:100-1). The 
result is not known from the available sources.
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to Amanuban, where he set about him with his sword and with fire. With a 
cruel irony, the princedom was newly ravaged shortly afterwards, this time 
by the troops of  the white governor for failing to meet its commitments.25
the voc connection
The Timorese and Topass forces of  Domingos da Costa besieged Lifau 
for the next few years. The details of  this struggle have been provided by 
Humberto Leitão and there is no need to repeat them here.26 Suffice it 
to say that the Portuguese garrison in Lifau was periodically reduced to 
extreme straits, although Da Costa was unable to completely overcome 
the stronghold. The new governor had a low opinion of  the fighting 
qualities of  the locals; four Portuguese, he bragged, could resist 4,000 
Rotenese, Solorese or Timorese.27 The Topasses were apparently an-
other matter, but they too had to lean on their Atoni network for sup-
port. Coelho Guerreiro and his successors were suspicious about the 
Company, which was believed to have supported the Topasses with mu-
nitions. The governorship of  Coelho Guerreiro coincided with the early 
stages of  the War of  Spanish Succession, where Portugal initially leaned 
towards the French side. In 1703, however, it concluded a military alli-
ance with England and its allies, bringing Portugal into the same camp 
as the Netherlands. While the European alliance prevented a full-scale 
confrontation between the VOC and the Estado, politics in the Timor 
area developed along their own lines. The accusations brought forward 
by the governors are not completely confirmed by the VOC sources. 
At this stage, Fort Concordia as well as Batavia felt that one should not 
meddle in internal Portuguese conflicts, but rather let both parts ‘jump 
in the bay’, in other words, that they should be allowed to fight it out 
between themselves.28 They kept a watchful eye on what went on in the 
Portuguese sphere, however, and sent envoys to both Lifau and Tulang 
Ikan to explore any trade possibilities.
Two Company servants, Nicolaas de Winter and Pieter van Dielen, 
25 Matos 1974a:258; VOC 1663 (1702), f. 6; VOC 1676 (1703), f. 6.
26 Leitão 1952. See also the letters of  Governor Coelho Guerreiro, printed in Matos 1974a:218-339.
27 Oliveira Marques 2001:244. Coelho Guerreiro’s use of  the term sabo seems to refer to the Rotenese, 
Rote being Sawu Minor.
28 VOC 1676 (1703), ff. 3-4.
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were dispatched from Kupang in August 1706 and arrived at Lifau after 
four days of  sailing, where they were to meet the next regular governor 
after Coelho Guerreiro, Jácomo de Morais Sarmento. ‘In the morning 
we went ashore. On the beach we were welcomed by a sergeant, and 
were led to the governor’s place. It was situated within the palisade, on a 
high mountain, where the governor received us in person, and brought 
us inside his dwelling’.29 After the talks had taken place, the envoys bid 
the governor farewell, ‘and went out to look around the place a bit. Its 
fortification consisted of  three palisades which each lay on a hill in step 
formation. Only the first one could bombard the shore and the anchor-
age. At the beach were some atap30 houses, inhabited by some of  their 
servants and free people. They did not seem to lack foodstuffs. We found 
no other ships here than a small Portuguese sloop that lay at anchor in 
the roadstead. After this tour, we went aboard’.31
After having concluded their affairs in Lifau, the two Dutchmen set 
sail and set their course for Tulang Ikan. 
In the morning we went ashore and reached the house of  the capitão cabo, 
who supervises the merchants who stay at the shore. He received us po-
litely. After mutual compliment he told us that the capitão mor Domingos 
da Costa has got his residence some two [Dutch] miles from here. Today 
there would be no opportunity to speak with Da Costa, but tomorrow he 
would arrange guides and horses for us to go there. […] We strolled some-
what along the beach. We did not see anything but some small dwellings 
which were mostly inhabited by Chinese people who were there for trade, 
apart from yet three or four small houses of  atap and straw where some 
servants stayed. Otherwise the beach lay open and deserted, and there 
is no other fortification than a wooden palisade on a hill where some 
artillery is situated, by which the roadstead and the river between Lifau 
and Tulang Ikan can be shelled. Most of  the people we met looked quite 
unhealthy. The Chinese traders were also not free from illness. Finally we 
came to the house of  the [Dutch] free burgher Samuel Ravken, who was 
desperately ill and had committed very little. Thus, he said, he had not 
managed more than two or three picul of  sandalwood.
29 VOC 1728 (1706), f. 132.
30 Atap is the material with which the indigenous houses were covered, made from dried leaves of  vari-
ous kinds of  palms, especially nipa and sago (VOC-Glossarium 2000:14).
31 VOC 1728 (1706), f. 133.
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The next day De Winter and Van Dielen rode to the inland residence, 
obviously Animata, where they met Domingos da Costa. They offered to 
trade sandalwood and beeswax for cloth, but Da Costa informed them 
that sickness among his subjects had prevented deliveries of  the wood 
from the forests. He suggested the Dutchmen that better times may come 
early next year. They returned to Tulang Ikan, taking with them the 
hapless Ravken, and sailed back to Kupang.32 The contrast between the 
two rival Portuguese centres is striking from this account. Lifau was well 
fortified by virtue of  the steep rocks behind the shore and was almost im-
possible to conquer without advanced equipment; although the Topasses 
had access to artillery, muskets and small ships, they were never able to 
master the place until the White Portuguese eventually abandoned the 
stronghold many years later. From other sources it appears that Lifau was 
an unhealthy place where the death toll among the reinforcements sent 
from Macao and Goa was of  frightening proportions. The spot was also 
unsuitable for agriculture so that the moradores had difficulties supporting 
their families (Matos 1974a:124). The Topasses of  Tulang Ikan, on the 
other hand, had access to a partly fertile hinterland and were not solely 
dependent on the simple wooden fortification at the coast. It also appears 
that, to a certain extent, the Topass establishment was attractive to the 
Southeast Asian Chinese.
To corroborate the above, we have an English account from exactly 
the same time as when De Winter and Van Dielen made their tour. 
In 1706, Captain Richard Pinnell sailed from Banjarmasin, where the 
English East India Company had a post, to Larantuka and then on 
to the Timorese coast. A limited number of  English vessels were seen 
in Timorese waters in these years exploring the dwindling possibili-
ties of  sandalwood trade. Finding nothing of  interest in Lifau, Pinnell 
proceeded to Tulang Ikan. There he met Domingos da Costa in a very 
simple dress, having just returned from the inland in the company of  30 
‘black’ retainers. Although Governor Jácome de Morais Sarmento tried 
to prevent it, the Englishmen decided to purchase wood from Da Costa, 
and were invited to Animata:
After much discourse we embarked on the shore, took horses and be-
ing guarded by 3 men, rode up to the Captain Majore’s house which is 
32 VOC 1728 (1706), ff. 132-8.
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about 4 miles in the Country. Here I expected to have seen a palace but 
it proved more like a West-country stable. Upon our first arrival we could 
not gain admittance therefore we stood by our horses a little while under 
a tree, then were desired to walk into the guard-house where we stood 
about one hour surrounded and gazed on by a great many black faces. 
Afterwards we were introduced into the Captain Majores entertaining 
room, which is open at the front of  his old Cadjan-house. Going into it 
we went up a Bamboo ladder with 3 Roterds [?] and afterwards over a 
rail; here we were received by a great many black gentlemen who we sup-
posed were his chief  officers. This room is adorned with our Saviour on 
the Cross, the Virgin Mary with some other Effigies, with lighted candles 
before them, at the upper end round it is hung up some other Saints in 
painting and under foot carpets spread for us to sit down upon. In little 
time the Captain Majore came to us, and treated us very handsomely ac-
cording to their custom.33
During negotiations it turned out that the Topasses were mainly inter-
ested in receiving payment in arms and gunpowder. Soon, however, 
Richard Pinnell found out what so many Dutch merchants had dis-
covered in the past decades: promises of  speedy deliveries of  the valu-
able sandalwood were worth little. Da Costa assured them that good 
sandalwood would be brought to Tulang Ikan from Amanuban very 
soon, but delay was followed by delay, until the Topass leader eventu-
ally had to order a Chinese trader to give his share of  the wood to the 
English in order to provide them with at least some cargo. Da Costa 
was obviously anxious to get the weapons, even at the expense of  bully-
ing smaller traders. Like the Portuguese and Dutch, Pinnell presents a 
rather unflattering portrait of  Domingos da Costa, whom he describes 
as an elderly, dark-skinned man of  short stature. Pinnell remarks that 
he was more often than not drunk, sometimes to the degree that he 
could not discuss business with his foreign guests. In the eyes of  the sea 
captain he was a conceited figure whose treatment of  the Englishmen 
was not always satisfactory. Pinnell was annoyed over ‘a damned sight 
of  ill manners’ when Da Costa and his associates were treated by the 
English to a dinner on the shore. Incidentally Pinnell indicates that the 
Hornay and Da Costa families had buried the hatchet by this time and 
33 Pinnell 1781:40-1. Coming directly from his log, Pinnell’s text is crude and without punctuation; I 
have added some punctuation marks to improve readability.
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were co-operating together. He met a son of  António Hornay, called 
Chic (Francisco) Hornay, who ran Domingos da Costa’s errands in Belu. 
This younger Hornay is described as a touchy and belligerent type, who 
nearly killed a Portuguese after being slighted by him in the presence of  
Pinnell. He would later play a leading role in Timorese politics (Pinnell 
1781:60-1).
While the Dutch may have preferred to keep out of  internal 
Portuguese troubles, the new division in the Portuguese sphere had its 
effects. Before the coming of  Coelho, Domingos da Costa’s attitude was 
ambivalent in the same way as Hornay’s had been: on the one hand he 
strove to maintain commercial relations, and on the other hand he sup-
ported certain nusak on Rote against the friends of  the VOC and planned 
incursions into the Kupang area (Coolhaas 1976:154-5). The establish-
ment of  a white governor, however, meant he had second thoughts. With 
Amarasi on good terms with both the governor and the VOC allies he 
found himself  increasingly cornered. In early 1704, the Lesser Sonbai 
ruler Bi Sonbai and another princess called Bi Sulla sent their regards 
to the Topass leader via an envoy, and suggested they begin talks ‘like 
before’.34 Bi Sonbai in turn received a conciliatory letter from Domingos 
da Costa, Emperor Dom Pedro Sonbai and Dom Francisco de Taenube 
of  Amakono, making proposals for a formal peace. This was a unique 
development since the Topass leaders never otherwise drew Sonbai into 
their diplomatic efforts within the VOC sphere. By this stage the senders 
both drew upon the Atoni-wide prestige of  the dynasty and the lingering 
affection between the two Sonbai branches. The letter hints at dynastic 
relations not mentioned by the voluminous Dutch sources: ‘The sister of  
Your Highnesses has received the gift that Your Highnesses have sent, 
and thanks them utmost for the good inclination; and sends for them 
a sarong from her body, as Your Highnesses have requested from her; 
and I [Da Costa] do not offer them anything else at the moment than a 
cord of  muti salak, as a token of  my good inclination.’35 One of  the two 
34 Bi Sulla is obviously Bi Sula(t) Sonbai, a Sonbai princess mentioned by later tradition. In all the 
versions she came to Kupang from the inland with her sister Bi Aulais Sonbai, but her exact dynastic 
position varies from source to source. The oldest version (Heijmering 1847:38, 44) has her marrying the 
Amabi ruler Saroro (fl. 1655), a younger version (Fobia 1984:75-8) lets her marry the Lesser Sonbai ruler 
Baki Bena Sonbai (reign 1776-95) – the case illustrates the problems for the historian using the traditional 
pedigrees! That the sisters enjoyed an important dynastic position is indicated by an alternative appel-
lation for Lesser Sonbai: Bi Sulat ‘m Bi Aobeis, Soes Las’im Bi Patbesi (Parera 1969:48). So maybe the 
other sister, Bi Aulais Sonbai, was reminiscent of  Empress Bi Sonbai.
35 VOC 1691 (1704), ff. 17-8, 114-7.
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sisters of  the empress must, therefore, have remained in the Portuguese 
sphere, within reach of  Da Costa. How this could have come about, one 
can only speculate.
At any rate, the strategy worked. Bi Sonbai loyally showed the let-
ter to the Dutch authorities, who checked and endorsed her reply to 
Da Costa and Greater Sonbai. In spite of  a few bloody incidents in the 
next year, 1705, a real rapprochement came about and resulted in an 
almost unprecedented period of  relative peace between the Company 
allies and Amarasi, Greater Sonbai and Amanuban. The peace would, 
however, be abruptly broken seven years later. The Dutch had a clear 
interest in promoting the peace process, the more so since their relations 
with the White Portuguese were strained. A Portuguese frigate seized 
the Dutch sloop Doradus in 1704 when it sailed for Tulang Ikan in order 
to trade with Da Costa. When a Portuguese frigate bound for Macao 
made a stopover in Semarang, it was in turn seized by the VOC resident 
there. Rancorous diplomatic notes were exchanged between Batavia 
and Kupang on one side and Lifau on the other. The Company accused 
António Coelho Guerreiro of  violating paragraph 12 of  the peace treaty 
of  1661, which allowed the free transportation of  goods, munitions, and 
so on, from Dutch ports to any other place, be it enemies of  Portugal 
or otherwise. They also honoured the old, and highly debatable, idea 
that the sultan of  Ternate, now a VOC vassal, had held the foremost 
authority in Solor-Timor since former times, which by extension made 
the Portuguese territorial claims doubtful.36 Coelho Guerreiro, for his 
part, accused the Kupangese opperhoofd Joannes van Alphen of  inciting 
the Chinese traders to do their dubious business with Domingos da 
Costa. Both parties, moreover, refused to return deserters to each other 
(Coolhaas 1976:291-2, 299-300; Boxer 1968:185-6), and the mutual 
suspicion that they harboured was only increased by various intermittent 
incidents, which would continue for the rest of  the century and longer. 
The ordinary relationship between the VOC and the Lifau and later Dili 
governments was one of  barely suppressed hostility.
36 Letter Batavia to Lifau 1704, 1.10.01:2956, Nationaal Archief.
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a clerical peace- and troublemaker
Much of  the political history of  Timor from 1702 to 1722 is centred 
on the bishop of  Malacca, the Goan Dominican Frei Manuel de Santo 
António (1660-1733). A person of  great zeal and devotion, he aroused 
widely different opinions in his lifetime – ‘one of  the most curious Jekyll 
and Hyde characters amongst the Dominican missionaries in 18th cen-
tury Timor’, according to Boxer (1968:190). António Coelho Guerreiro 
owed his position to the intervention of  Frei Manuel, whom he referred 
to as a human angel, an exception to the low levels of  education and 
application associated with the Dominican padres on Timor. In his own 
words, the bishop was happy to go to Timor where no sack of  money 
awaited him, and he had no other aim than to spread the honour and 
glory of  God. In the words of  Artur de Matos, he was a missionary por 
excelência (Matos 2001:116). While there were other underlying factors at 
play in the political networks on the island, the bishop tended to become 
the catalyst for several dramatic turns.
The more benign part of  his influence was shown when the gover-
nor, Jácomo de Morais Sarmento (gov. 1706-1710), turned out to be a 
brusque and undiplomatic figure who nearly ruined the position of  the 
Estado da Índia. On a military expedition to the Motael princedom, he 
forced the bishop to go along with the soldiers against his own will. He 
furthermore arrested the faithful Dom Matheus da Costa of  Viqueque 
when the latter expressed doubts on a point of  strategy. Both acts were 
reckless: the bishop was revered and respected by the Timorese elites, 
and Dom Matheus was a principal support for the Crown of  Portugal 
in Belu (in the more extended sense of  the geographical term). He was 
the superior headman of  the Belu auxiliaries (the arraial) and had fought 
the so-called rebels since 1702. Events quickly demonstrated that the 
local veneration for Portuguese symbols should not be misinterpreted: 
the Estado was only one of  several sources of  authority and its local sup-
porters quickly fell away. De Morais was soon besieged in Lifau in 1708 
by overwhelming Topass-led forces. At this moment, when the White 
Portuguese were on the verge of  total collapse, the bishop of  Malacca 
again intervened and seems to have miraculously saved the situation. 
He valiantly left the fortifications of  Lifau and walked to the camp of  
Domingos da Costa. With a dazzling show of  rhetoric he persuaded the 
Topass leader to submit to His Catholic Majesty João V. The account 
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of  Richard Pinnell, quoted before, indicates that Domingos da Costa 
had a strong Catholic identity, a factor that should not be underplayed. 
Another reason for the stunning success of  the bishop may have been the 
disastrous state of  trade at the time, which spoke in favour of  a reconcili-
ation among the Portuguese factions. The VOC reports complain that 
the war after 1702 impeded what little trading remained after Hornay’s 
death (Coolhaas 1976:299). This is not endorsed by a Portuguese source 
that states that some 10,000-12,000 picul of  sandalwood were cut per 
year, however. Of  these, only some 2,000-3,000 picul reached Macao, 
while the rest was brought to Batavia on Chinese keels. This would actu-
ally be a lot more than in the days of  António Hornay, though the figures 
may be debatable (Matos 1974a:178, 341). Whatever the true economic 
figures, the warring parties strove to block each other’s lines of  commu-
nication for as long as the war dragged on, evidently to the detriment of  
normal trade. After six years they would therefore have definitely been 
interested in seeing hostilities come to an end.
Peace did not reign for long, though. Under the next governor, Dom 
Manuel de Soto Maior (gov. 1710-1714), a curious and seemingly trivial 
event drew much of  the island into conflict, with the bishop acting as 
the catalyst. This time it was not a matter between White and Black 
Portuguese, but rather between the Portuguese community and the in-
digenous population. In 1711, a daughter of  Domingos da Costa passed 
away and was buried with solemnity in Lifau. The emperor of  Greater 
Sonbai, Dom Pedro, attended the ceremony. For unexplained reasons the 
bishop of  Malacca took the opportunity to order Domingos da Costa to 
take the wife of  Dom Pedro into custody.37 Later genealogical tradition 
knows Dom Pedro by the name of  Nai Neno Sonbai and mentions Bi 
Manlela Kosad (Manuela da Costa) of  Oecusse as one of  his consorts; 
Domingos may therefore have held his own daughter. VOC and, later, 
oral sources reveal that another wife of  the emperor was the non-Chris-
tian Usi Bi Lalan, mother of  some of  his many children.38 Dom Pedro, 
at least nominally a Catholic, was therefore a polygamist, which may be 
the background for the zeal of  the bishop and Domingos da Costa.
37 Leitão 1952:146; Faria de Morais 1934:131. Portuguese texts say that Da Costa’s daughter died in 
1712, but VOC sources clearly indicate 1711 as the year of  her death.
38 Weidner 1932; VOC 1995 (1723), f. 57. Oesje Bilalan in the Dutch text, Bi Lalan Mela in the tradi-
tional account. In some versions she was the mother of  the later emperor Nai Bau Sonbai (Dom Alfonso 
Salema).
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The furious Dom Pedro left Lifau and gathered thousands of  Sonbai. 
Under a subordinate lord called Manubait they began to ravage the 
territories adjacent to Lifau, killing and plundering. On the orders of  
Manuel de Soto Maior, Domingos da Costa marched against the Sonbai, 
who were defeated in a skirmish. This defeat triggered one of  the in-
numerable Timorese migrations. Parts of  the population of  the Sonbai 
lands, estimated to be 14,000 people, fled towards the west, pursued by 
Topasses, Belu and subjects of  the Kono lord. Like so many previous dis-
satisfied groups they set their course for Kupang. To the consternation of  
the Dutch opperhoofd Didloff  Blad they camped on the Ponai Plain, some 
distance to the east of  Kupang, and asked Empress Bi Sonbai for help. 
Especially disturbing was a letter from De Soto Maior, which arrived by 
Chinese sampan39 at the same time. The governor asked Blad not to 
receive the fugitives, and added that Timorese from Kupang had been 
active in the rebel forces. Blad replied that this was easier said than done; 
the Timorese here were not literally subjects of  the Company but rather 
friends and allies, and any decision would depend on their willingness to 
obey the Company.
There was an inclusive idea among the Timorese that their land was 
open, and that they could not refuse the hard-pressed Sonbai the right 
to settle by the Kupang bay. Blad attempted to forbid the allies from ac-
cepting the fugitives in line with De Soto Maior’s letter, but to no avail. 
On the contrary, the allies declared that the newcomers were relatives 
by blood who had no other means of  survival. Out of  compassion they 
must be accepted, and they hoped that Batavia would confirm them as 
new allies.40 The refugees thus settled in the neighbourhood of  Kupang. 
Unfortunately, this act of  generosity did not pay off. One year later, in 
December 1712, the redoubtable Domingos da Costa appeared in the 
VOC territory with a Topass army. While the Dutch were still in Fort 
Concordia, the Timorese tried to halt him. The battle quickly became a 
rout for the allies and the refugees. The acting head of  the newcomers, 
Manubait, fell together with several local grandees and a large number 
of  commoners.41 Da Costa burnt and killed all those he came across 
and he pursued the Timorese up to Fort Concordia. For a while the 
39 A sampan is a small sailing craft with a sharp keel (VOC-Glossarium 2000:100-1).
40 VOC 1826 (1712), ff. 4-7, 43.
41 Domingos da Costa claimed to have killed the king of  Kupang and his son and brought their heads 
to Lifau as trophies (Leitão 1952:151). In fact he killed the Helong temukung Poneo and his son.
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Topass leader encamped within reach of  the cannon of  the fort, thus 
demonstrating his contempt for the Dutchmen who were unable to pro-
tect their allies or the refugees. The foodstuffs in the area were systemati-
cally appropriated or destroyed: the crops in the fields, the fruit trees, the 
buffaloes, hogs and dogs. Even the dead were dug up from the graves 
and profaned, according to the allies. It was indeed the worst disaster to 
befall the allies since their arrival in Kupang, resulting in a famine that 
cost many lives among the Timorese. No one dared fell sandalwood out 
of  fear for roaming Topasses. Moreover, the event ended the relative 
peace with the Portuguese clients, which meant that low-scale hostilities 
continued to the mid-eighteenth century.42
Under these circumstances, people began to migrate to the Portuguese 
sphere. Not only did most of  the refugees leave, but also families that were 
part of  the five loyal allies. Some of  them went to Amarasi, but most of  
them headed for the old Sonbai lands. Dom Pedro Sonbai was one of  
the returnees, officially since he felt discontent with the reformed creed 
of  the Dutch and had been ill- treated for religious reasons. However, he 
left his remaining wife, Usi Bi Lalan, and at least two of  his sons in the 
Kupang enclave, and the sons would later play a political role. In spite of  
his previous resistance to the Crown of  Portugal, Dom Pedro was able to 
return to his old role as emperor of  Servião, as seen in a letter from the 
Goan viceroy in 1720 (Boxer 1970:107-8). As a ritual figure he was quite 
simply too important to dispense with.
The years after the Manubait-Sonbai incident saw an uneasy truce 
between the Portuguese factions, and between these and the Company. 
Domingos da Costa was made the temporary governor in the period 
1715-1718, but he was less than popular among his white compatriots, 
let alone among the Dutch. The documents complain about his alleged 
bad habits, debauchery and arbitrary dispositions, which disturbed 
trade. Nevertheless, he filled the post loyally and the Dominicans suc-
cessfully mediated between him and the whites. In Kupang, it was noted 
that the White Portuguese retained their dominant influence in the Belu 
‘province’ in the centre and east of  the island. Da Costa, who still strong-
ly favoured the particular Topass interests, was not pleased with this, but 
there was little he could do. East Timor produced most of  the beeswax, 
and the whites could carry on their trade securely and without having 
42 VOC 1841 (1713), ff. 7-8, 42-4; Leitão 1952:153.
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to pay the usual fees.43 Da Costa then ventured in another direction. 
According to the agreement of  1708, he was acknowledged as the capitão 
mor of  Larantuka and also of  Sumba – a cheap concession on the part 
of  the governor considering the lack of  real political influence the post 
had. As a matter of  fact, a Topass expedition to Sumba was organized in 
1715. Batavia regarded the island as Company land, presumably since its 
vassal Bima on Sumbawa had made vague claims over it. It seems that 
the expedition managed to bind the domain of  Melolo to the Topasses, 
but caused some other Sumbanese chiefs to shift their loyalties to the 
VOC. Meanwhile Bima regarded Larantuka with hostililty.44 Another 
attempt was made in the Alor Islands, where a Topass captain estab-
lished himself  with a small troop and two padres. They built a church, 
and began to erect a fortress. This time the Kupang authorities reacted 
and sent an official who protested to the captain that Alor was Company 
land and hence off-limits for the Portuguese. The captain found reason 
to comply and withdrew from the enterprise.45
A state of  political crisis was fiercely resumed when, in 1718, a new 
governor arrived, Francisco de Mello de Castro. Once again the bishop 
of  Malacca was the catalyst of  the trouble, and once again a number 
of  conflicts on different levels combined to make the following fourteen 
years a highly turbulent period. While the struggle is depicted in the 
documents as one between White and Black Portuguese protagonists, a 
closer reading shows that it was just as much a result of  Timorese agency, 
where the princely elites supported one party or another as best suited 
their interests. 
The uncompromising bishop of  Malacca immediately fell foul of  
Francisco de Mello de Castro. He used his religious prestige to the utmost 
when he excommunicated the governor, while the latter stated his wish 
to put Frei Manuel in a small boat in the midst of  the ocean where he 
could preach for the fishes. Meanwhile hostile movements unfolded in 
West and East Timor and the governor was forced to move from place 
to place. The situation on the island finally became so tense that De 
Mello de Castro suddenly left his post – cobardemente (cowardly), in the 
eyes of  some – and headed for Batavia and thence for India (Faria de 
43 VOC 1894 (1717), f. 21.
44 Leitão 1952:112; VOC 1867 (1715), f. 10; Coolhaas 1979:231, 336; De Roo van Alderwerelt 
1906:194.
45 VOC 1894 (1717), f. 145; VOC 1944 (1719), ff. 84-5.
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Morais 1934:134-5, 1944:202-3). Afterwards he accused the bishop of  
having plotted to effectuate his downfall. The bishop, more accustomed 
to Timorese conditions, argued that ‘these rebels use, when they fight, 
any excuse to give their rebellion a good name’ (Araujo 1978:129-35). In 
other words, the local leadership would have used Portuguese conflicts 
to further their own interests, an important theme in the early colonial 
history of  the island. The bishop of  Malacca took over the government 
on a provisional basis and used Christianized aristocrats to fill major 
administrative posts. His old royal converts, Dom Domingos Soares of  
Manatuto and Dom António Hornay of  Samoro, were elevated to capitão 
mor and tenente superior of  Belu. At the same time, the Topass Francisco 
Hornay, who was incidentally married to a daughter of  Domingos da 
Costa, was made tenente general of  Servião. The arrangement seemed to 
confirm the vague tendency of  a Servião being tied to the old Topass 
network, and a Belu as being susceptible to the Estado. These strategic 
patterns would soon be blurred, though.
The bishop and Domingos da Costa were elderly men of  about the 
same age, whose relationship over the past decades had oscillated be-
tween hostility and co-operation. With the bishop at the helm, however, 
relations finally broke down completely. Frei Manuel again used the 
excommunication weapon in 1720, when Da Costa was denounced for 
a number of  alleged crimes against the church and royal sovereignty. 
The letters of  the bishop sometimes took on an explicit racialist qual-
ity; thus Da Costa was ‘in appearance the most stinking negro’, and a 
‘debauched and vicious’ figure (Faria de Morais 1944:212; Sá 1949:30). 
Da Costa’s Topass party remained defiant, but soon ran into trouble with 
their clients in Servião. The bishop encouraged a non-Christian lord, the 
Sonbai regent Nai Taupah Kono, to attack the old Topass leader.46 The 
Kono family does not seem to have participated in the Sonbai-Manubait 
exodus of  1711-1713, but in the new political situation they found reason 
to turn against the semi-foreign community upon whom they had been 
dependent for about sixty years. A letter specifies that Nai Taupah Kono 
actively asked to rebel against Da Costa under the pretext that he wished 
to serve under the government of  the king of  Portugal.47 The bishop 
46 In the Portuguese documents this prince is called Atopá or Tepá. According to the orally transmit-
ted genealogy, Nai Taupah Kono was the seventh generation of  Uis Kono, son of  Nai Taenube Kono.
47 Leitão 1952:308. VOC 1979 (1722), f. 16 gives as the reason for the defection on the part of  the 
Topasses the violent oppression (geweldige knevelarijen) of  Domingos da Costa.
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himself  departed from Lifau with a troop of  auxiliaries, led by a son of  
his old adherent Dom Matheus da Costa of  Viqueque, and set his course 
for the Topass stronghold Animata to the south. 
For the last time, Domingos da Costa gathered the men still loyal to 
him. With a final, furious effort the old man sallied out with his battle-
hardened musketeers and repulsed the Sonbai who suffered great losses. 
Nai Taupah Kono was killed and Da Costa subjected Greater Sonbai to 
horrors comparable to those he inflicted upon the sister domain Lesser 
Sonbai ten years earlier. He ordered his men to slay the male popula-
tion of  Amakono, probably meaning those people who immediately 
surround the Kono lord. About 2,000 or 3,000 died. Next, the women 
and children were herded together and brought to Tulang Ikan.48 The 
auxiliaries of  the bishop retreated to Lifau in haste, and Frei Manuel 
rounded up new forces in Belu, where his position was still strong. Before 
more could be done, however, the last effort of  Da Costa took its toll. 
Ten days after the massacre of  Amakono, on 23 February 1722, the old 
warrior died after 25 unruly years of  contested leadership. His followers 
showed their grief  by cropping their hair ‘according to the custom of  
the land’ – in that respect they were more Timorese than Portuguese in 
terms of  cultural customs.49 Also in accordance with Timorese tradi-
tion, his widow grieved by his unburied chest, and it was rumoured that 
she could hear the voices of  various souls being tormented in hell – a 
testimony of  his rather doubtful posthumous reputation.50
His son-in-law Francisco Hornay tried for a while to deny Da Costa’s 
death, probably to gain time to secure his own position as the successor 
of  Domingos da Costa. The survivors from Amakono were spared the 
fate of  the slave market and were sent back to the Sonbai lands to collect 
sandalwood, beeswax and other items in what may have been a show of  
benevolence to strengthen his position in the Atoni domains; indeed, a 
strong Topass network was maintained. There is not much evidence for 
the presence of  a White Portuguese influence in West Timor over the 
next few decades, given that the new Topass leader, Francisco Hornay 
(ruled 1722-1730), maintained a policy of  confrontation with the bishop 
48 VOC 1979 (1722), f. 17; Leitão 1952:268-9, 308, 322-3. A VOC source from 1766 states that a man 
of  the Takaip family killed the old Kono lord, and that Takaip then usurped the position of  regent of  
Greater Sonbai for three generations, up until 1766, when Kono took over again. It is possible that the 
Kono-Takaip transition has something to do with the events of  1722 (VOC 8359 [1766], f. 9).
49 Leitão 1952:308; VOC 1979 (1722), f. 17, 19.
50 Leitão 1952:270; VOC 1979 (1722), f. 20.
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and his Belu adherents. However, the long career of  Frei Manuel came to 
an abrupt end with the arrival of  a new governor to Timor, the Brazilian 
mestizo António de Albuquerque Coelho (gov. 1722-1725). He found the 
political activism of  the zealous bishop to be a disturbing element and 
forcibly shipped him over to Macao and then on to Goa.51
The strong following commanded by the bishop of  Malacca prompts 
questions about what he actually meant to the Timorese. There is no 
denying that Christian principles, disseminated in a forceful way by the 
bishop, could have appealed to the local society. Frei Manuel’s charisma 
was obvious: the new governor launched an attack in Servião that 
proved futile, as many Timorese did not want to fight for someone who 
had expelled their religious leader. At the same time, he was obviously 
understood in a localized way, as an expert of  the supernatural – like 
the priestly figures that in Tetun are called dato-lulic. A story circulated 
that the last illness of  Domingos da Costa was represented in his throat 
by the shape of  a cross, which was actually the cross of  the bishop – the 
idea that curses lodged by individuals might cause somebody’s death, is a 
common Timorese belief  (Middelkoop 1960; Leitão 1952: 270).
anti-portuguese movements
Commenting on the clash between the bishop and Da Costa in 1722, 
a Macanese writer in Lifau referred to ‘the ancient collusion that until 
the present day has been preserved, of  a union that pretended to make 
the Timorese of  the two provinces [Servião and Belu] go against the 
white Christian foreigners, and the black ones’ (Leitão 1952:308). The 
quotation is interesting for several reasons. It suggests an early Timorese 
anti-foreignism, of  a higher order than the occasional resentment shown 
against the Portuguese during the last century. It also indicates that 
religion was an element that defined this anti-foreignism; lastly, it envi-
51 Leitão 1952: 283. Curiously, there is an oral tradition tied to Luca, which says that the king of  Luca 
was displeased with the missionary efforts of  the bishop of  Malacca. The king hid in the confessional box 
and, when the bishop entered, killed him (Spillett 1999:299). The occurrence of  this tradition is perplex-
ing considering the strong position of  the bishop in Viqueque and Luca; possibly the memory of  the 
bishop is mixed up with a later event, such as the anti-foreign movement in Luca in circa 1779-85 (Castro 
1867:89-92, 292). At least two later bishops of  Malacca resided on Timor (1740-43, 1749-59/60), but 
both of  them appear to have died in Lifau (Matos 1974a:76). A vague assertion that a certain bishop of  
Malacca was buried in Luca is also found in Visser 1934:162.
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sioned a Timor-wide perspective that transcended the parochialism of  
individual domains. 
During the next decade, there is further scattered evidence of  a larger 
movement containing revivalist ambitions grounded in Timorese tradi-
tion. There would be too much supposition involved at this stage to speak 
of  anti-colonialism; whatever their oppressive features, the Portuguese of  
all skin colours strove to extract the products of  the island, rather than to 
change the structure of  the princedoms. In this respect they were similar 
to other Asian forms of  political paramount lordship. With their Catholic 
religion, advanced weaponry and skill at overseas travel, the Portuguese 
were still not so much colonial masters as covetous suzerains, epitomized 
in the image of  the distant stranger king in Lisbon. 
The principal financial levy on the Timorese, the finta, appears 
to have been imposed in the time of  Manuel de Soto Maior (gov. 
1710-1714), soon after the Portuguese parties had made peace. It was 
calculated in pardaus,52 and each princedom had to pay its dues ac-
cording to a table drawn up by the governor, payment mostly being in 
sandalwood, gold or beeswax. This was different from the Topass and 
VOC systems, where irregular-sized gifts were provided to the external 
suzerains (Matos 1974a:127). Indigenous grievances can partly be fol-
lowed through tracing VOC materials. Although the Estado da Índia 
was at an advantage in East Timor compared to the Topasses, the fintas 
demanded by the governor aroused a great feeling of  discontentment, 
which generally brought about the last stage of  protest, that of  voting 
with one’s feet, or in this case, rather with one’s boats. There remained 
a great deal of  interaction between the peoples of  East Timor and the 
South-Western Islands, who shared cultural and linguistic similarities. 
By 1714, Timorese refugees were living on Kisar; conversely, persons 
from Kisar and Wetar sometimes visited Timor, or even found refuge 
there (Coolhaas 1979:81-2, 167). The VOC authorities in Banda were 
opposed to such migrations and tried to prevent them via their allied 
rajas on the islands;this proved easier said than done, though. The refu-
gees on Kisar were forcibly repatriated, but in 1719, three new shiploads 
of  Timorese arrived. They were accompanied by 93 men from the 
Kisarese village of  Oirata who had previously fled to Timor but soon 
found Portuguese rule to be a worse alternative. In spite of  attempts to 
52 A pardau (from Sanskrit pratapa) was a gold or silver coin, equivalent to roughly 300 réis.
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repatriate them, a Timorese community grew in Oirata and has pre-
served its own identity until modern times.53
A similar event was witnessed by Corporal Ernst Christoph 
Barchewitz, who served as VOC representative on Leti, an island close 
to the eastern cape of  Timor. In April 1715, an orangkaya told Barchewitz 
that a ship from Timor had just arrived at his negeri, and that the pas-
sengers were keen to settle on Leti. Barchewitz immediately hastened to 
meet the newcomers. They explained that they were unable to endure 
the miserable treatment meted out to them by their superiors: each 
month, three mounted soldiers came to their negeri and demanded that 
they deliver a certain amount of  corals. If  they could not supply this, the 
soldiers would take their children as slaves, chase them from their houses 
and sleep with their wives. Barchewitz, who was good at recognizing 
faces, noted that one of  the Timorese women was exactly like a Leti he 
knew, and upon looking into it, he found that they were indeed siblings. 
Before the Dutch came to Leti, he was told, the locals and people from 
Timor often visited each other and intermarried. Barchewitz asked how 
that could be since the Company had been represented on Leti for more 
than 50 years, while the woman was less than 20 years of  age. He was 
told that the same Timorese persons had made an unsuccessful attempt 
to be allowed on Leti four years ago, and had brought the woman back 
with them without telling the Dutch corporal. Barchewitz resolutely took 
the woman into custody and returned her to her native negeri. He then 
forced the Timorese to leave, since the VOC authorities of  Banda or 
Batavia had not granted permission for their migration; he believed the 
newcomers to be no more than ‘rascals’ (Barchewitz 1730:330-2). 
In fact, a new spate of  anti-foreignism emanated from East Timor. 
It was neither Sonbai nor Wehali who organized resistance against the 
Estado but rather Camenaça, sometimes identified as the eastern liurai-
ship in the ceremonial tripartition of  Timor. In 1719, the king of  that 
East Timorese Tetun domain assembled several lords from Servião and 
Belu in his residence and a blood-oath was sworn. The idea was ‘to ex-
clude the Christian name [faith] from these islands’ whereby they held 
‘notorious and impudent negotiations’ (Faria de Morais 1934:136), as 
a Portuguese report has it. A black-and-white dog called Lebo – in ac-
53 Coolhaas 1979:486-7, 553-4; Van Goor 1988:132. Riedel 1886:403 dates the definite establishment 
of  the Timorese in Oirata in 1721. They would have arrived from Loikera, that is, Loiquero close to the 
eastern cape of  Timor. For oral traditions pertaining to Oirata, see Josselin de Jong 1937:144-9.
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counts from Timor, animals are often given personal names – was killed 
and the lords that were present mixed their own blood with that of  the 
dog, smeared a sacred sword with some of  the mixture and then drank 
the rest. The oath was understood to implicate loyalty until death, and 
was aimed at the White as well as Black Portuguese. ‘They killed buf-
faloes and made sacrifices, killing Christians and [performing] other 
diabolic rites according to their custom’ (Faria de Morais 1934:136; see 
also Castro 1862:470-1).
Some of  the more exotic details may be attributed to Portuguese 
imagination, but that of  animal sacrifice by a ritual expert (dato-lulic) and 
the confirmation of  an alliance by the drinking of  blood (hemu-ran), are 
both clearly recognizable elements of  Timorese custom (Sá 1949:17). 
The effects of  the oath were real enough. At the end of  António de 
Albuqueque Coelho’s turbulent tenure, (gov. 1722-1725), popular re-
sentment against the fintas broke out in some East Timorese domains. 
Camenaça seized the opportunity to co-ordinate a major rebellion 
that encompassed a number of  domains in the province of  Belu. The 
governorship was then taken over by António Moniz de Macedo (gov. 
1725-1728), who managed to secure the nominal allegiance of  Francisco 
Hornay. Hornay was not necessarily opposed to the Estado; on the 
contrary, he assisted in talking some of  the rebels out of  the enterprise 
(Araujo 1978:137-8). Others persisted, however, and withdrew to the 
mountainous stronghold of  Cailaco. 
Cailaco had been successively strengthened over the last 50 years, in 
other words, since roughly the time of  Hornay’s attacks on East Timor 
in the 1670s. Every rock at the place served as a redoubt, which made 
access to the summit of  the mountain fortress almost impossible. Moniz 
de Macedo rallied arraiais from a large number of  East Timorese prince-
doms, although the Topass-dominated Atoni lands did not contribute 
much. In spite of  the logistical obstacles, the governor secured manpower 
for the Portuguese effort from relatively distant places: Samoro, Vemasse, 
Saráu, Faturó and Luca. Firearms were fairly widespread by this time, 
but still in a clear minority; of  1,184 Timorese or Black Portuguese sol-
diers in one division of  the expedition, 214 were equipped with muskets, 
while the rest carried shields and assegais (Matos 1974a:372-3). The 
combined forces, a few thousand men strong, gathered in Batugade and 
Dili, which was already a place of  some importance. From there the ar-
raiais marched to Cailaco and surrounded the stronghold from all sides. 
The siege of  the mountain stronghold Cailaco in 1726, by the forces of  
the Estado da Índia. A contemporary illustration, possibly by an Indian 
artist, published by Artur Basílio de Sá, A planta de Cailaco (1949).
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According to Portuguese records, 8,600 enemy soldiers stood opposite 
them, a number that perhaps should not be taken at face value (Matos 
1974a:372-3). The operation commenced in late October 1726, and is 
described in great detail in the extant documents.
The first operations were relatively successful for the Estado forces, 
who defeated reinforcements to the enemy who suffered substantial loss-
es. The problem of  keeping a far from uniform army was nevertheless 
apparent; for example, the kings of  Viqueque and Lolotoe declined to 
follow the orders of  the Portuguese commander Joaquim de Matos, since 
they were related to the aristocracy of  Cailaco (Sá 1949:48-9; Araujo 
1978:140). In addition, there was still no sign that the besieged Timorese 
would yield. Still, the lack of  water made the defenders on the encircled 
rocks desperate and some of  them, hoping to find water, descended from 
the sides of  the mountain by rope only to be all too often trapped and 
killed. Women overcome by despair could be seen jumping to their death 
with their children. In the face of  these displays of  desperate defiance, 
Joaquim de Matos offered the adversaries a chance to negotiate, and the 
ruler, Dom Aleixo, came down from the mountain with several chiefs. It 
was agreed that Cailaco would hand over its gunpowder and weapons, 
pay the fintas and henceforth behave as good vassals, and in return, the 
defenders would be spared from the slave market. The delegation re-
turned, leaving Dom Aleixo and some grandees in the Portuguese camp 
(Sá 1949:49). 
Then, however, torrential rains provided a swift solution to the lack 
of  water. The defenders refused to keep to their side of  the agreement 
and so the siege wore on until early December. The main fortifications 
held out, since, to quote Joaquim de Matos, ‘our people could not do 
more, for it was necessary to climb up one by one and without a shotgun, 
giving the hand to the other person so they could also step up from the 
low to the high place. And the enemy threw rocks, which was like an 
inferno, smashing everyone who was in front of  them. The sight of  that 
stopped our people who were in the trenches and posts from gaining on 
the enemy below, because of  the risks involved’ (Sá 1949:49-50). This 
heroic defence forced De Matos to lift the siege and to be content with 
having seized Dom Aleixo. He described the grim results of  the expedi-
tion in a letter to the governor:
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[T]here was neither a settlement nor a sign of  one that was not burnt 
down. Seventy-two of  their trenches were destroyed, among which were 
some of  considerable strength. They had stone parapets apart from the 
large poles and thick beams on which they were built, with ditches of  a 
good size all around, very sharp bamboo sticks full of  poison, which were 
dug into the roads […] And all people were brought away from them. 
Many provisions were burnt, without them being able to impede it, or 
preserving them to feed these people, although I gave orders to spare 
much of  it. Of  buffaloes, our men took more than 2,000 as booty. Of  
severed heads, 152 were shown to me, apart from the other dead that 
they buried. Concerning the 168 prisoners and the principal leaders, they 
confessed that in the besieged fortress, more than 300 people died from 
wounds and suffocation [heat exposure], including men, women and chil-
dren, and some leaders; so that one can assume that the enemy had more 
than 700 dead. On this occasion I lost 39 soldiers. I do not speak of  the 
wounded, of  which there was a large number.54
The lack of  complete Portuguese success was typical of  warfare on 
Timor. Well-prepared mountain strongholds were sometimes able to 
hold out against large forces equipped with European weaponry, such as 
Noimuti did in the 1740s and again in 1758-1759. The siege of  Cailaco 
was followed by further fighting that continued until 1728. Then an 
agreement was made with the Timorese adversaries. There is no extant 
Portuguese documentation of  this event, but according to the Dutch 
version the Belu were henceforth to stand under their ‘lawful master’, 
Francisco Hornay. They would only deliver sirih pinang to the Crown of  
Portugal.55 It is not quite clear what is meant by ‘Belu’ here, but the 
account suggests that the Timorese were partly successful in balancing 
the role of  governor with the tenente general. At the same time, the upris-
ing and siege indicate the weakness of  the traditional forms of  power; 
in spite of  Camenaça’s exalted ritual position in the east, its efforts were 
checked by the fact that most of  the East Timorese domains chose to 
54 Sá 1949:51-2; also in Araujo 1978:141-2.
55 VOC 2100 (1728), f. 8-9; Van Goor 1985:135, 199. For the siege of  Cailaco, see in particular Sá 
1949. A detailed illustration of  the siege of  Cailaco, A planta de Cailaco, has been preserved; possibly made 
by an Indian artist, it is reproduced in Sá 1949. The siege is also covered by Araujo 1978:138-42; Gunn 
n.y.:42-3. The latter writer notes how, with reference to Ruy Cinatti, A planta de Cailaco offers insight into 
the botany of  Timor at the time. The illustration depicts casuarina trees in the river areas, palm trees and 
acacias on the open savannah, and tamarinds, pandanus trees and fig trees in secondary forest zones.
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support the Crown of  Portugal. The method of  using Timorese to fight 
Timorese started with the early expeditions of  1641-1642, was improved 
by António Hornay, and was applied by the white governors up until the 
twentieth century.
There was, however, also a strategy whereby Portuguese were used to 
fight Portuguese. For a concerted effort to expel the White Portuguese, 
an strong leader was needed to organize them. The original idea of  
the blood-oath was to expel both Portuguese factions, but as we have 
just seen, this idea was now modified. In the time of  António Moniz 
de Macedo, the resistance leaders contacted Francisco Hornay, whose 
ambitions were not dissimilar to those of  his long-deceased father. The 
parties reportedly agreed that they would work together to defeat the 
white government, ‘and the adverse intent, driven by ambition, was to 
make truth of  the feigned deception that the Timorese offered him in 
the idea to expel [the governor] and to the enthronement of  their three 
kings of  Sonbai, Likusaen [here interchangeable with Camenaça] and 
Wehali’ (Castro 1867:241-2). In other words, this is a stunning piece of  
revivalism, which according to a later memorandum signified an ex-
pected liberation from impositions: ‘[The insurgents would] only obey, in 
conformity with their ancient rites and customs, the three unique kings 
Sonbai, Camenaça and Wehali, and be exempted from contributions 
such as royal fintas, pensions to the captains at the ports, rooms for the 
missionaries, freights, sirih pinang and food for the foreigners that they 
were obliged [to deliver]’ (Castro 1867:205). The idea of  an old ritual-
political order was combined with very concrete grievances and aims.
As a matter of  fact, the burdensome fintas were briefly abolished by 
Governor Moniz de Macedo, who declared that he would be content 
with the Belu presenting sirih pinang to the Crown of  Portugal (Van Goor 
1985:199). It goes without saying that such an arrangement could only 
ever have been a temporary measure to soothe resistance. His succes-
sor, Pedro de Mello (gov. 1728-1731), found the funds he was given to 
maintain the Estado on Timor to be insufficient, and so resumed the col-
lection of  fintas and other taxes. He also became involved in a personal 
brawl with Francisco Hornay, and consequently, widespread resistance 
against the governor flared up in 1729. The following years are some 
of  the most chaotic in the annals of  the island. Pedro de Mello furiously 
accused the Dutch in Kupang of  supplying his enemies with gunpowder 
and bullets, and rashly declared them to be his enemies, although there 
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were no direct hostilities. Other Dutchmen, however, who had deserted 
from the VOC, assisted the governor against the Topasses. The failure 
of  the annual Macanese ship to appear with basic necessities added to 
the hardships of  the Estado, and a smallpox epidemic afflicted all sides, 
especially depleting the Topass manpower. The few coastal places under 
the governor’s control appeared to be doomed as they were surrounded 
by the Topasses and their clients. In Manatuto, the governor and his men 
endured a siege for three months and suffered badly from lack of  food 
and provisions.56
Still, the Estado survived. The defenders of  Manatuto made a des-
perate sortie that broke the siege and forced the adversaries into full re-
treat (Boxer 1937:11-2). The incoming governor Pedro do Rego Barreto 
de Gama e Castro (gov. 1731-1734) managed to obtain the submission 
of  the most important rebels through the mediation of  the respected 
padre Manuel do Pilar, thus partly repeating the old reconciliation of  
1708 (Matos 1974a:94; Araujo 1978:146-51; Gunn n.y.:43). The resis-
tance came to a halt during 1732 and the Topass leaders as well as the 
Timorese lords endorsed an agreement that returned them to the royalist 
fold. Among the latter were Dom Mathias da Costa of  Camenaça and 
Dom Caethano da Costa who was described as king of  the province of  
Belu. Dutch sources, which give the events from an outside perspective, 
hint that the survival of  the Estado involved more than rhetorics and 
latent adherence to Portuguese and Catholic symbols of  authority. From 
what the Dutch opperhoofd heard from their allies, the Belu suffered from 
the hostilities between the Portuguese parties. However, when peace 
was eventually concluded between the White and Black Portuguese in 
1732, the local elites were equally worried: a unitary Portuguese power 
would be highly detrimental to their own powers of  manoeuvre.57 The 
continuing existence of  three rival centres of  external power, including 
Kupang, was not contrary to Timorese interests. 
Apart from this there were obvious logistic reasons for the abrupt end 
of  this and similar Timorese movements. As discussed by C.R. Boxer, the 
comprehensive leagues of  resistance could not be maintained for long 
periods (Boxer 1968:194-5). The usually small-scale nature of  Timorese 
warfare was not suited to lengthy campaigns or the amassment of  large 
56 VOC 2133 (1729), f. 7-8; VOC 2163 (1730), f. 7, 82-3; Castro 1867:61-3; Oliveira 1948:169-78; 
Boxer 1968:194.
57 VOC 2239 (1731-32), Dagregister, sub 6-5-1732, 16-7-1732.
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troops, since the military organization for such ventures was lacking. 
The Topasses kept movements going for some time with vigour, but they, 
too, were dependent on comprehensive alliances with local domains, al-
liances that shifted all too rapidly. For such reasons, Lifau in 1702-1708 
and Manatuto in 1730-1731 were able to survive in White Portuguese 
hands, despite being badly cornered.
Conditions in the Portuguese homeland were increasingly settled 
and even prosperous in the first half  of  the eighteenth century. The long 
reign of  João V (1706-1750) saw peace, tranquility and an economy that 
was driven by Brazilian gold and diamonds (Disney 2009, I:249-56). This 
period of  relative success was not entirely matched by the activities of  the 
Estado da Índia. A degree of  conservatism characterized the Estado in 
South Asia, which was accompanied by the loss of  a few territories and 
increased activities by other European trading companies. The traders 
of  Macao were able to flourish by bringing Chinese wares to Batavia 
and they developed a network that extended to India and Sri Lanka. As 
before, their network included Timor, but Macanese interest in Timor 
over the century waned, for reasons that will soon become apparent. 
There would often be no more than one single officially commissioned 
ship per year to the turbulent island (Disney 2009, II:317-9, 334-5, 349; 
Matos 1974b:334-5).
the topass leader at the helm
The period 1732-1749 was free from major Portuguese in-fighting. These 
were also the years of  tenure of  a new tenente general of  the Topasses. The 
old Domingos da Costa left a number of  sons who were among those 
who concluded a peace with Pedro do Rego Barreto de Gama e Castro 
in May 1732. One of  these may have been Gaspar da Costa, who is first 
documented as tenente general in October of  the same year.58 Certain 
oral traditions describe Gaspar as the son of  Domingos and a Helong 
princess called Johanna, which would have given the new tenente general an 
58 Faria de Morais 1934:155; Rouffaer 1910a, Dagboekaantekeningen, H 677 II, KITLV. Rouffaer found 
a document from 20-10-1732 in the residence of  the Maubara royal family, which mentioned Gaspar.
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ominous potential claim to Kupang.59 Although the peace treaty seemed 
to grant the governor control over impositions and administration, 
the real issue is the way in which the 23 paragraphs of  the treaty were 
implemented. From their perspective, the Dutch in Kupang understood 
the position of  the governor to be quite restricted with the conclusion 
of  the treaty. According to a VOC report the whites were supposed to 
stay peacefully in Lifau, while the Topasses were to collect an annual 
tax on their behalf.60 In other words, the arrangement would have given 
Gaspar da Costa a large say in the affairs of  the Estado. The finta was 
once again abolished by the governor António Moniz de Macedo, who 
returned for a second tenure (1734-1741). It was replaced by a head tax 
of  one pardau, which the kings were to take from their subjects; besides, 
the rulers had to send provisions and corvée labourers for the upkeep 
of  Lifau. The weakness of  the arrangement is apparent: at that time 
there was no possibility of  undertaking a census on Timor. The head tax 
was therefore soon abandoned. According to the Dutch version, Moniz 
de Macedo first promised the Belu princedoms that it would be a non-
recurrent fee that henceforth left them fully autonomous, but he then 
broke his promise. Also, the money allegedly ended up in the governor’s 
own chest without ever reaching the royal treasury.61 Statistics are largely 
lacking, but it is clear that the income derived from the fintas decreased 
greatly after a summit in the 1720s, thereby reducing one rationale for 
resistance against the Estado (Serrão and Oliveira Marques 2006:427).
A few documents from 1733 indicate the taxes that were demanded 
from the Provincia dos Bellos in that year. One list sets out how many picul 
of  each provision every domain had to send to maintain Lifau; altogether 
the forty domains were to deliver 4,000 picul. A similar list determines 
the number of  men that each domain would send to Lifau to serve as 
59 Professor Hendrik Ataupah, Kupang, interview 27-11-2009. In this way, tradition provided a ratio-
nale for Gaspar de Costa’s later military attack on Kupang. Johanna would have been the daughter of  
a king of  the old dynasty of  Kupang, who was superseded by the Bisslissin family. Through his mother, 
Gaspar could therefore – according to the rules of  legendary history – claim rights to the Kingdom of  
Kupang; it should be remembered that the monarch of  this domain was the pah tuaf, the lord of  the land 
where the Dutch settlement was built.
60 VOC 2239 (1731-32), Dagregister, sub 30-7-1732. The text of  the treaty can be found in Faria de 
Morais 1934:155-9.
61 Matos 1974a: 95, 127-8; De Roo van Alderwerelt 1904:196; Heijmering 1847:132-3; Schooneveld-
Oosterling 2007:307-8; VOC 2991 (1760), ff. 36-7. The episode was later used by the Dutch to legitimize 
their own plans of  expansion in the province of  Belu; they could argue that the Estado had forfeited 
Belu.
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auxiliaries in the garrison. These figures vary from 1 to 35, with a total 
number of  815. The lists also provide important indications about the 
dissemination of  Portuguese influence in the eastern part of  the island 
by this time. The forty domains are spread over the entire length of  East 
Timor including the inland, with a concentration in the western sec-
tion. Interestingly, the three easternmost domains of  Faturó, Saráu and 
Matarufa were also those that contributed the most men and offered the 
largest deliveries of  provisions. While the lists enumerate the northern 
Tetun princedoms of  Central Timor, Fialaran, Jenilu, Lidak and Silawang, 
Wewiku-Wehali is conspicuously absent (Castro 1867:225-8). As we have 
seen, it was inexplicably deemed a part of  Servião rather than Belu, 
and also tended to stay out of  the fighting in the 1720s and early 1730s. 
While Wewiku-Wehali was used as a ponderous millenarian symbol, the 
role that it actually played in the anti-finta risings remains unclear.62
Rather few Portuguese documents have survived from this period, but 
there is a group of  letters which were preserved as valuable heirlooms in 
Maucatar in the south-west of  present Timor Leste.63 These letters, most 
of  which are dated 1735-1747, show the degree to which the Topass 
leader was involved in local affairs, even in a relatively inaccessible corner 
of  the province of  Belu. Gaspar da Costa personally signed documents 
stating the appointment of  regents, and it also appears that Dominican 
padres were frequently involved in local affairs. Thus, there is reason to 
question the assumption sometimes made that Portuguese power was 
basically confined to the coastlands (Sá 1949:14; Forman 1977:100). The 
fact that economic matters relating to payments and debts were commit-
ted to paper also questions the old thinking that Timor was a thoroughly 
illiterate society. In spite of  the archaic structures, there were situations 
and transactions that were best served by written documentation, even in 
a small and hidden domain.64 The material testifies to distant relations 
existing between the various ethnic groups and domains on the island in 
spite of  their parochial character, at least on the elite level. For example, 
the mainly Bunaq-speaking Maucatar maintained relations with the 
Dawan-speaking Amanuban far to the west. 
62 The adjacent king or loro of  Dirma assisted the governor in 1727, contributing 241 men to the 
siege of  Cailaco (Matos 1974a:372). Dirma was among the areas that were considered to be included in 
Wehali’s direct sphere of  authority (Therik 2004:56).
63 Stukken n.y., H 693, KITLV.
64 Apart from these letters, I have only found a couple of  references to Maucatar in Dutch and Portu-
guese documents before the nineteenth century.
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By this time, Costa-Hornay had become a conceptual pair in 
Timorese consciousness, since the term occurs in a Maucatar letter from 
1747. When Francisco Hornay II (d.1730) married the daughter of  
Domingos da Costa (d.1722) in the early part of  the eighteenth century, 
the rivalry between the two families turned into a close co-operation, 
not least through continuing intermarriages. In practice, a Hornay ruler 
usually tended to be followed by a Da Costa leader, so that the Topass 
leadership could rotate between the two; a formal agreement over the 
notion of  a rotating succession only seems to have been forged later, be-
ing expressly mentioned for the first time in 1829.65
Gaspar da Costa himself  was generally on poor terms with the VOC 
and with extensive Timorese areas, but he was initially appreciated by 
the White Portuguese establishment. A letter commended Da Costa for 
his liberalidade (liberality), and he promised to donate funds for a Catholic 
seminar in the Portuguese sphere. The funds were to be taken from 
Biboki and Insana, two Atoni princedoms on the north coast, which 
had been made a part of  Da Costa’s sphere in the time of  his ancestors, 
but were also counted under the realm of  Wewiku-Wehali. The Estado 
recommended that Da Costa be ennobled and accepted into the Order 
of  Christ, although this was postponed until the promised donation was 
completed – if  it ever was.66 A Timorese gentleman who ended up in 
Europe, Pascal-Jean-Balthazar, claimed to be the son of  Gaspar who, 
perhaps characteristically, would have sent his heir to France to be edu-
cated and thereby be integrated into European high culture. The project 
failed tragically, since the accompanying Dominican padre, Ignacio, 
disappeared with the goods of  Balthazar upon his arrival in France in 
1749. The young Topass was left to pursue a modest life in the West as 
a ship’s cook and submitted humble applications for French state subsi-
65 Müller 1857, II:189-90. Four Hornays led the Topasses without any known break in the sequence 
continuously from 1749 to after 1817, so the rotation principle can only have been fully formalized long 
after the time of  Gaspar da Costa.
66 Matos 1974a:400, 404, 407-8. During the 1740s and 1740s Catholic seminars were opened in Lifau 
and Manatuto, and by 1752 there were reportedly eight churches in the Portuguese sphere. Of  these, five 
were situated within a limited area east of  Dili: Manatuto, Lacló, Laicore, Laleia and Vemasse; the others 
were in the Ambeno area: Tulang Ikan, Animata and Lifau (Durand 2004:41, 46; Visser 1934:162). The 
list suggests a very patchy dissemination of  Catholicism, but may only encompass the principal churches; 
another text mentions as many as 50 churches on the island in 1780 (Visser 1934:162).
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dies.67 The circumstances, one might add, are not entirely clear, since 
Balthazar’s putative Topass kinsmen in Oecusse later claimed that he was 
an imposter and in actuality the son of  a peranakan Chinese.68
In spite of  Topass preponderance, and the benefits that went with 
it, there were, however, indications that all was not well with Gaspar 
da Costa’s rule. For one, the Portuguese economic enterprise in Timor 
faltered. While the material support from the viceroy of  Goa was often 
lacking, Macao was always prepared to send assistance to the hard-
pressed white governor of  Timor, since the city was dependent on the 
sandalwood trade. It had, however, long been a problem for Macanese 
traders that much of  the wood was sold by the inhabitants to other 
merchants, in particular Chinese ones, who furnished the important 
South Chinese market. The authorities in Goa had a mercantilist ap-
proach to economic management, but its measures failed to remedy the 
situation. By the 1740s, it was reported that the Timor trade did not 
yield the quantities it once had. The sandalwood did not reach Macao 
and the clothes of  the Macanese merchants no longer found a market 
(Matos 1974a:178-81; Matos 1974b:334-5). A Dutch opperhoofd reported 
in 1749 that the places where sandalwood used to be cut were becoming 
poorer from year to year. The best sandalwood forests, he believed, were 
untouched due to the bad treatment of  the natives at the hands of  the 
White and Black Portuguese.69 Adding to these concerns new threats 
were being issued by the Timorese clients and the VOC, and it is these 
matters that shall be addressed in the following chapter
67 Matos 1974a:404, 407, 410-1. The curious story of  Balthazar has been traced by Lombard-Jour-
dain 1978 and 2001. Balthazar appears to have died poor and forgotten after 1778. Most probably he 
never heard the news of  the violent end of  his putative father less than two years after his departure from 
Timor.
68 VOC 7586 (1779), ff. 281-4. The Dutch, on French instigation, sent a commissioner to Oecusse in 
1779 to investigate the case of  Pascal-Jean-Balthazar. The commissioner met the Topass leaders of  the 
day, Pedro Hornay and Gaspar da Costa (Junior). The latter announced that the Chinese small trader 
João Balthazar had previously lived in Animata. With his concubine, the Amanuban slave Dominga, 
he begot three sons: Manuel, Sico and Pascal. While Manuel and Sico were raised in Lifau by a Padre 
Maria, Pascal went to study at the Catholic seminar in Dili in 1750, under a certain Frei Ignacio, and 
was never heard of  again. The Topass leaders’ vehement denial of  Pascal-Jean-Balthazar’s paternity 
might also, of  cause, have been in their own interest, since he was a potential rival for authority among 
the Topasses. 
69 VOC 8342 (1749), f. 15.
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dutch activism and belu overtures
While the Topass and Estado forces battled in the Portuguese sphere, life 
at the VOC post in Kupang was comparatively tranquil. In economic 
terms, the post was trading at a loss, but this had been the case since 
its inception. When in 1735/36 there was a surplus of  2,421 guilders 
for the Company, it was seen as a remarkable event, the likes of  which 
had not occurred for forty years (Van Goor 1988:711). The administra-
tive reports illustrate, year by year, how beeswax, beans and slaves were 
brought to Batavia in modest quantities, sometimes accompanied by 
even smaller deliveries of  gold and snakewood. Imports of  sandalwood 
were almost nil by this time, and in 1738 a Company missive remarked 
that better and cheaper wood could be obtained from Cochin in South 
India. Nevertheless, the idea still prevailed that something useful could 
come out of  the Timorese sandalwood resources. In the early 1730s, the 
grandees of  Kupang and Amabi provided the opperhoofd with sandalwood 
plants in jars, which were taken to Ambon where there was stricter 
Dutch control of  the economy. The problem was that at this time no 
one knew about the special conditions necessary for growing sandal-
wood, especially its dependence on a host tree. As a result, the plants 
died fairly quickly, in spite of  warnings from Batavia that they should be 
properly tended; the plants brought to Batavia itself  in the late 1730s, 
however, suffered the same fate (Van Goor 1988:490, 712; De Roever 
1998:47).
Politically, there was no major internal threat to the Dutch position. 
The most troublesome conditions were to be found in the Helong king-
dom of  Kupang, a domain, as a VOC report complained, that ‘knows 
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neither a cook nor an inn-keeper’.1 The old Ama Pono line died out 
in 1731, and power was contested between the sub-regents of  Pulau 
Semau and the descendants of  Ama Besi, who had long since returned to 
Kupang. As a result of  the squabbles, a Pulau Semau prince called Hilak 
staged an open rebellion in 1743. Together with a number of  followers, 
he built fortifications on an inaccessible rock south of  Kupang. The mili-
tary weakness of  the Company and its allies became apparent when they 
were unable to efficiently take action against him. Furthermore, the fact 
that some Topasses joined his ranks was worrying. By the following year, 
however, Hilak obviously decided that he had tired of  the situation, for 
he unexpectedly arrived at Fort Concordia with his men.2 His surrender 
brought to an end the only outright rebellion against the VOC system 
after the flight of  Ama Besi in 1678.
In Lesser Sonbai, the dynasty evolved along lines that ran counter 
to the conventional division of  a Dutch and a Portuguese sphere. When 
Empress Bi Sonbai passed away in 1717, she was succeeded by the son 
of  her ‘brother’ (cousin) Dom Pedro Sonbai, despite the fact that the 
latter had returned to his former role as emperor of  Servião. When the 
boy, Bernardus de Leeuw (reign 1717-1726), was baptized a reformed 
Protestant, the Dutch received serious threats from the deputy leader 
of  the Topasses, Francisco Hornay II: if  the young emperor and his 
mother were not returned within the year, Hornay would forcibly fetch 
them from Kupang.3 The Dutch rightly considered Hornay’s diatribes 
to be mere bragging, but the event again illustrates the importance of  
mainting control over Sonbai royalty and the strong Catholic identity 
of  the Topasses. When Bernardus de Leeuw died during his teenage 
years, two other princes from Greater Sonbai were set up one after the 
other, apparently with the full consent of  the Dutch and their relatives, 
though not with Portuguese approval. A similar dynastic arrangement 
that equally transcended the colonial borders occurred circa 1736. The 
Portuguese client Amanuban had a long-standing relationship with 
Amabi. Dissatisfied with their heavy-handed suzerains, the Amanuban 
sent a muti salak to King Balas of  Amabi by way of  acknowledging him as 
their own king. Although they withdrew their allegiance after a few years, 
1 VOC 2606 (1743), f. 37.
2 VOC 2628 (1744), f. 9-15.
3 VOC 1961 (1721), f. 4, 9.
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it indicates how Portuguese control was on the decline.4
Conditions on Rote in the first half  of  the eighteenth century con-
tinued to be turbulent, and the same situation could be found on Sawu 
and Solor, albeit to a lesser degree. From time to time, the opperhoofden 
found it necessary to arrest Rotenese and Solorese rulers and expel them 
to Batavia. In addition to this, the Dutch were worried about pirates and 
merchants, particularly those from South Sulawesi, who were trading 
without passes. In actual fact, there was a comprehensive web of  mari-
time relationships connecting the eastern islands, and it was these people 
who broke the mercantilist control that the Company tried to wield over 
the sprawling archipelago. From the Dutch point of  view, they were 
therefore seen as ‘rascals’. The Kupang post did not have the necessary 
resources to send out cruisers to intercept illegal shipping, although they 
did try to use the Solorese for this purpose. A comment from 1737, by 
the opperhoofd Aart Peper, says that Makassarese fleets visited the Papuan 
Islands and the islands around Banda every third or fourth year to 
hunt trepang (sea cucumber). These animals were dried and sold to the 
Chinese, who considered them to be an exclusive delicacy. For the fisher-
men of  Sulawesi, there were therefore considerable profits to be made. 
The fleets, up to 60 ships strong, also visited East Timor during the east-
ern monsoon, since trepang could sometimes be found there. According 
to the opperhoofd, trepang hunting was often a pretext for the ‘wide-scale 
taking of  people on various islands’ – in other words, slavery.5
Some examples indicate a stunning lack of  respect for the Dutchmen. 
In 1732, opperhoofd Gerardus Visscher tried to mediate a conflict between 
the Watan Lema allies and the Pamakayu district on West Solor, which 
was under the control of  Raja Ola of  Larantuka. Arriving at Larantuka 
on a minor ship, Visscher found a Makassarese merchant ship at the 
roadstead. From a Dutch point of  view, there were several indications 
that they were in fact smugglers and so Visscher ordered the crew to 
sail along with him to Solor and Kupang in order to investigate the 
matter. However, the sailors bluntly refused to do so. Visscher then at-
tempted to frighten them by threatening to remove their anchors, but the 
Makassarese became even more aggressive and seized their spears and 
4 VOC 2384 (1736); VOC 8332 (1739), f. 53. A long-standing connection between Amabi and the 
Amanuban lands is also mentioned in late traditions of  the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Parera 
1969:47).
5 VOC 8330 (1736-37), Dagregister, sub 24-6-1737.
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keris. In turn, the opperhoofd threatened to shoot them, an action that only 
served to increase their anger. The Makassarese then pointed out in no 
uncertain terms that they intended to use their deadly weapons to kill the 
Dutch. In the end, Visscher lost face and had to return to Solor without 
chastising the recalcitrant merchants.6 On another occasion, in 1726, 
a cruiser from the Dutch fort in Makassar arrived at Lembata and sent 
a barge along the shoreline to look for any signs of  smugglers; they were 
met by men armed with bows and arrows who denied the Dutchmen 
access. For one hour the barge rowed along the shore without the Dutch 
being able to disembark, since they were followed by the hostile troop. 
Later, the expedition discovered a Butonese in Menanga in Solor who 
was running a small trade in turtle-shell and beeswax, but without a 
satisfactory licence. He was arrested with his son, two employees and the 
goods, and forced to go away with the Dutch.7 Events such as the latter 
would undoubtedly help explain the way in which Dutch visitors to these 
waters were faced with hostility and non-co-operation from traders and 
locals alike. At the same time, the cases mentioned above highlight the 
limits of  VOC surveillance, hence encouraging seafarers from Sulawesi 
to continue their activities. The Makassarese undertakings in fact appear 
to have increased in number over the century.8
The one major threat to the Company in Solor-Timor in the 1730s 
and 1740s came from the Portuguese complex, in particular the Topasses. 
This was not, however, a one-sided affair. VOC documents reveal various 
plans aimed at destabilizing the Portuguese position, so in this respect, 
both parties can be tarred with the same brush. In spite of  the frequent 
trips made by Company traders to Tulang Ikan, we can follow how ten-
sion increased in the years prior to 1749.
Barely had the ink on the treaty between the White and Black 
Portuguese dried before the Belu turned to the Company for assis-
tance. The female paramount ruler of  Belu, known as Liulai (Liurai), 
sent an envoy to Kupang in 1732, explaining how she now feared the 
6 VOC 2239 (1731-32), Dagregister, sub 5-6-1732, 6-6-1732; Knaap and Sutherland 2004:24, 98-100.
7 VOC 2050 (1726), ff. 349-52.
8 A letter from 1772, from Liwang Laba of  Terong on Adonara, mentions that Makassarese, Bugis, 
Mandar and Bonerate traders came to the Solor area at that time (VOC 3366 [1772-73]). A report from 
1779 says that the Makassarese tended to arrive in increasing numbers and without fear of  the Dutch: 
so far, the VOC had only taken one single prize in Timor waters (VOC 3553 [1779], f. 8). Political crises 
and anti-Dutch resistance in South Sulawesi in the 1730s and later were apparently conducive to the 
spread of  seaborne adventurers (compare Marwati Djoenad Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto 
1975, IV:208-9).
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Portuguese since the two of  them were at peace with each other. She 
requested Dutch firearms and flags, an important symbol of  political 
adherence. The Sonbai elite confirmed to opperhoofd Visscher that they 
were related to Liulai – the first recorded reference to the Liurai-Sonbai 
relationship. A small box containing earth, beeswax and sandalwood 
was subsequently taken to Batavia symbolic of  the fact that the land 
of  Belu was being offered to the Company. The province of  Belu had 
actually been off-limits for VOC traders since 1702 and the Kupang of-
ficials were receptive to the idea of  acquiring the eastern lands, for only 
then, they argued, could trade flourish again. In Batavia it was felt that 
the previous contracts from 1616 and 1668 indeed gave the VOC the 
legal right to the lands from Hera and eastwards, towards the south to 
Viqueque and Vessoro, and to Amanuban. The idea was attractive since 
the Dutch were still hopeful of  locating the gold and copper mountains 
that were thought to exist in East Timor. Nevertheless, it was concluded 
by the Supreme Government that the Kupang post should be improved 
through the expansion of  trade rather than through political expansion.9
The Kupang authorities therefore had to decline the Belu offer, which 
was renewed in vain in 1741.10 An instruction from Batavia, in 1735, 
expressly forbade Kupang to interfere in the Portuguese-Belu differences 
in any way. This instruction was not completely adhered to, however, for 
Governor Pedro do Rego Barreto de Gama e Castro claimed that Dutch 
and Chinese traders went to Belu in secret in order to trade cloths for 
beeswax, sandalwood, gold and slaves. In addition, he criticized them 
for providing weapons and gunpowder to the rebellious Belu. Judging 
from various witness accounts made public by the Lifau authorities in the 
late 1730s, these accusations were not without foundation. At the same 
time, moreover, the five loyal allies sent muskets and ammunition to their 
Belu ‘blood relatives’, as openly confessed in a letter to Batavia. Texts 
produced in both Kupang and Batavia indicate that the Dutch tried to 
take advantage of  the unstable situation: not only would it be highly ad-
vantageous to them if  the Portuguese were forced out of  Timor, warfare 
9 VOC 2239 (1732), ff. 98-9, 100-1, 109-10; Van Goor 1988:272-3, 428, 490-1. Stories of  over-
flowing goldmines were encouraged by the Portuguese officials in the eighteenth century (Thomaz 
2001:122).
10 Pedro do Rego Barreto da Gama e Castro claims in a letter to have captured, among other places, 
Limace in the province of  Belu, shortly after 1732 (Araujo 1978:150; Castro 1867:239). Limace appears 
to have been situated in the Wewiku-Wehali area (compare Godinho de Eredia 1997:254; Valentijn 
1726, III:122).
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between the Portuguese and the Belu would also be an advantage for the 
Company. The problem was simply that hostilities could not be openly 
committed given the official good relations that existed between Portugal 
and the Netherlands in Europe.11
Under these circumstances it is not wholly surprising to find the 
Topasses engaged in hostile action against the Company and its allies. A 
first incident took place in 1735 and involved the two Sonbai princedoms 
and their respective symbolic significance. After the massacre of  1722, 
there is little information to be found on Greater Sonbai, or Amakono, 
as the Dutch usually called it. Oral stories tell of  a Sonbai ruler who was 
murdered in his own sonaf by a male dancer, possibly during this period. 
Instigated by his own chiefs because of  the ruler’s cruel practice of  mak-
ing annual human sacrifices, the murder was followed by a long inter-
regnum before the ruler’s son was accepted as the new lord. In some ver-
sions, this new ruler is identified as Nai Bau Sonbai, who appears in the 
historical records between 1749-1752 (Fobia 1984:68-74; Middelkoop 
1938:428-32, 499-500). Nevertheless, the story is primarily of  symbolic 
significance, highlighting the tyrannical properties of  Sonbai as well as 
the ability of  this indispensable lineage to arise again and again.12
Early in 1735, the unnamed emperor of  Greater Sonbai sent an 
envoy to his kinsman Corneo Leu (reign 1728-1748) of  Lesser Sonbai. 
The envoy warned him that the Topass had forced their Sonbai clients 
to march with them to Kupang, with the intention of  forcing the Dutch 
Sonbai allies to resettle in the inland, thus reuniting the realm. Indeed, 
a troop of  450 men approached the port in March and behaved in a 
threatening manner, telling the perplexed locals that ‘We come to devour 
flesh’. They demanded that the Company extradite Corneo Leu and 
other Sonbai who had arrived to Kupang in connection with the Sonbai-
Manubait exodus in 1711. Opperhoofd Visscher refused point blank and 
asked the emperor to come to the fort late in the evening, for reasons of  
safety. As Corneo entered Fort Concordia, a salute of  honour was fired; 
unfortunately, the Topasses understood this as a signal that battle was to 
commence, and panicked. The next day the astonished locals could see 
11 VOC 2285 (1733), ff. 13-6; VOC 8332 (1739), ff. 154-5; Van Goor 2004:269.
12 In some versions, the first Sonbai ruler was also the very same figure who caused hatred through 
his arbitrary acts, and was consequently murdered. This is typical of  the ahistorical or, rather, atemporal 
Timorese perspective: various stories, in actual fact pertaining to different rulers, could be told about one 
single figure. Nevertheless, the pedigrees more or less match the European sources back to c.1650.
A letter written by Gaspar da Costa, who led the Topass community 
between 1732 and 1749. It confirms the appointment of  a lord 
of  the princedom Maucatar. H 693, KITLV Archive.
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abandoned baggage and utensils at some distance from the fort, for the 
Topasses had hastily run away to Amarasi, which they severely repri-
manded for not having provided them with sufficient assistance.13 
A new spate of  hostilities took place in 1743-1744, when a number 
of  Topasses supported the Helong rebel Hilak. The enterprise failed, but 
the Dutch found documents written by Gaspar da Costa on the body of  
a slain Topass captain. These papers indicated Portuguese ambitions in 
the Kupang area as well as Rote, where certain nusak still remembered 
their old Lusitanian ties. In 1744, Da Costa again gathered large forces 
to attack Kupang, but the undertaking failed before it began: his officers 
simply refused to march there since they had no intention of  being killed 
to no avail.14
All these events suggest that Gaspar da Costa faced serious problems 
in enforcing his authority. The highland village of  Noimuti was a Sonbai 
dependency that was attacked by a sizeable Topass-led army some 
time in the 1740s. The exact reasons for this venture are not clear, but 
chiefs employed by the Sonbai rulers are said to have provided effective 
resistance against Da Costa’s forces. After a siege lasting from May to 
the beginning of  the wet season, he had to withdraw.15 The Belu also 
caused him serious problems in 1732-1733 and in 1739-1743. While 
Wewiku-Wehali, Tiris-Mauta, Manufai and Samoro resisted his power, 
Amanuban in the Atoni area deserted Portugal altogether for a number 
of  years.
the meulenbeek incident
Simmering Dutch-Topass rivalries next surfaced on the island of  Rote. 
The catalyst was a routine tour by the opperhoofd Jan Anthony Meulenbeek 
through the various nusak in October 1746. This incident is worth study-
ing in detail for several reasons: the event is well preserved in Rotenese 
oral tradition, it indicates the extent to which locals were prepared to 
be patient with the Dutch foreign lords,16 and it shows how indigenous 
13 Dagregister 1734-35, H 244, KITLV, sub 3-2-1735, 12-3-1735, 16-3-1735, 17-3-1735, 25-3-1735.
14 VOC 2628 (1744), f. 27; De Roo van Alderwerelt 1904:197; Heijmering 1847:135-6.
15 VOC 2991 (1760), ff. 132-3.
16 For more about the Meulenbeek incident in Rotenese tradition, see Fox 1979:22. Fox notes that the 
traditional version is similar to the contemporary Dutch account in its broad outline, but is still a percep-
tion of  the past, rather than a factual record.
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and European lines of  conflict could become blurred. The opperhoofd’s 
lack of  diplomacy and his unpopularity are evident from examining the 
documents. Using trickery he arrested three rebellious chiefs from the 
conflict-ridden nusak Landu, and sent them to Termanu, the mainstay of  
Dutch power. When it later turned out that the prisoners had escaped, 
Meulenbeek flew into a fit of  rage and caned the manek of  Termanu, 
Fola Sinlae. If  the locals did not return the chiefs to him, he threatened, 
he would set fire to the negeri Termanu. Meulenbeek, with 36 Dutchmen 
and Mardijkers at his disposal, told the artillerists to fetch cannon from 
the ship and bring them inside the VOC palisade at Termanu. He also 
sent Fola Sinlae to look for the refugees, although Fola Sinlae did warn 
him that there might be trouble if  he was not there to calm down the en-
raged locals. At Meulenbeek’s side was Benjamin Messak, the Christian 
raja of  Thie, an ambitious lord who would have gladly seen Termanu 
go up in flames. On Rote there was widespread resentment towards 
Termanu, which allegedly used its Company-backed position of  impor-
tance to oppress the other nusak.
The following day the opperhoofd proceeded to arrest two chiefs. He 
then broke into the house of  an aristocratic lady, the widow of  the for-
mer manek, Ndaomanu, who was reputed to possess a chest of  gold. He 
pulled off  her clothes and presented her stark naked before the stunned 
locals. The highly respected widow then asked the bystanders if  they 
would tolerate this behaviour any longer. The manek of  the nusak Dengka, 
who accompanied Meulenbeek, realized that this would only cause fur-
ther trouble and so attempted to calm down the hot-headed European. 
Meanwhile people began to crowd in closely around them, and some 
shouted curses at Meulenbeek. A corporal drew his sword and started to 
lay about the crowd with it. Meulenbeek himself  cocked his pistol, but 
the manek of  Dengka hit his arm so that the shot went into the air. When 
Meulenbeek’s slaves saw this they also fired into the crowd, but by this 
time, many Termanu possessed shotguns, and they returned the fire. The 
opperhoofd and the rest of  his men retreated towards the palisade. The 
official report of  the incident’s outcomes deserves to be quoted in full:
The wife of  the opperhoofd gave orders to the sentry to set the two arrested 
temukung [chiefs] free. She asked them not to be angry about what had 
happened since her husband was crazy, and asked them to see to it that 
our people [the Dutch] were not harmed. The two of  them promised 
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that. The temukung from Oenale still hesitated to leave without the ap-
proval of  the opperhoofd. In this state, both the great and the small took 
to drinking until they were all completely drunk. Throughout the entire 
afternoon all of  them (apart from the opperhoofd) were lying on the ground 
on all sides, although the regent of  Thie in the meantime had been shot 
dead in the palisade. However, towards the evening the opperhoofd sent the 
bookkeeper Gonst outside to see what might be done. As soon as he came 
outside the palisade he was taken and disarmed and bound. Meulenbeek 
then hoisted the white flag and asked for mercy, offering gold and slaves. 
The Termanese only replied with the demand that Raja Thie should be 
handed over to them, and promised to then make peace with them [the 
Dutch]. His dead body was in fact thrown outside the palisade and was 
cut in a thousand pieces.
However, as [the Termanu] were not content with that, and no offers 
could help, the opperhoofd disarmed his people and locked up the weapons 
in the chamber. All together, they then started to drink again, until by 
night they were once again awake and sober. The soldiers and Mardijkers 
asked Meulenbeek to retrieve their arms so that they could try to break 
out of  the crowd, and many of  them could go aboard the ship again. His 
wife asked him to show mercy on her. If  he himself  would not agree to 
the request, [then at least] the men might have permission to save her 
and bring her on board. However, His Excellency absolutely refused to 
hand over the weapons. He said to his unlucky wife that where he stayed, 
she also must stay, without paying further attention to her tears and cries.
He furthermore promised them all that he would make peace the next 
morning. They would give the people as much gold as they might require, 
and therewith all the troubles would be out of  the way. Thus, in the morn-
ing, His Excellency took all his gold and his wife even took her golden 
beugeltas17 and handed it over to [the chief] Edon through the palisade. 
[The Termanu] promised, through the latter, to make everything good 
again and to immediately send them water and rice (which they lacked). 
A short while after he had withdrawn, our people [the Dutch] were once 
again attacked. As the palisade was broken up, several people were shot 
and killed. Meanwhile, the opperhoofd, having gone inside the house, set 
fire to it (not out of  fear, they say), and therewith everyone who was not 
too drunk stood up and left it – apart from Mrs Meulenbeek who never 
17 A kind of  handbag, common among European ladies at this time.
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came out from there and was almost reduced to ashes. Meanwhile her 
husband rushed out like a lunatic, and was attacked, resulting in several 
[fatal] wounds. Likewise, the rest of  the people and the regent of  Lole all 
died, apart from a soldier, a free woman and three Mardijkers. They were 
tied up and prepared by Edon and Patola for slaughter, in order to per-
form their pemali or devilish services to confirm the oath that was made, 
to give themselves over to the Portuguese and keep the Noble Company 
out of  Rote forever. The artillerist (who had meanwhile come back from 
Thie) was destined [condemned] to be slaughtered before the regent of  
Landu, the bookkeeper Gonst before Bilba, and the soldier before Ring-
gou. [The Termanu] thus at once sent an envoy to ask the regents if  they 
agreed to this.18
Anger towards the Dutch thus brought about a solemn ritual declaration 
to join Portugal, an entity with whom the Termanu had previously had 
little contact. The locals perceived the two foreign lords to be in direct 
opposition to each other, where rejection of  one meant adherence to the 
other. Any human sacrifices that were planned – if  they were not sim-
ply the product of  an over-active Dutch imagination – were prevented 
by Fola Sinlae, and the horror-ridden survivors managed to sail back 
to Kupang. When news about the Rote debacle reached Batavia, the 
Supreme Government concluded that the only cause of  the massacre 
was Meulenbeek himself. It was therefore not necessary to exact bru-
tal revenge on the Rotenese if  they repented (Schooneveld-Oosterling 
1997:653). This, however, they did not do. Termanu and a further 
number of  nusak actively opposed the Company and obtained muni-
tions and men from Gaspar da Costa. One such resistance fighter was 
Ndaomanu’s widow, who bore a great hatred for the Europeans who had 
once deposed her husband and now insulted her. This coincided with her 
resentment towards the pro-Dutch Fola Sinlae, who had refused to marry 
her after the death of  his brother – her husband.19
When a new regular opperhoofd, Daniel van der Burgh, arrived on 
Kupang in 1748, he found that ‘words cannot describe the confusion 
and disorder in which this post had been plunged. Any respect or obedi-
18 VOC 8341 (1748), ff. 18-22. The story was pieced together from several witness accounts by the 
later opperhoofd Daniel van der Burgh. A rather different version is found in De Roo van Alderwerelt 
1904:197.
19 VOC 8342 (1749), ff. 66-73.
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ence for the Noble Company and its officials by the indigenous peoples, 
great or small, had gone. Any subordination and discipline had almost 
completely fallen into oblivion, among the Company soldiers as well as 
among the burghers and Mardijkers.’20 The Timorese and Solorese 
allies declined to assist the Company and remained resolute in their 
decision. It seemed as if  deference for the stranger lords – or at least, its 
representatives in Kupang – had waned.
Nevertheless, Van der Burgh turned out to be the right man for the 
task. He was fluent in Malay, which enabled him to communicate freely 
with the allies. Furthermore, he restored discipline among the Company 
servants, reshaping the VOC as the commanding force, which was its 
main raison d’être in Timorese eyes.21 Finally, he was a man of  military 
prowess who was not afraid to take on a fight against a strong opponent. 
In a society where warfare was both perpetual and indicative of  status, 
this strengthened his leadership, especially since his tenure (1748-1754) 
would see an unprecedented expansion of  Dutch prestige and power in 
the area.
His first step was to assemble a Dutch-Timorese-Sawunese army 
to deal with the chaos on Rote. Together with some loyal Rotenese, he 
closed in on Termanu in June 1749. During the fighting, Van der Burgh 
noted that the Rotenese and most of  the Timorese held back. His rhe-
torical skills came into play when he summoned his troops and addressed 
them in an admonitory fashion, asking them frankly whether they wished 
to fight for their land, or to withdraw as cowards. This was definitely not 
a Timorese way of  looking at matters, but it had the desired effect; the 
astounded soldiers chose to stay and fight out of  shame. The foremost 
negeri of  Termanu was attacked. The Timorese soldiers first shot at the 
enemies from afar, but egged on by the Company officers they then made 
a full assault, when despite a display of  stubborn resistance, they over-
whelmed the defenders. The destruction of  the supposedly proud and ar-
rogant Termanu was greeted with much jubilation by the Company allies 
(although it did remain the most important nusak, even after this setback). 
The Topass forces sent to the island by Gaspar da Costa surrendered, 
20 VOC 8341 (1748), f. 4.
21 Schooneveld-Oosterling 1997:651. One should also note, however, that Van der Burgh was a cor-
rupt figure, especially during his last years. Among other things he forced the Helong to contribute to the 
construction of  a private residence under the false pretext that it was to be a Company fortification (Van 
der Chijs 1872:214).
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and Daniel van der Burgh recovered a compromising document which 
stated that Da Costa vowed to assist the rulers of  ‘Sawu’ (here meaning 
Rote) in any way possible. The Rote campaign was therefore a prequel 
to the larger Company-Topass confrontation that would soon follow.22
the road to penfui
At the time of  the Rote campaign, events had already taken a new di-
rection in the Portuguese sphere. The Atoni lands of  West Timor and 
the province of  Servião had been under strict Topass control for a long 
time. White Portuguese activities outside of  Lifau were largely confined 
to the province of  Belu, and even there the hand of  Gaspar da Costa was 
strongly felt. Towards the end of  Da Costa’s tenure, however, there were 
major signs of  dissatisfaction. The Dutch sources tend to blame the per-
sonality of  Da Costa, who was described as stingy and arrogant, for this, 
but the deeper causes of  the problems are not clear, since there are very 
few extant Portuguese documents from these years. To start, it is useful to 
look at the indigenous version of  history as documented by the dissatis-
fied elite of  Greater Sonbai, who sent a letter to the Company in 1749:
Furthermore we […] communicate that previously, when the Noble 
Company first took possession of  the island of  Rote, the Topasses or 
Black Portuguese settled there in peace, and increased their number over 
time. Subsequently the aforementioned people became stout and recal-
citrant, and persuaded us to cede a certain area of  land. And since we 
were unable to resist them, we had to follow all their demands. Not only 
that, but for several years we also had to endure severe punishments. We 
can no longer endure this poor treatment. And since we heard that two 
persons, namely [the kings of] Amanuban and Timau [part of  Amfoan] 
had fled for the aforementioned reasons, we humbly ask Your Excellency 
[…] to listen to our plea...23
The idea that the Topasses were at first refractory settlers on VOC-
dominated Rote is historically inaccurate and seems to be a way of  
placing the legitimacy of  their position on Timor in doubt. The elite of  
22 VOC 8342 (1749), ff. 58, 75-88.
23 VOC 2741 (1749), ff. 183-4.
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Amanuban wrote in similar terms at the same time, and made a point 
of  mentioning their old contract concluded with the Company in the 
early seventeenth century. In this way, they could be seen as ‘return-
ing’ allies of  the Company who had never really been submissive to 
the ‘Black Christians’, ‘and who could no longer endure the rigour and 
tyranny under which they treat us as slaves’.24 It is difficult, however, 
to be more precise as to why the old Topass-Atoni relation broke down. 
The Portuguese intention of  maintaining sandalwood deliveries in spite 
of  the diminishing stands of  the fragrant wood, may have placed further 
demands on the princedoms – the aforementioned Sonbai letter empha-
sizes that the Topasses kept close control over the sandalwood at the time.
The breakdown of  the Topass network started with Amfoan, which, 
as we have seen, was split between two dynastic lines: a VOC-allied 
polity in the Kupang area and a Portuguese-affiliated polity in Timau 
in the north-west. The king of  the latter domain, Dom Bernardo da 
Costa, made overtures to his royal kinsman in Kupang about receiving 
the Company’s blessing for an attack against the Topass strongholds. 
Although direct Dutch assistance was refused, the signals from Kupang 
were positive enough for the king to pursue the enterprise in 1748. In one 
late version of  the tale, he was assisted by troops provided by the VOC 
allies and by some Mardijkers.25 If  this is correct, Van der Burgh acted 
in precisely the same way as Gaspar da Costa had recently done with 
regard to Rote. Dom Bernardo da Costa rashly attacked the Topasses 
who were staying in Amfoan, and then turned towards their heartland in 
the east. This was the signal for other Timorese domains to join the fray. 
Amanuban, which had shown signs of  anti-Portuguese sentiments in the 
1730s, attacked Gaspar da Costa’s residence in Animata and co-operated 
with troops from Belu. The suddenness of  the assault took the Topasses 
by surprise, and Animata was close to falling into enemy hands because 
of  a complete lack of  food supplies. Then, however, the rebellion faded 
away as soon as it had begun. As on previous occasions, the capabili-
ties of  the princedoms were insufficient to sustain an anti-Portuguese 
movement for a long period of  time; in addition, Amarasi, Ambeno, 
Amanatun and part of  Belu stayed loyal to the cause, with timely re-
inforcements arriving from Larantuka. The troops of  Amanuban were 
scattered and thousands of  people were slain. The Greater Sonbai 
24 VOC 2741 (1749), ff. 193-4.
25 Heijmering 1847:138-40; Heijmering had access to local, now lost documents.
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realm was divided in its loyalties as had often been the case in previous 
conflicts. When Amfoan and Amanuban attacked Gaspar da Costa, the 
latter took the precaution of  taking a number of  princes and grandees 
as hostages, including a brother of  the emperor, Dom Alfonso Salema 
alias Nai Bau Sonbai.26 The emperor – who played a far more active 
part in affairs than prescribed by his ritual role – led a party that at-
tacked the Topasses and killed them wherever they could. Another party, 
on the contrary, supported the Portuguese and helped them to besiege 
what remained of  the Amanuban troops at a rock called Nianama, 
thus turning against their Sonbai compatriots. In the end, huge num-
bers of  Amanuban and Sonbai fled to Kupang, where they hoped to 
find a safe haven.27
By this time, the attitude of  the Supreme Government in Batavia was 
belligerent, as indicated by a missive from the end of  1748: ‘Although 
the old orders decreed that one should not cause trouble with the 
Portuguese, nevertheless one could not wholly turn down or decline 
Company protection for those who have been wronged by them and 
are tired of  their brutal rule’ (Schooneveld-Oosterling 1997:652). At 
this stage it was not even necessary to act in a clandestine manner; in 
fact, acting in a bold manner was considered better. As a missive from 
the following year points out, the Topasses had made clear their hostile 
stance by their recent actions, and Daniel van der Burgh was given 
free reign to harass them by any means he deemed to be appropriate. 
The Company was to offer the defecting Portuguese clients a helping 
hand, thus totally reversing the careful attitude of  the early eighteenth 
century (Schooneveld-Oosterling 1997:652, 779). It was understood 
that the conflict was with the Topasses, not the Estado da Índia, which 
had led a modest existence under the last governors António Leonis de 
Castro (gov. 1741-1745), Francisco Xavier Doutel (gov. 1745-1748) and 
Manuel Correia de Lacerda (gov. 1748-1751). The diplomatic situation 
in Europe did not encourage a direct aggressive stance towards the 
26 Apart from his Christian name he is known in VOC documents as Nabi Bahoe or Bau Leu To-
menu, which identifies him as Nai Bau (Baob) Sonbai of  the later pedigrees. Judging from his name he 
was probably the son of  Dom Pedro Sonbai alias Tomenu, who died some time after 1726. Dom Pedro’s 
wife, Usi Bi Lalan, is described in later Sonbai tradition as the mother of  Nai Bau Sonbai (Fobia 1984, 
Lampiran I:1).
27 ANRI Timor: 36, Contractenboek Timor, sub 1749, ff. 30, 33; VOC 8342 (1749), ff. 28-33; Stapel 
1938:489-91. The chronology of  the rebellion is somewhat difficult to follow from the Dutch and Ti-
morese letters; I have attempted here to draw logical conclusions based on the available materials.
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Estado. It was believed that the White Portuguese would automatically 
leave if  their dark-skinned compatriots were expelled from the island. In 
addition to the strategic aims, the Company servants on Timor searched 
for tantalizing scraps of  evidence pertaining to potential economic gains, 
in particular copper deposits. 28
In early 1749, therefore, Dom Alfonso Salema of  Greater Sonbai, 
Dom Miguel de Conceição of  Amanuban and Dom Bernardo da Costa 
of  Amfoan-Timau were accepted as new allies, and the people of  the 
two exiled leaders settled near Kupang. The additional numbers of  able-
bodied Sonbai males totalled 2,350, which probably resulted in a popula-
tion of  more than 10,000 men – a substantial increase in the context of  
Timor. For the Portuguese enterprise it was a severe blow, especially since 
control over both Sonbai rulers was now in Dutch hands. Gaspar da 
Costa put everything at stake and gathered arraiais from all the Timorese 
areas still supportive of  Portugal. In spite of  all the defections he was able 
to raise an army of  tens of  thousands. Dutch sources speak of  20,000 
or even 40,000-50,000, though this number is perhaps an exaggeration 
given that the population of  the entire island was probably well below 
half  a million people. 
According to later tradition, the troops gathered at Nunuhenu, the 
old centre of  the Ambeno princedom, and then moved towards Kupang 
(Fobia 1984:83-4). The exact aims of  Gaspar da Costa are to be guessed. 
Portuguese texts say no more than that he pursued Sonbai and anybody 
else rebelling against his rule. A witness statement from 1756, given by a 
number of  Timorese lords and Portuguese, stated that da Costa intended 
to expand the area under his control. As the witnesses put it, he declared 
that he was not afraid of  the ‘cat-eyed’ people, a term that denoted the 
blue-eyed Dutchmen. His intention was to invest Fort Concordia and 
turn the defenders into payung-carriers. A payung, or parasol, is a token 
of  lordship in the context of  Southeast Asia, and the Dutch would con-
sequently be reduced to the status of  a humble servant. After the antici-
pated defeat of  the Company he planned to turn his attention towards 
the governor in Lifau.29
No Portuguese or affiliated troops had ever openly attacked Fort 
Concordia, and one wonders whether the above statement is exagger-
ated. To conquer a European fort would have severe repercussions, of  
28 VOC 2718 (1748), ff. 110-4.
29 VOC 2941 (1756), ff. 112-4.
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which Da Costa was no doubt aware. Possibly, the true aim was to return 
the refugees to their original lands. The stance of  Governor Manuel 
Correia de Lacerda however, is just as ambiguous. He later insisted that 
he had warned Gaspar da Costa several times about his unreasonable 
plans, telling him not to bring His Catholic Majesty into conflict with 
the Netherlands through his actions.30 As the Dutch were quick to point 
out, the words of  Correia de Lacerda revealed that he knew of  the plans 
well in advance yet did not send a single word of  warning to Kupang.31 
He may well have decided to adopt a wait-and-see policy – whichever 
side won, he could not only claim to be innocent, but potentially even 
benefit from the situation.
There are several extant versions which relate the following events. 
It would seem best to begin by quoting an indigenous Timorese source, 
a letter from the five loyal allies to Governor General Van Imhoff  in 
September 1750:
We announce that on 9 November 1749, the proud Portuguese and their 
might invaded our Kupangese land. They massacred a number of  our 
people, namely: of  Raja Kupang 1, of  the regent of  Amabi 50, of  Sonbai 
30, of  Amfoan 1, and of  Taebenu, 6 persons. They meanwhile robbed 
all their cattle and goods, and set two small negeri on fire. After that, the 
aforementioned Portuguese marched to a place called Penfui. Upon this 
action, we five kings asked opperhoofd Daniel van der Burgh in the name 
of  the Company to ask the referred-to Portuguese why they had done 
this. These people gave a very proud reply: ‘What need do we have for 
the Noble Company? We come to our land as it pleases us. Why does the 
Noble Company ask us about this or that?’ After this speech, the opperhoofd 
sent, on our insistence, some Mardijkers and people from the negeri Sawu 
to assist. The aim was to do everything possible to damage these Portu-
guese, our enemies, and to take revenge for what they had done as far as 
could be. After having received assistance from the Noble Company, we 
united our forces with them, attacked the enemy and expelled them from 
their site. They left numerous dead, consisting of  the following: the king 
of  Kupang took 75 heads in the battle; the Sonbai, 360; the Amabi, 600 
heads besides seven banners and five drums; the Amfoan, 20 heads; and 
the Taebenu, 150 heads, apart from five of  their chiefs. Thus we kings of  
30 VOC 2941 (1756), ff. 112-4.
31 VOC 2892 (1756), f. 1362.
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Kupang are presently living in good harmony and fraternal friendship 
with the three kings who arrived to Kupang last year.32
From the point of  the view of  the Timorese, the Battle of  Penfui was 
essentially their victory. A long report by Daniel van der Burgh provides 
quite another perspective, however, in which the leading Dutch officials 
barely managed to stop the allies from panicking at the approach of  
the great army, and where the brunt of  the fighting was undertaken 
by a 500-strong troop consisting of  Dutchmen, Mardijkers, Sawunese, 
Solorese and Rotenese, all under the leadership of  the formidable 
Second Lieutenant Christoffel Lip (Haga 1882b:391-402). A third ver-
sion of  events was recorded by the missionary Geerloff  Heijmering al-
most a century later. In this account the Mardijker chief  Frans Monkana 
created confusion in the Portuguese camp, taking enemy heads in a 
show of  immense bravery; in this way he laid the groundwork for the 
astounding VOC victory (Heijmering 1847:141-53). There are still more 
legendary versions, as is befitting of  a battle that changed many things 
in Timor’s historical geography.33
What is clear enough is that the battle was an unmitigated disaster 
in terms of  the Portuguese position on Timor. The huge army of  Da 
Costa took up a position at Penfui, situated on a hillside east of  Kupang, 
where the troops constructed seven or eight fortifications out of  stone 
and earth. However, many of  the Portuguese clients suffered from hav-
ing little or no motivation. The Amarasi, often seen as the foremost sup-
porters of  the Portuguese, were ensconced in the front row of  redoubts. 
When the VOC troops approached the camp a chief  rode towards them 
and announced that Amarasi could from now on be called friends of  the 
Company. When this declaration had been read, the Amarasi turned and 
fled towards the inland. Christoffel Lip prevented his troops from pursu-
ing them and instead led an assault on the remaining redoubts, which 
were taken one by one. Early in the battle the men from Amanatun and 
Greater Sonbai followed the example of  Amarasi and abandoned the 
Topass camp. When all but one redoubt had been taken, the remaining 
defenders began to scatter in panic but were slaughtered in a matter of  
32 VOC 8343 (1750), ff. 132-5.
33 For an Alorese version, see Gomang 1993:149-50. Local Alorese tradition mentions two warlords 
who participated at Penfui and slew the Topass leader; the story appears to have been influenced by the 
Mardijker legend referred to earlier.
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moments by the five allies. As the last redoubt fell to the VOC after a hard 
fight, the carnage was complete. With no way of  escape, since the horses 
of  the Topass army had been taken by the Company troops, Gaspar da 
Costa realized that everything was lost. He rode from the battlefield with 
a few of  his followers, but was struck by a Timorese assegai, tumbled 
down from his horse and was beheaded (Haga 1882b:398-400). With 
him fell his major officers, three kings and the new emperor of  Sonbai 
whom he had just enthroned and taken along as symbolic ammunition.
It was, as Van der Burgh’s report specifies, a ‘remarkable action’, but 
the circumstances also highlight remarkable weaknesses in Da Costa’s 
enterprise. As an experienced soldier, the tenente general must have known 
that the Timorese arraiais were not suited to lengthy campaigns or 
pitched battles; indeed, to gather such a large Timor-wide army was in 
itself  quite a feat. The Topass leader played with very high stakes – and 
lost. Hitherto loyal clients took the first opportunity to abandon his 
cause, while on the other hand the Company allies fought with their 
backs against the wall – a fortified, albeit somewhat ramshackle wall 
that had deterred potential attackers for the last century. The outcomes 
of  the Battle of  Penfui were therefore logical, and the Topass failure far 
from astonishing.
the map is redrawn
The twelve years following the Battle of  Penfui saw the political map of  
Timor reshuffled. Consequently, it saw the end of  a system that had its 
origins in a small Dutch enclave and a Topass power, which based its 
position on co-opting the Atoni princedoms. When looking on modern 
maps, two roughly equal halves of  the island can be seen; this divide was 
in fact brought about by the battle and its aftermath. On the one hand, 
these were years when the very existence of  a Portuguese presence was 
in doubt, but on the other hand, they were also years of  repeated disap-
pointments and setbacks for the Company.
Looking at the first few years after that fateful November day, it 
is evident that an increasing number of  territories acknowledged the 
VOC’s authority. Apart from Sonbai, Amanuban and Amfoan, the Atoni 
territories of  Amarasi, Amanatun and its sister domain Amanesi all sent 
humble letters of  submission. Parts of  Ambeno also joined the Company 
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ranks. Around 1751-1752 the area of  Belu began to be recalcitrant in 
their dealings with the Portuguese and likewise began to make approach-
es towards the Company. Their old hatred towards the Topasses could be 
seen in their message to Van der Burgh, which stated that they would be 
more than happy to see the Topasses exterminated.34 
The response to this development was an increase in the Dutch pres-
ence on the surrounding islands. On Rote, ten out of  thirteen nusak ac-
cepted the Protestant Reformed religion by 1753 and actively requested 
that schoolmasters educate their children; in this way, they were able 
to come into closer contact with the Dutch (Schooneveld-Oosterling 
2007:310). In 1751 Van der Burgh paid a visit to Sawu, where no opper-
hoofd had been for eight years. After settling local disputes he proceeded 
to Sumba, which had hitherto been an easy prey for anyone wishing to 
attack it. Ten of  the innumerable small chiefdoms of  Sumba had previ-
ously sought ties with the Company, and they now solemnly bestowed 
their land to its representative, the opperhoofd.35 At least, this is how Van 
der Burgh understood the situation. He noted that Sumba was a fertile 
and pretty land which was largely uninhabited due to incessant warfare, 
and that the locals did not take advantage of  the land and the trees and 
the trade to be made from them. In actual fact, the unsafe conditions on 
the coast, where the opperhoofd stayed, probably meant normal agricul-
ture and forestry activities were too dangerous – Sumba had a long and 
dark history of  coastal raids.36 In fact it soon turned out that the new 
Sumbanese allies intended to use the VOC to support them in their war 
against the eastern chiefdom Batakapedu. In order to demonstrate the 
Company’s might, Van der Burgh sent the few men at his immediate dis-
posal to attack the unsuspecting Batakapedu, and consequently hunted 
a few heads. Immediately afterwards the opperhoofd returned to Kupang 
with sixteen slaves, with which the grateful new allies had provided him. 
Slaves were, together with turtle-shell and, to a lesser extent, sandalwood 
the main commercial exports of  the island.37
Commercially, the situation was less positive. While it was normal that 
the Kupang post operated at a deficit, the amount did in fact fall after 
34 VOC 2762 (1751), f. 597.
35 Stapel 1938:510-1. Previous contact was made in 1720-25, when some chiefs asked – to no avail – 
for Company assistance in their domestic wars (De Roo van Alderwerelt 1906:193-4, 200).
36 Compare Needham 1983.
37 VOC 8322 (1751), ff. 9-14.
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1730, until it finally returned a very modest profit of  20 guilders in 1752. 
However, external trade with the Portuguese continued in spite of  all the 
political reshuffles. The old system where a large merchantman arrived 
from Macao each year was maintained, while smaller Portuguese sloops 
likewise supplied the coasts of  Timor with cloths and did good business 
with the locals. Last but not least, a large number of  Makassarese vessels 
that did not have trading passes supplied Alor, Solor, Flores and Sumba. 
A worrying sign was that the Makassarese began to frequent the outer 
coast of  Timor for the first time in living memory, using the Portuguese 
flag as cover. In sum, the VOC traders had to watch as the sandalwood 
and slaves were taken to other places. In December 1753, Batavia tried 
to stimulate trade by relaxing the restrictions on the VOC traders who 
transferred textiles to Kupang, much in the same way as it had done in 
the easternmost archipelago seven years earlier (Schooneveld-Oosterling 
2007: 311).
As a matter of  fact, the Makassarese played a minor role in ensuring 
the survival of  the Portuguese enterprise. Immediately after the Battle 
of  Penfui, the number of  areas under Portuguese domination were re-
duced to Lifau, Ambeno, Insana, Biboki, Sakunaba, Tunbaba, Bikomi, 
Ambabo and Naaiolie – in total, some 8,000 able-bodied men. These 
places formed a stretch of  land in the north of  West Timor. Meanwhile, 
the Belu decided to wait and see how the situation developed. The 
Topasses were in dire need of  gunpowder, but the Makassarese traders 
soon supplied them with this, thus sparing them from being completely 
overrun by pro-VOC forces. 38 Moreover, the Portuguese influence out-
side of  Timor survived intact. Apart from Larantuka, Sikka on Flores 
remained under their control, as did the Demon areas of  the Solor 
Islands. In actual fact, the Dutch sphere even contracted somewhat, since 
the three Watan Lema princedoms on Adonara cared little or nothing for 
the Company (Schooneveld-Oosterling 2007:307).
The years after the Battle of  Penfui saw a heated diplomatic ex-
change take place between the Company and the representatives of  the 
Estado da Índia in Lifau and Goa. In particular, the viceroy complained 
about the acquirement of  Amarasi, described as a vassal of  the Crown 
of  Portugal. The Dutch for their part could cite the disobedient stance 
38 VOC 2761 (1750), f. 71. Ambabo and Naaiolie are not to be found on modern maps; they can 
possibly be matched up with Bobo in Manamas in Miomaffo, and Olin in Oefalu, also in Miomaffo 
(Alexander Kono, Kefamenanu, personal communication, 27-2-2008).
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of  the Topass leader vis-à-vis the Estado, something which justified 
the revenge wreaked by the Company. They also reiterated the old fic-
tion that the sultan of  Ternate once had power over Timor and that 
he signed it over to the VOC in 1683. Batavia, however, did not even 
begin to adopt the belligerent proposals of  Daniel van der Burgh, who 
believed it was time to rid the Timor area of  the Portuguese once and 
for all. The Supreme Government found that the Company post in 
Kupang had exaggerated the amount of  territory under its control, and 
that the White and Black Portuguese still possessed far more land than 
the Company. As Batavia noted, a comprehensive military operation 
against the Portuguese enterprise would endanger relations with Gowa 
and Bima who were both VOC-allied kingdoms that claimed portions 
of  Flores as their own (Schooneveld-Oosterling 2007:307-8; Heijmering 
1847:167-8).
Moreover, the Portuguese supporters in Timor fought back. The 
highland negeri Noimuti, close to present-day Kefamenanu, fell under 
the Sonbai ruler, but soon after Penfui there was a change in circum-
stances. Some ‘ill-minded rascals’, as they were called by the Dutch, 
rejected the suzerainty of  the Sonbai ruler and established the inacces-
sible settlement of  Noimuti as a centre of  anti-Dutch activities.39 It is 
not clear how much Topass blood ran through the veins of  the Noimuti; 
later, there were 18 ume mnasi (houses of  elders) where a minor part of  
the descent groups bore Portuguese names.40 At any rate they were 
soon intensely engaged in the resistance movement together with the 
Topasses of  Tulang Ikan and Animata, some 30-35 kilometres away. 
The background to the situation may partly be explained by a lingering 
attachment to Catholicism and the king of  Portugal, but also by a certain 
amount of  resentment harboured about the behaviour of  the Company 
and its allies. West Timor after 1749 was a land of  great disruption and 
devastation. The five loyal allies plundered and bullied the now defence-
less lands that had recently been under Portuguese domination. Van der 
Burgh believed this to be the main reason why the remaining Timorese 
rulers declined to submit to the Company’s authority.41 
39 Tradition mentions a certain Richard Louis Sonbai, son of  a Sonbai lord, who resided in Noimuti. 
His body lay unburied in Noimuti until 1956, and was the object of  ritual veneration. His exact position 
in the Sonbai genealogy is not quite clear, but some versions place him as the son of  Nai Neno Sonbai, 
in other words, Dom Pedro Sonbai (early eighteenth century). See Tey Seran et al. 2006.
40 Tey Seran et al. 2006:37-40. Another enumeration has 27 ume mnasi.
41 VOC 8322 (1751), ff. 39-43.
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Van der Burgh tried to induce a sense of  Orange patriotism in both 
his old and his new allies, perhaps as a way of  combatting the powerful 
symbol of  the Portuguese Crown. In March 1751, a grand celebration 
took place in Kupang in honour of  Prince Willem IV, who had acceded 
to the position of  stadtholder four years earlier (and would die later in 
the same year). The allied kings attended, wearing orange roses in their 
long hair, and made a solemn pledge of  allegiance in the assembly hall. 
In spite of  such gestures, the opperhoofd faced the same problem as his 
fallen adversary, Da Costa: in terms of  warfare, the Timorese showed 
little interest in large-scale military campaigns. For them, the important 
factor was to carry out raids in order to capture enemy heads; the higher 
strategic goals of  the Company were not their own goals. A first attack 
attempted against the Noimuti in 1751 turned into a fiasco. Logistical 
problems and the unwilling attitude of  the Amarasi, who were their new 
supposed allies, meant that the VOC army never reached Noimuti. A 
second attempt four months later fared no better. Rains, floods and a 
thick fog (which the astounded people from the lowlands had never seen 
before) halted the venture less than a day’s march away from Noimuti. 
As hunger began to take a hold over his men, Van der Burgh once again 
had to retreat.42 
The ill-fated Gaspar da Costa was succeeded by his capitão mor, João 
Hornay (ruled 1749-1757). Any relationship to the previous Hornays is 
unknown, but he was the grandson of  the Dutch adventurer and deserter 
from the VOC Daniel de Cock, who joined the Topass ranks in circa 
1695 and alternated between living in Lifau and Macao.43 Hornay’s 
attitude towards the Company was ambivalent. While he distanced him-
self  from the aggressive Da Costa, he clandestinely tried to persuade the 
old Timorese clients to once again be ruled by the king of  Portugal. The 
new governor of  Lifau, Manuel Doutel de Figueiredo Sarmento (gov. 
1751-1759), actively assisted him in this venture (Matos 1974a:418-20), 
which was partially successful since the rulers of  Amarasi and Greater 
Sonbai began to have second thoughts about their VOC affiliation in 
1751-1752. Without doubt, these two were the most important of  the 
new allies, and their defection would surely have severe repercussions for 
the recent Dutch gains.
The reasons behind the allies’ change of  mind were varied. At this 
42 VOC 8322 (1751), ff. 41-54, 64-6, 131-5.
43 VOC 1637 (1700), f. 13; VOC 2763 (1751), ff. 596-7.
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time, Dom Alfonso Salema of  Sonbai lived with the bulk of  his troops 
near Kupang. Not only was he promised a full pardon by the governor 
and by Hornay, but he was also promised certain privileges. The tyran-
nical rule of  Gaspar da Costa, he was assured, would come to an end 
with his fall from power. The Dutch, however, do not seem to have paid 
heed to the fact that he was formerly the emperor of  Servião, a position 
backed by the Portuguese; instead, they ranked the allies after their date 
of  joining the VOC alliance, which may have decreased Da Costa’s at-
tachment to them. Harsh treatment of  the newly subjugated areas, the 
lack of  food and other daily necessities in the wake of  the recent dev-
astation, and military corvée service to fight Noimuti might have given 
the resentment a broader popular base. At any rate, part of  the Sonbai 
population moved towards the highlands above Amarasi in early 1752, 
in preparation for the defection from the Company. Together with the 
Amarasi they were to force the Amanuban to march – or else kill them 
where they stood. However, the plans were leaked and the suspicious 
Dutch arrested Dom Alfonso Salema on 19 March, without coming up 
against any resistance. The emperor paid a large ransom in gold to Van 
der Burgh, who acccepted it but nevertheless proceeded to exile Dom 
Alfonso and some of  his chiefs to Batavia. He was placed on the island 
of  Edam outside Batavia and at that point disappears from the history 
annals. According to a later rumour, he was beheaded by his captors.44
The Amarasi elite likewise received letters from the governor of  Lifau 
and tenente general which employed a mixture of  religious symbolism and 
hard-core threats, explaining that the Dutch were likely to seize land 
and demand heavy impositions and contributions from the Amarasi. 
By going over to the Company willingly, the regent in the eyes of  the 
Portuguese had betrayed his religion and become a ‘child of  the Devil’, 
thereby throwing not only himself, but all of  Amarasi into the jaws of  
hell . Dominican priests played a large part in winning back the Amarasi 
to the Portuguese fold, once again emphasizing the fact that there was a 
Catholic heritage among the elite dating back until the mid-seventeenth 
century. Stories also circulated that the Dutch were ruining the maize 
in the fields – the principal Timorese means of  survival. In general, the 
Amarasi elite appear to have been most reluctant to swear allegiance 
to the VOC; in a message to Manuel Doutel they insisted that they 
44 VOC 2799 (1752), ff. 11-28; VOC 2941 (1756), f. 644; VOC 3779 (1785-88), f. 5707; Schooneveld-
Oosterling 2007:209.
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had only submitted because they had stood on the verge of  destruction 
(Matos 1974a:419). Unlike Sonbai they refused to yield when the opper-
hoofd realized their defection. Van der Burgh had to summon a force of  
Dutchmen, Mardijkers, Timorese, Rotenese and Solorese, all of  whom 
attacked the defectors in June 1752. The Amarasi first managed to fight 
off  the Timorese allies, but were overwhelmed in the end. The allies took 
the opportunity to exact revenge for a century of  enmity and aggression, 
capturing many heads. The old king, Dom Luís Hornay de Roza, agreed 
to a meeting to discuss the terms of  surrender. However, when the allies 
approached the cave he was in, the king ordered his retainers to kill him 
and more than a hundred women and children who were with him.45
The dramatic fates of  Dom Alfonso Salema and Dom Luís Hornay 
de Roza were remembered in some detail until modern times. A wide-
spread version of  events depicts the opperhoofd and the Sonbai lord 
engaging in a contest of  magic. The various sections of  the contest are 
won by the ruler, who puts the Dutchman to shame. He turns into a 
snake and crawls through a blowpipe, puts a burning wax candle into 
his mouth without being hurt, and outweighs a load of  sandalwood. The 
Dutchman, fearful of  the magic powers of  his adversary, finally resorts to 
treachery and exiles the ruler to Batavia. In this way the historiographi-
cal tables are turned, and the element of  treason is transferred from the 
Sonbai lord to the opperhoofd.46 The violent end of  the Amarasi ruler is 
likewise commemorated in local tradition as a defining moment in the 
history of  the polity, and is narrated in a way that is surprisingly faithful 
to the actual historical event (Middelkoop 1939:77-9).
The defeat of  the defectors stabilized the Dutch position once more, 
but the killing of  part of  the Amarasi population turned out to be a 
mixed blessing. Some of  the survivors were declared slaves, the usual 
fate for prisoners of  war, while others were resettled south of  Kupang 
(Heijmering 1847:164-5). Most Amarasi consisted of  families descend-
ing from Amabi, Sonbai, Amfoan and Taebenu had been a part of  
the Amarasi population for many years but were now returned to their 
homelands and the allies. Domains like Amfoan and Taebenu almost 
45 VOC 2799 (1752), f. 87.
46 Fobia 1984:78-81; Middelkoop 1938:441-2; Spillett 1999:85-6. The theme of  a series of  tests be-
tween two princely rivals is well known; it occurs in legends from other parts of  Timor as well (McWil-
liam 2002:62-3).
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doubled their populations.47 Finally, there were many refugees who 
flocked to Noimuti. Meanwhile in the deserted land of  Amarasi, there 
were spoils to be had. By 1750, Van der Burgh had already found it 
necessary to allow the trade in sandalwood and beeswax to be free. 
Now, however, the Timorese had negotiating power; quite simply, they 
were no longer willing to fell the sandalwood and make the supreme 
effort to bring it downhill, without personally gaining anything from it. 
Henceforth, anyone could cut the fragrant wood, as long as he delivered 
one-third to the Company as fee (De Roo van Alderwerelt 1904:198). 
With the victory of  1752, the forests of  the defeated Amarasi became 
a free-for-all in accordance with the 1750 decree, and the Timorese al-
lies happily took advantage of  the riches to me made from sandalwood 
and beeswax. The stipulated fee meant little in practice (Fiedler 1931, 
4:31), and it was already far too late by the time the Company realized 
it had little to gain from the arrangement. In the late 1750s, the Amarasi 
princedom was therefore provisionally restored, with a son of  the fallen 
king at its helm. By now, however, it was an insignificant domain with 
only a few hundred able-bodied men. For the remainder of  the colonial 
period, it presented few problems for the Dutch colonizers or its neigh-
bours.
The following years saw continuing low-scale hostilities between 
the Company and their allies on the one hand, and Noimuti and the 
Topasses on the other. In 1753, Sultan Abdul Kadim Muhammad Syah 
of  Bima on Sumbawa announced his intention to have a share of  the 
spoils. For years, this Company ally had had interests in Flores, which 
was subjected to ever-changing overlordships. The sultan now prepared 
an expedition with the full backing of  the VOC authorities in Batavia. If  
the Topasses could be attacked from that direction it would be of  clear 
benefit; moreover, the inhabitants of  Bima were asked to reserve the 
cinnamon plantations on Flores for the Company. A spate of  military 
expansion by Bima finally did take place on Flores in the 1760s, but 
appears to have been restricted to Manggarai in the west and did not 
directly involve the Topasses (Schooneveld-Oosterling 2007:309; Toda 
1999:117-51).
The most important change in the VOC sphere was the vast increase 
in importance of  the Mardijkers. Since they were included in the Dutch 
47 VOC 2799 (1752), ff. 93-4.
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legal system and in no way were related to the indigenous princes, they 
were a useful mediation tool, especially as the sphere was expanding. 
The leaderless population of  Greater Sonbai had settled in a number of  
places; likewise for Amanuban and, as we have seen, Amarasi. Van der 
Burgh wished to have the three groups within reach of  Kupang with its 
sizeable multi-ethnic Mardijker population. The Mardijker chiefs took 
liberties with the defeated populations, and the Dutch perceived them 
as peevish figures. However, the Mardijkers also interfered in the affairs 
of  the original five allies. In effect, the Helong kingdom of  Kupang 
broke up into three parts after 1749, one part being led by a royal rela-
tive called Lafu Funai, who stayed among the Mardijkers. This was the 
beginning of  the mini-princedom of  Funai that was to last until 1917. 
Lesser Sonbai was likewise in decline, since day by day more men left 
because of  one injustice or another, preferring instead to stay under the 
Mardijkers.48 The rise of  the Mardijkers is also hinted at by the afore-
mentioned – and historically inaccurate – legend of  the Battle of  Penfui, 
according to which Frans Monkana (Maucaan) plays the role of  the hero. 
In reality, Frans Maucaan was a historical figure; he was a Mardijker 
chief  who played an important role in the years after the Battle of  Penfui, 
finally being sentenced by the suspicious Dutch for criminal acts. As they 
were rivals for political control, the Dutch opperhoofden usually maintained 
a negative stance apropos the Mardijkers, but it also appears that they 
were indispensible as soldiers and envoys. They were used for far-flung 
and dangerous expeditions that the Dutchmen declined to undertake 
themselves, and were organized into two companies, called Saudale 
and Oedale, which remained in use up until the nineteenth century 
(Haga 1882a).
Daniel van der Burgh, notwithstanding his enthusiasm for expansion 
in the area, was no supporter of  Timor, which he referred to as ‘this dis-
gusting place’. In spite of  his requests to be allowed to step down from 
his post, he would never see his native Amsterdam again since he fell ill 
and died in 1754, sharing the fate of  so many previous opperhoofden. His 
successor, Elias Jacob Beynon (gov. 1754-1758), was in many respects his 
very opposite, a careful merchant with little personal authority. It was at 
this stage that the Supreme Government in Batavia decided to investi-
gate their turbulent dependencies in Timor.
48 VOC 2837 (1754).
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the paravicini mission
The Spanish-born Johannes Andreas Paravicini (1710-1771) was rather 
well known when he became commissioner for the VOC on Timor.49 
In 1755, he carried out a similar role with regard to Palembang on 
Sumatra, where he investigated illicit trading and drew up a contract 
with the sultan. The sultan of  Banjarmasin, whom he later visited, char-
acterized Paravicini as confident yet arrogant, a judgement that is not 
contradicted by any of  his Timor papers (Vos 1993:31-2, 40-4). With the 
threat of  war looming in Europe, the Supreme Government handed over 
a set of  instructions to Paravicini in February 1756, which detailed four 
main tasks. Firstly, he was to renew the contracts with the princes, replac-
ing the assortment of  separate agreements, letters of  submission and 
customary bonds that had hitherto regulated Dutch-indigenous relations. 
Secondly, he was to investigate the situation at the Kupang post where, 
as Batavia understood, matters were run in a far from efficient manner. 
Thirdly, he was to improve the defences of  the dependencies, and fourth-
ly, he was to secure the dependencies from any external hostile force.50 
Naturally, potential aggressors did include the local Portuguese, but also 
the covetous great powers of  Europe, in particular France, which was 
looking at the potential for commercial and colonial expansion in South 
Asia and beyond, in the years leading up to the Seven Years’ War.51 In 
1755, the French horticulturist Pierre Poivre explored the opportunities 
for the French to make inroads in the archipelago and visited Lifau, com-
menting on the ostensibly good opportunities for trade in beeswax and 
slaves. Governor Manuel Doutel appears to have perceived the French as 
a useful counterbalance to the expansionist plans of  the Dutch (Durand 
2006a:150-2; Van der Chijs 1872:210).
Upon arriving in Kupang, Paravicini found matters to be less than 
satisfactory among the Company servants. He heard many witness ac-
counts and discovered ample evidence of  dishonesty, outright corruption 
and oppressive behaviour against the indigenous elite. At a vergadering on 
10 May 1756, he spoke to a splendid assembly of  rulers from Timor, 
Rote, Sawu, Solor and Sumba. He announced to the rulers that he had 
49 Brief  biographical information on Paravicini can be found in Leeuwerik 1992.
50 VOC 2941 (1756), Dagverhael, sub 14-3-1756.
51 The Seven Years’ War in Europe formally commenced in May 1756, during the visit of  Paravicini 
to Timor, but unknown to the Dutch in the East Indies until later in the same year. 
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been sent to save the colony from the miserable state in which it had 
found itself  in recent years, to make it flourish once more, and to protect 
it from outside aggression. He subsequently deliberated with the kings 
and regents for many hours over the draft contract. Finally, on 9 June, 
a solemn ceremony took place during which 92 aristocrats thronged 
the assembly hall. Each of  the grandees made the oath by raising the 
right hand, while the left hand touched the banner of  the Company. 
Afterwards a salute was fired with 25 shots for Governor General Jacob 
Mossel, 13 for Paravicini, 9 for the opperhoofd and his council, and 9 for 
the kings and regents. On the following day, the grandees were feted 
with a sumptuous banquet in a purpose-built hall. It was decorated with 
the colours of  the Dutch flag, and the artistic Chinese assisted with the 
lighting. The guests were entertained with food, music and dance until 
six o’clock in the morning.52
No doubt this was a grandiose occasion that became a life-long 
memory for the attending lords, but what did the Paravicini contract 
actually entail? The large number of  signatories, representing some 77 
princedoms, has raised doubts about the authenticity of  the document. 
The very circumstantial description given by Paravicini suggests that the 
majority of  places concerned were represented by their rulers, but there 
are some points open to debate. The contract is purported to be signed 
by ‘the eight regents of  the island of  Sumba’, but in fact only the chief  
of  Mangili was present in Kupang; moreover, the eight regents were 
only a fraction of  all the minor chiefs on the island. Another moot point 
was Belu. Already in 1753, Van der Burgh had highlighted Wewiku-
Wehali as ‘the key to the province of  Belu that stands under the White 
Portuguese’, which was ‘of  utmost importance for us’.53 When the con-
tract was to be signed the king of  Wewiku, Nai Liu, appeared at Kupang. 
Wewiku was a ‘post’ of  the liurai of  Wehali, and acted as his representa-
tive. Paravicini may have sensed that this was not enough for him to be 
able to claim the entire province of  Belu for the Company. He therefore 
sent a sizeable army of  Mardijkers and Amanuban to Wewiku-Wehali to 
suggest that the liurai appear in Kupang in person. To demonstrate the 
force and strength of  the Company, the troops subjugated the small Belu 
princedom of  Banibani on the way. Almost two months after the original 
52 VOC 2941 (1756), Dagverhael, sub 10-5-1756, 9-6-1756, 10-6-1756. The banquet is commemorated 
in a painting, reproduced in Jacobs 2000:35.
53 VOC 8346 (1753), ff. 42-3.
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contract had been signed, Paravicini had the pleasure to receive Jacinto 
Correia, ‘the grand prince of  the wide-embracing Kingdom of  Belu and 
sovereign king of  Wewiku-Wehali’.54 To quote Paravicini’s diary:
These troops had not even entered the negeri [Kupang] when, according 
to their custom, they started a horrific noise and brought forward 40 sev-
ered heads and 44 prisoners, which they had taken in a recent encounter 
with the Noimutians as well as in an attack on the aforementioned king of  
Banibani who had tried to impede them from marching through his land. 
[They carried the heads] through the entire negeri to the residence of  the 
commissioner, where they halted and waited for a while.
When the envoys announced their arrival to His Excellency, they were 
immediately let in and were introduced to an audience with the [allied] 
kings, and were received very politely and warmly, in particular the grand 
prince of  Belu who, although still young, seemed to the Europeans to be 
very polite. According to the custom of  the Portuguese he kissed the hand 
of  His Excellency, as did Nai Liu. The rightful king of  Banibani, Dom 
Luís Pinheiro, approached the feet of  His Excellency while maintaining a 
kneeling position. With his hand crossed over his head as a token of  sub-
mission he asked for pardon and forgiveness for having attacked the men 
of  the Noble Company and having opposed their invincible arms.55
Jacinto Correia then made a speech in Portuguese, referred to at length 
by Paravicini. Correia asserted, citing rather dubious evidence, that his 
ancestors had once concluded a contract with the VOC, which had been 
brutally abrogated by the Portuguese,56 and he now wished to return 
to the Company. Together with the rulers of  Wewiku and Banibani he 
received a ceremonial staff  topped with a silver knob engraved with 
the arms of  the VOC. Their names were included in the contract, 
which alleged that a large number of  eastern princedoms stood un-
der Jacinto Correia: Dirma, Lakekun, Leowalu, Fialaran, Lamaknen, 
Maubara, Lacló, Samoro, Letululi, Fatuboro, Lanqueiro, Same, Atsabe, 
Raimean, Deribate, Marobo, Lidak, Jenilu, Sakunaba, Biboki, Insana 
54 Jacinto Correia (Hiacynthoe Corea) is not expressly called liurai, but the circumstances leave little 
doubt that he was. The maromak oan was not supposed to settle executive tasks of  this kind.
55 VOC 2941 (1756), Dagverhael, sub 26-7-1756.
56 The ‘contracts’ from 1668 mention Ade, Manatuto, Laivai, Waimaa and Hera, but not Wewiku-
Wehali.
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and Leimea. He also exercised authority over the domains of  Manufai, 
Suai, Tiris, Alas, Luca, Viqueque and Corora.57 Later in the contract, 
Ade (Vemasse) and Manatuto were likewise mentioned as being under 
his control. Looking at it from the perspective of  an outsider, this gave 
the impression that the whole of  Timor, except for parts of  the north-
eastern coast, had been signed over to the VOC; not even the core terri-
tory of  the Estado da Índia was seen as undisputed property of  Portugal. 
Sitenoni, the deputy king of  Ambeno, signed the contract and was re-
ferred to in the text as ‘king of  Lifau’. By extension, this meant that the 
governor’s residence could potentially become a bone of  contention.58 
In fact, Jacinto Correia’s gesture of  submission had limited implica-
tions. While Paravicini may have believed that the contract gave him 
access to East Timor, this was in fact nothing more than vain hopes, or 
rather, a grave misunderstanding of  the Timorese hierarchy. As for the 
contents of  the contract, it is a verbose document of  30 paragraphs. 
Some of  them pertain to practical matters, for example military ser-
vice, corvée service for gold mining, the capture of  runaway slaves, the 
settling of  internal conflicts and similar matters, but much of  the text 
has a rhetorical, indeed propagandist slant, which mixes echoes of  the 
Enlightenment with self-righteous chauvinism:
The peculiar privilege to make land and people flourish through the 
enjoyment of  freedom, and make the inhabitants happily live calm and 
safely in their property without fear, may only be found among the free 
Dutchmen. They have shown an attitude filled with upright and noble 
feelings about all the nations and peoples who stand under their protec-
tion. They make no distinction between the black and white nations. On 
the contrary they regard all humans as their brothers, and treat humans 
as humans in accordance with their basic laws […] And as one compares 
the miserable, destitute and ravaged main post of  the Portuguese on this 
island, called Lifau, although situated in the best part of  this island; and 
one on the other hand considers in what blessed state the kings, grandees, 
57 Most of  these names are easily found on modern maps. Tiris often occurs in texts from the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries. It is now obscure, but according to an informant of  Peter Spillett, 
(1999:300) the Kingdom of  Tieres lay about 80 kilometers to the east of  Beacu, perhaps close to the 
mouth of  the Sui River. This corroborates early Dutch sources that suggest it was close to Manufai. 
Corora or Corara is the place called Korrara in the far east of  the island on the map of  Freycinet 1825, 
Atlas. It is called Cararol on the map in Castro 1867.
58 Stapel 1955:88-9, 91; VOC 2941 (1756), ff. 61-3, 77; Therik 2004:57; s’Jacob 2007:12.
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Company servants, burghers and further inhabitants in this place Ku-
pang find themselves, although in the most sterile area in the entire island 
of  Timor, then it will give the more compelling evidence of  the virtues 
that the noble Dutchmen know. (Stapel 1955:93-4.) 
Partly contradicting himself, Paravicini warned the allies in a later para-
graph of  the potentially dangerous consequences of  intermingling with 
the burghers of  Kupang. The lords weakened their royal authority by 
entering into family ties with these people; no mixed marriages should 
be arranged without consulting the opperhoofd or vicar, and no trade 
should be committed with the burghers (Stapel 1955:102-3). During his 
investigation Paravicini found that some burghers tended to treat the 
allies around Kupang in a pernicious manner and that the aristocrats 
were victims of  some of  the burghers’ more brutal and overbearing acts. 
They were forced into buying goods from the townsfolk at extortionate 
prices, and their subjects were occasionally taken into custody as slaves 
for dubious reasons (Van der Chijs 1872:217). In particular, the burgher 
David Schrijver bullied the allied ruling families, capturing and even 
mistreating princes. Paravicini condemned Schrijver as somebody who 
could cause a great deal of  harm to relations between the VOC and 
the locals; consequently, Schrijver was fined 4,200 rijksdaalders.59 In 
the contract, Paravicini tried to protect the interests of  the allies in a 
number of  ways. They were to deliver gold, beeswax, slaves, pepper and 
indigo to the official VOC channels, in return for reasonable payment. 
They were advised to only buy goods from the Company warehouse 
‘at a civil price’, and if  any European or coloured person tried to take 
advantage of  the allies in the name of  the Company, they should be de-
livered to the opperhoofd to be punished according to what they deserved 
(Stapel 1955:104).
Despite his use of  rhetoric and argument, Paravicini’s actions did not 
quite match up with his goal of  bringing the Enlightenment to Timor. 
On Rote, the trouble-ridden nusak Landu was divided into a number of  
factions, which the Company was unable to reconcile. Paravicini saw 
this as the ideal opportunity to make an example: he vowed to remove 
all the inhabitants of  this ‘disreputable and rebellious’ nusak, ruin it, ex-
tinguish its very name. He actually came close to fulfilling this vow. After 
59 VOC 2941 (1756), ff. 116-9, 150-2, 172.
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a bloody campaign, 1,060 Landu were brought to Batavia as slaves, out 
of  an original population of  circa 4,000.60 Back in Batavia, the Supreme 
Government scrutinized Paravicini’s conduct and found that he had 
severely berated other European nations in the contract, using terms 
wholly unsuitable for a diplomatic document. They were also critical of  
the massacre he carried out on Rote, but in May 1757, a total of  777 
captive Landu were nevertheless sold on the slave market, making a total 
of  50,012 guilders (Leupe 1877; s’Jacob 2007:527).
In other respects, too, the very actions attributed to Johannes Andreas 
Paravicini are controversial. He negotiated a commercial treaty with the 
governor of  Lifau – still not an official enemy of  the Netherlands – which 
Batavia was unwilling to endorse, and he interfered in local governance, 
an area that definitely did not fall under his remit. The commissioner 
arrived in Timor with a sizeable military force, a fact that probably ex-
erted pressure on the local princes to sign the contract. The impressive 
celebrations and feasting that took place at the time of  the signing also 
raises doubts as to whether the rulers really thought about the contents 
of  the 30 paragraphs, or if  they were simply drawn into something they 
did not quite comprehend (Fiedler 1931, 4:33). Like previous so-called 
contracts the agreement may, in Timorese eyes, have been a confirma-
tion of  alliance akin to the traditional blood-oath, rather than a set of  
fixed regulations.
new company initiatives
Two years after Paravicini was commissioned, the leadership in Kupang 
was assumed by a similarly colourful and ambitious figure. This was 
the German Hans Albrecht von Plüskow, whose short career was to see 
both a climax to, and sudden implosion of, Dutch ambitions to master 
the unruly island. Born in Mecklenburg in 1709, the nobleman Von 
Plüskow arrived in the East Indies in 1753 at a relatively mature age. 
Many Germans were employed by the VOC, also in higher positions, 
and most of  the soldiers in Fort Concordia in the mid-eighteenth century 
appear to have been German. After a modest career as an administra-
tor at the warehouses of  Batavia he was appointed opperhoofd in Timor 
60 VOC 2941 (1756), ff. 603-4, 627-8, 674, 677, 715-46; Van der Chijs 1872:220-6.
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in 1758. His energetic and scrupulous character caught the attention of  
his superiors, who needed a more forceful hand than that of  Elias Jacob 
Beynon (Fiedler 1931, 4:31-3). 
Upon his arrival, Von Plüskow found a complicated situation. The 
Battle of  Penfui had led to improvements in security in the area sur-
rounding Kupang, but in much of  western and central Timor it had 
led to a chaotic and insecure situation in a land already ravaged by war 
The Company waged war in the same manner as the Topasses once 
had: expeditions of  Mardijkers, Sonbai and Amanuban were dispatched 
to attack one particular location or another that was considered hos-
tile. ‘Enemy’ heads would be taken, settlements burnt down and cattle 
slaughtered.61 Some of  the new supposed allies were divided in their 
loyalties. In particular this was the case in the Greater Sonbai realm, 
which stretched over a large part of  West Timor. After the exile of  
Emperor Dom Alfonso Salema and his heir, Nai Sane, the Company 
at first tried to bring the various amaf  naek or temukung directly under 
its authority. This turned out to be impractical, however, and another 
son of  the exiled ruler was officially installed as emperor. This was Don 
(Dom) Bernardo, who was told by the Dutch to stay in the vicinity of  
Bakunase, a few kilometres south of  Kupang, where his kinsmen from 
Lesser Sonbai resided.62 In choosing this location, the Company created 
poor preconditions for wielding control over the extensive, mountainous 
and isolated territories of  the inland: Don Bernardo would hardly have 
been able to direct the components of  his realm even if  he had held the 
power to rule directly. The executive regent, Nai Takaip, remained in 
the interior where he confiscated gold that was extracted on behalf  of  
the Company and also led an unsuccessful kidnap attempt on the young 
emperor. In Mollo, in the central part of  West Timor, the usif of  the 
Oematan family kept his distance from the Company.63
Similar divisions beset Ambeno, where part of  the population moved 
into the Dutch sphere of  power in 1751 while others remained under 
another leader. The unfortunate King Dom Paulo II was incarcerated 
by the Topasses in 1756 and again in 1761, during which time he was 
allegedly treated worse than an animal. His successors upheld a very 
61 VOC 8349 (1757), ff. 61-2.
62 VOC 2799 (1752); VOC 8349 (1757), f. 62. The Dutch used the Spanish spelling ‘Don’ rather than 
the Portuguese ‘Dom’.
63 VOC 8350 (1758), ff. 62-5; VOC 8351 (1758), f. 27.
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ambiguous political position until late in the nineteenth century. They 
maintained open relations with the Dutch and were sometimes counted 
as tributaries, while at the same time they married into the Hornay 
and Da Costa families as well as closely associating themselves with the 
Topass authority.64 As for Belu, not even the immediate sphere of  Wehali 
in south-central Timor was effectively controlled by the liurai. The sister 
princedom of  Wewiku had a long history of  actions taken against Wehali, 
and kept the munitions and tokens of  vassalage that Johannes Andreas 
Paravicini sent to the liurai in 1756. Faced with Wewiku’s bullying, and 
aggression from the nearby Suai, the VOC-minded liurai of  Wehali and 
his two loro of  Dirma and Lakekun had no other recourse than to es-
cape to the Portuguese territory in the north in 1758.65 The liurai ended 
up in Batugade, while the loro of  Dirma found refuge in Tolgrita, both 
places being White Portuguese strongholds. Furthermore, three princes 
from Dirma were brought up and educated by the Portuguese in Lifau. 
The heartland of  Wewiku-Wehali was subsequently dominated by a 
Portuguese captain called Alesu Fernandes, who had a hundred soldiers 
at his disposal. The presence of  Fernandes apparently reversed what 
was left of  Paravicini’s diplomatic efforts in these quarters. One of  the 
liurai of  Wehali in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries bore 
the name Dom Alesu Fernandes, which testifies to the influence of  the 
captain.66 In a similar fashion to Ambeno, Wewiku-Wehali oscillated be-
tween Portugal and the Netherlands over the next century, and had very 
limited contact with either. From a non-colonial perspective, Wewiku-
64 Castro 1867:283, 291. Pedro Hornay (ruled 1777-c.1795) and his son José Hornay (ruled c.1795-
post 1817) were both described as brothers-in-law of  Ambeno rulers.
65 VOC 8352 (1758), ff. 36-7. According to a story told in 1892, a certain maromak oan or liurai called 
Don Pedro was expelled by his subjects and fled to Oecusse, taking with him the heirlooms of  the realm. 
This would have happened ‘maybe 50 to 100 years ago’. He was later killed in a fight against the Dutch 
and his widow ended up in Dili while the heirlooms fell into Portuguese hands (Jansen 1893:28-9). This 
story confuses the maromak oan and liurai titles; modern Belu tradition knows Don Peur (Pedro) as an 
early liurai (Tifa and Itta 2007:232). The story may also refer to the Belu troubles of  the late eighteenth 
century. The loss of  the valuable silver heirlooms was allegedly a principal reason for subsequent Belu 
resentment against the Portuguese.
66 A list of  liurai, derived from the royal family, and several makoan can be found in Tifa and Itta 
2007:230-4. It states Alesu Fernandes as being the grandfather of  liurai Sasita Mean, who in turn can 
be placed as being around in approximately the mid-nineteenth century. A tongkat with the name Don 
Aleesoe Fernando de Wayhale is still preserved in Wehali until the present day. There are several lists of  
liurai which contradict each other; see Vroklage 1953, I:582; Spillett 1999:166-8 The lack of  corroborat-
ing Dutch and Portuguese data makes it impossible to establish a historical sequence of  rulers with any 
confidence.
384
| Lords of  the land, lords of  the sea
Wehali remained completely autonomous until circa 1900.67
When Von Plüskow arrived, Kupang, the hub that attempted to 
control the turbulent area under the Company’s command, was in many 
respects in a poor state. Fort Concordia was dilapidated as were the 
warehouses and there was a lack of  Company soldiers, who moreover 
were in poor health and often undisciplined. The Mardijkers were a self-
confident group who allowed the indigenous people to work their fields 
near Kupang; the Dutch, however, believed that they had the potential 
to become a Topass-like entity that may threaten the European establish-
ment.
With characteristic energy, Hans Albrecht von Plüskow brought 
about several initiatives to run the ‘colony’. One step was to improve 
the quality of  indigenous rule. Minutes from the vergaderingen show him 
admonishing the local princes in the manner of  a stern schoolmaster, as 
he pointed out their duties and the qualities expected of  them as rulers. 
While Paravicini understood the Timorese system of  an inactive king 
and an active regent, Von Plüskow insisted on treating the former as 
vassal rulers in a conventional sense. By strengthening their positions vis-
à-vis their subjects and by making them conform to European ideals, the 
numerous princedoms could be controlled more effectively. 
Von Plüskow’s strategy included deposing and exiling individuals 
who did not live up to these ideals. This notion had not been put into 
practice on Timor by the Dutch prior to the Battle of  Penfui; previously 
the main idea was to preserve a precarious equilibrium in the semi-
besieged Kupang enclave. Under this new regime, however, the rulers 
were subjected to stricter demands.68 The young Helong ruler Karel 
Buni (reign 1749-1760) was a semi-educated Christian. According to 
Paravicini he knew ‘far too much to be a Timorese kinglet, and made 
malignant use of  it’.69 Von Plüskow made a number of  rather imprecise 
67 The extent of  Wehali’s influence in the first half  of  the nineteenth century is an area of  debate. 
A recent East Timorese historian claims that the liurai of  Wehali fought an unsuccessful war against 
the powerful Luca in 1832-33, and was killed and beheaded. When the loro of  Tahacae subsequently 
attacked the loro of  Fialaran and Lamaknen, there was no liurai to mediate in the conflict. Since that 
time the various loro withdrew from the writ of  the liurai of  Wehali and the maromak oan (Marques Soares 
2003:56). This account is not entirely endorsed by Dutch reports from the 1840s, which point out the 
important role the liurai of  Wehali played as a mediator in Central Timor (ANRI Timor:54, Register der 
handelingen en besluiten, sub 24-5-1844; Brouwer 1849-50, H 731, KITLV).
68 On Solor, two sengaji of  Lohayong and Lamakera were in fact exiled in 1715 and 1721 respectively, 
and a similar fate befell a manek of  Termanu, Ndaomanu, in 1738.
69 VOC 2941 (1756), f. 259.
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accusations against the king, namely that he indulged in improper be-
haviour and mistreated his temukung. Karel Buni replied that ‘he wanted, 
according to the ideal of  the old emperor of  Sonbai, to sit still, eat, drink 
and sleep’.70 This is of  course the predominant virtue of  a classical 
Timorese ruler, but to the opperhoofd such things were bad habits. The 
hapless prince was put in irons and shipped to Batavia. The Supreme 
Government was displeased by this brutal treatment of  a member of  the 
royal family, but it did send Karel Buni to Ceylon where he remained 
until after 1795. A rival branch from Pulau Semau took over the king-
ship, but soon turned out to be just as inefficient in its rule in Dutch eyes 
(Schooneveld-Oosterling 2007:522).
Von Plüskow also tried to manage the complicated affairs of  Sonbai. 
The recalcitrant regent of  Greater Sonbai, Nai Takaip, was arrested and 
exiled, while the emperor, Don Bernardo, was severely reprimanded by 
the opperhoofd for his alcoholism and ostensibly immoral conduct. None 
of  this made Sonbai into a unified kingdom in the Western sense of  the 
word. On the contrary, the usif of  the districts of  Bikomi and Tunbaba 
followed the example of  Ambeno in their ever-shifting allegiance to 
Portugal and the VOC. Von Plüskow found the conduct of  Bikomi to 
be treacherous and in 1760 forced the population of  the small highland 
district to march to westernmost Timor, where they could be better 
monitored. The situation was complicated by a traditional wife-giving 
relationship (barlaque) between Bikomi and Sonbai. The Sonbai lord 
had the duty to marry a daughter of  the ruling Lake clan of  Bikomi.71 
At the time, Don Bernardo lay on his death-bed. His only heir was a 
younger brother, Usi Ana, who had had some dealings with the enemies 
of  Noimuti, and who was offered a daughter by Nai Lake of  Bikomi, 
his uncle. Although Usi Ana and Nai Lake were both traitors by Von 
Plüskow’s European standards, he felt he had to be pragmatic and so 
pardoned the two men. Usi Ana received his Lake wife and succeeded 
his brother as emperor.72
During his visit in 1756, Paravicini confiscated the heirlooms of  
the two Sonbai realms. These heirlooms consisted of  golden discs and 
70 VOC 2991 (1760), Resolutions, sub 9-4-1760.
71 During the late colonial period, Bikomi was dominated by two pairs of  clans: Atok-Bana and Lake-
Senak. Senak was the atupas, the resting ruler, while Lake was the male, active counterpart (H.G. Schulte 
Nordholt 1971:292).
72 VOC 2991 (1760), Resolutions, sub 27-2-1760, 18-4-1760.
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similar objects to the value of  several thousands of  rijksdaalders. In 
particular, there were two discs called Coneboy and Labalaba that were 
much revered. As seen above, such treasures (leu) were hugely important 
as protective symbols of  the Timorese princedoms.73 Von Plüskow in-
quired at a vergadering to whom the heirlooms rightfully belonged. The 
new executive regent of  Greater Sonbai pointed out that Lesser Sonbai 
was the elder party (bapak) in relation to Greater Sonbai, the junior party 
(anak). The objects were inspected by the princes in the vergadering, and 
then given to the Lesser Sonbai regent. It was also stipulated that the 
heirlooms and the position as ruler would pass to Greater Sonbai if  the 
elder line died out.74 In fact, this is exactly what happened in 1776.
A further initiative was to find sources of  wealth which, in the spirit of  
mercantilism, could make the Company a profit. Von Plüskow had heard 
tantalizing stories of  a pearl bank on the coast of  Amarasi, but upon 
closer inspection it only yielded small pearls and made little economic 
difference. More effort was put into the gold deposit that was identified 
by Paravicini. At Tepas in the Greater Sonbai realm, and apparently at 
Noeleke close to the Noilmina River, it was possible to pan for gold.75 
The means of  extracting it were exceedingly simple. The Timorese dug a 
narrow channel that flowed over a flat stone. When water had flown over 
the stone for a while, they diverted the channel. The heavy sand full of  
gold stayed on the stone and could be collected. A number of  slaves were 
sent to Tepas to work, but their numbers were not sufficient. Instead, Von 
Plüskow made a deal with the regent of  Greater Sonbai, who promised 
to keep a thousand men panning for gold on a daily basis. The Sonbai 
elite was to hand over one third of  the gold to the Company, and to use 
the rest to buy supplies from the very same Company. It appeared to be 
a win-win situation, but the quantities of  gold retrieved were modest: in 
the final year of  Von Plüskow’s tenure, 45 taels of  gold were produced 
– approximately 1.7 kilograms. It looks as if  much of  the gold was 
siphoned off  by the Sonbai.76
73 Pelon 2002:34; Van Geuns 1927:467. Labalaba was the original name of  the land of  Kune before 
the Sonbai takeover (Müller 1857, II:150). The name Coneboy also seems to be connected with Kune.
74 VOC 2991 (1760), Resolutions, sub 26-1-1760.
75 The situation of  Tepas was explained to me by Professor Hendrik Ataupah, Kupang, 27-11-2009. 
Tepas is not a river in itself, as is sometimes stated in the literature; the name means ‘swamp’.
76 Prospecting in West Timor in 1925 indicated that there are gold deposits close to Kupang and 
in various places of  the highlands of  the old Sonbai realm; however, there are no prospects for profit-
able exploitation. Moreover, what gold there is on Timor is pale and not very pure (Lombard-Jourdain 
2000:177-8). 
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Although an administrator by profession, Hans Albrecht von 
Plüskow’s legacy on Timor was one of  military endeavours. He at-
tempted to keep the new ‘allies’ on Timor and draw more areas under 
Company control without openly challenging the Estado da Índia.77 
The important Maubara princedom on the north coast, in present-day 
Timor Leste, was co-opted and a Dutch fortress was built there. With 
Maubara there followed a large number of  neighbouring princedoms, 
such as Nusadila, Lanqueiro, Fatuboro, Deribate, Atsabe and Samoro.78 
Together they constituted a large area of  East Timor, but their so-called 
submission was hardly more than temporary strategic convenience on 
their part; apart from Maubara, no VOC representative seems to have 
set foot there. 
The principal enemies were the Topasses of  Larantuka and Tulang 
Ikan-Animata, and Noimuti in the highlands, a notorious hideaway for 
robbers. In 1756 or 1757, João Hornay passed away and a brief  dispute 
arose between the Hornays and the Da Costas, which also entailed a 
dispute between the Topasses in Larantuka and Timor. Perhaps in view 
of  the danger posed by the Dutch, the dispute was resolved so that João’s 
son Francisco Hornay III (ruled 1757-1777) governed in Animata and 
married a sister of  Domingos da Costa II who held the title of  tenente 
general. A younger brother of  Domingos, António da Costa, ruled in 
Noimuti. Larantuka was controlled by João’s sister Dona Maria.79 The 
Supreme Government in Batavia entertained the somewhat outlandish 
idea of  infiltrating this intricate family web; they proposed to let an at-
tractive Dutch official marry Dona Maria, thereby bringing Larantuka 
into the VOC sphere (De Roo van Alderwerelt 1904:202).
Naturally, none of  this actually took place. During a time of  of-
ficial peace with the governor in Lifau, Von Plüskow attacked Noimuti 
in 1758 with a well-equipped army of  5,000 men, who marched over 
some 160 kilometres of  hilly terrain dragging artillery pieces with them. 
Von Plüskow managed to conquer two fortified places outside Noimuti, 
but then the enterprise floundered when faced with the peculiarities of  
Timorese warfare. Much in the same way as Gaspar de Costa had faced 
77 In 1759 he sent a small expedition to Sumba under the command of  one Hans Erasmusz, who 
concluded that no commercial advantage could be won for the Company as long as the petty warfare 
between the domains continued. In addition to this, the number of  raids carried out by Makassarese 
pirates-cum-traders rapidly increased in this period (Leupe 1879:227, 230).
78 VOC 3024 (1761); De Roo van Alderwerelt 1904:205.
79 VOC 2908 (1757), ff. 9-10.
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problems, Von Plüskow was also unable to use the size of  his army to his 
advantage due to issues of  cohesiveness, and he eventually had to retreat 
from Noimuti with its strong defences of  a triple palisade.80 The follow-
ing year he made a fresh attempt, starting with the lowland strongholds 
of  the Topasses. In July 1759, Tulang Ikan and Animata were swiftly 
captured in a seaborne expedition that originated from Kupang, while 
the weak governor of  Lifau dared not lift a finger against the enter-
prise. Meanwhile the Larantuqueiros carried out an attack against Fort 
Henricus on Solor which was repulsed with losses for the attackers.81 
The only thing now left standing in the way of  Von Plüskow’s plans was 
Noimuti. Once again the highland stronghold was besieged by a large 
VOC-led force, and once again it prevailed. Many Topasses from the 
lowlands joined the defenders in Noimuti, as well as a number of  fugitive 
slaves and other runaways from the VOC sphere, all of  whom flocked 
to the place. These people knew the harsh fate that would await them 
if  the stronghold fell to the Dutch, and so they fought with a desperate 
courage. As for the Company allies, they acted in much the same way as 
always and not in the least bit as a military unit should, refusing to storm 
Noimuti. The dreaded smallpox raged throughout the area and the 
Sawunese contingent withdrew in the face of  the epidemic. A rash sortie 
by the defenders completed the Dutch fiasco. In October, Von Plüskow 
had to admit defeat. He retreated to Kupang, leaving behind the cannon 
that had previously been carried with such effort. The Topasses now 
established a new stronghold in Oecusse on the coast, a few kilometres 
to the east of  Lifau.82
Nevertheless, internal Portuguese intrigues seemed to play into Von 
Plüskow’s hands. After 1759, three persons acted as caretaker governors 
in Lifau. One of  them, Vicente Ferreira de Carvalho, was forced to flee 
by another, the Dominican padre Jacinto de Conceição.83 The padre 
drew upon Topass support, thus meaning the struggle was also a case of  
White versus Black Portuguese. When Ferreira de Carvalho appeared 
in Kupang in 1761, Von Plüskow thought it the ideal opportunity to fi-
80 VOC 8352 (1758), ff. 7-12.
81 VOC 2965 (1759), ff. 12-5, 29-33.
82 VOC 2965 (1759), ff. 15-8; Fiedler 1931, 7:2-3. There are still oral traditions detailing the Dutch 
defeat in Noimuti; see Tey Seran et al. 2006:72-3. The extant stories mention a Manuel da Costa as be-
ing the war leader, and state that preparations included a blend of  traditional leu musu rituals and church 
ceremonies.
83 The third party, interestingly, was a native Timorese, King Dom José of  Alas (Matos 1974a:97, 139).
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nally achieve domination over the island. The refugee, namely, declared 
Oecusse and Noimuti to be rebels against the king of  Portugal, and offi-
cially ceded these places to the Company in return for its assistance in his 
bid to regain power.84 Without waiting for endorsement from Batavia, 
the belligerent opperhoofd proceeded with his plans. The ensuing events 
are described in a letter of  November 1761, written by three Company 
officials to the authorities in Batavia, and they are well worth quoting:
The opperhoofd Hans Albrecht von Plüskow went to Lifau with the ship 
De Batavier along with other private sloops and ships, on 8 October. He 
was accompanied by the Second Lieutenant Fredrik Karel Marlier and 
the scribe Willem Aadrian van Este, besides most of  the militaries, Eu-
ropeans as well as Balinese, and some burghers, Mardijkers and 400 
Sawunese. The aim was to restore the governor who had fled from this 
place. His Excellency luckily arrived there on 17 October. First, the Lifau 
governor took back his power and arrested the rebellious padre-governor 
[Jacinto de Conceicão]. The padre died a few days later in custody. 
Meanwhile the Topass chiefs of  Oecusse and Noimuti, Francisco Hor-
nay and António da Costa – who were abandoned by the White Por-
tuguese and knew that the latter had handed them over to the Noble 
Company for extermination – asked the opperhoofd by way of  an envoy for 
a pardon. They sought Company protection under assurances that they 
were intent on throwing away the Portuguese flag [no longer adhere to 
Portugal]. The opperhoofd again sent envoys on behalf  of  the Company 
in order to know their true wish and intention. These came back with 
the message that [the Topasses] only wished to be friends and allies with 
the Noble Company, and to be accepted like the other allied kings. They 
wished for no more than to speak with the opperhoofd in order to swear 
their oath of  loyalty. However, they alleged that they were afraid to come 
to Lifau under the eyes of  the Portuguese. For a second time they sent 
two envoys to assure the opperhoofd of  their good intentions, and to apply 
for a Company flag.
The opperhoofd suggested that the two envoys remain for a few days on 
the sloop of  the burgher David Schrijver, where they would be treated with 
food, drink and all necessities. The opperhoofd thereupon sent them a Com-
pany flag according to their request. Through a letter he let the envoys 
84 VOC 3024 (1761), f. 56-8.
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know that since they did not wish to come ashore at Lifau, they may rather 
appear at the Company ship that lay in the roadstead, in order to speak 
with His Excellency. He also told them to mention what day [Hornay and 
Da Costa] would like to come, so that the opperhoofd could pick them up 
halfway in a small craft. The two chiefs agreed on that and wrote a letter 
to the opperhoofd in Portuguese, stating that they were prepared to come 
aboard on Wednesday, 11 November. But instead two Oecusse arrived at 
the cape of  Lifau that afternoon. They came aboard and made it known 
by signs that the two chiefs Hornay and Da Costa were arriving. The opper-
hoofd, without wasting any time, stepped into the small craft accompanied 
by the Second Lieutenant Fredrik Karel Marlier, the burghers David Schri-
jver, Hendrik d’Moucheron and Carel Cobusz, besides the two envoys Bar-
tolomeu Dias and Salvador Pires from Oecusse, and went over there.
However, as he did not [?] see Hornay or Da Costa arriving, His Ex-
cellency and all the aforementioned people stepped ashore. He was then 
embraced by Hornay in person, and was received by a lot of  people with 
tokens of  honour, while the Company flag was hoisted. He [Von Plüs-
kow] sat down and spoke to these people. Then the opperhoofd and his 
company, and all the slaves who had come with him, were, without warn-
ing, miserably massacred in a treacherous fashion. After that the motley 
crew rushed to the small craft, where they finished off  yet six men and an 
under steersman in the same way. Only a sailor, a common burgher and 
a slave boy of  David Schrijver were able to save themselves by swimming 
ashore. In addition, the scribe Van Este had not been able to come along 
due to sickness, but had remained in Lifau and thus remained alive. Upon 
his arrival [back to Kupang] he recounted this story.
Due to this disaster, the government of  Lifau once again fell into disor-
der, as they could only hope for Company assistance to defend their govern-
ment against the attack by the Oecusse. Thus the governor, his wife and two 
other Portuguese were brought back here [to Kupang] again on De Batavier, 
and once again sought Company protection. All the others fled aboard the 
Macao ship and turned their course towards Dili in order to seek safety 
there. And they left the government of  Lifau as prey [to the Topasses].85
At first glance, the massacre was a clear-cut case of  Topass treachery. 
However, as time progressed, other pieces of  information reached the 
85 VOC 3002 (1761), ff. 1734-8.
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Dutch ears that complicated the situation. By this time, fugitive slaves 
from the Dutch sphere constituted a substantial part of  the Oecusse 
population. The contract that was being drafted stipulated that these ex-
slaves were to be returned to their former masters; it goes without saying 
that those concerned would do their utmost to avoid this fate. Among 
those present at the shore on that fateful November day was a former 
slave who had escaped to the Topasses and risen to the rank of  captain. 
He was the first one to pull the trigger of  his musket, firing at the hap-
less Dutch, whereupon others followed suit.86 Furthermore, some days 
before the massacre a Dutch lieutenant had visited Oecusse in order to 
translate the draft of  the contract for Hornay and Da Costa. The settle-
ment was suddenly agitated, when inhabitants received the news that the 
ship belonging to the VOC captain Lindholm had fired at the people on 
the shore. The Topass leaders angrily told the lieutenant to get out quick-
ly to avoid being lynched, which he did. As we have seen, his flight only 
prolonged his life by a few days. Von Plüskow was furious with Lindholm 
and threatened to send him to Batavia as a prisoner, but the damage was 
already done.87 A third assertion was put forward by Francisco Hornay 
himself  in 1767, during a brief  flirtation with the VOC: the ungrateful 
White Portuguese had incited the Oecusseans to kill the Dutchmen.88
While the circumstances remain shrouded in mystery, the conse-
quences are much clearer. The Dutch project immediately imploded; 
Batavia reacted in much the same way as it did after the killings of  Jacob 
Verheyden and Jan Anthony Meulenbeek: the opperhoofd had been care-
less and only had himself  to blame. He had engaged in an adventure 
that was unlikely to be advantageous to the Company, and there was 
no need to equip a retaliatory expedition. The massacre was thus never 
avenged, which, understandably, was deemed to be a sign of  weakness by 
the Timorese. For many months the Topasses and their Timorese clients 
celebrated by parading the head of  the Mecklenburger who strove to 
conquer Timor for the Dutch.89
86 VOC 8359 (1766), ff. 17-8.
87 VOC 3059 (1762), f. 9.
88 VOC 3215 (1767), f. 164. A similar story was told in 1772 by the French visitor François-Etienne 
de Rosily, who heard that Domingos da Costa II massacred the Dutch in order to please the White Por-
tuguese (Lombard-Jourdain 1982:93). Various rumours relating to the murder, of  uncertain origins, are 
given by Heijmering 1847:177-82.
89 VOC 3002 (1761), f. 1729; VOC 3059 (1762), f. 9; Boxer 1947:16.
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two ports in decline
The hectic final days of  Von Plüskow were witness to the deepest humili-
ation yet of  the Estado da Índia and the illusory triumph of  the VOC. 
In the following years, however, both entities led a troublesome exis-
tence, exhibiting apparent difficulties in co-opting their clients. Unlike 
its Portuguese counterpart, the VOC port was not seriously threatened, 
but it was increasingly clear that its former role as the site of  a stranger 
king could not easily be translated on a Timor-wide level given the obvi-
ous difficulties in forging an effective political network. This role, on the 
other hand, is one that the monarchy of  Portugal had occupied for many 
years: a network underpinned by politico-religious symbols helped the 
Estado to survive against seemingly overwhelming odds.
From a Dutch as well as from an indigenous perspective, there could 
hardly have been a worse successor to Von Plüskow. Johan ter Herbruggen 
(gov. 1762-1765) seems to have easily been the most covetous and corrupt 
opperhoofd of  the VOC period. The Timor documents from the mid-1760s 
abound with stories detailing his extortion of  local princes and townsfolk. 
The five original allies nevertheless remained fundamentally loyal to the 
VOC. They now carried an official rank that was higher than the more 
populated domains of  the interior, and when the Dutch offered the rul-
ers the title of  Don (Dom) like those of  the formerly Portuguese lands, 
they proudly declared that they had no need for Portuguese titles. It was 
quite another matter, however, with the recent allies made inland. Latent 
dissatisfaction with the Company system came to a head with a series of  
uprisings during the time of  Ter Herbruggen’s successors.1
1 Ter Herbruggen also sent a pirate-like expedition to Sumba, which alienated the chiefs of  that 
island from the Company (VOC 3251 [1769], f. 744).
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The extraction of  gold from the rivers was an unpopular burden for 
the Sonbai of  the interior to carry. Accidents occurred and the sub-rulers 
feared for their own safety, since the kinsmen of  the casualties would 
rather turn their anger towards them than towards the Dutch.2 The 
project soon became loaded with danger from another quarter. The usif 
of  Mollo was an Oematan, as was the regent family of  Lesser Sonbai, 
and after the Battle of  Penfui he was assumed to be subordinate to the 
emperor of  this princedom.3 He nevertheless acted in a fiercely inde-
pendent manner, carrying out massacres in various gold-mining camps 
in 1765 and 1767. The precise cause of  these deeds remained unclear 
to the Dutch, but there were ominous rumours that the Sonbai dynasty 
itself  was involved.4 If  the intention was to guard the Sonbai inland from 
the covetous Dutch then it turned out to be very successful. The then op-
perhoofd, Alexander Cornabé (gov. 1767-1772), had no means to avenge 
the last massacre, and the gold-mining project ceased completely by 
circa 1770 (Müller 1857, II:138-9). Indeed, after Von Plüskow, no VOC 
opperhoofd took the trouble to travel inland, complete with all its dangers.
The weakness of  the Company was similarly demonstrated by 
Timau, the area of  Amfoan that lay on the north coast. When King 
Dom Bernardo da Costa died in a skirmish in 1753, he was succeeded 
by his brother Tusala. Whilst initially praising Tusala for a number of  
virtues the Dutch soon changed their opinion when he began to engage 
in anti-VOC activities. In 1767, shortly after he had committed some 
particularly bloody acts against the Company allies, he was suddenly par-
doned by the opperhoofd. In much the same way as previous instances, the 
Company again realized that they had no power to punish determined 
opponents, as Cornabé himself  admitted. One reason as to why Kupang 
was so powerless, was that few Dutch troops could be allocated to such 
an unprofitable island. After 1733, malaria killed off  a large proportion 
of  incoming Europeans to Batavia, which suddenly made Kupang the 
healthier place to be. All of  this affected the VOC’s ability to staff  the 
outposts in the archipelago or to organize military expeditions.5 
While Dutch power in West Timor declined, the Portuguese sphere 
2 VOC 3473 (1777), ff. 515b-516a.
3 VOC 3473 (1777), f. 515b.
4 VOC 3151 (1765), ff. 11-3; VOC 3215 (1767), ff. 665a.
5 Van der Brug 1994:155; Jones 2003:44. The mortality rate for Batavia in 1768/69 was 36%, for 
Banten 19%, for Cape Town 17% and for Timor 6%. In Indonesia, only Makassar had lower death 
rates.
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fell into chaos, reminiscent of  the situation in the early eighteenth cen-
tury. In the wake of  the Von Plüskow affair, a number of  interim juntas 
attempted to govern the ‘colony’. A central figure in the somewhat con-
fused political situation of  the 1760s was the Oecusse leader, Francisco 
Hornay III. Through the murder of  Von Plüskow, his Topasses had 
probably regained much of  the military prestige that they had lost in 
1749 (Andaya 2010). Francisco Hornay was a sly yet enterprising figure 
who was guided by his activist mother, Dona Agostinha. This lady was, 
according to the Lifau government, ‘the person who foments and has 
always fomented all the wicked things and machinations against this port 
and all the royal domains on these islands’ (Castro 1867:260). Hornay 
briefly joined one of  the juntas in 1762-1763 but then had a falling-
out with his colleagues and withdrew. In May 1766, he openly rebelled 
against Lifau, and in July of  the following year he attacked the port.6 
The conflicts that were apparent in these years cannot simply be reduced 
to the old White versus Black Portuguese dichotomy. Hornay made 
overtures towards Alexander Cornabé and asked for protection and as-
sistance against Lifau, but not every Topass appreciated his venture. The 
Company was still perceived as the antithesis of  both Portugal and the 
true religion, and the Da Costas preferred instead to maintain contact 
with the Lifau government, leading to a situation where the Topass 
group was temporarily split into two camps.7
Matters came to a head in 1768 when a new regular governor sailed 
to Timor. This was António José Telles de Meneses (gov. 1768-1776), 
who had gained much experience as an administrator in Mozambique 
and Macao. His arrival coincided with the death of  Raja Dom Gaspar 
of  Larantuka, who favoured the Estado da Índia. It was only by this 
time that the native rajas of  Larantuka had become both active and re-
sourceful rulers, at roughly the same time as the Hornays and Da Costas 
confined their activities to Timor. The new raja, Dom Manuel was in 
favour of  the Topasses and sent auxiliaries to Hornay, who by now had 
blocked Lifau. The Dutch described the struggle as a showdown between 
the White and Black Portuguese that could only possibly end with the 
destruction of  one or other of  them.8 There was bitter personal resent-
ment against the whites, who arrested 23 prominent Topasses when they 
6 VOC 3779 (1785-88), f. 5730-1.
7 VOC 3215 (1767), f. 654b.
8 VOC 3249 (1769), f. 746.
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came to negotiate. The Lifau fortifications were too strong to be taken by 
assault, but Hornay managed to block the port from the land as well as 
the sea. The Da Costa brothers Domingos and António joined Hornay 
in the enterprise.9
Finally António José Telles de Meneses realized the impossibility 
of  beating the hostile onslaught. He was responsible for 1,200 people 
in Lifau, including slaves, and there was no way of  protecting them. 
Subsequently he resolved to give up the post that he had endured for 
67 troubled years. During the night of  11 August 1769, he put artillery 
and inhabitants into the available boats, set fire to all the buildings and 
left in haste.10 During the siege Francisco Hornay sent envoys to tell 
Cornabé that he may well consider turning Lifau over to the VOC. 
Similar words had been uttered eight years previously, with a now well-
known result, and Batavia as well as Amsterdam reiterated their wish not 
to get involved with the internecine Portuguese troubles. Such an action 
would only be interpreted as trouble, trouble that was likely to outweigh 
the benefits of  such a mission. After Francisco Hornay had taken Lifau 
he declined to follow up the previous offer.11 His relations with Kupang 
nevertheless remained good, and – if  a somewhat later Portuguese text 
can be trusted – his party swore a blood-oath with the Company and was 
given back the head of  Gaspar da Costa, slain twenty years earlier, an 
important symbolic gesture.12
The Topass victory, however, was hollow. The reward for the lengthy 
siege was a burnt-out settlement with little or no booty to be had. The 
Topasses kept an area of  land centred in Oecusse, plus the highland 
enclave of  Noimuti, as well as concluding a symbiotic relationship with 
the original lords of  the land of  Ambeno. The Hornay or Da Costa 
leader was henceforth known as king or raja of  Oecusse, indicative of  an 
ongoing indigenization and a change from the early colonial economic 
structures. These structures, which also exhibited precolonial features, 
had in the past included coercive trade with local polities, and had been 
9 Matos 1974a:438. The Da Costa brothers were among those 23 people imprisoned in Lifau. Ac-
cording to a Dutch source seen by Boxer (1947:16), these people were executed by Telles de Meneses. De 
Rosily’s account from 1772 nevertheless indicates that Domingos da Costa survived (Lombard-Jourdain 
1982:93).
10 Telles de Meneses’s own account of  this is found in Castro 1867:252-3.
11 VOC 8301 (1772), ff. 25-6.
12 VOC 3779 (1785-88), f. 5732. The issue of  winning back the heads of  slain rulers is a theme in 
Timorese oral tradition (Parera 1994:190-3).
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based on political dominance over wide territories. These times, however, 
were now over, and the very word ‘Topass’ seems to have disappeared 
from usage in the nineteenth century.13 The Dutch impact was no doubt 
a principal reason for the declining Topass fortunes – in spite of  the 
Dutch experiencing their own difficulties. While some new allies of  the 
Company became unwilling and even defected, they did not return to 
the Topass network.14 The old military advantage of  the mestizos was 
lessened by the dissemination of  firearms among indigenous groups. The 
incomes derived from sandalwood, beeswax and slaves that co-operation 
with the West Timorese domains had engendered before 1749, did 
not reappear. Larantuka and Sikka on Flores retained a (mainly Black) 
Portuguese attachment, and the rajas of  Larantuka had matrimonial ties 
with the Hornays.15 Nevertheless, the indigenous Florenese rajas rather 
than the Hornays and Da Costas ruled the former Portuguese stronghold 
after the 1760s. Trade on Timor by the late eighteenth century onwards 
was dominated by Chinese people whose flexible approach to business 
replaced the older structures. Global trade quickened during the same 
period and with it the Chinese junk trade in Southeast Asia. Although 
the junk trade to Batavia declined, the Chinese staying in, or going to, 
Timor stabilized their position.16 
Furthermore, much of  whatever influence the Topasses might have 
enjoyed in East Timor vanished with their seizure of  Lifau. The royalist 
fleet led by Telles de Meneses made a stopover in Batugade and pon-
dered upon the viability of  a new permanent stronghold. In spite of  the 
Lifau debacle, the East Timorese elites were not averse to receiving the 
White Portuguese in their land. While the siege was still in progress, they 
decided to settle at Vemasse, whose king, Dom Felipe de Freitas Soares, 
was attached to the Portuguese; this was the same Vemasse that was 
13 Nineteenth-century European officials do not use the term in their reports, but rather speak of  
Oecusse people (Oeykoessiers). The term is nevertheless preserved in the ritual language in Amfoan and 
Oecusse (Hendrik Ataupah, Kupang, interview 27-11-2009).
14 At best, they entered into temporary strategic alliances with Oecusse. Thus Nai To Oematan of  
Mollo, an usif subordinated to Greater Sonbai, quarrelled with the then emperor in 1798, and briefly 
co-operated with Pedro Hornay (ANRI VOC:4059, Missive, Batavia to Kupang, 2-3-1802). Mollo was 
soon inside the Sonbai sphere once again, however. The king of  Ambeno, the original lord of  the land, 
was closely related to the Hornays, but he, too, sent periodical gifts of  homage to the Dutch authorities. 
As late as 1851, a prince of  Ambeno visited Kupang (ANRI Timor:60, Kort verslag, sub 20-5-1851).
15 Castro 1867:212. Larantuka was still dependent on the Topasses around 1780 (Van Hogendorp 
1780:97).
16 Schlicher 1996:100-2; Pan 1999:51-2; Gupta 2001:123; Lombard-Jourdain 1998.
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ravaged by Matheus da Costa in 1668. Although Vemasse offered good 
defences, Telles de Meneses finally decided upon Dili in the territory 
of  the important Motael (Mota Ain) princedom. Dili, it will be remem-
bered, served as a refuge for the White Portuguese in 1761. A new 
Portuguese stronghold was founded there on 10 October 1769.17 
Dili offered more advantages than any other feasible alternative. It 
was unhealthy, but little attention was paid to this at the time. Coral 
banks protected the beach from the breakers, which made it the only 
place suitable to anchor large ships on the island. Kupang, Lifau and 
Oecusse are ports that are open to adverse winds (Castro 1862:474-5). 
Dili was surrounded by a sizeable plain suitable for rice cultivation, so 
that its hinterland could support a considerable population, and to the 
south were swampy lands that offered protection against native enemies. 
The king of  Motael, Dom Alexandre Rodrigues Pereira, enthusiasti-
cally offered gifts to the Crown of  Portugal: large fields and lands for 
cultivation, a supply of  firewood, wood for construction, horses and men 
(Matos 1974a:98-9). Soon after they had settled at Dili, the majority of  
the rulers of  the Province of  Belu came to offer their homage to the gov-
ernor; in that way, the fact that the royalist centre had moved to the east, 
served to tie the East Timorese domains to the Crown. In Dili, Telles de 
Meneses was present along with some 40 White Portuguese and a size-
able troop of  sepoys, non-white soldiers trained in Western fashion, with 
most of  them coming from Goa and Mozambique. Only at this point in 
time do we find clear evidence in the sources of  the presence of  soldiers 
from Portuguese Africa in Timor.18
17 Marques Soares 2003:44 relates some details about this process that were not found in published 
Portuguese sources, and were possibly dependent upon oral tradition. After fleeing Lifau, Teles de Men-
eses would have visited Kefamenanu and Kupang, before being expelled to Dili by the ruler of  Sonbai. 
Dutch archival sources on the other hand indicate that Sonbai was, for once, not involved in this cata-
clysmic affair.
18 Lombard-Jourdain 1982:94. As we have seen, there were ‘Kaffers’ present on Timor at the time of  
António Hornay. There were Goa plans to provide reinforcements to the hard-pressed António Coelho 
Guerreiro by way of  cafres in the early years of  the eighteenth century, although in the end they do not 
seem to have reached Timor (Faria de Morais 1944:125). By 1813, out of  a population of  1,768 in Dili, 
688 were African slaves, which was apparently the result of  the annual import of  slaves from Mozam-
bique to Portuguese Asia (Gunn n.y.:52-3).
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chaos in the west, stabilization in the east
With the stirring events of  1761 and 1769, the stage was set for almost 
two centuries of  colonial division. It was a division that was of  practically 
no consequence for large groups of  Timorese who had little or nothing 
to do with either the Dutch or the Portuguese. Still, the Battle of  Penfui, 
the murder of  Von Plüskow, and the transfer of  administrative power 
from Lifau to Dili were events that provided the prerequisites for a re-
drawing of  the political map in 1859, which was finalized in 1916, and 
again in 1999. We shall now take a brief  look at the ways in which the 
two colonial entities managed to stabilize their respective spheres in the 
years leading up to the Napoleonic Wars. 
The Atoni princedoms of  Amanatun, Amarasi and Amfoan-Timau, 
and the Tocodede-speaking Maubara, enjoyed predominantly amicable 
relations with the Company during the last three decades of  the century. 
Ambeno, as well as Belu (in its more restricted Central Timorese sense), 
continued in their vacillating stance and had occasionally written the 
annual native letter of  homage to Batavia. Jean-Baptiste Pelon noted in 
1778 that the princes on the south coast of  the island would favour either 
Dutch or Portuguese traders, depending on the circumstances, but had 
not formed a steady attachment to one or the other. Ironically, this was 
the only area left on Timor where one could still obtain a good amount 
of  sandalwood, the principal economic rationale behind the foreign 
presence (Pelon 2002:8-9). As the sandalwood stands along the coast 
continued to decrease in number, the price of  sandalwood rose from 
15 cents per pound before 1750 to 55 cents in the late 1780s. Timorese 
suppliers now tended to sort the wood according to its quality rather 
than just sell it at a single price. Under the right conditions, there were 
therefore still profits to be made, profits which were enhanced by the fact 
that the Chinese demand for sandalwood increased during this period 
because of  the trade with China carried on by so called country traders. 
Moreover, in 1792 the Company tried to reduce the costs of  maintaining 
the Kupang post by loosening the restrictions on the Timor trade (Jacobs 
2000:35).
The major problem for the Dutch were the important inland realms 
of  Greater Sonbai and Amanuban. The emperor Usi Ana, alias Albertus 
Johannes Taffy, passed away in 1768; according to the rumours, he 
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had been poisoned.19 His young son Alphonsus Adrianus, or Nai Kau 
Sonbai, (1762-1802) was raised in the household of  the opperhoofden in 
order to avoid the problems that haunted Dutch relations with previ-
ous emperors. The result, however, was not the outcome desired by the 
Dutch, according to the sombre judgement of  opperhoofd Barend Fokkens: 
there was reason to fear that the youngster would develop the same 
ostensibly bad character as his father.20 To make matters more com-
plicated, the young man inherited the lordship of  Lesser Sonbai when 
that line expired in 1776.21 For the first time since 1657-1658 there was 
technically one single Sonbai realm, but the union was not destined to 
be a long or lucky one.
Later Dutch writers tended to blame the miserly opperhoofd Willem 
Adriaan van Este (gov. 1777-1789) for the Dutch-Sonbai break that 
subsequently followed. According to a well-known story told in the nine-
teenth century, the young Alphonsus Adrianus happened to overhear 
an ominous conversation between Van Este, an influential Chinese man 
and the emperor’s governor and relative, Bernardus Nisnoni. The three 
men resolved to remove Alphonsus Adrianus from power in order to 
further their own ambitions. The emperor immediately mounted a horse 
and galloped out of  Kupang, never to return. Instead, he found that he 
had followers in the highlands where the name of  Sonbai was still held 
in high regard (Heijmering 1847:193; B. 1852:219; Veth 1855:708). 
Nothing of  this kind is hinted at in the reports of  Van Este himself, 
who only admits that the emperor secretly left Kupang for unspeci-
fied reasons, and that he initiated trouble inland in 1782-1783.22 Oral 
Timorese tradition, however, suggests a ‘pull’ rather than ‘push’ factor by 
way of  explanation for the flight of  Alphonsus Adrianus. The highland 
chiefs found the absence of  a monarch in their territory distressing and 
sent a delegation to Kupang, which persuaded the young ruler to return 
with them (Middelkoop 1938:435; Fobia 1984:91-2). Regardless of  the 
details, the Timorese perspective on the story is indeed plausible, since 
a symbolic central figure was no doubt needed to maintain the coher-
ence of  the Sonbai realm. In Alphonsus Adrianus, the highland Atoni 
received a lord who was an activist figure, and therefore quite atypical 
19 VOC 3779 (1785-88), f. 8707.
20 VOC 3473 (1777), ff. 514b-515a.
21 VOC 3465 (1776).
22 VOC 3649 (1783).
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of  the traditional diarchy. In a sense he reinvented Sonbai and made it 
into an aggressive and even expansive polity that, for the first time in 
living memory, depended on neither the Dutch nor the Portuguese. His 
European upbringing may have influenced his rather intricate political 
manoeuvring, although he acted much like any Southeast Asian ‘man 
of  prowess’.
Gathering thousands of  followers, Alphonsus Adrianus formed an 
alliance with Amfoan-Timau and Ambeno, and also with a dissatisfied 
prince from Amanuban called Tobani. With these supposed allies of  the 
Company at his side he attacked Mollo, a Sonbai component which over 
the last few decades had followed an independent route, and plundered 
its almost impenetrable mountain stronghold of  Kauniki.23 Adrianus’ 
former governor, Bernardus Nisnoni, tried to talk him out of  the en-
terprise via envoys, but to no avail, which was hardly surprising given 
his previous plotting against the young ruler. The emperor nevertheless 
continued to send gifts of  homage to Kupang year after year, so that it 
seemed as if  he were not really working against the VOC. In 1786 he 
allowed his troops to attack Dirma in the Belu area, which was under the 
control of  the Dutch. He captured the loro and his family along with a 
booty consisting of  cattle, horses and people. Some captives were sent as 
a present to Van Este, who was not amused.24 It seems that Alphonsus 
Adrianus made use of  the simmering rivalry between Kupang and Dili, 
playing the two colonial entities against each other: Dili by this time had 
claimed Dirma as part of  its territory and its governor, João Baptista 
Vieira Godinho, reacted angrily to the ‘Dutch’ incursion. In spite of  his 
actions in Dirma, Alphonsus Adrianus made contact with a Portuguese 
padre who resided in Noimuti and who sold weapons to the Sonbai lord 
via Oecusse. The Dutch found out about this trade, which aroused their 
anger against the Portuguese. The following years saw a very heated 
exchange of  letters between the two ports, with both sides accusing the 
other of  acting in an outrageous and dishonest way.25
By this time, a state of  open warfare existed between Sonbai and the 
Company. In 1786, Emperor Adrianus led an attack on the very heart 
of  the area under direct VOC control, which cost the life of  the king of  
Kupang, Kolang Tepak. Soon after this, his troops devastated the settle-
23 VOC 3674 (1784), ff. 5, 39; De Roo van Alderwerelt 1904:214.
24 VOC 3779 (1785-88), ff. 5692-5.
25 VOC 3779 (1785-88), ff. 5705-6, 5749-51.
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ment of  Pariti on the north-eastern shore of  Kupang Bay.26 Captain 
William Bligh, who arrived in Kupang in 1789 after his remarkable sea 
trip, commented that the ravages committed during the war had brought 
about such a scarcity of  provisions that the effects could still clearly be 
seen at the time of  his stay.27 Finally Van Este took the less than heroic, 
but well-tried step of  granting the emperor a pardon in 1788. This being 
done, Kupang reported to Batavia that everything on Timor was once 
again peaceful and in order.28
This was, however, not quite true. Greater Sonbai remained an au-
tonomous entity that managed its own affairs, and Alphonsus Adrianus 
was never actually punished; he continued to reside on the fortified rock 
of  Nefo a few days travel east of  Kupang, until his death in 1802.29 After 
the outbreak of  the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in 1780, the Company 
suffered an acute financial crisis, which meant that unprofitable out-
posts became a low priority (Gaastra 2003). In these waning days of  
the VOC, there were clear indications of  the level of  impotency of  the 
Dutch establishment, reminiscent of  the worst days of  humiliation suf-
fered by the Portuguese Lifau government. In 1792, Alphonsus Adrianus 
intervened in a succession issue in Amabi and ravaged land that was 
loyal to the Company. The Dutch opperhoofd Timoteus Wanjon (gov. 
1789-1797) was bewildered by the ferocious behaviour of  a princedom 
that had just ‘submitted’ to VOC rule, but he could do little about it. 
At precisely the same time, Maubara, which doggedly remained a part 
of  the precarious VOC system, came under severe threat from Oecusse 
and Ambeno, and this time Wanjon reacted quickly. He gave his bless-
ings to Alphonsus Adrianus to intervene in Maubara, on the condition 
that it must not be known that Kupang was behind the enterprise; the 
governor in Dili should not be provoked more than necessary. In other 
words, Wanjon cunningly used the same ruler, who had just ravaged the 
26 ANRI Timor:7, Algemeene missiven (1786); VOC 3787 (1787), f. 578a; VOC 3810 (1788), f. 41.
27 Miller 1996:65. A short Dutch account of  the mutiny on the Bounty and Bligh’s adventurous sea 
journey to Kupang can be found in VOC 3859 (1789), ff. 4-5.
28 VOC 3659 (1789), f. 76-9.
29 B. 1852:219 incorrectly asserts that Alphonsus Adrianus died in 1819, while an original Dutch 
source actually reports his death in early 1803, implying that it took place in 1802 (ANRI VOC:4059, 
Missive from Batavia to Kupang, 15-3-1803). A long letter that Alphonsus Adrianus sent to the Company 
in 1798 contains a circumstantial story about a conflict with the Oematan lord of  Mollo (LOr 2238, UB 
Leiden; Raad der Aziatische Bezittingen1800-1806, No. 131, Nationaal Archief). Oral tradition also men-
tions that Nai Kau Sonbai (Alphonsus Adrianus) fell out with Kono-Oematan after he had killed two of  
their men, who were accused of  having an illicit affair with his wife (Fobia 1984:92-3).
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land belonging to a faithful ally, to solve a problem for the VOC. The 
Dutch to all intents and purposes, made a virtue out of  necessity and 
improvised their shaky Timor policy as far as was possible. In this case 
it worked, since the commanders of  Oecusse and Ambeno mismanaged 
the operation, and Maubara remained affiliated to the VOC for the 
time being.30
In actual fact, Greater Sonbai held a degree of  influence in Belu. 
Alphonsus Adrianus was reportedly the ‘support and consolation’ of  the 
central Tetun regents by the 1790s.31 The Oecusse ruler Pedro Hornay, 
now at peace with Dili, attempted to tie these regents more closely to 
the Portuguese network by spreading a false rumour that the Sonbai 
lord had died. The fraud was soon discovered, and the Belu suggested 
that Alphonsus Adrianus join forces to attack the lands of  Hornay, but 
Timoteus Wanjon advised against the adventure and strongly urged 
the emperor to keep the peace with Oecusse. Nevertheless, hostilities 
between Oecusse and Sonbai are known to have lasted until at least 
1810, and to have had dire consequences for the Portuguese sandalwood 
trade.32 The contrast with the heyday of  Topass rule is apparent, and 
confirms what is said in a Dutch report from circa 1819: the power of  
the Black Portuguese had receded greatly in recent times, and they were 
not nearly as feared as before.33
The active stance assumed by Alphonsus Adrianus also sparked off  a 
few other cases of  recalcitrance towards the Company. The Amanuban 
prince Tobani claimed a new position as ruler of  the princedom, and 
used the 1786 warfare to attack the king, despite his Dutch support. The 
larger part of  Amanuban henceforth acknowledged Tobani, who acted 
with great spite towards the Dutch.34 Especially under the leadership 
of  his son Don Louis (r. circa 1808-1824), Amanuban developed into a 
belligerent power that managed to hold British and Dutch adversaries at 
bay in spite of  several expeditions. In the same way, the important Belu 
realm of  Fialaran denounced the VOC in 1786 and made contact with 
30 VOC 3960 (1792), ff. 55-60; Castro 1867:291. In a letter of  homage from 23-11-1798, the East Ti-
morese domains Nusadila and Lanqueiro are also mentioned, together with Maubara, as being affiliated 
to the Dutch (Raad der Aziatische Bezittingen 1800-1806, No. 131, Nationaal Archief). In a treaty of  1859, 
the Netherlands finally ceded Maubara to Portugal. The takeover was implemented in 1861 (ANRI 
Timor:104, Kort verslag, sub 22-3-1861; Pélissier 1996:40).
31 Comité Oost-Indische Handel en Bezittingen 1795, No. 102, Nationaal Archief.
32 Comité Oost-Indische Handel en Bezittingen 1795, No. 102, Nationaal Archief; Castro 1867:213-5.
33 Iets over het eiland Timor, c.1819, H 245a, KITLV.
34 For a legendary version of  this, see Parera 1994:200.
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Dili, possibly because of  the perceived level of  Dutch impotency in the 
face of  the Sonbai onslaught.35
During this era Greater Sonbai and Amanuban were contest realms, 
characterized by the atypical activism of  traditionally inactive rulers. 
That their status was dependent on the personal qualities of  their lead-
ers is shown by their shifting fortunes during the nineteenth century. 
There was no real move towards state formation, but power was wielded 
through traditional channels, and relied upon alliances, wife-giving rela-
tions, and the Dutch unwillingness to penetrate the inland.36 Sonbai was 
split up between various usif in the early nineteenth century, and power 
had to be reassembled in a slow and cumbersome manner by the next 
35 VOC 3767 (1787).
36 In the early nineteenth century, the king of  Amanuban was considered ‘the only one who has re-
duced any part of  his subjects to a state of  discipline’. He trained a large corps of  horsemen armed with 
muskets, like the Pindaris of  India, but the rapid decline of  royal power after the death of  Don Louis 
demonstrates the fragility of  the system (Moor 1968:7-8).
The Sonbai ruler Pieter Nube, who ruled in 1798-1821, with French 
visitors. Illustration by Jacques Arago, who followed the expedition of  L.-C. 
Freycinet in 1818. This is the only known portrait of  an early Sonbai ruler.
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ruler, Nai Sobe Sonbai (reign 1808-1867).37 Towards the late nineteenth 
century, the wide but incoherent realm once again began to break up, 
and this time the onset of  real colonial rule prevented its resurgence. In 
1906, the last emperor was captured by Dutch troops, an act indicative 
of  the definitive end of  Greater Sonbai. After circa 1824 Amanuban, 
too, experienced long periods of  fragmentation until it was finally 
brought under complete Dutch domination in 1906-1910 (McWilliam 
2002:55-60; Farram 2003:74-9, 90-8; Farram 2009).
In spite of  all these disturbances in the interior of  the island, Dutch 
authority in the Kupang area remained intact, with the five loyal allies 
still forming a protective belt. After the flight of  the emperor, the Lesser 
Sonbai princedom continued under the Nisnoni side-branch which, like 
the other four loyal allies, never questioned the Company’s status as 
stranger lord up until the 1940s. When the French Revolutionary Wars 
reached the East Indies in the 1790s, this was demonstrated in a remark-
able fashion. As a consequence of  the Kew letters issued by the exiled 
Dutch stadtholder, British squadrons were dispatched to secure a number 
of  VOC posts. A small British expedition approached Kupang in 1797 
and tried to pressure Timoteus Wanjon and his council into capitulating 
without a fight, but the Company servant Carel Gratus Greeving refused 
to surrender. He met with the Sonbai, Amabi and Taebenu lords and 
asked their opinion about the situation. They replied: ‘We rajas have the 
land and Tuan has the sea.’ In a written statement the rulers commented, 
‘From that statement, Tuan could then see that we rajas in the land of  
Kupang have the Lord Company at heart’.38 The British soldiers who 
had been posted in Kupang were subsequently assaulted and massacred, 
and the expedition left after using the ship’s artillery to reduce the town 
to rubble. 
Similarly, a second British attack in April 1811 was defeated, mainly 
by Amabi marksmen who had been recruited by the Eurasian resident 
(commander)39 Jacobus Arnoldus Hazaart. It was only in January 1812 
37 Although the concept of  ‘contest state’ might be useful here, the denomination ‘state’ fails to cover 
the situation of  Timorese princedoms (compare Henk Schulte Nordholt 1996:4-10). In the contest state, 
a complex of  vertical relations between ruler and entourage had to be reconstructed with each succes-
sion. The power of  Nai Sobe Sonbai as the heir of  Alphonsus Adrianus was stabilized in 1808 (Timor:9, 
Missive from Kupang to Batavia, 10-9- 1808). However, his level of  authority fluctuated greatly during 
almost 60 years of  turbulent rule.
38 LOr 2242, 1798, UB Leiden; Meursinge 1845:xix-xx.
39 After the dissolution of  the VOC in 1799-1800, the term resident is used rather than opperhoofd.
406
| Lords of  the land, lords of  the sea
that a British ship persuaded Fort Concordia to surrender without a 
blow, several months after the capitulation of  the Dutch and French in 
Java (Farram 2007:461-6). After the return of  the Dutch in circa 1819, 
a witness was intrigued by the scene in Kupang of  allied kings greeting 
a visiting commissioner. They appeared at the meeting clad in costumes 
from the VOC period, and ‘it was noted that when the name of  the East 
India Company was still pronounced by them, it was done so with deep 
reverence’.40 That was two decades after the rather unspectacular end 
of  the VOC.
The old system was maintained in a modified version during the 
nineteenth century, meaning that it was still ‘early colonial’ and built on 
reciprocity between foreign lord and indigenous allies. In a friendly con-
versation with a Dutch resident in the 1870s, the ruler of  Amabi expressed 
no qualms about the symbiotic relationship between his princedom 
and the Dutch local government, nor about his own strong position in 
the system: ‘If  you are attacked yourself, and I do not assist you, then 
you will be rapidly put to the sword even if  the other small rajas come 
to your help. But when I help you, you need not fear anything’ (Schets 
1877:339). As late as in the 1890s, according to a former controleur (local 
administrative headman), ‘the interior was still almost “terra incognita”, 
the encounters that we had with the inhabitants were only sporadic and 
superficial and did not always leave the most pleasant memories. And 
in the 5% [of  the territory] where we had a say, we did almost nothing. 
There was no question of  roads and bridges, corvée labour, taxes, cul-
tivation, and so on; we preserved the order as good or bad as could be, 
and that was that’ (Grijzen 1923:466).
Certain theories of  imperialism have noted a tendency among co-
lonial powers to expand their influence informally until a relatively late 
point in time. Formal control was normally only implemented in times 
of  absolute necessity, as when indigenous groups resisted the economic 
and political dispositions of  the colonial overlords (Ardhana 2000:5-7). 
Timor, in the decades surrounding 1900, would be a case in point: from 
an economic point of  view, the Timor area during the nineteenth cen-
tury was characterized by a relatively open system in which several trad-
ing networks existed, operated by Indonesian, Chinese and Arab traders. 
After 1891, a regular line of  Dutch government shipping began to alter 
40 Iets over het eiland Timor, c.1819, H 245a, KITLV.
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the situation, and in the early twentieth century the old trading struc-
tures were subordinated to the colonial economic system (Parimartha 
2008:75-7). In the meantime, economic change was matched by political 
restructuring. The two halves of  the island now saw the colonial pow-
ers penetrate Timor further, which meant that the functioning of  the 
five loyal allies as a protective belt, as rightfully pointed out by the king 
of  Amabi, no longer existed. The consequences thereof  were soon vis-
ible: in 1910 and 1917 these domains merged into a few zelfbesturende 
landschappen as part of  a Dutch plan to rationalize local governance (Van 
Dijk 1925, 1934; Bongenaar 2005:23, 73, 358). Today the descendants 
of  the old princely families lead modest urban lives in the lower-middle-
class echelons, occasionally carving a minor career for themselves as a 
bureaucrat or local politician.
After 1769, the Portuguese establishment in Dili led a more stable 
existence than the old Lifau post, but it was still not approaching any-
thing akin to a colonial power in the modern sense of  the word. Alliances 
shifted rapidly back and forth, and a ruler who had recently adhered to 
the Company’s rule, could suddenly decide to offer an oath of  allegiance 
to the Crown. Thus some of  the lords of  the central Belu area were per-
suaded to come to Batugade in 1777 and offer their loyalty to Portugal 
once more.41 A few cases of  anti-Portuguese resistance occurred, espe-
cially in the important and influential domain of  Luca during the late 
1770s. Luca had hitherto usually supported the Crown of  Portugal, but 
now a woman of  prophetic qualities gathered the population, preaching 
that the ancestral spirits would assist the living, allowing them to shake 
off  the yoke of  the foreigners. This movement, which the Portuguese 
called the ‘War of  the Madmen’, involved nearby domains and could 
not be entirely suppressed by the Dili administration. Nevertheless the 
neighbouring Viqueque stood firmly on the Portuguese side, as it had 
done 80 years previously. After several years the resistance ended in 
approximately 1785, as had so many previous anti-foreign movements, 
with the voluntary submission of  the local elite.42 Missionaries were not 
41 VOC 3779 (1785-88), f. 5732-3.
42 Castro 1867:89-91. Textbooks usually date the beginning of  this rebellion as 1781, but a document 
printed in Castro 1867:292 suggests that it started at some point between 1776 and 1779. Oral traditions re-
corded in the late twentieth century are ambivalent about the exact relationship between Luca and Viqueque. 
While Luca was considered to have a symbolically subordinate position vis-à-vis Wewiku, Viqueque was 
beneath Wehali in terms of  status. In one version Luca had a position of  precedence vis-à-vis Viqueque, but 
the latter was not included among the four liurai who were under Luca’s authority (Spillett 1999:289-305). 
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always supportive of  the Dili government; they sometimes took the side 
of  the locals, to the point of  playing an active role in armed resistance 
(Visser 1934:163). This may not be so hard to understand, for the qual-
ity of  colonial governance at this stage was quite poor. An ex-governor 
wrote in 1795 that most of  the governors were lethargic people who did 
not have the requisite military or political skills. The officers tended to be 
criminal figures sent from Goa, who re-enacted their misdeeds on Timor, 
irritated the princes and conspired against the Estado. In spite of  all this, 
the princes still took great pride in being vassals of  Her Majesty (Thomaz 
2001:122). The Count of  Sarzedas, a viceroy of  Goa who in 1811 wrote 
a set of  instructions regarding Timor, had few illusions about the work 
of  his compatriots there: ‘the vexations, injustices, stealth and despotism 
practised in these islands have occasioned these uprisings, and this is 
shown by the general insurrections of  the entire establishment which are 
undone by the simple arrival of  the new governor.’43 The ‘rebellions’ in 
the early Dili period were, however, less frequent than during the Lifau 
epoch.
Catholicism had long been a binding symbolic force, but by the late 
eighteenth century the missionary project was dwindling. The Portuguese 
mission in Asian waters declined for a number of  ideological reasons, 
and Timor was affected accordingly. The number of  Dominican padres 
had shrunk from eighteen in 1740 to merely eight in 1804; in 1811, one 
single cleric remained. The results of  the religious seminaries established 
in Lifau and Manatuto in the mid-eighteenth century are basically un-
known, and no indigenous Timorese priest appears in the sources until 
the nineteenth century (Serrão and Oliveira Marques 2006:429-30). 
Under these circumstances it is remarkable that Christianity persisted 
at all. In 1856, two years after the lifting of  a long interdict on religious 
orders, 22 princedoms out of  circa 50 had Christian communities, which 
together amounted to perhaps 2% of  the population of  Portuguese 
Timor (Durand 2004: 48-50). 
On the other hand, the early Dili government finally saw an end to 
the old enmity that had existed between White and Black Portuguese. In 
view of  the weakened position of  the latter, there was not much left to 
fight over, and their Portuguese identity demanded a degree of  contact 
with the wider world of  Portuguese Asia. Governor João Baptista Vieira 
43 Castro 1867:217. On the Count of  Sarzedas, see Faria de Morais 1944:133-7.
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Godinho (gov. 1785-1788) managed to make the first move, and Pedro 
Hornay (ruled 1777-circa 1795) was described by the Dutch as the most 
civilized and agreeable figure among the Topass elite. Pedro now swore 
obedience to Her Majesty and promised to defend Dili and provide it 
with provisions. In return, he was officially appointed tenente general of  
the province of  Servião; as it stood, the title was by this point obvious 
fiction. At the same time his in-law in the Larantuka princedom, Dom 
Constantino Belantran de Rozari, submitted to the Estado.44 Oecusse 
proved to be a self-willed but generally loyal and occasionally even help-
ful client of  Dili for the remainder of  the colonial period.
The economy of  the small Portuguese establishment remained as 
cumbersome as ever. The principal means of  taxation, the fintas, would 
be levied on Timor until 1906, but the income derived from it decreased 
sharply after the great rebellions of  the 1720s and 1730s. After 1785, 
the Estado recompensed some of  these losses by reorganizing the system 
of  customs fees, but nevertheless, events in South Asia did disturb the 
trade. When the British conquered the lands of  Tipu Sultan of  Mysore 
in 1799, they found good resources of  sandalwood, which were better 
and more conveniently located than the Timorese resources (Serrão and 
Oliveira Marques 2006:427; Castro 1867:219). Whether this decline 
disadvantaged the Timorese is debatable, though, as for two centuries, 
the precious wood had brought endless strife and probably few blessings 
to the inhabitants of  the turbulent island.
conclusions: cultures in contact
Thus, the Napoleonic Era is where we will leave our discussions of  the 
two early colonial networks. A weakened Dutch enterprise in the west 
balanced a somewhat stabilized Portuguese establishment in the east, 
an establishment that had managed to co-opt its old mestizo enemies. 
Outside the restricted hinterlands of  Kupang, Dili and Oecusse, the ma-
jority of  the perhaps 200,000-strong Timorese population led lives that 
were at best (or at worst) indirectly affected by the stranger lords.
This is not to say that the Timor and Solor area remained unchanged 
by two centuries of  early-colonial activity. Anthropologists have dis-
44 Castro 1867:212. A Dutch report (VOC 3810 [1789], f. 73) rather credits the next governor 
Nogueira with visiting Oecusse and bringing Pedro Hornay over to the Estado camp.
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cerned an interesting ability of  the societies in the eastern archipelago 
to integrate foreign influence in spite of  their typically ‘traditional’ char-
acter.45 This includes very basic means of  comfort and nutrition that 
latterly depended on overseas connections. Maize was introduced by 
the mid-seventeenth century and has been a staple food ever since; as 
such it was a mixed blessing, since linguistic evidence suggests that the 
Timorese diet was more varied in earlier times (Fox 1991a:254). Coffee 
had been introduced by 1734, although its intense cultivation only began 
in the early nineteenth century.46 High-quality tobacco was grown in 
large quantities by 1772, probably for indigenous use (Lombard-Jourdain 
1982:91). Contact with foreigners also had cultural implications, influ-
encing for instance outward appearances: while early accounts suggest 
that commoner women went virtually naked, they covered up most of  
their bodies from at least the eighteenth century (Lombard-Jourdain 
1982:97). The Christian impact, often ridiculed as superficial, should not 
be disregarded since selective pieces of  material culture, habits and sym-
bols trickled down via the partly Christianized elite. This coincided with 
trade which, it should be noted, was mostly carried out in non-European 
keels. Clothes from South Asia and elsewhere were in great demand 
and slowly changed fashions and the now-famous weaving traditions. 
Household utensils such as advanced pottery and iron tools could not be 
manufactured locally but also had to be imported.
The organization of  society and warfare was also affected. The 
written word was restricted but not unknown, and the surviving corpus 
shows that letters in Portuguese and Malay were seen as important docu-
ments, detailing for instance appointments and debts owed.47 While 
the basic traditional structures of  governance may have changed little, 
they were infused with Western-derived symbols. Titles like brigadier, 
colonel, emperor, and so on, may not have meant that the correspond-
ing administrative functions were actually carried out, but they were an 
important part of  the legitimization of  the indigenous elite. For example, 
the Dutch denomination keizer (emperor), originally reserved for the lord 
45 The argument has been advanced by the well-known Dutch anthropologist F.A.E. van Wouden 
(1968); see also Yoder 2005:111; Ospina and Hohe 2002:27.
46 Matos 1974a:172. An attempt to introduce coffee in the Amarasi kingdom is referred to in ANRI 
VOC:4059, Missive, Batavia to Kupang, 17-2-1809.
47 Apart from these so-called Maucatar letters (Stukken n.y., H 693, KITLV), see also the Malay docu-
ments pertaining to Pitai, a sub-division of  Greater Sonbai, in Middelkoop 1968:85-7. These date from 
the 1760s-1790s.
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of  Sonbai, had been reduced in value by this time as it was appropriated 
by an increasing number of  rulers. During the late colonial period it was 
used, among others, by the lords of  Amfoan-Timau, Amanuban and 
Insana, and foreign objects of  authority, such as drums, halberds, tongkat 
and flags, were kept as sacred heirlooms of  the princedoms (referred to 
by the Indonesian term, pusaka). 
Also, it should not be forgotten that Western technology changed the 
way in which warfare and conflict took place. Firearms were rare, even 
among the closest VOC allies, in the seventeenth century, but their pres-
ence gradually spread. There was no indigenous manufacturer, meaning 
that the weapons were always imported, but they seem to have been 
ubiquitous by the nineteenth century. Bows and arrows fell out of  use, 
as did shields – the Atoni did not even have words for these items by the 
twentieth century (H.G. Schulte Nordholt 1971:346). The dissemination 
of  modern tools and weaponry meant that new possibilities to assemble 
political power were opened up, and this may have strengthened the 
dominance of  Atoni ethnicity in West Timor (Fox 1988:269). Precisely 
this may also be one factor behind the military upsurge of  a few king-
ships, such as those of  Sonbai and Amanuban, in the late eighteenth 
century; an atypical feature in the traditional political system that did not 
ultimately lead to an actual process of  state-building. The taking of  slaves 
was a further factor that depended on Western technology and presence. 
Sizeable numbers of  slaves could be shipped away on European keels, 
and somewhat smaller ones on Chinese and Makassarese crafts. This ac-
tion doubtlessly encouraged warfare, as did the mutually hostile alliances 
centred on foreign or semi-foreign establishments like Kupang, Lifau and 
Tulang Ikan-Animata.
What was the nature, then, of  these alliances? They originated in 
blood-oaths which implied fraternal bonds but also precedence, and 
which could be perceived as, or transformed into, a lord-vassal relation-
ship. As Timorese and foreign perceptions of  the oaths differed, this 
could cause friction, but the outcome might also be one in which lasting 
bonds of  loyalty were forged. The Count of  Sarzedas made a sarcastic 
statement in 1811, quoted in Castro (1867:218), summarizing the last 
century of  Portuguese overlordship: 
the Timorese are the best vassals and the best Christians. They are the 
best vassals since they recognize the sovereignty of  their legitimate sover-
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eign, while they are governed by men who humiliate them in every way 
as the circumstances permit without the forces to keep them in obedience. 
They are the best Christians since they still recognize the evangelical 
truths without having clergymen who direct them. A nation which unites 
two such qualities deserves the particular care of  our august sovereign.
The case of  the Kupang sphere is similar, though even more pronounced 
in its characteristics. Despite the, at times, poor leadership of  the op-
perhoofden, and despite numerous cases of  extortion and vexations by 
burghers and administrators, there were almost no uprisings against the 
Company. Although the words of  the viceroy contain rhetoric exag-
geration, they do highlight a striking characteristic of  Timorese history. 
Small, sometimes negligible European groups were able to remain in 
situ for hundreds of  years and to exert their influence over large parts of  
the island. There were bonds of  loyalty and deference in place that in 
the case of  the Dutch lasted for periods of  time, and in the case of  the 
Portuguese were renewed from time to time.
This situation is defined by two characteristics that are typically 
Timorese. The first is the ‘stranger king’ syndrome, which has been ex-
plored in a number of  Southeast Asian contexts. Shared ethnic identity 
was not necessarily a unifying factor (Henley 2002:53); on the contrary, 
one can see that the Minahasa, Minangkabau, Malays, Balinese, and so 
on, were engaged in ceaseless domestic hostilities during the early colo-
nial period that has been studied here, and, therefore, did not construct 
a bona fide state. As the preceding chapters have clearly proven, this was 
the case in the Atoni and Tetun territories, and probably also among the 
less known Galoli, Makassae, Mambai, and so on. Shared language, kin-
ship and barlaque exchange were not sufficient to construct organizations 
that could enable conflict resolution at the level of  the princedoms, and 
often not even below that level. As an outsider, the Dutch opperhoofd, the 
Portuguese governor, and – albeit to a lesser degree – the semi-foreign 
Topass leader had the potential to foment such organization. That they, 
as outsiders, did not fall under the adat meant that they had no interest 
in kinship constellations, thus not making claims and counterclaims. 
Opperhoofden and governors were normally brought in from outside of  
Timor, would not stay for more than four or five years, and represented 
the distant but prestige-laden lordships of  Batavia and Lisbon. Although 
they could be quite rapacious, their coming and going was predictable, 
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and the more foreign they were, the more likely they were to successfully 
resolve conflicts (Henley 2002:55).
This would work for as long as there were fixed arenas of  interaction 
and negotiation between the stranger lords and their subordinate allies 
or clients. It was successful for the Dutch, who had a manageable area in 
westernmost Timor to look after up until 1749. The vergaderingen between 
the opperhoofd and his council and the five allies were normally held within 
an atmosphere of  consensus, but on several occasions the allies could 
press Father and Mother Company to make concessions. The small 
Dutch community was completely dependent upon the maintenance of  
the system in order that they remain on Timor. Though frequently at 
odds with each other, the allies nearly always let the opperhoofd intervene 
in order to settle the issue before bloodshed had actually taken place. 
The expansion of  the VOC sphere post-1749 immediately illustrated to 
the Dutch and the five allies that matters were not so easily resolved on 
a Timor-wide or even West Timor-wide level. 
The situation was somewhat different for the Portuguese mestizo 
community living on Timor. The Hornays and Da Costas were stranger 
kings in the traditional Southeast Asian sense: their ancestors had once 
migrated from elsewhere. Still, they were born in East Flores or Timor 
and always remained in power until their deaths, thereby developing 
dynastic dynamics. Acting on behalf  of  the king of  Portugal and in the 
name of  Catholicism, the Topasses posed as a military Portuguese sub-
tribe, while at the same time remaining securely anchored in the local 
Lamaholot and Timorese cultures. Up until 1702, they were able to 
obtain the partly voluntary deference of  the various Atoni princedoms 
which they managed to keep in check in spite of  occasional clashes. 
Their late and brutal subjugation of  the eastern parts of  the island in 
1668-1677, however, meant these areas were never stabilized and they 
willingly defected when the opportunity arose.
Finally, the Estado da Índia was able to quickly gain a following in 
East Timor after 1702, helped by the mediating authority of  Catholic 
priests. As they had wider areas to attend to than their Dutch counter-
part in Kupang, their management was far more turbulent, and was ag-
gravated by the hostilities of  the rival Dutch and Topass stranger lords. 
Although their presence was often justified by extremely tenuous means, 
they always managed to prevail in their activities. Rather than being a 
result of  the desperate endurance often shown by Portuguese outposts in 
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Asia, or the continuous support of  Macao, this is testimony to indigenous 
preferences. Especially when the fintas dwindled into insignificance after 
the great rebellions, the innumerable princedoms of  East Timor saw the 
advantage that could be gained by having an external force in control, 
as pointed out by the able governor José Pinto Alcoforado e Sousa (gov. 
1815-1819) (quoted in Castro 1867:295): ‘The Timorese have preserved 
us [tolerated our presence] until now due to their interests, since when 
they make war against each other […] and when they are exhausted 
or if  one party has the advantage in the conflict, the oppressed party 
requests that the town [Dili] [acts as an intermediary] to make peace 
among them – the terms of  which are almost never carried out for lack 
of  active force.’
At this point it should be remembered that the situation between 
the Portuguese, the Dutch and the Timorese population was often one 
of  near open hostility, as observed by a French visitor in 1772 (quoted 
in Lombard-Jourdain 1982:96): ‘They generally detest the domination 
of  the Portuguese who make them lack everything and maltreat them 
through their robberies and vexations. They only seem to need a support 
in order to throw off  the yoke; they obey them through habit and fear. 
They have much more fear for the Dutch because of  their cruelties and 
do not like them at all.’ The two quotations above seem to contradict 
each other, but in fact they view matters on two different levels. The 
Estado and Company servants who ended up on Timor were not always 
the best ambassadors of  the mother countries, but that did not detract 
from their important structural function. In the Timorese world of  per-
petual small-scale violence, what people desperately needed was support 
and security; in the best of  situations, this is what the covetous foreigners 
could offer.
Apart from the stranger king aspect there is a peculiar circumstance 
which makes Timor unique in a Southeast Asian colonial context. There 
were three rival centres of  foreign or semi-foreign authority on the is-
land for an extended period of  time. The opperhoofd and governor acted 
against each other with regard to trade policy and strategic concerns, 
although they never openly attacked each other. The Hornays and Da 
Costas, on the other hand, periodically fought full-scale wars with both 
European authorities. Nobody could secure a definite victory, and the 
question remains as to whether such a victory would have been desirable 
from the local perspective. The entire period from the 1650s onwards 
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sees many Timorese who had broken free from an alliance or client-ship 
with one external power and then submitted to another. Since such po-
litical behaviour was also a ubiquitous feature of  pre-colonial Timorese 
polities, it does not contradict the stranger king syndrome. The existence 
of  rival centres of  authority made one centre rely heavily on alliances 
with indigenous princedoms, thus placing the latter in a position whereby 
they could negotiate an advantage. In various ways, they could pit the 
external parties against each other.
Do these features therefore make Timor unique in a Southeast Asian, 
or even wider, context? Can Timor help us to understand the workings 
of  European expansion in the early modern period, or the potential 
for indigenous response? While the small and isolated nature of  the 
European outposts is somewhat unusual, at least over an extended period 
of  several centuries, the patterns do conform to the results of  research 
carried out on global aspects of  colonialism since the 1970s. It has been 
pointed out that European-Asian relations up until the nineteenth cen-
tury tended to be centred on partnership rather than hostility. The story 
of  early colonial penetration in coastal Asia and Africa, and in parts of  
North America, almost always has an element of  voluntary collabora-
tion by a local group or fraction, sometimes even by larger communities. 
As Richard White has shown with regard to the Great Lakes region, 
Europeans and Indians, in precisely the same period as covered by this 
book, constructed a system of  mutual exchange where negotiations took 
place and the emergence of  new cultural forms began. Only in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was this superseded by white 
domination and the suppression of  native groups (White 1991). Small 
European outposts around the globe could survive thanks to indigenous 
people who hoped to benefit from their presence. Moreover, the role of  
European entities as arbiters or mediators in a politically complex system 
has been demonstrated for central and densely populated areas such as 
Java. The Dutch of  the VOC period have been characterized as ‘reluc-
tant imperialists’ whose expansion was conditioned as much by local de-
mands for assistance as by economically motivated design.48 In that way, 
the roots of  colonial governance are to be found within Asia, Africa or, 
in some cases, North America as much as in Europe itself. Early-colonial 
social and political manifestations on Timor offer a poignant example of  
48 Kwee Hui Kian 2008. Frank (1998) emphasizes the relative lateness of  European global economic 
leadership, the full impact of  which was only felt in the nineteenth century.
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historical processes that in various ways are found in many other loca-
tions where colonial power relations evolved.
To conclude, Timor in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries be-
comes part of  a model which only partly justifies the term colonialism. 
The indigenous societies were only marginally, or indirectly, transformed 
through this lengthy period of  external impact, and none of  the plans for 
intense commercial cultivation had come to fruition by the nineteenth 
century. It was only in the twentieth century that the governance of  
the old princedoms and the traditional settlement pattern was broken 
up by a new and thorough colonial apparatus. Kupang, Lifau, Animata 
and later Dili were just some of  the numerous players in the quest for 
power that affected the strife-torn island. They were components of  
shifting alliances, alliances over which the Dutch and Portuguese could 
not fully wield control, and many of  the so-called rebellions can just as 
well be termed factionalism. At the same time, the external centres were 
colonial in nature. Due to their vastly superior technology, their modern 
organization, their means of  physical transportation and trade, and their 
inclusion in larger, even global organizations of  commerce and military 
power, they were secured a lasting role that had both brighter as well as 
darker implications for the peoples of  Timor.
Appendix 1
rulers of local princedoms from 1619 to 
approximately 1850
Kupang
Ama Pono I died 1619
Dom Duarte mentioned 1645
Ama Pono II before 1649-1659 (grandson of  Ama Pono I)
Mauritius Ama Pot 1659-1660 (son)
Ama Susang regent-ruler 1660?-1698 (brother)
Ama Besi co-ruler 1660-1678
Pono Koi 1673-1691 (son of  Ama Pono II)
Ama Tomananu 1698-1731 (son)
Buni 1732-1749 (grandson of  Ama Besi)
Karel Korang 1749-1760 (son)
Lasi Tepak 1760-1770 (descended from Ama Pono II)
Nai Manas 1770-1785 (son)
Kolang Tepak 1785-1786 (uncle)
Tepak Lasi 1786-circa1795 (son of  Lasi Tepak)
Susang Manas circa 1795-after 1803 (son of  Nai Manas?)
Lasi Kloman before 1832-1858 (putative grandson of  Lasi Tepak)
Lesser Sonbai
Ama Tuan II  1659-1672 (son of  Ama Tuan I of  Greater Sonbai)
Usi Tetu Utang 1672-1717 (daughter)
Bernardus de Leeuw 1717-1726 (son of  a cousin)
Corneo Leu 1728-1748 (brother)
Daniel Tafin Leu 1748-1760 (brother)
Jacobus Albertus Taffy 1760-1776 (son of  Bernardus de Leeuw)
Alphonsus Adrianus 1776-1782 (of  Greater Sonbai)




Dirk Hendrik Aulasi 1795-1798 (son?)
Pieter Nube or Nube Bena 1798-1821 (brother of  Bernardus Nisnoni)
Pieter Babakase 1821-circa 1825 (son)
Isu Baki 1820s (?) (son of  Bernardus Nisnoni)
Pieter Aulasi or Ote Nuben circa 1825-1839 (grandson of  Pieter Nube)
Meis Nisnoni 1839-1860 (son of  Pieter Babakase)
Amabi
Sebastião mentioned 1652
Saroro Neno mentioned 1655
Aiputu died 1658 (maybe identical with either of  the two above)
Ama Kefi I 1666-1704
Ama Kefi II 1704-1725 (son)
Loti 1725-1732 (son)
Nai Balas regent-ruler 1732-1755 (brother)
Balthazar Loti 1755-1790 (son of  Loti)
Osu I 1791-1795 (son)
Slolo 1795-circa 1797
Afu Balthazar circa 1797-before 1824
Arnoldus Adriaan Karel Loti before 1824-1834 (son)
Osu II 1834-1859 (brother)
Amfoan
Nai Toas 1683-after 1698
Am Foan ?-1708 (son?)
Dom Manuel 1708-18 (son)
Daniel I 1718-48 (uncle)
Bartholomeus I 1748-76 (son)
Daniel II 1776-83 (son)
Bartholomeus II 1783-95 (brother)
Babneno 1795-circa 1800
Bartholomeus III circa 1802-06
Jacob 1806-? (brother)
Abi Aunoni mentioned 1829
Manoh Aunoni mentioned 1832
Neno 1830s







Mano Nassa mentioned 1728
Taiboko before 1749
Dom Bernardo da Costa before 1749-1753 (son)
Tusala (Susale) Taiboko 1753-1779 (brother)
Talnoni Forisa 1779-1808? (son)
Masu Taiboko (Usi Molo) mentioned 1829
Willem Manoh before 1847-1854
Taebenu
Tanof  I 1688-1700
Tanof  II 1700-37 (nephew?)
Tus Tanof  1737-68 (son)
Marcus Kobe Tanof  mentioned 1746-1803 (uncle)
Enus Kobe mentioned 1832 (son)
Salolo Kobe died 1841 (brother)
Kobe Tus 1841-50 (nephew)
Greater Sonbai
Ama Tuan I or Ama Utang circa 1650-circa 1680
N.N. circa 1680-1686 (?) (son)
Dom Pedro Sonbai or Tomenu mentioned 1704-1726 (son)
Dom Alfonso Salema or Nai Bau Sonbai before 1749-1752 (son)
Don Bernardo 1752-1760 (son)
Albertus Johannes Taffy or Nai Tafin Sonbai 1760-1768 (brother)
Alphonsus Adrianus or Nai Kau Sonbai 1768-1802 (son)
Nai Sobe Sonbai 1808-1867 (son)
Amarasi
Dom António I died 1665
Dom Tomás 1665-after 1672 (brother)
Dona Maria 1660s (sister, titular queen)
N.N. mentioned 1679 (nephew)
Dom António II mentioned 1688
Dom Affonço mentioned 1703
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Dom Augusto Fernandes mentioned 1703
Nai Soti mentioned 1714
Dom Luís Hornay de Roza before 1749-1751, died 1752
Dom Affonço Hornay 1751-74 (son)
Rote Ruatefu 1774-1802 (son)
Kiri Lote 1803-before 1832 (son)
Muni before 1832 (son?)
Koro Kefi before 1832-1853 (brother)
Amanuban
Don Michel before 1749-1751
Don Louis I 1751-70 (brother)
Don Jacobus Albertus 1770-86 (son)
Tubani 1786-circa 1808 (cousin)
Don Louis II circa 1808-circa 1824 (son)
Baki circa 1824-1862 (son)
Ambeno
Dom Pedro mentioned 1641
Dom Paulo I ?-1670
Dom Paulo II before 1749-1761
Nai Sitenoni born 1756-1762 (nephew)
Nai Nobe Dom Paulo 1761-after 1764 (son or brother of  Dom Paulo II)
Dom Paulo III before 1766-circa 1800 (maybe the same person as above)
Domingos Francisco mentioned 1817-1829 (son; ruling in Citrana, 
born 1832-1836)
Dom Paulo IV mentioned 1832
Wehali
Dom Jacinto Correia mentioned 1756-1757
António de Melo mentioned 1767
Dom Alesu Fernandes circa 1800
A Queen mentioned 1814





Dom Gregorio Rodrigues Pereira I mentioned 1726-32
Dom Alexandre Rodrigues Pereira mentioned 1763-1769
Dom Cosme Rodrigues Pereira mentioned 1789 (tenente coronel)
Dom Gregorio Rodrigues Pereira II ?-1820
Dom António da Costa Pereira mentioned 1832-1861
Vemasse (Ade)
N.N. mentioned 1660s (father of  Ama Sili or Salomon Speelman)
Dom Tomás mentioned 1720
Dom Cosme de Freitas mentioned 1726
Dom Tomás de Freitas mentioned circa 1769
Dom Duarte de Castro mentioned 1786
Dom Domingos de Freitas Soares ?-1859
Luca
Dom Sebastião Fernandes mentioned 1703
Dom Sancho Manuel mentioned 1738
Dom Sebastião do Amaral before circa 1769-circa 1789
Dom Tomás do Amaral mentioned 1789 (nephew, tenente general of  Belu)
Dom Felix António do Amaral mentioned 1817
Dona Maria Amaral 1826-1850
Viqueque
Dom Matheus da Costa before 1702-1708
N.N. ?-1729
Dom Dire dos Santos Pinto mentioned circa 1769
Dom Joaquim de Matos mentioned 1818
Samoro
Dom António Hornay mentioned 1703-1720
Dom Bernardo Sarmento mentioned 1726
Dom Henrique Hornay Samoro mentioned 1738
Dom Simão (?) mentioned 1761
Dom Cristovão Fereira mentioned 1761 (ruling in Samoro Kecil)
Dom Matheus mentioned 1761 (ruling in Samoro Kecil)




Dom Francisco Xavier mentioned 1726
Dom José Xavier Doutel before 1754-1776 
Dom Caleto Xavier Doutel I 1776-1794 (son)
Nyong Mas 1794-? (son)
Dom Caleto II before 1832-1859
Solor
Kaicili Pertawi before 1613-1645
Nyai Cili 1646-64 (widow)
Nyai Cili Muda 1664-86 (granddaughter)
Sengaji Cili 1687-1700 (nephew)
Larantuka
Dom Constantino before 1625-1661
Dom Luís mentioned 1675
Dom Domingos Vieira mentioned 1702
Olla mentioned 1732-59
Dom Gaspar Dias Vieira Godinho ?-1768 (son)
Dom Manuel Dias Vieira Godinho 1768-? (brother)
Dom Constantino Balantran de Rozari before 1785-1812 (regent)
Dom André Dias Vieira Godinho before 1812 (son of  Dom Gaspar)
Dona Lorenza Gonsalvi 1812-? (widow)
Dom Lorenzo Dias Vieira Godinho 1812-1849 (son)
 Appendix 2
governors of portuguese timor from 1696 to 1832
António de Mesquita Pimentel 1696-1697 (deposed)
António Coelho Guerreiro 1702-1705 (recalled)
Frei Manuel de Santo António (temporary) 1705
Lourenço Lopes (temporary) 1705-1706
Jácome de Morais Sarmento 1706-1710
Manuel de Soto Maior 1710-1714
Manuel Ferreira de Almeida 1714-1715 (died in office)
Domingos da Costa 1715-1718
Francisco de Melo de Castro 1718-1719 (expelled)
Frei Manuel de Santo António 1719-1722
António de Albuquerque Coelho 1722-1725
António Moniz de Macedo 1725-1728
Pedro de Melo 1728-1731
Pedro do Rego Barreto de Gama e Castro 1731-1734
António Moniz de Macedo 1734-1741
António Leonis de Castro 1741-1745
Francisco Xavier Doutel 1745-1748
Manuel Correia de Lacerda 1748-1751 (died in office)
Frei Jacinto de Conceição and João Hornay (interim junta) 1751
Manuel Doutel de Figueiredo Sarmento 1751-1759
Sebastião de Azevedo e Brito 1759-1760 (recalled)
Frei Jacinto de Conceição, Vicente Ferreira de Carvalho, and Dom José of  Alas 
(interim junta) 1760-1761
Frei Francisco de Purificação and Francisco Hornay (interim junta) 1762-1763
Dionísio Gonçalves e Rebelo 1763-1765 (poisoned)
Frei António de São Boaventura and José Rodrigues Pereira (interim junta) 
1765-1768
António José Teles de Meneses 1768-1776 (moved to Dili 1769)
Caetano de Lemos Teles de Meneses 1776-1779 (recalled)
424
| Appendix 2
Lourenço de Brito Correia 1779-1782 
João Anselmo de Almeida Soares 1782-1785
João Baptista Vieira Godinho 1785-1788
Feliciano António Nogueira Lisboa 1788-1790
Joaquim Xavier de Morais Sarmento 1790-1794
João Baptista Verquaim 1794-1800
José Joaquim de Sousa 1800-1803
João Vicente Soares da Veiga 1803-1807
António de Mendonça Côrte-Real 1807-1810
António Botelho Homem Bernardes Pessõa 1810 (died in office)
Frei José de Anunciação, Dom Gregório Rodrigues Pereira of  Motael, and 
Joaquim António Veloso (interim junta) 1810-1812
Vitorio Freire da Cunha Gusmão 1812-1815
José Pinto Alcoforado e Sousa 1815-1820 (died in office)
António Caetano Diniz, Padre Bartolomeu Pereira, and Dom Gregório 
Rodrigues Pereira of  Motael (interim junta 1820)
António Caetano Diniz and Padre Bartolomeu Pereira (interim junta) 
1820-1821
Manuel Joaquim de Matos Góis 1821-1832 (died in office)
Appendix 3
dutch opperhoofden and residents of timor from 
1646 to 1832
Hendrick Hendricksz van Oldenburgh (on Solor), February 1646-20 January 
1648 (died in office)
Hendrick ter Horst (on Solor), January 1648-February 1654
Jacob Verheyden (on Solor), February 1654-17 September 1655 (killed in battle)
Cornelis Ockersz (on Solor, temporary), 1655
Hendrick ter Horst (on Solor until 1657), 1655-1659
Joseph Margits, 1659-1660
Johan Truytman (commissioner), 1660
Hugo Cuylenburgh, 4 September 1660-March 1665
Anthony Hurt, March 1665-November 1667
Jacob Pietersz van den Kerper, November 1667-25 November 1670 
(died in office)
Jacob Lidema (temporary), 1670-1672 (died in office)
Jacob van Wijckersloot, March 1672-20 July 1680 (died in office)
Joannes van den Broeck, 21 January 1681-15 April 1683 (died in office)
Jan van Heden 1683-1684 (died in office)
Willem Tange, 1684-1685 (dismissed)
Gerrit Hoofd, 1685-9 July 1686 (died in office)
Willem Moerman, July 1686-April 1687
Arend Verhoeven April 1687-10 November 1687 (died in office)
Willem Moerman November 1687-1698
François van den Eynde, 1698-14 May 1698 (died in office)
Willem Moerman, May 1698-12 March 1699
Joan Focanus, 12 March 1699-1702
Joannes van Alphen, 1702-1706
Didloff  Blad, 1706-1712
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Reynier Leers, 1712-1714 (dismiss ed)
Isaac Marmer, 1714-5 October 1714 (died in office)
Leendert Grim (temporary), October 1714-1715
Willem van Putten, 1715-1717
Barend van der Swaan, 1717-1721
Hendrick Engelert, 1721-7 December 1725 (died in office)
Balthazar de Moucheron, December 1725-1728 (died in office)
Steven Palm (temporary), 1728-1729
Anthony Hurt, 1729-1730
Gerardus Bernardus Visscher, 1730-6 May 1736
Aart Jansz Peper, 6 May 1736-1739
Pieter Jacob Blok, 1739
Aart Jansz Peper, 1739-1740
Jan Dinnies, 1740-22 October 1740
Christiaan Fredrik Brandenburg (temporary), October 1740-4 July 1741
Anthony Cornelis van Oldenbarnevelt (Tulling), 4 July 1741-30 November 
1742 (died in office)
Christiaan Fredrik Brandenburg (temporary), December 1742-1744
Jan Anthony Meulenbeek, 1744-12 October 1746 (killed)
Gilles Jacob Helmmuts (temporary), October 1746-January 1747 (died in office)
Johannes Steenwegh (temporary), January 1747-1747/48
Daniel van der Burgh, 1748-1 March 1754 (died in office)
Elias Jacob Beynon, 1 March 1754-1758
Johannes Andreas Paravicini (commissioner), March-Aug. 1756
Hans Albrecht von Plüskow, 1758-11 November 1761 (killed)
Johan Willem Erland Daniel ter Herbruggen, 1762-1765
Bartholomeus van Voorst, 1765-3 January 1766
Willem Adriaan van Este (temporary), January 1766-1767
Alexander Cornabé, 1767-1772
Barend W. Fokkens, 1772-1777
Willem Adriaan van Este, 1777-1789 (died in office)
Timotheus Wanjon, 1789-1797 (dismissed)
Carel Gratus Greving, 1797-1799
J. Doser (commissaris), 1799-1800
Hans Andries Lofsteth (commissaris), 1800-10 October 1802 (died in office)
Johannes Giesler, 1802-1803 (died in office)
Viertzen (Kurtzen?) 1803-1804?
Pieter Bernardus van Kruijne, 1804-1807
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Frans Philip Christiaan Kurtzen (temporary) 1807
Pieter Stopkerb, 1807-1810
Jacobus Arnoldus Hazaart, 11 April 1810-22 March 1812
Cornelis Willem Knibbe, 22 March 1812-1812
Watson, 1812
Joseph Burn, 1812-1814 (died in office)
Curtois (temporary), 1814
Jacobus Arnoldus Hazaart, 1814-1818
M. Haleweijn (temporary), 1818-1819




amaf  father (Timorese)
amaf  naek  great father (Timorese)
arrayal, pl. arraiais auxiliaries, levies (Portuguese)
barlaque bride-receiving relation (Timorese)
belis bride-price (Timorese)
capitão mor  captain major (Portuguese) 
capitão mor da mar senior naval officer (Portuguese)
carreira da Índia Portuguese sea traffic to India
casados pretos  black settlers, Asiatics with a Portuguese identity
client  here: polity subordinated to colonial power
dato-lulic ritual expert (Timorese)
duae ruler (Sawu)
Estado da Índia Portuguese colonial organization in Asia
fani  bees (Timorese)
feitor overseer (Portuguese)
fettor  executive regent or district head (Timor), second regent 
(Rote)
gula palm juice sugar (local Malay)
hangbroeken  the hanging trousers, the Portuguese (Dutch)
huaqiao  overseas Chinese (Mandarin)
kase metan  the black foreigners (Timorese)
kase muti the white foreig ners (Timorese)
keizer  emperor (Dutch)
kèser  emperor (Timorese) 
kolnel colonel (Timorese)
krankbezoeker visitor of  the sick, a clerical position (Dutch)
kuan or lopo hamlet (Timorese)
leu  sacred heirlooms, treasure, sacred spirit power 
(Timorese)
liurai  ‘surpassing the earth’, ruler (Timorese)
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Loro  ‘sun’, lord of  a princedom (Timorese)
lutu-hum serfs (Timorese)
makoan spokesman for the ruler, expert on tradition (Belu) 
mafefa spokesman for the ruler, expert on tradition (Atoni)
manek  ruler (Rotenese)
Mardijker  free Asian under Dutch jurisdiction (Dutch-Malay)
maromak oan  ‘son of  God’, ritual lord of  the realm (Timorese)
meo prominent warrior (Timorese)
momboir executive regent (Timorese)
moradores permanent settlers, inhabitants (Portuguese)
muti salak  coral necklace (Malay-Timorese)
nakhoda captain (Malay)
negeri settlement (Malay)
nusak  princedom, domain (Rotenese)
opperhoofd resident, commander (Dutch)
orangkaya  rich man, usually denotes a village or district chief  in 
the Southeast Asian Archipelago; petty ruler, local man 
of  influence (Malay)
pah tuaf   lord of  the land (Timorese)
payung  parasol (Malay)
perahu  boat, especially small vessel (Malay)
perkenier  planter (Dutch)
picul circa 61 kilograms
princevlag  Dutch tricolour (Dutch)
regent  assisstant or executive lord of  the king (Dutch) 
reis, koningen kings (Portuguese, Dutch)
reinos, rijken kingdoms (Portuguese, Dutch)
resident  local commander of  a post (Dutch)
rice Christians newly converted Asian Christians (derogatory term)
sangha Buddhist monastic community (Pali)
sengaji local chief  or prince (Solorese) 
Sina Mutin Malaka  ‘White China Malacca’, origin of  the Belu (Timorese)
sirih pinang  betel and areca, voluntary gift of  honour (Malay)
sonaf   ruler’s residence, house of  the king (Timorese)
temukung  village head, chief  (Timorese)
tenente  lieutenant (Portuguese)




tongkat ceremonial staff  (Timorese)
Topass  Black Portuguese (Indian-Indonesian)
tuan gentleman, master (Malay)
tuthais contributions, fee, customary gifts (Timorese)
ulun-houris chattel slaves (Timorese)
ume mnasi  house of  elders (Timorese)
usi(f) lord, prince, regent, noble assistant of  the palace 
(Timorese)
veltoverste  field commander (Dutch)
vergadering  meeting with the council (Dutch)
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